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Sunday, November 29, 2009
Who Decides On Big Issues?
The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 32a) states that when a court adjudicates a capital case, a junior member of the court must begin the discussion. He must offer his opinion first because if the most senior member gives his opinion first, there is a danger that those more junior will automatically defer to him without fully discussing the various sides of the case. In a civil or ritual case, however, we are not as concerned and allow the senior member to begin the discussion.The Gemara (Gittin 59a, Sanhedrin 36a) says that every time R. Yehudah Ha-Nasi would institute an enactment, even regarding civil matters, he would insist that a junior member begin the discussion. Rashi (Gittin 36a sv. de-kulhu) explains that R. Yehudah Ha-Nasi disagreed with the Mishnah's distinction and held that discussion of all cases must begin with a junior member. Tosafos (Gittin 36a sv. de-kulhu) suggest that there was no dispute of the law and R. Yehudah Ha-Nasi had an idiosyncratic practice due to his extreme humility.
Click here to read moreR. Reuven Margoliyos (Margoliyos Ha-Yam 36a:2) suggests an explanation with wider application. Even though civil and ritual cases are normally less severe than capital cases, that is when dealing with specific cases. When the halakhah is being established for generations to come, the issue is much more serious and has such broad impact that it reaches the level of a capital case and requires the stricter treatment.
Yes, we no longer have such rabbinical courts. But we still have to recognize that wide-reaching changes to practice affect the entire nation for generations to come. These are not matters to be taken lightly. While less established scholars are certainly allowed to voice their opinions and make their arguments known, the final decisions must be reached by the leading scholars of the generation. A local rabbi is allowed to rule on local matters but global issues with long-range impact fall on broader shoulders.
Whose shoulders? Reasonable people can disagree on who is the right choice but there can still be widespread agreement on who is unqualified for that role.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Audio Roundup LXIX
by Joel RichQuestion: (PC Way) – What process do pulpit rabbis/organizations use in due diligence checks of kashrut certifiers? (What I really mean) why is triangle K seemingly not “accepted”?
With regard to an earlier question (link):
Our Rabbi, Ha-Rav Tzvi Yehudah Ha-Cohain Kook
The Honor of Women
Our Rabbi gave classes for the yeshiva students at his house, and they set up an amplification system into the apartment next door so that the women could hear. There was sometimes a problem with the system and our Rabbi would wait until they fixed it. He would explain that for the honor of women he was obligated to delay so that they could also hear.
Click here to read moreWith all of our Rabbi's care regarding issues relating to modesty, our Rabbi was also strict about women's honor. Before Kiddush on Shabbat day, he would ask over and over: "Are all the women here? 'Women are obligated in Kiddush during the day' (Berachot 20b)."
Our Rabbi would instruct his married students that there was also an obligation to provide their wives with spiritual food. In contrast to the general thought that women are exempt from learning Torah, he would emphasize with a smile that this does not apply to learning about faith: "Is faith a time-bound, positive mitzvah?..."
When the Beit Midrash was in the dormitory building, the women's section was close to the entrance to the Beit Midrash. There was a sign: "Women are requested not to linger in the hallway after davening" [in order that women and men not intermingle]. When our Rabbi saw it, he asked that the note be taken down and rewritten in a more general manner: "The community is requested not to linger in the hallway after davening," in order not to offend the honor of the women.
Our Rabbi was extremely particular not to stare at women. Even when a woman came to him for a long conversation on important matters, he listened to her carefully and responded warmly – his sight was always to the side. The same was when he gave a class to women. He would stand for a woman who was a Torah scholar, but he would not directly look at her. (Ha-Rav Eliyahu Mali – Iturei Cohanim #176)
And follow on to another earlier question: What, if any, extra effort should be expended to daven mincha in a shul versus at an office minyan? What, if any, extra effort should be expended to daven mincha in a minyan that says full chazarat hashatz versus "heicha kedusha"?
Rabbi A Weiss - Kohanim going into Maarat Hamachpeiloh: link
Can Cohanim pray at the graves of the righteous? What about non-Cohanim?
There’s a medrash that the graves of the righteous don’t generate impurity, but we don’t hold that way. Kever Rachel may be different due to the physical structure of the building.
Don’t worry about how physically close you get to the grave, worry about how you pray; but it is ok to ask others (including those no longer alive) to pray for you [but not to pray to them].
Continuation of series, here focus on whether a) there is a mitzvah today to have a king, but it’s just not practical or b) is the mitzvah not applicable today for technical reasons?
Discussion of use of anesthetic (general? local?) during brit milah. Is there a requirement to experience pain? (What about women in childbirth?) Is there a positive element (if there is no requirement) to the nimol to experience pain? More general question of how to evaluate change from a halachic standpoint [me – assuming you accept that chazal may not have known all of the medical (etc.) information now known!]. Is “we never did it before” a reason not to?
R’M Lichtenstein on what exactly we require of converts.
Comparing text of orthodox, conservative and reform siddurim. Issues such as sacrifices, return to Zion, Aleinu…
Issues discussed include family focus, can you prove existence of HKB”H, hashgacha pratit, army vs. learning as a priority, allocating time to non-learning priorities.
Malachi – discussion of the message of the sefer with some detail. Bottom line – prophecy coming to an end, learn to swim (pray) for yourself, Cohanim must become religious leaders, hold onto your hats – here comes Rabbinic Judaism!
Halacha covers a broad range but areas of hashkafa and aggada don’t have “psak”. (hmmm – I guess he didn’t get the memo)
The main requirement to be a posek – fear of heaven [me – of course this is always the question – not who is a Jew but who is a posek?].
There will be no unanimity of halachic opinion until biyat hamashiach.
Modernity has yielded assimilation, splits within rabbinic opinion etc. Some secular studies makes sense.
First in a series?
First in a series. Discussion of new genre of halacha books – not “lists” but development of concepts. Even within this genre, differing styles. Worth listening to find a writer whose style you may like.
General Issues. Zohar says ger gets a new neshama. R’YBS and others said shelo asani nachri since Jews are only real goy (nation)!
Kabbalat (acceptance) ol mitzvot is the essence of geirut (R’YBS and R’MF had Kabbala that when Rambam/S”A said it isn’t meakev (keep from being effective) it meant don’t need “drama” of doing it in mikvah).
Geirut for marriage is ok b’dieved; can uproot retroactively if “clear” they didn’t mean it – how long? – some say 30 days – certainly less than 5 years!). Man - No brit, no geirut! (some disagreed if medical reason).
Does bet din have to agree to geirut (are they “stand in” for shechina? Klal Yisrael?). Nafka Mina if misled bet din. Is bet din’s presence absolutely needed? Impact of conservative Rabbis in bet din? How does bet din “see” woman’s tvila? Do you ever have to tell a child they are converted – what if you didn’t.
Kabalat ol mitzvot means at the level of orthodox community (e.g. historically didn’t focus on taharat hamishpacha).
RCA decided on its own to upgrade geirut standards well in advance of Chief Rabbinate, situation in Israel is much worse! There was no pressure on the RCA!
Lots of detail.
History of issues, opinions and controversy regarding metzitza. Bottom line – is it an intrinsic part of the mitzvah or just an issue of perceived danger? To be continued….
Review of halachic issues regarding possible damages/prohibition of harm to others involved in second hand smoke [me- IMHO – issue is how society views it]
Which 2 sedrahs have no “breaks” (ptuchot or stumot)? Order of sfarim in Nach? Breaks in Nach not well preserved over time. What is the source of these breaks which always make sense (frum answer – when Moshe needed a break!). There’s only one difference in breaks between our sefer torah and temanim (me – pretty amazing). Psukim were broken up very early. To be continued.
Very clear analysis of issues surrounding Chalav Yisrael including thumbnail sketch of bitul, rov and min bmino. Summary – should be no issue of Torah level but chazal forbad due to kashrut concern of “derivative” of non-kosher animal.
Debate – was it a “davar shebiminyan” which would require a greater bet din to modify? Pri Chadash - it only applies where there is a “realistic” concern of adulteration [me – Miyut hamertzui?]. Chatam Sofer – either it is davar shebiminyan or (worse) a communal neder (oath) [sounded like lo rainu (we never saw) rayah (is a proof {that it must be forbidden always})
R’Moshe (and others) in certain cases (famous Shitah of Tosfot) we say “edut yidiyah blo reah” (it’s like witnesses if everyone knows) and in U.S. combination of government and dairy industry provides this (i.e. it’s all Chalav Yisrael) [me – it should be easily calculable what the additional outlay is for this “coverage” family who uses the stricter definition – an interesting issue of resource allocation]
A young TC asked me if Rabbis hold like that Tosfot here, shouldn’t they also by a female being Tovel for geirut (i.e. just need to hear the splash). BTW – What level of supervision is ued for “Chalav Yisrael”?
Aveirah l’shma (me - see Horiyot for basic discussion)
Cases of Esther and Yael – can we extrapolate that sin (even one of big 3) to save life is ok. And if yes, is it only if to save all of Israel (and requires beit din – perhaps as a horaat shah [temporary measure] and perhaps ruach hakodash [nodeh Byehuda], or for a “large” group (shvut Yaakov) or even a single individual (beit yitzchak) some “practical” applications in sh”ut literature [me – I’m not convinced that in every case that the terminology was used they meant a technical construct; sometimes seems like “libi omer li”]
Halacha wrestles to get modern banking system (checks, credit cards, internet purchases) into Kinyanic (yes, I just made that word up) constructs.
Women Receiving Aliyot?
Women Receiving Aliyot? A Short Halakhic Analysis(Abridged)
by Michael J. Broyde
Michael J. Broyde is a law professor and Project Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University’s School of Law. He is also a dayan in the Beth Din of America and was the Founding Rabbi of the Young Israel in Atlanta.
This article will appear in unabridged form in the forthcoming Festschrift in honor of the retirement of Professor Bernard Jackson, Chairman of the Jewish Law Association. At the request of the publisher, the footnotes have been deleted in this posted version.
Click here to read moreAbstract: This article focuses on the fundamental underlying issue of women receiving aliyot: whether the practice is consistent with the minimal halakha of Torah reading, and if so, how. The article begins with a discussion of the dispute between Maharam and Rashba about aliyot protocol in a city where all of the men are kohanim. The second section discusses the views of the Tur, the Shulhan Arukh, and post-medieval posekim. This article concludes that, though the possibility of women receiving aliyot was disputed among the Rishonim, posekim from the Tur onward are nearly unanimous in insisting that Jewish law prohibits women from receiving aliyot.
Introduction
Over the last few years an innovation has been suggested to Orthodox synagogue ritual: Women should receive aliyot and read Torah as part of the public reading of Torah every Shabbat (in the presence of a minyan of men). Much has been written about this proposal, focusing on many different aspects of it, from the breach of minhag yisrael to the public policy issues, to such concepts as the dignity of the congregation and the dignity of the people, to the rules of modesty of women and the proposed need for public sanction by eminent halakhic authorities for such a dramatic change (footnote removed).
This article will not address any of those issues, but will focus instead on the crucial underlying issue which, in this writer’s opinion, has not received sufficient attention – whether this proposed change is consistent with the minimal halakha of Torah reading, independent of any other issues (footnote removed), and if so, how. The article begins with a discussion of the dispute between Maharam and Rashba about a city where all of the men are kohanim. The crux of this dispute rests on two issues: whether or not pegam (stigma) kohen is subjectively or objectively generated, and whether or not women can be oleh as a matter of base-line halakha. The second section of the article discusses the view of Tur, Shulhan Arukh, and post-medieval posekim. This article concludes that, though the possibility of women receiving aliyot (as a matter of hilchot keri’at ha-Torah) was disputed among the Rishonim, posekim from the Tur onward are nearly unanimous in insisting that Jewish law prohibits such aliyot.
The Talmud in Megillah 23a, quoting a beraita, states:
Anyone may count towards the obligation [footnote removed] as a member of the seven mandatory aliyot [on Shabbat], even a minor, even a woman; but the Sages stated that a woman may not read from the Torah due to the dignity of the community (tzibbur).Relevant as this issue might seem, there is almost no further discussion of this point in the Talmudic sources. Is this assertion that women may not receive aliyot a rabbinic decree, good advice, or something else? There is no further analysis of this Talmudic source at all, and a serious discussion of it waited for the era of the Rishonim to elaborate and codify the halakha on this matter.
The Dispute Between Maharam and Rashba about a City Where All the Men are Kohanim
Exactly such a discussion starts with the famous question of how to allocate aliyot in a city where all the men are kohanim (footnote removed). The Talmudic rule (Gittin 59b) requires that the first aliyah goes to a kohen, the second to a levi, and the remaining five to yisraelim. What does one do when one cannot distribute the aliyot in that manner due to lack of yisraelim? The Talmud (Gittin 59b) indicates that there is a prohibition to give one kohen an aliyah after another one (and one levi after another) as this generates doubt as to whether the first kohen is really a valid kohen – called pegam (stigma) kohen (footnote removed). It is obvious, however, that in a city where all are kohanim, one cannot follow this rule and have a successful Torah reading, as there are only kohanim to receive aliyot. The proper protocol in this case was a dispute among the Rishonim.
Maharam proposes a solution relevant to this problem and also to women receiving aliyot. He states that:
It appears to me that the [selfsame] kohen receives the first two aliyot, [footnote removed] and after that women should read the Torah, since the Talmud tells us that all can receive aliyot to make up the seven, and the Talmud later recounts that the Sages decreed that a women may not read from the Torah due to the dignity of the congregation – when no other possibility is available, the dignity of the congregation is discarded lest we impute ancestral sin by the kohanim, since if additional kohanim read Torah, people might say that the initial kohanim are children of divorce [and not really kohanim] [footnote removed].The understanding of halakha upon which his view is predicated seems simple. Since the Talmud does not categorically preclude women from receiving aliyot, in a time of need one may conduct oneself consistent with the initial Talmudic rule that permits aliyot for women and assume that the congregation has waived its dignity. This congregation does not have enough people to give aliyot to, absent the women, thus, it has no choice but to waive its dignity in order to read Torah. This is better than either not reading Torah or calling up only kohanim, which Maharam posits is simply prohibited, based on the Talmudic rule found in Gittin 59b, which prohibits two kohanim from getting aliyot one after another due to pegam kohen. A number of Rishonim agree with this view, including Hagahot Maimoniot and the Mordechai (footnote removed). According to Maharam, there is no objective rabbinic decree flatly prohibiting women from receiving aliyot in all circumstances.
Of course, even if the Maharam is correct as a matter of halakha, it is still a leap to allow women to receive aliyot generally, but – it must be conceded – it is a leap that is within the range of possibility. One could confine the Maharam to a case where men could not receive the aliyot, and refuse to analogize cases where men cannot receive aliyot to cases where enough men could (footnote removed). However, it would not be beyond the pale to assert that, given the perceived reality of our society and the sha’at ha-dehak that some see, contemporary conditions give rise to enough of a be-de’avad situation to permit this conduct in a time of need. Such a line of reasoning has been spelled out by many others, and seems possible within the confines of the Maharam (footnote removed).
In contrast to the view of the Maharam stands the view of the Rashba. Rashba states:
In Chapter ha-Nizakin (Gittin 59b) it appears that one kohen should never receive an aliyah after another kohen, lest it imply that the first or second kohen is invalid, as it states there. In a city where all are kohanim, what should they do?...In a place where all are kohanim or there are not enough yisraelim as needed, one kohen receives an aliyah after another, and there is no stigma (pegam) since they all know that there are only kohanim present, and the second kohen knows that he is reading not because of the stigma of the first kohen, but because there are no yisraelim present.This is true for the third and the fourth and for all of them [footnote removed].
Rashba posits that only male kohanim should get aliyot in a town where all the men are kohanim, and everyone will understand that there is no invalidation of the kohanim in such a case, as there is no choice but to give kohanim all the aliyot (footnote removed). The intellectual basis for the Rashba is apparent. Rashba maintains that the doctrine of pegam kohen has a socially subjective component to it. There is no concern for stigma, and indeed none arises, when all the people in the congregation understand that one kohen is being oleh after another due to the fact that there is no choice as to whom else to give the aliyah. All the people listening to the Torah reading understand why this is happening, and do not think that any of the kohanim are actually invalid, since they know that no other choice is possible. Many Rishonim adopt the view of Rashba (footnote removed), yet the matter remained a dispute among the Rishonim.
Although the primary dispute between Rashba and Maharam is about whether pegam to a kohen is objectively determined by the abstract halakha, or subjectively determined by the knowledge of the people at this particular Torah reading, there is an important ancillary question that also needs to be resolved: why does the Rashba not consider the possibility of women receiving aliyot (as the Maharam proposes)? After all, given the presence of women who can receive aliyot (as Maharam claims), maybe the kohanim are in fact stigmatized– as the essence of the stigma, in Rashba’s view, occurs when a kohen receives an aliyah after another kohen when someone else could have (footnote removed).
This question is extremely important to the question of women receiving aliyot. According to both Maharam and Rashba, there is an improper stigma imposed on kohanim when a kohen receives an aliyah immediately after another kohen in the presence of a non-kohen who may receive an aliyah. Thus, both Rashba and Maharam agree that it is a violation of halakha to give two kohanim consecutive aliyot: Maharam accepts that this is a rabbinic decree with no exceptions and Rashba accepts that this decree does not apply when no one else in the congregation is eligible to receive an aliyah. Maharam thinks that the presence of women who could be olot obviates the issue of stigma, and thus one must give women aliyot when no other yisraelim are present, as the alternative stigmatizes kohanim in violation of halakha. The intellectual predicate of Maharam’s view is that women may receive aliyot in certain cases.
The Rashba maintains that women are generally ineligible to receive aliyot, and the nature of the decree of the Sages prohibiting women from receiving aliyot – even as it is built around the dignity of the congregation – appears in his view to be un-alterable by the reality on the ground. Since women cannot receive aliyot as a matter of halakha according to Rashba, women’s presence in the congregation does not generate pegam to the kohanim, and some other solution must be adopted if Torah reading is to proceed – and that is for one kohen get an aliyah after another (footnote removed).
Rashba is not merely positing an alternative solution to the one put forward by Maharam, or even a better solution than Maharam’s while conceding that the Maharam’s also can work. Instead, Rashba’s approach is predicated on the view that the solution put forward by Maharam is untenable, as women cannot receive aliyot as a matter of Jewish law by rabbinic decree (footnote removed). The simple and direct language of the Rashba in this teshuva directly supports the sub-silentio argument that women simply cannot receive aliyot. His phrasing of the issue “in a place where all are kohanim or there are not enough yisraelim to receive the aliyot” seems to simply exclude women from the counting; the same type of language is present in his discussion of the answer, where he states “everyone knows that there are only kohanim present, and a second kohen cannot read because of stigma (pegam), except in a case where there is no yisrael present”. This categorical linguistic exclusion only makes sense if – in fact – women are excluded.
According to Rashba, pegam kohen can, however, be generated by presence of minors. Thus, if there were ten kohanim and five minor yisraelim in a city, the minors would certainly have to get the yisrael aliyot, since the Gemara in Megillah 23 allows minors to receive aliyot. Their presence generates stigma (pegam) if two kohanim receive successive aliyot in the presence of these eligible minors – since the kohanim do not have to receive such aliyot, if they do, it is because the first kohen is defective. (Maharam agrees to this as well.) (footnote removed) For Rashba, the presence of women in the congregation cannot create any stigma (pegam) for the kohanim by their presence, such that the kohanim would not be able to receive multiple aliyot. Rashba’s position simply makes no sense if women are ever practically eligible to receive aliyot – pegam is attached to the kohanim exactly by such a person being present.
Nor is it possible to answer this question by positing that women simply were not present, as Rashba derives this halakha from the Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi) (Gittin, 5:9) which states:
Rabbi Haninah states: A city which is all kohanim (except for one), the single yisrael reads Torah first as such is the way of peace Rabbi Acha and Rabbi Tanhum the son of Rav Hiya states in the name of Rabbi Simlay: A city which is all kohanim, all the kohanim bless the people; to who do they bless? To their brothers in the north and the south. Who answers after the kohanim? The women and children.Thus it is clear that women were present in the synagogue, and were capable of ritual participation in synagogue activity – but yet, Rashba posits (correctly, from the view of the Yerushalmi) that one sees that women cannot receive aliyot, even though they can ritually participate in the priestly blessing (footnote removed).
Section Summary
One sees two views in the Rishonim as to what to do when all the congregants in the village are kohanim.
A. Maharam maintains that two or more kohanim may never receive consecutive aliyot due to the objectively determined stigma imposed on the first kohen in that case, and others must be oleh. Since women can receive aliyot as a matter of halakha when the tzibbur so directs, when there are no male leviim or yisraelim in the room, women receive aliyot (footnote removed).There is no middle ground between these two views – either women can or cannot receive aliyot. Each answer views the other as wrong – and this is independent of any general dispute about kavod ha-tzibbur in other contexts. One can say with some halakhic confidence that seven hundred years ago, a person living in Northern France or Southern Germany (those areas where the intellectual school of thought of the Maharam dominated) would not be considered a sinner if he or she lived in a village where all the adult men were kohanim and women received aliyot after them, as this school of thought was certainly a reasonable one for a moreh hora’ah to choose at that time.
B. Rashba maintains that multiple kohanim may receive aliyot when not enough eligible yisraelim are present, as stigma is determined subjectively. Women, however, may never get aliyot, as a rabbinic prohibition. Their presence does not generate stigma (pegam) on the kohanim so as to prevent two or more kohanim from receiving sequential aliyot in the presence of women.
The View of the Tur, Shulhan Arukh, and Post-Medieval Posekim
Jewish law is not intellectually static, and disputes can close. The question of the city with only male kohanim is widely discussed in the halakhic literature from the Tur onward, with many different aspects of the matter addressed. However, from the Tur onward, one does not see a single halakhic authority who accepts the view of the Maharam as a matter of Jewish law. The Tur rejects it (footnote removed), as do Bach (footnote removed), and Shulhan Arukh (footnote removed), as does Rama by his silence, and Levush (footnote removed) explicitly. So do the classical commentators on the Shulhan Arukh, including Taz (footnote removed), Magen Avraham (footnote removed), Gra (footnote removed), Birkei Yosef (footnote removed), Mishnah Berurah (footnote removed), and Arukh ha-Shulhan (footnote removed). Maharshal also agrees with the Rashba, as do other super-commentaries writing about normative Jewish law (footnote removed). Indeed, I have seen no authorities after the time of the Shulhan Arukh who adopt the view of the Maharam as correct or even plausible (bar samchi) – not a single one of the classical commentaries printed in the standard Shulhan Arukh even makes mention of the Maharam’s view (footnote removed).
The reason why these authorities seem to have rejected the view of Maharam and adopted the view of the Rashba is that the latter view is supported by an explicit statement in the Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi). The Yerushalmi states in the name of Rabbi Haninah that in a city in which there is but one yisrael and the rest are kohanim, the yisrael receives the first aliyah (footnote removed). This ruling can be understood as indicating that the presence of women in the congregation does not count toward creating stigma (pegam), as women can never receive aliyot by rabbinic decree. If the proper solution was that women should receive aliyot, the Jerusalem Talmud would have told us so. So strong is this question from the Yerushalmi on the Maharam, that even the Maharshal, who is generally a staunch defender of the school of thought of Maharam, writes that, “if Maharam had seen the Jerusalem Talmud, he would have retracted his view” (footnote removed). There seems to be no way in which to harmonize the Maharam’s view with that of the Jerusalem Talmud, and it is for that reason that his view is forsaken by halakhic authorities.
When considering the situation of a city where all the men are kohanim, Tosafot (Gittin 59a sv ki) suggests a different solution than those offered by the Maharam and Rashba:
In the name of Rabbenu Yehuda it is written that in a synagogue in which there are only kohanim, one kohen reads in the place of all seven, and for every aliyah he blesses before and after [footnote removed].Although his solution is rejected le’halakha (footnote removed), its predicate would seem to be that women are not olot, as he makes no mention of the possibility of women receiving aliyot to solve this problem.
Nor should one think that the formulation for the prohibition of women receiving aliyot found in Shulhan Arukh OC 282:2 is at tension with this analysis (footnote removed). That the Shulhan Arukh quotes both the pre and post decree status of halakha is not his typical style, but it is well within the normal linguistic framework of the Shulhan Arukh. Shulhan Arukh frequently introduces contemporary halakha with a framing of issues that requires that he discuss in the code both normative halakha and the halakha that preceded the Talmudic halakha – it certainly implies no acceptance of the view of Maharam (footnote removed). Rama’s formulation is more troubling. Given the fact that Rama quotes the Maharam in the Darkhei Moshe, but chooses not to quote him in the Rama is a fairly clear indication that he too agrees that the halakha does not follow the view of the Maharam (footnote removed).
It is worth noting that Maharam’s view, that a village with only kohanim should give women aliyot, is forsaken even by those Rishonim and Aharonim who agree with him generally that dignity of the congregation can be waived in many situations. For example, a similar dispute takes place between Maharam and Rashba about a related topic, which sharpens one sense of this dispute about aliyot, and is worth noting. The issue at hand is whether one may publicly read from a pasul sefer Torah when no other scroll is present. Maharam states (as quoted in the Mordechai):
...What is the rule with regard to reading from a humash [as opposed to a Torah scroll] to fulfill the communal obligation? And we conclude that it is not to be done due to the dignity of the congregation, and it appears that if the community forgives its dignity, it is permitted... [footnote removed]/blockquote>Rashba argues and insists that kavod ha-tzibbur may never be waived and such a Torah may never be used; instead, Torah reading should be cancelled (footnote removed).Many halakhic authorities agree with the ruling of the Maharam in this case, including a teshuvah of Maimonides which permits one to read from such a Torah and recite blessings (footnote removed). It is not without precedent in Jewish law that a community can forgive its dignity generally, and there is quite a literature which shows that many halakhic authorities in many different contexts permitted this. Indeed, the view of the Rambam and Maharam are relied on be-de’vad by no lesser authorities than Arukh ha-Shulhan and Mishnah Berurah (footnote removed).
Why do these same halakhic authorities accept the Maharam that dignity of the community can be waived in some cases, but yet understand that the specific decree prohibiting women from reading from the Torah is different in nature than the more general concept of kavod ha-tzibbur? Indeed, these same authorities accept the ruling of Rashba that categorically prohibits women’s aliyot – and this includes schools of thought that are generally very deferential to Maharam. The answer, I suspect, is that the Jerusalem Talmud makes it clear that in a city with only men who are kohanim in residence, women cannot receive aliyot by rabbinic decree, contrary to the ruling of Maharam. Based on this, I suspect that posekim intuited something different about this issue in contrast to other cases of kavod ha-tzibbur.
One might be tempted to argue that maybe Rashba’s followers merely have a different balance for women’s aliyot, and that even Rashba’s followers might agree that there could arise a case where women could be olot, as social stigma of kavod ha-tzibbur could be waived. In this theory, all that Rashba is doing is weighting one type of societally dependent stigma more heavily than the other – sort of “it is better to insult some kohanim than insult all men by calling women”, and still argue that women’s aliyot are not categorically precluded.
There are three serious flaws with this approach. First, it denies that there is a connection between who can be oleh and generating stigma to kohanim. Maharam is conceptually forced to give women aliyot, as (since he thinks women can sometimes be oleh) their presence must generate pegam to the kohen. Rashba’s followers do not contemplate that possibility since they deny that women can ever be oleh. Since they cannot be oleh ever, no pegam is possible, whereas people who can sometimes be oleh generate pegam (such as a minor in Talmudic times).
Second, this socially subjective explanation (the men are choosing not to waive kavod ha-tzibbur, even though they could, even according to Rashba) is centrally missing from Rashba. Many Rishonim believed that kavod ha-tzibbur could be waived in some cases (and they clearly had Maharam in front of them noting that it could be done for women). Yet they do not note that in a city of all kohanim, unless the tzibbur waives its kavod, only kohanim should be oleh, but if the tzibbur waives its kavod, then any can be oleh. The Levush (OC135:13) makes it clear that this view is rejected by later posekim.
Finally, if Rashba conceives of pegam kohen to be societally subjective (as he notes), there is no reason to put forward that he or his followers assume that women’s aliyot are also subjective, but still are outweighed by pegam kohen. Rather, it makes sense that he considers women’s aliyot to be objectively assur and that is the way he puts it on a higher level. If they are equal, we have no reason to pick one over the other.
It is important to understand that the ruling of the Rashba, that in a village of all kohanim, women are not oleh, but all the kohanim are oleh, is accepted as normative halakha. This is not only held by those posekim who accept the Rashba’s general theory of kavod ha-tzibbur as un-waivable, but also by those who generally argue with his theory, and accept that kavod ha-tzibbur can be waived in many cases – but not with regard to women’s aliyot.
Section Summary
Although there was a dispute among the Rishonim about what to do in a city with only male kohanim, (with the Maharam permitting women to receive aliyot in such a case and Rashba prohibiting women’s aliyot even in such a case) over the last five hundred years a deep and wide consensus has developed in halakha that Rashba is correct and Maharam is not to be followed – and women’s aliyot would then seem to be a violation of the halakha. To the best of this writer’s knowledge, no halakhic authority of the last five hundred years has disagreed with that consensus and thus halakhic practice is to generally prohibit women from receiving aliyot in all situations.
Some readers will be troubled by this conclusion, as a close read of the three teshuvot of the Rashba does not even make mention of women receiving aliyot. How can he be so clearly against it, one might ask, if he does not discuss it? The answer is important to understand conceptually. Precisely because Rashba and those who follow his view make no mention of the possibility of women receiving aliyot, and instead formulate an answer to the question of what to do in a city of kohanim that presupposes that women cannot receive aliyot, one has no choice but to accept that–if the Rashba is correct as a matter of halakha–it is because women cannot receive aliyot. Women’s presence does not create stigma for kohanim because they are not olot. Maharam thinks women can be oleh, and therefore do create stigma.
This understanding is also clear from many early and late explanations of the Rashba. Consider the comments of the Levush:
But, if there are kohanim and leviim and no yisraelim, or kohanim and yisraelim but no leviim, or leviim and yisraelim but no kohen, and no one group has the minimum number needed to get all the aliyot, I have not found for them any solution [and no Torah reading should occur]…But if there is seven from one group, then all of that group receives the aliyot [footnote removed].According to the Levush (who clearly accepts the view of the Rashba on this matter), when there are five kohanim and five leviim, no Torah reading takes place, as the problem of stigma (pegam) cannot be fixed. Why not give women aliyot rather than cease reading Torah according to the Levush? The answer is – albeit unstated – that the Levush recognizes that according to the approach of the Rashba, women cannot receive aliyot. Others propose other solutions to this problem predicated on the view of the Rashba, but – no matter how complex the problem – no one suggests that women be olot (footnote removed).
A further proof to the fact that women were generally thought to be simply ineligible for aliyot can be found in the treatment of aliyot by minors, which the Talmud (Megillah 23b) would seem to permit. Yet the broad and deep consensus of Rishonim and Achronim is that since nowadays each oleh recites their own blessing over Torah reading, we do not allow a minor to be called up to the Torah anymore. As the Arukh ha-Shulhan states:
Even though by Talmudic rule a minor can receive an aliyah to the seven aliyot, nonetheless, to us since all of those who receive aliyot recite blessings, we do not call up a minor for the seven aliyot [footnote removed]This rationale provides yet further proof to the proposition that women simply are not oleh according to the analysis of Rashba, in that if minors (who were permitted by Talmudic law to receive aliyot,) no longer may, this is even more so true for women (who were not permitted aliyot by Talmudic convention). Of course, Maharam disagrees with that analysis and directs that minors too may be oleh – but in this instance as well his view is not accepted.
As a side note, this halakhic analysis also explains why significant Aharonim and Rishonim repeatedly discuss each of the cases where dignity of the congregation is advanced as a reason to prohibit an activity (such as publicly reading from a pasul or partial Torah (footnote removed), or rolling a Torah during services) (footnote removed). Many conclude that such conduct is permitted in some situations and that a congregation can waive its dignity in a time of need–but in the recorded history of halakha (other than those few who accept the view of Maharam with regard to a city of all kohanim) one finds essentially no one who permits, or who even ponders the possibility of permitting, women to receive aliyot. Rashba’s analysis prohibited it, and his view was accepted as normative (footnote removed). This point also clarifies why it would be halakhically incorrect to analogize from the other cases of communal dignity to this one, as many have (incorrectly) done. Those who permit women’s aliyot can only do so by arguing that the dispute between Rashba and Maharam was wrongly decided in favor of Rashba (footnote removed) and that kavod ha-tzibbur can be waived in this case.
Conclusion
In Jewish law there are some matters that are in dispute for many generations with halakhic decisors taking diverse stands on the matters, and in such cases each and every Jewish law authority is entitled to resolve the matter in accordance with their own judgment and inclination – the Jewish law authority need not be able to “prove” their view to be absolutely correct, but can voice an opinion on an open dispute with less than certain proofs, and be relied on in practice. One is hard-pressed to be categorically wrong (or right) in such a case. Indeed, one could claim that such is exactly the job of a competent Jewish law authority (footnote removed).
On the other hand, there are many disputes in halakha that were open for a period of time and then functionally closed, as a strong intellectual consensus developed as to which view was correct (and which was not). Of course, just because disputes among the Rishonim are apparently resolved by the consensus of the modern posekim does not make them permanently closed – a contemporary halakhic authority can reopen a debate among Rishonim that appears to be closed, and can even argue with Rishonim in such cases (footnote removed). However, such can only be done when the halakhic authority who is reopening the debate claims to have clear proof as to why the view that was heretofore thought to be wrong is actually correct (footnote removed). It may not be done merely based on a practical desire to prefer one view over another in a time of need (which a posek certainly may do when a dispute is still open). It is well established that one may not rely on a discarded view of a Rishon not cited in the Shulhan Arukh without demonstrable analytic proof that this heretofore discarded view is indeed correct. So too, it is much more complex and difficult to rely on a view that is not even cited in the Tur or Shulhan Arukh than it is to rely on a cited view in the primary codes.
Women receiving aliyot is an example of such an intellectual movement in halakha. A group of Rishonim advanced a rationale that could plausibly permit women to receive aliyot in certain cases, and for a period of time this matter could fairly have been described as an open dispute within the sea of Torah, with authorities taking both sides of this issue. Gradually, over time, this dispute closed, as the unanimous intellectual weight of the posekim of the last six hundred years sided with Rashba, as the Yerushalmi is on his side. Consequently, one has not encountered a posek in the last five hundred years who actually accepts the view that women can receive aliyot as correct or even tenable, even in a case where all the congregation are kohanim. In the absence of an intellectually persuasive explanation for why the view of the Maharam is indeed correct (footnote removed), and the view of the Rashba wrong, it would be outside of the framework of normative halakha today to rely on the view of the Maharam absent a persuasive explanation of why the view of the Rashba, which is adopted by nearly all subsequent halakhic authorities, is not persuasive and the view of Maharam is plausible (footnote removed).
One who reads the literature written by those who favor women receiving aliyot (and even the literature by many of those opposed to this practice) finds that it seems to completely miss this issue. Instead, the arguments seems to focus on such secondary questions as whether dignity to the congregation can change over time, or how minhag can change, or what is the relationship between human dignity and congregational dignity, and many other secondary issues. In fact, no matter how one resolves those secondary issues, it seems to me that the intellectual predicate of the view of the Rashba – that women cannot receive aliyot due to an explicit rabbinic decree – has been adopted as the normative halakha in this matter, and all the other arguments are moot.
Weekly Links
Rules: link (Note that this post will move every day until the end of the week)Thursday
- SALT today: link
- Prof. Jacob Neusner on his return to Reform: link
- New international rabbinic organization founded by R. Avi Weiss and R. Marc Angel, considering the inclusion of women: link
Previous days' linksWednesday
- SALT today: link
- R. Jonathan Sacks: Islam must separate religion from power: link
- "Kick a Jew day" in Florida school: link
- Knesset battle over shtreimels: link
- R. Yona Metzger: Know the facts before ruling on prisoner swaps: link (does this also apply to Shabbos elevators?)
- R. Yaakov Horowitz: Abuse Survivors: Please Don't Suffer Alone: link
- SALT today: link
- Clergy protection from same-sex marriage link
- Rampant workplace sexual harassment in Israel: link
- Man in "coma" for 23 years was really just paralyzed and awake: link
- Sy Syms passes away: link
- R. Yosef Blau on women rabbis: link
- Book calls Jewish People an invention: link
- RCA bans Messianic Chabad rabbis from joining group: link
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Celebrating Thanksgiving Can Save This Country
R. Michael Broyde has exhausted the discussion of the permissibility of observing Thanksgiving (link). I'd like to discuss here the reason why, assuming observing Thanksgiving is permissible, it is a good thing.In The Home We Build Together, R. Jonathan Sacks argues that multiculturalism is destroying Western countries. When everyone clings exclusively to their ethnic heritage, there is no common culture to bind all members of the country together. There is no common language that everyone speaks and universally accepted morality that everyone observes. There is no cohesion between social groups.
Click here to read moreTo solve this problem, R. Sacks suggests that we need a covenant, an agreement to work together for mutual benefit because otherwise society will collapse. Part of this covenant is a national culture that includes a basic language of morality and patriotism. Before multiculturalism, there was a monoculturalism. Everyone had to either assimilate into the majority or remain an outsider to society. That model will not work anymore. Instead, what we need is a bare-bones national culture that transcends, and does not clash with, individual ethnic cultures to facilitate social cohesion.
Part of creating, or reviving, a national culture is promoting non-sectarian holidays, universal celebrations that tell a story about the history and values of the country. These facilitate the shared morality and language, and promote loyalty to the country and to those who are part of the shared culture.In other words, celebrating Thanksgiving and what it stands for is part of conquering multiculturalism and reestablishing a basic morality in this country. So eat up that turkey and enjoy the cranberry sauce.
Parashah Roundup: Vayetze 5770
by Steve BrizelYaakov's Journey
Torah Education and Torah Values
Click here to read moreThe Dream and The Vow
Tefilas Arvis Reshus
The Dust of the Earth
Leah and Rachel
The Threat of Lavan
The Covenant of Separation
Thanksgiving
Shoalim Vdorshim Department
Announcements #122: End the Madness Event
EndTheMadness proudly announces its Sixth Annual Small Group Discussion Group"Settling" for a Spouse: Positive or Negative?
DATE: Wednesday night, December 2, 2009
TIME: 7PM-10PM
PLACE: Congregation Adereth El, 133 E. 29th St., New York, NY
ADMISSION: $10 in advance, $15 at the door
Pizza and drinks will be served before the groups begin.
Groups will be moderated to maximize interaction and effectiveness.
Open to singles age 23-35 - age limit will be strictly enforced!
To make a reservation, please contact Michael Feldstein at
michaelgfeldstein@gmail.com or call 203-973-6279
(Announce your simchah or Torah lectures by clicking on the
button in the top right corner of Hirhurim. See here for readership statistics and here for instructions on buying an announcement.)The Anniversary of Evolution
Yesterday was the 150th anniversary of publication of Darwin's Origin of the Species. In celebration of the momentous occasion, I direct readers to the Templeton Foundation symposium about the question -- "Does evolution explain human nature?": link. Hint: Some say yes and some say no.
Warning: Expect some essays to be very anti-religious.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Hebrew Publishing
Prof. Shaul Stampfer, "What Did 'Knowing Hebrew' Mean in Eastern Europe?" in Lewis Glinert ed., Hebrew in Ashkenaz: A Language in Exile, p. 137:In the twentieth century, literary creativity in Hebrew and publication in Hebrew continually lagged behind that of Yiddish in Poland. Of about a thousand Jewish books published in Poland in 1928, about a quarter were in Hebrew. Two years later, the share of Hebrew books was under 20 percent. This does not necessarily mean that there was a decline in the readership of Hebrew. The drop might well be the product of increased imports from Eretz-Israel. What it does mean is that patterns of Jewish publishing were becoming more and more like those of other nations in that vernaculars took the lead.Which makes me wonder, what percentage of Jewish books in the US is published in Hebrew?
Announcements #121: Mission of Orthodoxy
Mission of Orthodoxy ProjectThe Webyeshiva is proud to announce the Mission of Orthodoxy Project, a twice-weekly blog by Gidon Rothstein, defining a basic and unarguable mission for Orthodox Jews and Judaism.
First post already up: here.
Read it today!
(Announce your simchah or Torah lectures by clicking on the
button in the top right corner of Hirhurim. See here for readership statistics and here for instructions on buying an announcement.)E-Shiur Reminder
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Just a reminder that my e-shiur through Torah in Motion begins tonight at 9pm EST. The series is called "Recent Books You Should Care About".Tonight we will discuss Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks' vision for repairing the social order in the world in general and in Israel in particular, as presented in his books The Dignity of Difference, The Home We Build Together and Future Tense.
Registration is free but required: link
Last week's class is available for download (for 99 cents) here: link
Semicha (Part I of III)
By: Rabbi Ari EnkinSemicha refers to a diploma which certifies the recipient's proficiency in halacha,[1] and authorizes him to serve as a rabbi. However, semicha in its classical sense refers to the ancient hallowed ordination which traces its lineage from teacher to student all the way back to Moshe Rabbeinu. The Torah tells us that Moshe Rabbeinu ordained Yehoshua as his successor by performing semicha (lit. "laying of the hands") upon him.[2] Moshe also ordained the seventy elders of Israel, who in turn ordained additional students.[3] This chain of semicha continued right through to the Roman Empire, at which time a decree was made forbidding the continuation of rabbinical ordination.[4] There have been a number of attempts throughout history to reinstate this original semicha, though these efforts have ultimately been unsuccessful.
Click here to read moreThere is a widespread practice for men to endeavor to receive semicha prior to marriage. This is true even if one has no intention of serving as a rabbi in any professional capacity. The idea behind this is because the material studied in the course of rabbinical ordination includes many practical and useful topics which arise frequently in a Jewish home. In fact, we are told that one should endeavor to become proficient enough in halacha to the point where one will not need to contact a rabbi for halachic queries.[5] One should hold a celebration in honor of receiving semicha, complete with a festive meal and the singing of appropriate songs.[6]
It may have been the late Lubavitcher Rebbe who revitalized the practice of students studying for rabbinical ordination on such an extensive scale.[7] Rabbi Joseph Ber Soloveitchik was no less a pioneer in organizing and preparing students for rabbinical ordination – however, in most cases, he did so with the intention that graduates would enter the rabbinate in some professional capacity. The Rebbe encouraged it primarily for the advantages of being proficient in these areas of halacha but also for professional purposes. One should endeavor to receive semicha from three rabbis.[8]
Before a yeshiva or other semicha-granting institution admits a student to its semicha program, it is necessary for them to ensure that the candidate has already achieved a high level of scholarship. This is especially important because semicha programs do not generally delve into the details of routine halachic matters, as it is assumed that the student is already familiar with those topics. While the completion of a semicha program and receiving the title "rabbi" is certainly grounds for both celebration and honor, it does not in any way testify that the newly-ordained individual is proficient in every area of Torah law. The granting of semicha merely testifies that the recipient has studied and amassed knowledge in very specific areas of halacha. It does not imply that the graduate is especially knowledgeable in areas of halacha which were not part of his semicha studies. It does, however, imply that the ordained individual has been found competent to make decisions in other areas of halacha after carefully reviewing all the relevant texts. A rabbi who issues halachic rulings in areas of halacha in which he is not especially fluent is called "and evil and arrogant person".[9]
Next Week: "Yoreh Yoreh", "Yadin Yadin", "Yatir Yatir", and the enigmatic "Rav U'manhig"
Feel free to send me "tidbits" and "factoids" for inclusion.
(Thanks Amiel!)
*********************************************************
[1] Rema Y.D. 242:14
[2] Bamidbar 27:15-23, Devarim 34:9
[3] Bamidbar 11:16-25, Rambam Sanhedrin 4:1
[4] Sanhedrin 14a
[5] Shulchan Aruch Harav Talmud Torah 4
[6] Ketubot 17a
[7] Sefer Haminhagim (Chabad) p.75
[8] Sanhedrin 13b
[9] Rambam Talmud Torah 5:30
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Outreach Books
I recently made a list of good outreach books for a friend. Let me present it here with a little elaboration:- Books that try to convince and respond to challenges:
- Nineteen Letters by R. Samson Raphael Hirsch
- Anvil of Sinai by R. Zechariah Fendel
- On Judaism by R. Emanuel Feldman
- A Letter in the Scroll by R. Jonathan Sacks
- This Is My God by Herman Wouk
- Judaism: A Way of Being by David Gelernter
- A Time to Every Purpose by Jonathan Sarna
- On Being a Jew by James Kugel (although written by a controversial figure)
- Halakhic Man by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik
- A World Built, Destroyed, and Rebuilt by R. Yehuda Amital
- Commitment and Complexity by R. Yehuda Amital
- By His Light by R. Aharon Lichtenstein
- One Man's Judaism by R. Emanuel Rackman
- The Sabbath by R. Abraham J. Heschel
- God in Search of Man by R. Abraham J. Heschel
- Faith After the Holocaust by R. Eliezer Berkovits God, Man and History by R. Eliezer Berkovits
A book that tries to inspire about the mission of a Jew:
Click here to read moreBooks that describe the meaningfulness of an observant lifestyle:
Books that try to pique curiosity about Judaism:
Books that present a compelling vision of Judaism:
Some good non-controversial books by controversial
figures:
Friday, November 20, 2009
Weekly Links
Rules: link (Note that this post will move every day until the end of the week)Friday
- SALT today: link
- More on Toldos Avraham Yitzchak rebbe: link
- R. Kenny Schiowitz wins teaching award: link
- Is Asian thinking better suited for the future?: link
Thursday
- SALT today: link
- Arab media claiming Gilad Shalit to be released soon: link
- Woman wearing tallis arrested at Kotel: link
- Secular Jewish academic studies: link
- The first Thanksgiving rabbi's sermon: link
- Chief Rabbi of Israel to punish and maybe fire city rabbis that do not accept Rabbinate converts: link
- SALT today: link
- Intel proposes non-Jewish Sabbath workers: link
- Filmmaker suggests disproportionate response to anti-semitism: link
- Hesder rabbis grapple with IDF insubordination: link
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Audio Roundup LXVIII
by Joel RichQuestion: If one has a choice between davening with a minyan of his own nusach which requires travel or with one of a different nusach next door, how does one evaluate how much extra effort (if any) must be extended to daven with the minyan of his own nusach?
R’A Kotler and R’SR Hirsch as approaches to how we view the avot. R’AK – not even a wiff of any defect; R’SRH – they are lessons in overcoming defects.
Interesting thoughts on how current culture might tend towards one over the other. Is R’SRH a slippery slope? Once we allow for imperfections do we make them too human (me – sounds like why brachot are in second and third person – dynamic tension). My usual response is – of course slopes are slippery, but that’s the world HKB”H chose to create (and he didn’t ask my opinion, just told me “deal with it”!)
Click here to read more
M.O. Halacha is more a question of self-awareness of change being dealt with by halacha. (i.e. everyone does it but MO are aware they do it). Here R’David Tzvi Hoffman deals with going to school in Germany on Shabbat. Interesting point on S.A./Rama (made by R’Sobolofsky elsewhere) that they only had love and war stories in their time. (me – nishtaneh hateva?)
Speaks pretty slowly for a smart guy talking to smart people. Anyway, now I understand (Herman’s Hermits sang about me but left out philosophy – “don’t know much about …”) what the Rav saw in Kant (no ben chorin except if mshubad to Torah) – I just don’t get why anyone would care about this morals business just based on reason.
Great point (because I agree) on reading Tanach without chazal first to see “both sides” of the story and better understand motivations and lessons (of course competing goods are the toughest).
First in a series. Don’t talk Lashon Hara don’t, if you know you shouldn’t, then you won’t, guard your lips from speaking evil in your house, your school and shteibel. Don’t talk Lashon Hara don’t.
Be a positive person!
Chofetz Chaim wrote for those living amongst outside influences (Emet L’Yaakov – the difference between the Yeshiva of Shem V’ever and that of Avraham was regarding the outside world). [me – I assume this was an issue of emphasis not that Avraham’s beit medrash lacked anything!!]
Historical tracing of identification of Yaakov and Esau with Jews and Christians.
Discussion of layout and content of new Sacks/Korein siddur (more MO orthodoxy focus).
Source of requirement to feed animals before you eat? Which animals are covered? Drinking, tasting vs. eating? Who is the requirement on? What are the exceptions? Some mussar as well.
Thought provoking analysis of the R’Gamliel vs. R’Yehoshua controversy as a battle to shape post churban Jewish history. Torat Bet Medrash (insular) vs. Torat Chaim (inclusive) [see above Avraham vs. Shem V’ever] - combination of both was result.
Second in series. Does the Torah mandate (which would imply this was the best political system) monarchy? Or does it not have an opinion? Rambam – Monarchy = mitzvah, others – no. Note that Gideon was offered the opportunity but turned it down. [me – try to correlate opinions on the question of “the King knows best” with times they lived in and tell me the result]
A number of years later but very similar to the earlier reviewed shiur. Here a little more focus on halacha as the singular component/bridge between man and HKB”H. More on the immutability of halacha yet reality does intrude (e.g. Torah wasn’t given to angels) and we apply ideal to real world (reality bites?).
I was struck by this statement: “We shouldn’t dismiss the possibility that certain exposure to societies in which we live may actually contribute to and even enhance halachic debate(?) and greater realization of ideal halachic principles. The possibility of such encounters, rare though they are, not usually the ones we worry about, enables us to engage the modern world even as a lchatchia as long as we keep the guidelines clear."
[me – rare?? ]
Mitnagdic view of Daat Torah was very different from Chassidic but now blurring. Exposure and surrender (complete) to torah yields total integration into the baal mesorah (thus Rambam requires all areas of halachic knowledge for smicha).
Not infallible but a “powerful tool”. (BTW -There is a role for local pulpit rabbi.)
Another wide ranging discussion! Here regarding Tfillin and includes the brachot, why say baruch shem, the relative levels of holiness, wearing at night, time of misheyakir (paging Dr. Bill!), differing calligraphy (is it a psul for a Litvak to wear Ari’s ktav), which arm to wear on (3 opinions) if not a clear “righty”.
Very moving tshuva from R’Moshe on saying bracha at night for those who “had to” put them on then (reflective of time, place and human condition).
If you want to give yourself a headache, listen to the opinion of differing authorities on HKB”H’s intervention in human affairs – Hashgacha Klalit, Hashgacha pratit differing by individual and tzaddik. (Yes Virginia, Jewish philosophy is not monolithic but it’s understandable why the rov am doesn’t seem to know it)
Is it subsumed under general acts of chesed (vahavta lreiecha, imitato dei) or a specific requirement? It seems common sense but remember – the choleh is more than a “cheftzah shel mitzvah” (don’t get me started!) – your job is to give chizuk, practical help and prayer. Don’t be matriarch the choleh and focus on result. As Shakespeare said “All the World’s a stage and all men and women merely players, they have their exits and entrances…” (know when to come and leave!)
MO, charedi? Eilu V’eilu but be passionate in your avodat Hashem. He doesn’t like labels (yeah – but don’t you need to declare a major if you want to credibly work to improve it?)
Physically and intellectually a brave man. Here the focus on military sh”ut – ethics of war.
Jews in 70 CE knew beit mikdash wouldn’t be rebuilt (vs. bayit rishon) [me – he sounds awfully certain of this – not sure why].
Yavneh and R’Yochanan Ben Zakkai (don’t read on if you don’t like academics) – truth is it was probably a refugee city (i.e. the story you know, it’s probably a story) which R’YBZ, in order to have Judaism continue, tried to make into a new Yerushalayim (e.g. blowing shofar on Shabbat). Since couldn’t have sacrifices, but wanted to maintain routine, prayer took it’s place (but still yearn for temple - tension between continuing on but missing what we had).
What is the nature of the responsibility of a grandparent to teach (or pay for) their grandchild torah. How many generations downstream? Females? Can they be forced to? (Doesn’t address if they have input into hashkafa J)
Reviews Rambam and Ran as differing approaches - Rambam as total integration of church and stat, Ran as viewing differeing streams of king and Sanhedrin – more flexible system.
Relevance to today’s issues in Israel.
Is Blogging Tzniusdik?
There's a question going around the Jewish social media (blogs, Twitter, Facebook): Is blogging tzni'usdik?* It seems to me that the question shows a misunderstanding of blogging but a good understanding of tzeni'us.Blogging is a generic term for a medium and does not describe the written content. For example, you can blog about economics or about your dating life. The former is perfectly tzni'usdik, the latter might not be if too explicit. Blogging can be done in many different styles and about many different topics. I can't see how anyone can make a general statement about blogging without differentiating between topics and style. Content is what counts.
Click here to read moreRegarding tzeni'us, however, I find the question perceptive. Tzeni'us is not just about how much skin a woman is showing. As R. Jack Abramowitz writes, in his recently published The Tzniyus Book (pp. 19-20):
Literally, tzniyus means "hidden." The meaning is that certain things are private. Not dirty or shameful, but private. Privacy is a good thing and an important thing...Tzeni'us is about acting dignified and keeping private matters private. Even if you sit in front of your computer with every single inch of your skin covered with baggy clothes, you can still act un-tzni'usdik if you broadcast private things to the world.
Similarly, tzniyus means more than just the secular concepts of modesty and privacy. There are major aspects of modest and privacy to be sure, but tzniyus also includes an aspect of humility and an aspect of dignity. Tzniyus refers not only to dress, but also to speech, actions and comportment.
In the book, R. Abramowitz speaks directly to high school girls. I'm not in that demographic so the language and tone was not what I am used to, but I still found it useful. The book addresses all the issues of contention -- girls wearing pants, kol ishah, "negi'ah" and more.
But most importantly, R. Abramowitz doesn't tell you what to do. He allows for different practices in different communities. As he says time and again, there are multiple legitimate ways to observe Judaism. His book is not about setting a standard but about making readers aware of the issues so they can ask their own rabbis. Much of the book consists of quoting primary sources and commenting about their meanings.
For example, how does he deal with the pants issue? He discusses the primary sources, up to recent responsa (in a detailed section that you can skip and then in bullet points for the browser) and then encourages people to follow the halakhic process. He doesn't say "no" to pants and he doesn't say "yes". He says to follow a legitimate halakhic opinion. In another context, he writes (p. 46):
So who's right? All of them, as long as they base their opinions on accepted Torah opinions, the word of the Torah as explained by the Rabbis.Throughout the book he discusses how tzeni'us applies to both males and females. And most importantly, he continuously emphasizes that tzeni'us is a way of comportment and not just about a dress code. In a sense, this is a feminist book, because it is about tzeni'us empowering women rather than objectifying them.
So what does R. Abramowitz think about the tzeni'us of blogging? He doesn't say, but I suspect he would say that it all depends whether you are putting your private matters into the public domain. If you are -- problem. But if you are just discussing general issues, there's nothing un-tzniusdik about it.
UPDATE: R. Abramowitz sent me the following, in response to my request, about blogging on personal issues:
Tzniyus isn't just about what we wear; it's also about what we say and how we act. Tzniyus is a sense of personal pride and knowing when to keep some things private. Sadly, because of the emotional wall that online communication affords us, many people are comfortable saying things online that they would think twice about before saying in a real-life venue. (It goes without saying that many pictures posted online are not appropriate for the universal access that the Internet facilitates.) Many people have later been "bitten" by their ill-conceived web postings, a fate that could have been avoided with a greater sensitivity to "virtual" tzniyus.
* Tzenius is a noun -- modesty. Tzniusdik is an adjective -- modest.
The Bible In Brief II
The Jewish Press on the publication of the second volume of The Nach Yomi Companion by OU Press (my employer) (link):
How do you make the most popular book in history even more accessible? Many people own a Bible and even start reading it, but only a small percentage ever complete it. In a new book published by OU Press, Rabbi Jack Abramowitz, associate director of the Orthodox Union's Pepa and Rabbi Joseph Karasick Department of Synagogue Services, sets out to change that by paraphrasing the Bible in plain language.Read the full article here: link. And see here for my review of the first volume, which applies equally to the second: link. Buy the books here: link.
In conjunction with the OU's Nach Yomi program of studying a chapter of Bible a day and its corresponding lectures on www.ouradio.org, Rabbi Abramowitz has composed brief summaries of every chapter in Nach (the Hebrew Bible, excluding the Five Books of Moses). His summaries bring the text to life, adding color and humor to sometimes obscure passages, along with frequent pop-culture references that serve to illustrate the scriptural messages...
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Parashah Roundup: Toldos 5770
by Steve BrizelYitzchak and Rivkah, Yaakov and Esau
Click here to read more
Avraham, Yitzchak , Yaakov and the wells
Esau's Sale of the Bchorah
The Avos and their observance of the Mitzvos
The hands are the hands of Esau , but the voice is the voice of Yaakov
Rosh Chodesh and Kiddush HaChodesh
Shoalim Vdorshim Department
Kitniyos III
R. Yosef Tzvi Rimon writes about the Ashkenazic custom to refrain from eating kitniyos on Pesach (link):Do The Various Rationales Apply Today?Also see these posts: I, II
At first glance, one might have thought that all of the reasons mentioned above for forbidding kitniyot on Pesach are no longer relevant today. The truth, however, is that even today these reasons are pertinent. Even today, all types of kitniyot and grains are packaged in the same factories. Thus, we sometimes find wheat kernels in packages of rice, or the like, and therefore the decree should apply today as well. What is more, in recent years food companies have begun to manufacture similar products out of rice and the five grains, such as rice cakes that frequently include the five grains in their ingredients.
Click here to read more[For this reason I am not fond of the idea of Pesach wafers, which look exactly like chametz wafers. While it is not in our power to impose new prohibitions, the decree regarding kitniyot is based on the idea of taking steps to prevent mistakes and deceptions. Even if Torah scholars are unlikely to come to error, the matter must be considered from a broader perspective. When a religious child is seen eating bisli (an popular Israeli snack food) on the street, his non-religious neighbor is liable to think that bisli is not chametz. Furthermore, one should find it emotionally difficult to eat food items on Pesach that look exactly like chametz].
And furthermore, we should add the words of the Meshekh Chokhma (Shemot 12) and the Arukh ha-Shulchan (Yoreh De'ah 115) that the Sages had additional, concealed reasons for the decrees that they imposed, and we must be very careful not to abolish a customary practice just because it seems to us that the reasons for which it had been instituted no longer apply.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Difficult Judaism
I remember hearing or reading that R. Moshe Feinstein blamed the mass defections from Jewish observance in America during the first half of the twentieth century on a simple phrase: "S'iz shver tzu zain a Yid – It is difficult to be a Jew." Because parents would tell their children how difficult it was to struggle to fulfill the commandments, children abandoned the observant life altogether. Instead, R. Feinsten said, parents should have emphasized how wonderful it is to be able to fulfill God’s commandments.Click here to read moreChief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, in his recent book Covenant and Conversation: Genesis – The Book of Beginnings (co-published by OU Press [my employer] and Maggid, an imprint for books of contemporary thought from Koren Publishers Jerusalem), takes the saying and, rather than rejecting it, turns it around. Yes, it is difficult to be a Jew. It is gloriously difficult to live up to the high expectations that you use your Judaism to change the world. Here is what he writes (pp. 140-141):
The ideals of Torah are high, and the story told by Tanakh and Jewish history is all too often suffused with failure and shortcomings. Yet Judaism produced generation after generation of prophets, sages, philosophers and poets, who never relinquished the dream, abandoned the ideals, or lowered their sights. They kept going, as Jacob kept going. There is grandeur in this refusal to abandon the struggle, this sustained reluctance to accept the world as it is, conforming to the conventional wisdom, following the herd. Jews have always been pioneers of the spirit, disturbers of the peace.
The path chosen by Jacob/Israel is not for the fainthearted. Zis schver zu sein a Yid, they used to say: "It's hard to be a Jew." In some ways, it still is. It is not easy to face our fears and wrestle with them, refusing to let go until we have turned them into renewed strength and blessing. But speaking personally, I would have it no other way. Judaism is not faith as illusion, seeing the world through rose-tinted lenses as we would wish it to be. It is faith as relentless honesty, seeing evil as evil and fighting it in the name of life, and good, and God. That is our vocation. It remains a privilege to carry Jacob's destiny, Israel's name.
