Hirhurim - Musings

Caution: This blog is la-halakhah ve-lo le-ma'aseh. Consult your rabbi before following any practices advocated here. Disclaimer: In reviewing books, I may choose works in which I have a financial interest. I believe that I will still be able to maintain objectivity but judge for yourselves. Important Policy: This blog is intended only for the interchange of ideas for the purpose of Torah study, promoting enlightened public policy and/or the refinement of character. Comments in that spirit are welcome but those that entail denigration of character are not welcome and if they appear will be deleted upon discovery. Since editing is rarely feasible, comments that are deemed inappropriate will be deleted entirely or, if possible, edited. Comments Moderation: For questions and suggestions about comments, please contact the blog's general editor Rabbi Ari Enkin at this e-mail address. Advertisement Policy: Please note that this blog does not necessarily endorse the services of advertisers. Please consider carefully any books and events announced on this blog and decide on your own whether they are appropriate for you.

Monday, February 28, 2005

Things That Don't Interest Me But Probably Should

1. The whole Wendy Shalit/Tova Mirvis controversy
2. The increase in NYC subway fare for monthly rides (which predominantly impacts poor workers)
3. The Daf Yomi Siyum

And some things that I am glad I don't care about:

1. NHL strike
2. The Oscars

The Limits of Non-Literal Interpretation of Scripture

One of the contributions to the Open Access Project is an essay by Dr. Joshua Golding titled "On the Limits of Non-Literal Interpretation of Scripture from an Orthodox Perspective" (PDF). I posted a review of some of the Rishonim on this topic here. Please post substantive comments to that forum and regular flame here. Thank you.

Sunday, February 27, 2005

Torah Freedom

R. Mayer Twersky via TorahWeb:

In truth, however, genuine freedom depends not only upon political liberation, but primarily upon internal liberation. Genuine freedom entails liberation from unrefined instincts and unredeemed passions. One who is hostage to his own anger, or can not curb his desire for physical pleasure or is forever driven to seek honor and riches may be politically free, but leads a brutal, slavish existence.

Friday, February 25, 2005

Confronting Abuse

Introducing JSafe, founded by R. Mark Dratch.

The Open Access Project

Yashar Books is finally ready to launch an online free Torah resource center and discussion forum called "The Open Access Project."

At the Open Access Project page you can download free articles, essays, dissertations and (soon) entire books online. But that’s not all. You can also post your own reviews and critiques and join discussions. You can even submit your own papers for consideration. The idea is to make quality source material available in an Open Access virtual Bet Midrash and stimulate a give and take of ideas. It is an experimental project in collaborative scholarship.

The Open Access Project is still growing. You might say it’s in “Beta” format. Join now and help it grow and spread. Read, learn, respond. And tell your friends to join too!

For an exciting adventure in free online Jewish scholarship, go now: http://www.YasharBooks.com/Open "The Open Access Project." Your interactive Journal offering "Open Source Learn-Ware": free articles, essays and books, and an open discussion forum to add your own ideas.

Interfaith Dialogue V

I missed this article by R. Shalom Carmy about Rav Soloveitchik's Confrontation essay.

Thanks to Out of Step Jew for bringing it to my attention.

Jewish Unity

Shemos 30:34-36:

The Lord said to Moses: Take for yourself spices, stacte, and onycha, and galbanum (ve-helbenah), spices and pure frankincense. They shall be of equal weight. Make it into incense, a blend blended by a blender, thoroughly blended, pure and holy. Pulverize some of it very finely and place it before the [Ark of] Testimony in the Tent of Meeting, where I will meet with you. It shall be holy of holies to you.

Rashi quotes the famous midrash about why helbenah, a bad-smelling spice, is included in this mixture:

Scripture counts it among the spices of the incense to teach us not to look with contempt at including in our gatherings for fasts and prayers the sinners among the Israelites, that they should be counted (i.e., united) with us.

This is frequently taken to imply that we must include the non-observant and/or heterodox in our communal activities. However, I believe this to be an incorrect interpretation.

The midrash (from Kerisos 6b) specifies that this is for praying and fasting. Rabbenu Bahya ben Asher, in his commentary to the Torah, explains that we must include sinners in our praying and fasting because they will repent and this will greatly enhance our communal prayer and fast. Rabbenu Bahya also cites the famous midrash about the four species we carry on Sukkos, with the aravah representing the sinner. Our use of the four species represents prayer (R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik addressed this issue at length), and we include sinners in our prayer for their repentance.

I do not think that this means that they must repent for every single sin they have committed. Even partial teshuvah is teshuvah. However, the inclusionary message of this midrash is only relevant to prayer and fasting in which teshuvah is a primary element. There is no indication that it applies to other undertakings as well.

As an aside, the Maharsha in his commentary to Kerisos states that this only applies to including a sinner to an existing minyan. However, he should not be counted for that minyan. I will leave this question for another time, but this is a matter of dispute with, I believe, the bulk of the posekim agreeing with the Maharsha.

Thursday, February 24, 2005

Slifkin on eBay

It was bound to happen eventually. A copy of R. Nosson Slifkin's The Science of Torah, which is currently out of print, sold on eBay yesterday for $125. I'm pretty sure there will be more auctions of this type (I'm not sure if this search link will work).

R. Aryeh Carmell's Position

R. Aryeh Carmell has recently disseminated an essay relevant to the current controversy over R. Slifkin's books titled "Freedom to Interpret" (available here in PDF).

Rav Soloveitchik and the JPS Translation

In 1953, JPS began work on a new translation of the Bible and invited respected Jewish academic scholars as well as rabbis from the three major Jewish movements to join. The RCA presented before R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik the question of whether or not they should allow a representative of their organization to participate. Below is an excerpt from R. Soloveitchik's answer. As an aside, this letter and many others were first brought to my attention by my late professor R. Louis Bernstein in his book Challenge and Mission: The Emergence of the English Speaking Orthodox Rabbinate. That terse but fascinating book makes an excellent companion volume to the recently printed Community, Covenant and Commitment: Selected Letters and Communications from which this excerpt is taken.

As to the question of a new English translation of the Bible suggested by the Jewish Publication Society, I am afraid that the purpose of this undertaking is not to infuse the spirit of Torah she-be-al peh into the new English version but, on the contrary, following the footsteps of the Protestant Liberal ministers who recently revised the English text of the Bible, to satisfy the so-called modern "scientific" demands for a more exact rendition in accordance with the latest archeological and philological discoveries. In other words, the Jewish Publication Society is going to give us a translation in full accord with, or at least influenced by, higher Biblical criticism, and I cannot see how we, representatvies of the Torah she-be-al peh, can lend our names to such an undertaking...

Only if the Jewish Publication Society should delegate to the Rabbinical Council of America the power to veto anything which it would consider contrary to our tradition, could we join the project.

(pp. 110-111)

I find this passage highly difficult and suspect that, like much of what R. Soloveitchik wrote and said, it has to be understood carefully.

As the Rashbam declares in his commentary to the beginning of Parashas Va-Yeshev, there is no objection to new peshat interpretations to the Torah. Furthermore, as the Rashbam - and Ibn Ezra and Ramban and Rambam and sometimes even Rashi - demonstrates, there is nothing wrong with peshat interpretations that contradict those found in the Talmud or midrashim.

However, there are times when we have a tradition from Sinai as to the correct interpretation of a biblical passage. In those cases, we are not allowed to interpret the passages contrary to our accepted tradition. For example, "ayin tahas ayin" (Shemos 21:24). Our tradition is that the verse was written intending it to mean that one must pay an eye's value for damage to an eye. Because this is a clear and unquestioned tradition, an Orthodox Jew may not interpret it otherwise and, in fact, none of the traditional commentaries do so, not even Rashbam or Ibn Ezra.* (Cf. Rambam, Introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah, Qafah tr., vol. 1 p. 11a sv. "Ha-helek ha-rishon")

It could be, therefore, that R. Soloveitchik was concerned that JPS would translate those few verses for which we have a specific interpretive tradition contrary to that Torah she-be-al peh. However, I don't think that is what he meant. I have never seen an English translation of Shemos 21:24 that does not translate it literally and plainly as "an eye for an eye," not even Artscroll. Even Onkelos translates it plainly like that. Evidently, a translation that is faithful but simple leaves the same room for the interpretive tradition as the original Hebrew and, therefore, is not in contradiction with the Torah she-be-al peh.

I would suggest that rather than objecting to literal translations that are not in accordance with our tradition, R. Soloveitchik was concerned that the text would be butchered by over-eager practitioners of biblical criticism who would change the Hebrew text and translate accordingly. He did not want to join a project over which he (or the RCA) had no control and could easily spiral into chaotic conjectural tampering with the Masoretic text. As it turns out, the new translation that resulted from that JPS project did not tamper with the Masoretic text, although it occasionally mentions textual variants in its footnotes. However, R. Soloveitchik was concerned with Higher Textual Criticism, not Lower, that might have, for example, combined Bereishis chapter 1 and chapter 2 into one flowing Creation story rather than two separate ones or combined the stories of Avraham leaving Israel due to famine, etc.

However, this is just my conjecture and it could very well be that I just don't understand R. Soloveitchik's objection. His mention of archeology and philology is puzzling to me. Was he objecting to inclusion of any archeological and philological finds? I find this difficult because the rishonim, including R. Soloveitchik's beloved commentary of the Ramban, utilize such information! Perhaps he was concerned with excessive use of speculative scholarship.

* I base this understanding on a long discussion with R. Soloveitchik's grandson, R. Mayer Twersky and used his example of ayin tahas ayin. However, given his inheritance of his grandfather's affinity to precision and nuance, it is possible that I did not fully understand him. It is also possible that the years that have passed have blurred my own understanding with what he told me.

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

The Eternity of the Torah IV

Biblical Proofs

Aside from our tradition of the eternal nature of the commandments and the logical proofs for it, medieval scholars also cite biblical proofs for this idea. R. Sa'adia Gaon (Emunos Ve-Dei'os 3:7) wrote:

When I checked in the books I found that what primarily proves this is that many commandments have written about them "beris olam" (an eternal covenant) and "le-doroseikhem" (for your generations). Also, that the Torah writes "Moses commanded us a law, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob" (Deut. 33:4).

In other words, regarding some commandments we are told that they are forever, such as Shabbos (Ex. 31:16) and Yom Kippur (Lev. 23:31). We, therefore, see that the commandments are not for a limited time but forever. This is also seen from the fact that we are told that the commandments are an inheritance of our people, implying a continued application.

The Rambam wrote in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1:

It is a clear and explicit matter that a commandment is forever, without change, detraction or addition as it says "All this word which I command you, that you shall observe, you shall not add to it nor diminish from it" (Deut. 13:1). And it says, "But the things that are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever (ad olam), that we may do all the words of this law" (Deut. 29:28). We see that we are commanded to perform all the words of the Torah forever. And it also says "It is a statute forever (hukas olam) throughout your generations" (Lev. 23:14).

R. David Luria (Radal), in his Hagahos Yad David ad loc., points out that it is out of the ordinary for the Rambam to cite verses, explain them and then cite another verse proving the identical point. Rather, he first quotes all of the verses and only then explains them. If so, why did the Rambam cite two verses (Deut. 13:1, 29:28), explain that we see from the that the commandments are forever and then cite another verse (Lev. 23:14)?

R. Yosef Qafah (ad loc., n. 2) explains that the first two verses prove that the commandments are "le-olam" however the Rambam has not yet proven what "olam" means. Therefore, he cited a further verse (Lev. 23:14) which demonstrates that "olam" refers to all future generations. However, as we shall see, the Rambam later modified his view in Moreh Nevukhim.

An important point of contention in this discussion is the definition of the world le-olam, a qualified of many commandments in the Torah.

1. R. Sa'adia Gaon (Emunos Ve-Dei'os 3:9) wrote that there are three definitions of this term: A. a period of 50 years, B. the lifetime of the referent, C. for the entire span of the existence of the world.

2. R. Yonah Ibn Janah (Sefer Ha-Shorashim sv. al"m) wrote that it means either: A. the distant past, B. the lifespan of something.

3. The Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 2:28) wrote:

We must, however, bear in mind that olam only signifies perpetuity when it is combined with ad: it makes no difference whether ad follows, as in "olam va-ed," or whether it precedes, as in "ad olam".

R. Yosef Albo (Sefer Ha-Ikkarim 3:16) poses significant challenges to those who argue that one can proof the eternity of the Torah from the biblical usage of the word "olam." He argues from the following verses:

1."Remove not the ancient landmark (gevul olam) which your fathers have set" (Prov. 22:28) which refers to something ancient, not eternal.
2. Similarly, "For of old time (me-olam) I have broken your yoke" (Jer. 2:20).
3. And, "Then shall the offering of Judah and Jerusalem be pleasant to the Lord as in the days of old (ki-yemei olam)" (Mal. 3:4).
4. "I will dwell in Your tent forever (olamim)" (Ps. 61:5) which refers to a long but limited time.
5. Similarly, "O Israel, that is saved by the Lord with an everlasting (olamim) salvation" (Isa. 45:17) that refers to the salvation from Sanheriv.
6. Also, "It has been already, in the ages (le-olamim) which were before us" (Eccl. 1:10).
7. It can also mean a short time, such as in "And he shall serve him forever (le-olam" (Ex. 21:6).
8. And in "When I will bring him, that he may appear before the Lord, and there abide forever (ad olam)" (1 Sam. 1:22) which the Sages tell us refer to the olam of Levi, a relatively short period.
9. "For the palace shall be forsaken; the city with its stir shall be deserted; the mound and the tower shall be for dens forever (ad olam)" (Isa. 32:14) and then in the next verse "Until the spirit be poured upon us from on high" implying a terminal period.
10. "And He bore them and carried them all the days of old (kol yemei olam)" and then in the next verse "But they rebelled and grieved His holy spirit; therefore He was turned to be their enemy, Himself fought against them" (Isa. 63:9-10).

These all seem to indicate that olam does not refer to eternity. However, according to the Rambam above, the only valid challenges are from ad olam or olam va-ed, which appear in only numbers 8 and 9. However, from the context of those verses one can see that the phrases were not meant literally. The simple meaning of the verse is that it is referring to Shmuel's lifetime (as the Radak explained) and the phrase is not meant literally. Number 9 above is not only not a challenge to the Rambam's view, but a proof for him. The phrase "ad olam" is insufficient on its own and must be immediately modified (see Rashi and Abarbanel, ad loc.). If it actually meant a long but limited time, then there would not have been any need to modify the phrase. However, since it literally means forever, the prophet had to immediately modify it to indicate that he did not mean it literally.

(B"n to be continued)

Note that translations here are only slight modifications of the JPS 1917 translation. Convenience trumped accuracy.

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Or Did He?

Reports are coming in questioning whether R. David Feinstein really retracted his signature to the ban. So what's the truth? I don't know. Feel free to call him and ask.

Monday, February 21, 2005

R. Moshe Shternbuch's Position

Since I had earlier quoted R. Moshe Shternbuch’s ruling in a din torah regarding Aish HaTorah's teaching that the world is billions of years old (here), I feel obligated to direct readers to a public statement that R. Shternbuch recently released on the subject clarifying his view (here). However, once mentioning it, I cannot refrain from commenting on it. I will try to due so with the utmost respect that he deserves, and have had this read by others I trust to ensure that it is written in the spirit of kevod ha-Torah.

I. Miracles and the Laws of Nature

The main theme in R. Shternbuch's statement is that everything is miraculous and it is wrong, perhaps bordering on heretical, to search for natural laws that explain the workings of the world. He writes, "[T]heir concern is to make even this miraculous event [Creation] as close to nature as possible. In other words, they much prefer to make the world as natural as possible and to minimize the miraculous... This is entirely to minimize the acknowledgment of G-d's power and to move instead in the direction of heresy."

I found this attitude very surprising simply because this almost-heretical approach is that of the Rambam (see Shemonah Perakim, ch. 8; Commentary to Avos 5:5; Moreh Nevukhim 2:29). Thus, according to the Rambam, all open miracles were "programmed" into nature during the Creation so that rather than violating the laws of nature they are actually a part of it. This is also the view of the Kuzari (3:73), the Meiri (see his commentary to Avos 5:7 for only one example of many) and the entire Rationalist school of medieval Jewish philosophy.

R. Shternbuch bases his criticism on the Ramban's words in his commentary to Shemos 13:16: "A person does not have a portion in the Torah of Moshe unless he believes that everything that happens in this world is miraculous." A parallel to this can be found in Ramban's Derashas Toras Hashem Temimah (Kisvei Ha-Ramban, vol. 1 pp. 153-154; cf. vol. 1 p. 192; Commentary to Bereishis 17:1, 46:15; Shemos 6:2; Vayikra 18:29, 26:11). For many years these words troubled me because they seem to contradict other statements of the Ramban. However, I found the solution in a brilliant essay by R. Dr. David Berger, "Miracles and the Natural Order in Nahmanides" (in Rabbi Moses Nahmanides: Explorations in His Religious and Literary Virtuosity, R. Isadore Twersky ed.). After marshalling a number of comments of the Ramban that explicitly contradict the above (cf. Commentary to Bereishis 18:19; Vayikra 26:11; Devarim 11:13; Iyov 36:7; Responsum on Astrology in Kisvei Ha-Ramban, vol. 1 p. 379), R. Berger explains that if one reads the passages in the Ramban denying nature within the context of the preceding and succeeding statements, one sees that they are only referring to reward and punishment. Indeed, this is the passage quoted by R. Shternbuch with its continuation:

A person does not have a portion in the Torah of Moshe unless he believes that everything that happens in this world is miraculous, without nature or the way of the world, whether for individuals or communities. Rather, if one fulfills the commandments one is rewarded and if one violates them he is punished.

The limitation of this denial of nature to reward and punishment seems quite viable, and taking into account the Ramban's other explicit advocacies of the theory of nature, it seems even likely. Indeed, as a friend (and prominent rav) pointed out, the Ramban was a doctor. Did he really examine his patients and then say "Let's see what miracle G-d has in store for you?" Certainly not. He attempted to cure the patient based on the laws of nature as he understood them (see his Commentary to Vayikra 26:11).

Thus, not only do the Rambam and the Meiri (and those following their school of thought) believe that there are laws of nature and that not everything is miraculous, even the Ramban agrees to it.

I humbly submit two other supporting points to R. Berger's analysis of the Ramban's attitude. First, while in the Derashas Toras Hashem Temimah the Ramban explicitly quotes the Rambam and disagrees with him, he does not quote any of the places in which the Rambam's main theory of natural law is proposed – i.e. Shemonah Perakim, ch. 8 or Moreh Nevukhim 2:29. Instead, he quotes the Rambam's view of the messianic era, which can be seen as an issue of reward and punishment. If the Ramban were going to argue on the Rambam (and call him a heretic!), he should have quoted the more explicit statements in the above sources.

Additionally, the Ramban had an illustrious descendant named R. Shimon ben Tzemah (Rashbatz) Duran. In the latter's classic commentary on Avos, Magen Avos (5:9), he quotes the Rambam's approach to miracles and only disagrees on whether open miracles were "programmed" into nature during Creation or can happen outside of nature. He does not, however, disagree that generally the world operates within natural laws. One would have expected him to at least quote his famous ancestor the Ramban if he were disagreeing with him on such a fundamental point.

In summary, it seems that many of the rishonim, including the Ramban, believed that the world operates according to laws of nature. The Rambam is quite open about his trying to minimize the miraculous. That this should be considered to be bordering on heresy is something that I find very difficult to understand.

II. The Limits of Human Knowledge

R. Shternbuch also emphasizes that there is a limit to what human beings can understand. We will never be able to fully understand why or how G-d created the universe. Nor, he adds, will we be able to understand His ways concerning good and evil. "In these issues we simply rely on our faith in G-d's greatness."

Again, I am surprised by this approach. Do not the rishonim, who fully acknowledge the limits of our understanding, still attempt to comprehend it? The Ramban in his treatise on theodicy, Sha'ar Ha-Gemul (Kisvei Ha-Ramban, vol. 2 p. 281), after proposing many detailed theories about how and why rewards and punishments are Divinely dispensed, raises the question why one should even delve into these matters since it is almost impossible to fully comprehend all of the issues. Why not just rely on faith that G-d is just and forget about the unfathomable details? He states that such is the question of those who despise wisdom. By studying such matters we learn more about G-d's ways. Rather, it is everyone's obligation to delve into such matters and to become satisfied in the justice of G-d's ways. Despite the limits on our understanding, not only may we try but, at least regarding good and evil, we must try.

The Ramhal, in his own treatise on theodicy Da'as Tevunos (par. 18), explains why G-d created the world:

What we can understand here is the following: The blessed Creator is the very essence of good. It is the nature of good to bestow good. This is why the Lord created men – so that He could bestow good upon them.

R. Hayim Friedlander, in his Iyunim studies on this passage, emphasizes that the Ramhal begins with the phrase "What we can understand here is the following." He acknowledges the severe limitations of our understanding. However, this does not stop him from attempting to understand!

III. The Agenda of Scientists

R. Shternbuch dwells at length on the hidden agenda of scientists:

"Their main concern is to try to shake the faith in G-d – which has been accepted by us generation after generation."

"Scientists – even those who are described as religious – are ashamed that we don't agree with the views of the leading scientists that man is descended from the apes... They will accept anything that enables them to avoid acknowledging that G-d created man with His wisdom. Therefore they use misleading and distorted citations from Torah literature to claim justification for such scientific beliefs in the words of our Sages."

I am not a scientist nor am I a member of the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists. However, I know scientists and members of that association, and I respectfully question whether R. Shternbuch's description is accurate. In matters such as this, which include very serious accusations about emunah, I remain in the position of judging these scientists favorably (le-khaf zekhus) and will say no more although much could be said.

IV. Proofs and Counterproofs

R. Shternbuch discusses a number of proofs for the antiquity of the universe and attempts to disprove them. It is unfortunate that he combined two separate but related issues – the age of the universe and evolution – because it is theoretically possible, and such is frequently the case among Orthodox Jews, to accept an ancient universe and reject evolution. However, I will not discuss those issues here because they are not entirely relevant. If he is arguing from tradition, then there is no need to bring proofs or counterproofs. But... im le-din, yesh teshuvah.

V. Science and Hedonism

R. Shternbuch blames much of the moral problems in today's society on science. Were he to blame it on atheists who use science as a reason for rejecting religion, I would understand entirely and sympathize. However, the blame belongs to atheists and not scientists. Science does not have an inherent moral system. It is a morally neutral methodology of analyzing facts and proposing theories that has nothing to do with behavior or ethics. In fact, polls have demonstrated again and again that professional scientists are by and large believers in religion. If science is combined with a morality, as it frequently is and as the Rambam attempted to do particularly in his Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah, then the catastrophic moral consequences that R. Shternbuch discusses do not directly follow. A true Torah Jew who studies science is not a hedonist and will not become one. Nor, for that matter, is a true Torah Jew who does not study science free from becoming a hedonist. It is the presence or lack of yiras Shamayim that determines the fate of a Jew, and not whether or how he investigates the workings of the world that G-d created.

VI. Heresy or Not?

To the main point, R. Shternbuch concludes with the following:

I do not know whether all those who accept the view of the scientists – that the world is very ancient – are heretics. However I do know that only heretics have such views against our Sages – who are fully accepted by us.

If he had said that it is heresy to believe that the world is ancient, then one could simply say that R. Shternbuch strongly disagrees with the Tiferes Yisrael and others. He considers the view that they proposed to be heretical, even though they are not to be blamed for their mistake. However, R. Shternbuch did not conclude in that way. Rather, he said that regardless of whether or not it is heresy, i.e. even if it is not an ikkar of emunah to believe that the world is 5765 years old, anyone who accepts such a theory reject the views of the Sages. Instead of disregarding the theory of these gedolim, R. Shternbuch is stating that they lacked emunas hakhamim. In a sense, his softer condemnation is much stronger and more personal. Who before has said that the Tiferes Yisrael lacked emunas hakhamim?

But is this view heresy? It is still not clear. Perhaps that is why R. Shternbuch decided in favor of Aish HaTorah in the din Torah that was brought before him.

In conclusion, R. Shternbuch has attempted to clarify his view and we must respect his right to do so. I do not understand his statement but since I have never gone to him with my questions before, I will not do so in this case either and probably never will. His Da'as Torah contradicts the Da'as Torah I have received from the numerous rabbanim and roshei yeshivah with whom I have spoken on this matter. Eilu va-eilu...

R. Joseph Zundel of Salant

Menachem Butler on his ancestor R. Joseph Zundel of Salant.

Religious Coercion II

R. Aharon Lichtenstein, Leaves of Faith vol. 2 p. 19:

Quite obviously, with respect to many, if not most, halakhic demands, fundamental acceptance by non-observant Israelis simply does not exist. This is not solely due to the fact that non-observant Jews are now so much more numerous than they were before the Enlightenment, although that is a factor. It is due, in large measure, to the fact that the recalcitrant Jew is now differently motivated. Whereas dereliction in fulfilling religious duties would previously have been probably due to frailty and backsliding, i.e., a volitional failing, it is now generally the result of unbelief, an intellectual failing. The type of resistance encountered is entirely different, therefore, and is not amenable to formerly effective modes of response. Moreover, in the generally libertarian climate of modern Western society, attempts at coercion are usually not only ineffectual but destructive. Inasmuch as they generate resentment, they do not simply fall short but backfire. In the present context, therefore, coercion, as a technique of stimulating positive religious observance, cannot generally succeed.

R. David Feinstein Rescinds

I have received permission to publicize that R. David Feinstein has asked that his name be removed from all letters disapproving the books by R. Nosson Slifkin. While he still does not entirely approve the contents because he thinks it might lead some people to question our tradition, he has disavowed the contents of the letter to which his signature was affixed and "has no problem if people to choose to read the books" (that is the language in the e-mail I received). [UPDATE: Or did he?]

I'll add that the unconfirmed rumor is that R. Matisyahu Solomon has also revoked his approval of the letter condemning R. Slifkin's books. However, R. Moshe Shternbuch has written condemning the ideas in the books. More on that soon.

Sunday, February 20, 2005

If I Were A Rosh Yeshiva

If I were a rosh yeshiva, and I discovered that my name had been signed to a letter without my permission, this is what I would do.

1. Institute a policy that any public letter I sign will be hanging in my yeshiva's administrative office for six months so that anyone can walk in off the street and verify that I signed it. If it isn't hanging there, I didn't sign it.

2. Contact the editor of the newspaper that printed the letter and:

A. Inform him of my new policy

B. Demand that he publish a retraction stating that I never signed the letter and, perhaps, explaining my position, or lack thereof, on the subject

C. Let him know that if he does not publish a retraction then I will inform his competitors of the situation and ask them to publish the retraction and inform the public that said newspaper refused to publish it even after I called and specifically requested it.

But I'm not a rosh yeshiva so I do not have to worry that my name and reputation will be used, or even distorted, without my permission.

Thursday, February 17, 2005

YU Politics

Finally, a little analysis of the developments in YU. An important first step in understanding what is going on at the flagship of Modern Orthodoxy.

The Limits of Orthodox Theology V

Parsha Blog has an interesting review of Marc Shapiro's book.

Problems with Prenups

Out of Step Jew (and a reader who e-mailed me) notes that The Jerusalem Post is reporting that R. Elyashiv's opposition to prenuptial agreements will likely render prenuptial agreements, legal document that force recalcitrant husbands to pay large sums of maintenance until the couple is religiously divorced, unenforceable.

Religious Coercion

R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Community, Covenant and Commitment, R. Nathaniel Helfgot, ed., pp. 210-211:

More might have been accomplished had there been total separation [of religion and State in Israel]. Among the modern Orthodox community in America, there is the prevailing opinion that it has been a practical mistake... I am not religious liberal. It is not for the sake of religious liberty but for pragmatic reasons... The secularists would not have been able to blame us for interfering in Israel's way of life.. If there are no buses on Shabbat , the Orthodox and Judaism as such are blamed...

It would have been the State, not religion, that would have suffered by separation... its own image would have been tarnished... [I have in the past advised] the leaders of Mizrahi not to press for religious legislation for practical, utilitarian reasons...

I frequently debate with myself whether, indeed, we were obligated to make the great sacrifice of exposing ourselves to vilification and slander in order to save some secularists from contracting halakhically illegitimate marriages. Ninety-five percent of the population would comply with the halakhic code of marriage and divorce even if it were not sanctioned by the authority of the State...

Wednesday, February 16, 2005

The Eternity of the Torah III

Proofs (cont'd from I & II)

3. Utmost Perfection

The Abarbanel (Rosh Amanah ch. 13) argues that since the Torah is in a state of utmost perfection and, therefore, is not dependent on time or place but is rather above those considerations. It follows that the Torah must never change because if it did, it would not have been entirely perfect. However, the Abarbanel responds to his own argument that only God is in a state of utmost perfection. Everything else is only relatively perfect. For example, humans are the most perfect of animals and Moshe was the most perfect of people but neither humans nor Moshe are immortal. Similarly, the Torah is the most perfect of laws but this does not remove it from the limitations of legal and religious codes. Therefore, there is no proof that the Torah cannot change or be nullified just like Moshe eventually died.

4. Perfect Giver

The Maharal (Tiferes Yisrael, ch. 51) modifies this argument slightly and states that since God gave us the Torah and God is perfect, He would not have given us a Torah that is less than perfect in any way. The Torah is thus a reflection of God's unchanging perfection. If God cannot change, then the Torah cannot either.

5. Human Nature

The Abarbanel offers another argument for the eternity of the Torah. God created man and gave him physical and spiritual sustenance. The physical sustenance is food and the spiritual is the Torah, both of which were designed specifically for human nature as it was created. Therefore, since human nature does not change, both the methods of physical and spiritual sustenance still apply equally regardless of time and place. The Torah, which is the spiritual sustenance, must remain unchanged as long as man's innate nature remains the same.

However, one can ask how we know that God established that Torah is the only spiritual sustenance for man. Maybe there are other ways for a person to be spiritually nourished? The Abarbanel himself recognizes that this question defeats his argument.

6. Greater Prophet

R. Yosef Albo, in his Sefer Ha-Ikkarim (part 3), asks many questions on this principle but in the end concludes that it is correct. His final argument (ibid., ch. 19) is that since Moshe gave us the Torah, any other prophet must be greater than Moshe in order to override his prophecy. Since it is impossible for another prophet to be greater than Moshe (Deut. 34:10), no one can ever nullify Moshe's Torah. The Abarbanel (ibid.) concludes similarly.

However, this proof (not statement of but proof) for the principle leaves open a loophole. God Himself can change or nullify the Torah. According to R. Yosef Albo's and the Abarbanel's final argument to prove this principle, the logic proving it leaves open the possibility that God can change the Torah if He wants to.

(B"n to be continued)

Tuesday, February 15, 2005

More on Evolution

Dr. Joel Wolowelsky has a good article on evolution and teaching it in Jewish schools (here).

(thanks to Lamed)

Thursday, February 10, 2005

Ban Conspiracy Theory

Chakira is back up with a grand conspiracy theory about the Slifkin ban (here):

Gil, according to the version of the theory I have heard in numerous conversations this week, is supposed to have shown the offending books or passages to Haredi figures like Rabbi Weintraub, in hopes of producing a highly profitable ban.

Simple answer: no. However, Chakira omits a damning piece of evidence that could have been used to support this theory. I was (very minorly) involved in the researching of Mysterious Creatures and am mentioned in the acknowledgments on page 11.

However, Chakira's less humorous point is exactly correct.

What is notably absent from the dozen or so posts on Slifkin is any condemnation of the Rabbis who banned the books with these acceptable ideas.

I did not use this as an opportunity to attack Haredim and have been very careful to treat all of the rabbis involved with respect. That is not something about which I am ashamed. If that is labeled bland, so be it. I am sure that my rabbeim would be proud of that "blandness."

Date of the Exodus

There is currently (another round of) a (perpetual) debate ensuing on the Avodah e-mail list over whether there is an obligation to follow the Seder Olam timeline in determining dates in history. In regards to that debate, I thought it would be relevant to note the different dates for the Exodus from Egypt that are given in traditional rabbinic sources, as summarized by R. Menahem Kasher in Torah Shelemah (Shemos, addenda 5 pp. 240-241):

According to the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 9) and other sources, the Exodus took place in the year 2448. According to the version preserved in Ra'avad's Sefer Ha-Kabbalah, 2449. According to R. Moshe of Provence, 2447. This discrepancy can be attributed to the starting point from when one starts counting years and not to a disagreement about in which year the Exodus takes place.

Josephus (Antiquities, 1:3:4), following Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer (ch. 48) that the Jews were in Egypt for 215 years rather than 210, places the Exodus in the year 2453.

According to Rabbeinu Hananel, the Exodus took place in the year 2478. This is also the Abarbanel's view in his commentary to the Haggadah.

R. Moshe Latif's view is that it was in the year 2456, and the Ramban's view implies 2458.

Seforim Sale: Night 1

I got to the Seforim Sale after 10pm and quickly found my contact there, whom I had not previously met in person. The sale was moved to the first floor of Belfer this year and is set up very nicely. It is very easy to find books and there is plenty of staff walking around and offering assistance.

So, of course, I looked around to find my books. R. Daniel Feldman's book is upfront on the YU table, next to R. Aharon Lichtenstein's. R. Nosson Slifkin's books are prominently displayed and, from what I heard, selling quickly. R. Eli Schochet's book The Hasidic Movement and the Gaon of Vilna is in the English language Kabbalah/Hassidus section and is priced really cheap. You will never find it this cheap anywhere else.

After a lot of searching, with help, we determined that the Salanter books were not out on the tables. Hopefully, they will be out by tomorrow night. Because of the late hour and the long search for the Salanter book, I did not check on R. Yehuda Henkin's books. His newest volume of responsa (Bnei Banim 4) is available at the sale.

I will, IY"H be back at the sale tomorrow night and will be checking on Bnei Banim then.

Wednesday, February 09, 2005

MoshiachTalk Back Online

My thanks go to Shmarya for showing me that my website had been hacked into. I have resolved the problems and MoshiachTalk is now back online.

Torah, Science, Pseudo-Torah & Pseudo-Science

When science appears to contradict the Torah, there are a few ways to deal with the situation. When I was a child, I was taught to compartmentalize the two - science and Torah are different realms and there is no need to reconcile them. This, it seems to me, can be a symptom of or result in either dismissing Torah as untrue, and I think that is how it was taught to me. But it can also be a result of remaining in a state of unconcerned faith. This is my personal approach. Due to my lack of interest in science - my last biology class was in ninth grade and physics was in my freshman year of college - I don't claim to understand science well enough to find a resolution. I just remain confident that a resolution will eventually be found.

I had a roommate in yeshiva who had a more right-wing schooling and was taught by his rebbeim that science is wrong and the scientists are just a bunch of faithless fools. This did not sit well with him because his father is an accomplished research physicist. Quite the opposite of their intent, the rebbeim were the ones who seemed like ignorant fools, dismissing matters of which they had little knowledge. (To his and his parents' credit, my friend's faith did not suffer and he is still learning full-time well into his 30s.)

Science, the rebbeim pronounced authoritatively, is only made up of theories to explain facts. Those theories are inherently biased to the scientists' worldview and scientists are a bunch of heretics and atheists. Scientific theories come and go, so why should we believe any particular one?

This is just wrong. I know plenty of scientists with whom I went to yeshiva or know otherwise and they are neither heretics nor atheists. They are far less biased (and far more knowledgable in these matters) than these rebbeim. Additionally, some scientific theories come and go but many are here to stay. The law of gravity is not changing any time soon. That the planets revolve around the sun is not going to be disproven. That blood carries oxygen throughout the body is also fairly well documented. Viruses, bacteria, germs - these were all big hiddushim in their times. It is wrong to state that science cannot be trusted because it changes all the time. Not all things change and not all things remain unchanged. Scientifically ignorant people like me might not be able to tell the difference between what is definite and what is not, but that does not mean that those involved in these matters cannot (more on this below). Not to mention that we put our life on the line very frequently because of scientific theories. I would never get on a big box and travel full speed towards the Atlantic Ocean unless science confirmed that the box would be able to fly. Nor would I take all sorts of medicines that do untold things to my inner body unless medical theory confirmed that they would not harm me.

Another response that I see adopted is that of adhering to any scientific theory that can support Torah doctrine. Believing scientists and laypeople latch onto any scientist who proposes a theory that bends science to fit in with (what appears to be) the Torah's view. I believe that there is a danger in this.

There are always fully-credentialed scientists who devise elaborate opposition views to regnant scientific theories. Some call them crackpots and their teachings pseudo-science. Do we really want to align ourselves with crackpots? Does our faith require us to latch onto any pseudo-scientific theory that uses lots of big words and elaborate conspiracy theories to explain away the evidence? As a religious person, I find this embarrassing.

I've spent a lot of years learning Torah, enough to be able to tell fairly quickly when someone discussing a Torah topic is a gross ignoramus. For fun, I sometimes read Heterodox responsa. Some are good. Some are excellent. Most are pseudo-Torah, the kind that makes me wince in pain from the distortion of my religion (but it's still an interesting read). Sometimes I will read an article from someone trying to make a political or social point and use a Torah concept as proof. The people who have a leg within serious Torah study can usually do this successfully but many do not have that background and make obviously inept comparisons and statements that will fool outsiders but are immediately obvious to the initiates. They are engaging in pseudo-Torah and they probably do not even know it. In a way, it is harmless amha'aratzus and at least they respect Torah enough to try to prove their point from it. But frequently they are distorting the Torah and are also respected as Torah scholars by those even more ignorant. Pseudo-Torah can be dangerous.

Le-havdil, this can be applied to all areas of study. The initiates know immediately what is pure junk while those of us on the outside cannot tell the difference. I do not know what is pseudo-science and what is real science. I do know that many fundamentalist Christians will defend anything to preserve their faith, no matter how untrue. I will not align myself with them on matters such as this and prefer to say "I don't know" than to accept their pseudo-science.

Is Creationist Science pseudo-science? I don't know. It has more respectable adherents than the flat-earth theory and Dr. Nathan Aviezer is a serious scientist. But when rov minyan u-binyan of the scientific world is arguing one thing, I find it hard to believe that a rabbi in Brooklyn who read one or two popular works on science can refute their arguments. More likely, he doesn't know what he is talking about and would do better to say "I don't know but some scientists disagree with the mainstream theory."

What is my point in this rambling post? Don't dismiss all science as "just a theory." Don't latch onto pseudo-scientists. And don't pretend to know things that you don't. Lamed leshonkha lomar "eini yodei'a" (teach your tongue to say "I don't know").

Tuesday, February 08, 2005

Barukh Dayan Ha-Emes

I just got this e-mail:

It is with much regret that I have to inform all past talmidim and colleagues of Rabbi Michael Katz at Yeshiva University, that my Rebbe and Teacher Rabbi Yechiel Michael Ben Reuven Hacohen Zecher Tzaddik Livracha was niftar at 9:00 p.m. yesterday. The levaya will be at Young Israel of Kew Garden Hills, in Queens New York (150th Street and 71st) at 2:00 p.m. today February 8th. The burial will take place in Yerushalayim.

The Eternity of the Torah II

Proofs

1. National Proof

Medieval philosophers proved the eternity of the Torah in two ways - through logical proofs and through biblical proofs. The first logical proof (mofes) in this area is that brought by R. Sa'adia Gaon (Emunos Ve-Dei'os 3:7) that since the Jewish people is only a nation because of the Torah, and God has said that the Jewish people will last forever, therefore the Torah must last forever also. However, this only proves that the Torah as a whole will last forever, and not that individual laws will also remain eternally. Furthermore, R. Sa'adia Gaon operated under the unproven thesis that the Jewish people is only a nation because of that Torah. If one were to reject that premise then the entire argument falls. R. Sa'adia Gaon cited as proof for this thesis the following verse from Jeremiah (31:34-35): "Thus said the Lord, 'Who gives the sun as a light by day and the laws of the moon and the stars as a light by night; Who agitates the sea so that its waves roar; God of Hosts is His name. If these laws could be removed from before Me - the word of God - so could the seed of Israel cease from being a people before Me forever." However, a simple reading of this passage compares the eternity of the Jewish people with the laws of nature, and not the laws of the Torah.

2. Perfection Proof

R. Hasdai Crescas (Or Hashem 3:1:5:1) offers the following complex argument: God gaves us the Torah in order to bestow good upon us and the Torah is perfect. Therefore, it cannot be nullified because, if so, why did God give it to us at all? Rather, certainly God knew that we needed a Torah and that is why we must always have one. Therefore, one can only suggest that the Torah would be exchanged with another one and not entirely nullified. However, the Torah would not be exchanged with a lesser version because that detracts from God's purpose in giving it to us. Clearly, the Torah could only be replaced by a greater or equal Torah. Since the Torah is perfect, there is no greater Torah. And if the Torah were replaced by an equal Torah, what purpose woud there be for that? Therefore, the Torah can never be nullified nor replaced.

The Maharal makes a similar argument in his Tiferes Yisrael (ch. 51): We physical people are not worthy of the Torah. Rather, it was given to us as a gift by God. Since the Torah is God's it must be perfect, and therefore unsusceptible to nullification.

However, one could argue that no two people are the same and that what is perfect for one person is not perfect for another. Additionally, times and circumstances change and the commandments that were appropriate for the generation of the desert, such as refraining from submitting one's children to Molekh, are not perfect for later generations. Therefore, one could argue, it is possible to have two entirely perfect Torahs whose exchange is reasonable given different times and places - one being perfect for an earlier generation and another being perfect for a later generation.

R. Crescas anticipated such an argument and stated that the ultimately perfect Torah has everything that everyone needs and is equally applicable to different people in different circumstances. If it were only perfect for earlier generations and not later ones, it would not be perfect.

However, the Rambam would disagree with this last point. In Moreh Nevukhim (3:34), Rambam writes (Friedlander translation):

It is also important to note that the Law does not take into account exceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely occur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it be of an intellectual, a moral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule and not on that which is the exception: it ignores the injury that might be caused to a single person through a certain maxim or a certain divine precept. For the Law is a divine institution, and [in order to understand its operation] we must consider how in Nature the various forces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases they cause also injury. This is clear from what has been said by ourselves as well as by others. We must consequently not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the instruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive from the specific forms in Nature all that they require.

Torah applies to the majority of people in the majority of circumstances but there are times and people for whom the Torah is not perfect. R. Yosef Qafah, in his notes to that chapter (no. 6) offers the example of a divorced woman who may not marry a man of priestly descent because the priests are God's servants and divorced women are generally women whose husbands found them involved in sexual improprieties, and are therefore inappropriate spouses for priests. However, even though it is possible for a woman to be divorced without having engaged in sexual improprieties, the Torah commanded based on the generality and not on each individual circumstance. Therefore, one could argue that since times have changed and, nowadays, most divorced women have not engaged in sexual improprieties and priests do not serve God any more than any other Jews, this law should be exchanged for a law that applies to today's majority.

R. Yitzhak Abarbanel (Rosh Amanah 13) argues similarly against R. Crescas' proof. Since people's practices change, the laws of the Torah that bring people to individual perfection should also change to become more appropriate to their individual circumstances.

(B"n to be continued)

Monday, February 07, 2005

Blog Elections

It seems that this blog has been nominated for a JIB (Jewish-Israeli Blog) award in two categories - Best Jewish Religion Blog and Best Series (Women's Prayer Groups).

I don't think there is any actual award so I don't understand why some other blogs are campaigning. Vote for me (here and here). Or don't. Whatever.

I thank the nominaters, voters and anyone else involved in the process.

(Now please stop e-mailing me about this. I've put it on my blog.)

Buying Books from Yashar

A note to those interested in books that are currently available from Yashar. If you want to help out the new company, instead of buying the book online go to your local Jewish bookstore and ask for the book. Chances are that the store already has our catalog but, if not, direct them to www.YasharBooks.com. They will order it for you and sell it to you cheaper (i.e. without shipping costs) than if you buy it online. And it will open up a new store to Yashar.

Thank you for your support.

The Eternity of the Torah

One of my many unfinished projects is a sefer on the Rambam's 13 principles. I started on one principle - the ninth, the eternity of the Torah - but never finished it. I will be translating portions of what I've written in a series of posts. The following text of this principle is from Dr. Fred Rosner's translation of Rambam's commentary to Sanhedrin (Sepher-Herman Press, 1981):

The ninth fundamental principle is the abrogation (of the Torah), that is to say that this Torah of Moses will not be abrogated and no other Torah will come from God. One may not add to it nor delete from it, neither in the written nor the oral Torah, as it is written "Thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it." We have already explained all that needs to be explained concerning this fundamental principle at the beginning of this treatise.

There are four parts to this principle:
1. That the Torah will never be abrogated, i.e. that the commandments will always be binding.
2. That there will never be a new Torah.
3. That nothing will be removed from the Torah.
4. That nothing will be added to it.

Every English translation that I have seen translates a passage from the middle of the principle along the lines of "One may not add to it nor delete from it..." I am not sure that this is correct. R. Yosef Qafah translates this into Hebrew as "Ve-lo yisvasef bah ve-lo yigara mimenah..." which means "Nothing will be added to it nor deleted from it..." I don't know what the Arabic says but R. Qafah's translation follows from the Abarbanel's discussion in his Rosh Amanah (ch. 13):

However, this mistake in [understanding] the words of the master is evident because the specific commandment is not to add or detract [from the commandments] and the principle is to believe in the eternity of the Torah and that God will not add to nor detract from it... However, when the master brought, in explaining this principle, the verse "Thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it" - his intention was not to explain the belief of this principle, i.e. that God will not change the Torah, exchange it, add to it or subtract from it because the verse is speaking about Israel. Rather, the master's intent was that this Torah will never ever have an addition or a subtraction from it, and because of that it emerges that we are commanded not to add to or detract from it.

In other words, the Torah will never change. The principle of belief is that God will not change it but, certainly, we are not allowed to change it either.

The Rambam mentioned this principle four times in his Mishneh Torah - in Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah (9:1); in Hilkhos Teshuvah (3:8), when listing those who are heretics; in Hilkhos Megillah 2:18; and in (uncensored versions of) Hilkhos Melakhim (11:3).

It is worth noting that this principle does not discuss adding or subtracting verses from the text of the Torah. That is contained in the eighth principle. The ninth principle deals with the commandments and their eternal status. But will the commandments remain in eternal force or are there passages in rabbinic literature implying that they will be abrogated in future times? That subject is for future, very lengthy posts.

Sunday, February 06, 2005

Emerging From Behind My Keyboard

I am going to be getting away from my computer (gasp!) and shlepping up to Washington Heights for the SOY Seforim Sale. I obviously will not be there the whole time, or even most of the time. But I will be there for some of the first night, some other random times on which I have not yet decided and for R. Daniel Feldman's speech there on Sunday the 13th, 12:30 pm (Topic: "Why should we learn about Mitzvot Bein Adam L'Chaveiro? - Interpersonal Relations and Halacha"). ~~There is also a good chance that I will be speaking on Feb. 23rd at 8pm.~~ (cancelled) If you are at the sale and are looking for me, ask for Menachem Butler. Everyone knows who he is and he knows what I look like.

Friday, February 04, 2005

An Eye for an Eye

See here for my summary/adaptation of Nehama Leibowitz's explanation that peshat of Exodus 21:24 ("ayin tahas ayin") is that damage to an eye must be compensated.

Thursday, February 03, 2005

Rabbi Israel Salanter: Religious-Ethical Thinker

I just received the first copies of Rabbi Israel Salanter:Religious-Ethical Thinker, a reprint of a little-known academic biography of R. Yisrael Salanter from 1953, and I am blown away by how great the book looks. I know, don't judge a book by its cover. But this has a great cover and, if I may say so with full prejudice, great insides as well.

When I first contacted Prof. Shaul Stampfer of Hebrew U for a blurb, I didn't think he would even respond to my e-mail. He is, after all, probably the world's foremost expert on the yeshiva world of the nineteenth century and has better things to do than to respond to e-mails from someone out to make a buck off his name. But he was so enthusiastic I could sense his excitement over the book. Here is his blurb that graces the back cover of the book:

Menahem Glenn's classic study, Israel Salanter: Religious-Ethical Thinker, was a pioneering biography of one of the most creative and influential thinkers in the East European world of Torah scholarship. In his sober and carefully documented study, Glenn carefully described the life and ideas of R. Israel in their historical context as well as in the context of Jewish thought. By doing so, he opened the world of the East European Musar movement to the English speaking reader. Even after the publication of subsequent important works on R. Israel, Glenn's work remains a valuable resource and contains materials and information not available elsewhere.

And, not to be outdone, here is Zalman Alpert of Yeshiva University's blurb:

This volume is a classic in the study of the 19th century Musar movement and its leader Rabbi Israel Salanter. Not only is the reader presented with a critical study of the life and teachings of R. Salanter in English, but we also get a critical English translation of Salanter's major work the Iggereth Ha-Musar, the Epistle of Musar. The book fills an important lacuna in English for the serious student of the Musar movement. As this movement gains prominence in 21st century America, this classic volume gains new importance as a valuable tool in understanding Salanter and his teachings.

A colleague of mine referred to this book as a "Making of a Godol"-style biography, in that it is full of fascinating historical tidbits that you simply will not find anywhere else. Interestingly, the book contains the only biography I have seen of Rabbi Jacob Joseph (chief rabbi of New York) that focuses on his time in Europe. He was a student of R. Yisrael Salanter and, along with other students, is biographied (is that a word?) in this book.

More info on the book here. You can buy it here. A few copies will be available at the Seforim Sale.

Metzitzah

Yesterday, my sister-in-law learned that the mohel who circumcised her three-month-old son has been accused of infecting babies with herpes. Like any mother would, she freaked out and spent the day getting her son tested. Let's take a step back and briefly examine the issue of metzitzah, ignoring the issue of this particular mohel.

The Mishnah in Shabbos (19:2; 133a) states that metzitzah must be done at the end of a circumcision. As the commentators explain, metzitzah is the sucking of a bit of blood from the circumcision wound to start its healing (the mohel then spits the blood out on a napkin). The Gemara (133b) explains that refraining from performing metzitzah is a danger for the baby.

However, contemporary science tells us that there is no danger to the baby if metzitzah is not performed. Presumably, then, there would be no need for metzitzah. I suspect that many posekim would agree to this conclusion if not for an important historical fact. One of the first changes that the Reform movement enacted was abolishing metzitzah. Because of this, there was an understandable reaction among the Orthodox to insist on maintaining the practice so as not to confirm the Heterodox (see the posts on this subject, listed on the right). Thus, throughout the nineteenth century we find extended discussion of metzitzah, neatly summarized in Sedei Hemed (ma'arekhes metzitzah) and, with historical information added, by Jacob Katz in his Divine Law in Jewish Hands.

One example of an analysis is in the Tiferes Yisrael commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbos 19:2). He accepts that the danger no longer exists and explains the different medical circumstance from the Gemara's by stating that nature has changed (nishtaneh ha-teva). However, since even doctors agree that there is a small benefit to performing metzitzah the practice should be continued.

It is interesting to note that, in Budapest, the practice of metzitzah was abolished with the approval of the rabbi of Ungvar.

For a long time, various instruments have been introduced so that the metzitzah can be done without direct contact between the mohel's mouth and the circumcision wound. Some posekim prohibited any change in the practice, mainly because it would be a confirmation of the Heterodox. We cannot change this custom even one bit. Others adopted these instruments and, by now, they have become fairly standard in non-Hasidic communities. At my oldest son's bris, I asked the mohel out of curiosity whether he would be willing to perform metzitzah be-feh (i.e. directly with the mouth, without an instrument) and he said that if I wanted it done I could do that part myself.

Interestingly, the following was written by R. Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Ha-Rav (p. 243) about R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik's position on this matter, and was confirmed by R. Fabian Schoenfeld as having happened at his son's circumcision:

Our teacher's view was that nowadays there is no need for metzitzah at all, like the Tiferes Yisrael's view in the Mishnah [sic!] (see the Sedei Hemed for a long treatment of this). He told us how a mohel once wated to perform metzitzah be-feh and our teacher asked him not to. When the mohel refused, our teacher told him that if his father, R. Moshe Soloveitchik, were there, he would definitely not have allowed him to perform metzitzah be-feh. However, I am more tolerant and since you are refusing, I will let you.

Wednesday, February 02, 2005

Buy the Books II

From Sefer Ha-Hayim Blog:

Due to heavy demand, we are temporarily out of Mysterious Creatures. A shipment is already on the way from Israel and should arrive by the end of February.

In the meantime, you will be able to purchase copies of the book at the SOY Seforim Sale.

The Camel, the Hare, & the Hyrax is still available.

Respect for Crazy Parents

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 24a) tells the famous story about Dama ben Nesinah. This non-Jewish gentleman's father owned a gem that was needed for the kohen gadol's Hoshen and when the rabbis came to purchase the gem his father was sleeping over the key to where the gem was kept. Even though the rabbis offered enormous amounts of money, Dama refused to wake his father to get the key. For this enormous sacrifice in order to fulfill the commandment of honoring one's father, Dama was eventually rewarded with great riches.

R. Yosef Viener (in this tape) quotes from R. Moshe Feinstein (I couldn't find it but I did not look very hard) that, clearly, Dama's father was a little crazy. What normal person would object to being woken up from a nap in order to make a huge profit on a sale? Despite the likelihood that Dama knew that it would be better for his father if he woke him up and received this huge sum of money, Dama was correct in honoring his father's irrational wish. Even irrational parents should be obeyed.

Tuesday, February 01, 2005

Banned V - Hazal and Science

The issue of Hazal and science is more difficult than the others that we have tackled in this series simply because the literature is so vast. Where do I begin? As I stated originally, the main point of these series of posts is to make the argument that these are issues of contemporary debate, i.e. there are rabbis on both sides of this debate. However, because history is so important to us, I have quoted and will continue to cite ancient sources as well as contemporary.

Additionally, this current essay is omitting discussion of how we are to relate to this topic. If Hazal made scientific errors, how are we to relate to them? This is extremely important but space constraints force me to omit such a discussion. See the bibliography listed towards the end of this post for discussions of this important matter.

The issue for this post is the science of Hazal. Did they use their contemporary science, much of which has been disproven, or did they have Sinaitic traditions for all their scientific views?

On this matter, the medieval sources are quite prevalent. Let me make it clear that there was no single, unanimous opinion on this matter and that I am intentionally only citing sources on one side of this issue. There were certainly those on the other side as well. Be that as it may, the point still stands that there were rishonim whose views are important for this discussion.

Primary among the rishonim on this subject is the Rambam. In his Mishneh Torah (Hilkhos Kiddush Ha-Hodesh 17:24), the Rambam wrote:

The reasons behind all these calculations... and the methods by which they are derived belong to the science of astronomy on which the sages of Greece have compiled many books

The scientific and mathematical bases for the calculations of Kiddush ha-hodesh were, according to the Rambam, determined by the science prevalent during the times of the Sages. They were not, writes the Rambam explicitly (read further there), received traditions. Similarly, he writes in his Moreh Nevukhim (3:14):

You must, however, not expect that everything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters should agree with observation, for mathematics were not fully developed in those days: and their statements were not based on the authority of the Prophets, but on the knowledge which they either themselves possessed or derived from contemporary men of science. (Friedlander translation)

Before the Rambam, too, R. Sherira Gaon (or possibly his son, R. Hai Gaon) wrote similarly of the medical knowledge of Hazal (Teshuvos Ha-Geonim – Harkaby, no. 394):

Our sages were not doctors and said what they did based on experience with the diseases of their time. Therefore, there is no commandment to listen to the sages [regarding medical advice] because they only spoke from their opinion based on what they saw in their day.

R. Avraham ben Ha-Rambam wrote similarly in his Ma'amal Al Aggados Hazal (in Margoliyos edition of Milhamos Hashem, pp. 84-88), as did many other rishonim. For example, as one reader sent me, the Meiri to Horiyos 13b writes that Hazal's advice on how to avoid memory loss was based on what they found in "the books of the doctors." I am sure that a thorough review of the Meiri's writings will reveal many similar statements. Abarbanel, in his introduction to part 2 of Yeshu'os Meshiho (p. 17b), writes that Hazal's knowledge of science was based on their experience in their particular climate and time which might not apply to our climates and times (a forerunner of the "nishtaneh ha-teva" approach). That is in the rishonim, although there are certainly those who disagree (e.g. Rashba and Rivash).

The debate on this issue continued throughout the ages and remains to this day. For example, the Gemara (Pesahim 94b) records a debate between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nation over the sun's movement. The sages of Israel took the pre-Ptolemaic view that the sun travels from east to west under the sky during the day and back again from west to east over the sky at night. The sages of the nations maintained the Ptolemaic view that the sun travels above the earth during the day and below (i.e. around) the earth at night. While the simple reading of the continuation of this passage is that the sages of Israel submitted to the proofs of the sages of the nations, Rabbeinu Tam was of the view that the sages of Israel never conceded their stance. Indeed, his entire approach to the onset of night is based on the pre-Ptolemaic understanding of the sun's movement. While those who maintain that Hazal had received traditions for their scientific views will side with Rabbeinu Tam that the sages never conceded their position, the Maharam Al-Ashkar (no. 96) wrote explicitly that Rabbeinu Tam's position is based on incorrect astronomy. Even the Minhas Cohen (4:10), a great advocate of Rabbeinu Tam's position, admitted that its basis is on incorrect science but argued that this was irrelevant to the argument. (Note that Copernicus disproved both the pre-Ptolemaic and the Ptolemaic views; and see the citations from R. Yosef Qafah further.)

Moving to more current times, again skipping large sections of the literature due simply to its vastness, it is worth noting that R. Israel Meir Levinger, in his Sefer Ha-Ma'or Le-Masekhes Bekhoros (7b), corrects a Baraisa that states that bats lay eggs. In actuality, writes R. Levinger, the retired rabbi of Basel and a world-renowned expert on shehitah, bats do not lay eggs. I am sure that there are more examples but this one was pointed out by R. Shlomo Sternberg in his review of R. Levinger's book in B.D.D. 4, Winter 1997 (p. 82).

R. Samson Raphael Hirsch wrote an essay titled "Trusting the Torah's Sages" that was first published by Dr. Mordechai Breuer in 1976 in the journal Ha-Ma'ayan. It was translated into English by Yehoshua Leiman for Light magazine and then published in a booklet titled "Two Giants Speak" in 2002 by Neve Yerushalayim. R. Hirsch explained that Hazal relied on the science of their contemporaries and that many of their scientific statements have their origin in those sources. An example he brings is the statement in Bava Kama 16a that seven years after a person's death, his spine turns into a snake unless he bowed at modim. This seems quite outlandish but is mirrored in the writings of Pliny. Clearly, R. Hirsch says, Hazal's source for this statement of fact was their contemporary science.

R. Eliyahu Dessler was of the following view, according to his close student and editor, R. Aryeh Carmell (B.D.D. 6, Winter 1998, p. 57):

Rabbi Dessler, with his commonsense approach, sought neither to deny scientific facts nor to assume drastic changes in nature since the time of Hazal. He accepted that Hazal did not get their ideas on nature from revelation, but from their cultural environment.

This approach is seen in Mikhtav Me-Eliyahu, vol. 4 p. 355 n. 4 in which R. Dessler is quoted as stating that, contrary to the claims of the Gemara, wildcats do not contain venom in their nails, streams are not warmer at night because the sun passes under the earth and lice are not generated spontaneously.

One of the most recent debates of this nature revolves around DNA testing. The Gemara (Nidah 31a) states that a person's blood comes from his mother. Therefore, one could conclude that a DNA comparison of a child's and his father's blood cannot determine relation. And so do some posekim rule (e.g. Tzitz Eliezer 13:104). R. Yitzhak Herzog (in a letter published in Assia 5), however, argued forcefully against this position because science has clearly demonstrated that such matching works. Hazal, he states, had no received tradition on this matter and science has disproven the Gemara's statement.

R. Yosef Qafah, in a number of places, also argues similarly. In his notes to Moreh Nevukhim 2:8, he comments that the above-mentioned debate between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nation is of interest mainly to "Archaeologists of Astronomy" because the science is outdated (see also his notes to 2:24). He writes similarly in his notes to Mishneh Torah (Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah ch. 3 n. 1). In his notes to MT Hilkhos Shabbos (ch. 11 n. 4), R. Qafah states that the Gemara was incorrect about the spontaneous generation of lice.

R. Eddie Reichman, in the most recent issue of Jewish Action, wrote a glowing review of Mysterious Creatures (reprinted here with permission) and provided a good bibliography on this topic. I would only add to it R. Yehuda Levi's Ha-Mada She-Ba-Torah, recently translated as The Science in Torah (Feldheim: 2004). Also, see my essay here.

To summarize this long but insufficient post, there is a clear history to claims that Hazal's scientific knowledge was based on the theories current in their time and can be disproven by later scientific discoveries. This debate continues to our time, with scholars on both sides of the disagreement.