The Eternity of the Torah II

Proofs

1. National Proof

Medieval philosophers proved the eternity of the Torah in two ways - through logical proofs and through biblical proofs. The first logical proof (mofes) in this area is that brought by R. Sa'adia Gaon (Emunos Ve-Dei'os 3:7) that since the Jewish people is only a nation because of the Torah, and God has said that the Jewish people will last forever, therefore the Torah must last forever also. However, this only proves that the Torah as a whole will last forever, and not that individual laws will also remain eternally. Furthermore, R. Sa'adia Gaon operated under the unproven thesis that the Jewish people is only a nation because of that Torah. If one were to reject that premise then the entire argument falls. R. Sa'adia Gaon cited as proof for this thesis the following verse from Jeremiah (31:34-35): "Thus said the Lord, 'Who gives the sun as a light by day and the laws of the moon and the stars as a light by night; Who agitates the sea so that its waves roar; God of Hosts is His name. If these laws could be removed from before Me - the word of God - so could the seed of Israel cease from being a people before Me forever." However, a simple reading of this passage compares the eternity of the Jewish people with the laws of nature, and not the laws of the Torah.

2. Perfection Proof

R. Hasdai Crescas (Or Hashem 3:1:5:1) offers the following complex argument: God gaves us the Torah in order to bestow good upon us and the Torah is perfect. Therefore, it cannot be nullified because, if so, why did God give it to us at all? Rather, certainly God knew that we needed a Torah and that is why we must always have one. Therefore, one can only suggest that the Torah would be exchanged with another one and not entirely nullified. However, the Torah would not be exchanged with a lesser version because that detracts from God's purpose in giving it to us. Clearly, the Torah could only be replaced by a greater or equal Torah. Since the Torah is perfect, there is no greater Torah. And if the Torah were replaced by an equal Torah, what purpose woud there be for that? Therefore, the Torah can never be nullified nor replaced.

The Maharal makes a similar argument in his Tiferes Yisrael (ch. 51): We physical people are not worthy of the Torah. Rather, it was given to us as a gift by God. Since the Torah is God's it must be perfect, and therefore unsusceptible to nullification.

However, one could argue that no two people are the same and that what is perfect for one person is not perfect for another. Additionally, times and circumstances change and the commandments that were appropriate for the generation of the desert, such as refraining from submitting one's children to Molekh, are not perfect for later generations. Therefore, one could argue, it is possible to have two entirely perfect Torahs whose exchange is reasonable given different times and places - one being perfect for an earlier generation and another being perfect for a later generation.

R. Crescas anticipated such an argument and stated that the ultimately perfect Torah has everything that everyone needs and is equally applicable to different people in different circumstances. If it were only perfect for earlier generations and not later ones, it would not be perfect.

However, the Rambam would disagree with this last point. In Moreh Nevukhim (3:34), Rambam writes (Friedlander translation):

It is also important to note that the Law does not take into account exceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely occur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it be of an intellectual, a moral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule and not on that which is the exception: it ignores the injury that might be caused to a single person through a certain maxim or a certain divine precept. For the Law is a divine institution, and [in order to understand its operation] we must consider how in Nature the various forces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases they cause also injury. This is clear from what has been said by ourselves as well as by others. We must consequently not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the instruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive from the specific forms in Nature all that they require.

Torah applies to the majority of people in the majority of circumstances but there are times and people for whom the Torah is not perfect. R. Yosef Qafah, in his notes to that chapter (no. 6) offers the example of a divorced woman who may not marry a man of priestly descent because the priests are God's servants and divorced women are generally women whose husbands found them involved in sexual improprieties, and are therefore inappropriate spouses for priests. However, even though it is possible for a woman to be divorced without having engaged in sexual improprieties, the Torah commanded based on the generality and not on each individual circumstance. Therefore, one could argue that since times have changed and, nowadays, most divorced women have not engaged in sexual improprieties and priests do not serve God any more than any other Jews, this law should be exchanged for a law that applies to today's majority.

R. Yitzhak Abarbanel (Rosh Amanah 13) argues similarly against R. Crescas' proof. Since people's practices change, the laws of the Torah that bring people to individual perfection should also change to become more appropriate to their individual circumstances.

(B"n to be continued)