Publishing Torah Insights Without Permission

Regarding the correspondence in this post, R. Shaul Yisraeli had sent R. Shlomo Goren a letter about his (R. Goren's) article. R. Goren then wrote a response and forwarded both the letter and the response to the newspaper for publication. R. Goren later said that he had asked the newspaper to obtain permission from R. Yisraeli before publishing his letter, but that never happened and R. Yisraeli was upset. R. Goren then wrote a letter apologizing but arguing that even though he would ask for permission, it was not necessarily halakhically required. R. Yisraeli then published that letter (presumably with permission) along with a response in the journal Techumin, vol. 4 pp. 354-360. Here are the arguments.

1. R. Goren quotes the Gemara in Yoma (4b) derives that you may not repeat something that you hear because it says (Lev. 1:1), "Now the Lord called to Moses, and spoke to him from the tabernacle of meeting, saying." The last word -- "saying" (leimor) -- teaches us that you have to be given explicit permission to repeat something you are told. This is quoted in the Magen Avraham (156:2). Presumably, one would therefore not be allowed to publish a letter without permission.

2. However, the Tosefta (Bava Kamma ch. 7) states that someone who "steals" (overhears) someone else's teachings may go and repeat the teachings. The Shakh (292:35) rules, based on this, that you may copy Torah insights from someone else's book even if he doesn't want you to. Therefore, it would seem that one would be allowed to publish a letter of Torah insights without permission.

3. To explain the contradiction between the above two sources, R. Goren posits that the Gemara in Yoma was referring to non-Torah related material while the Tosefta deals with Torah. Thus, one would technically be allowed to publish a letter of Torah insights without permission. Although it is always best to obtain permission.

4. R. Yisraeli responded that the contradiction can be explained based on the rule that one must review one's Torah thoughts multiple times before teaching them in public, to ensure that they are properly thought out and appropriately worded. Thus, if you tell someone privately a Torah insight he may not repeat it without permission because it might not be sufficiently well thought out for public consumption. Hence the Gemara in Yoma. But an individual may intentionally overhear ("steal") a Torah insight that is not ready for the public, if he himself will also not reveal it to the public. Thus, either way, a letter that was written for an individual should not be shared with the public because the thoughts might be insufficiently worked out or not worded optimally.

(See also this post regarding the proper attribution of secondary sources.)

Read the rest of this entry »

YU Celebrates Ancient Oppressive Cultures

In honor of his eightieth birthday, students of Louis Feldman, Distinguished Professor of Ancient Goyishe Zachen at Yeshiva University, held a toga party to celebrate his many years of instructing Yeshiva students in the civilizations that banned circumcision and Torah study, defiled the holy sanctuary, destroyed the Temple and exiled the Jews.

Pictured here is Menachem Butler, who planned the surprise party and solicited contributions for a tribute book filled with letters of affection, respect, and appreciation for the Roman tyrants of ancient times.

Rabbi Saul Berman, director of non-heretical education at Yeshivat Chovevei Torah, recalls Dr. Feldman's teaching style, with "its intellectual rigor, its constant hovering on the edge of humor, its openness to the whole of the human experience."

Read the rest of this entry »

Abuse in Our Community? Protecting our Future

Abuse in Our Community? Protecting our Future – Halakhic and Legal Methods to Stop Predators and Enablers

• Rabbi Mark Dratch, Founder and Director of Jsafe


• Elliot Pasik, Attorney for Abuse Victims and Author of NYS Background Check Law


• Rabbi Allen Schwartz, Rabbi of Ohab Zedek


• Mark Weiss, Abuse Survivor and Advocate for Change and Education

Moderated by Rabbi Maury Kelman, Attorney

Tuesday, March 6 @ 8:15 PM,
Congregation Ohab Zedek, 118 W. 95th St., NY, NY

Please attend and find out what practical actions you can take to both protect our children from abuse and to detect and remove sexual predators from the organized Jewish community.

Read the rest of this entry »

Purim - A Religious Zionism Renaissance

R. Chaim Jachter (link):

Mordechai observed this appalling lack of Jewish nationalism and set Am Yisrael on a course to correct the situation. The first was refusing to bow to Haman, despite the protests of other Jewish leaders (see the Midrash cited in the Torah Sh’leimah 17:21). Apparently, Mordechai was the only Jew who refused to bow to Haman. Other Jews acted as loyal and happy citizens of Shushan and obeyed the King’s edict to bow to Achashveirosh.

Subsequently, when Mordechai rose to power he secured four major nationalistic achievements for the Jews in the Persian Empire. First, was that Hebrew became a recognized language of the Persian Empire. Note that when Haman issued his decrees (Esther 3:12) he did not issue his decree in Hebrew even though he had the decree translated into all of the languages of the many lands controlled by the Persian Empire. On the other hand, when Mordechai issued his decree the Megillah emphasizes (8:9) that the Jews were sent their version of the decree in Hebrew.

Mordechai’s second achievement was the creation of a Jewish army whose legitimacy was recognized by the Persian Empire. Moreover, the Persian Empire granted the Jewish army the right to launch preemptive actions against its enemies (see Esther 8:11 and the Da’at Mikra commentary). Individuals enjoy the right to defend themselves but do not enjoy the right to attack preemptively. Only nations have the right to attack preemptively. Thus, the Persian Empire authorized us to act as a nation in their battle against their enemies, with the imprimatur of the Persian Empire...

Mordechai’s third achievement to advance Jewish nationalism was obtaining the right to punish war criminals, namely the ten sons of Haman. Rav Meidan suggested that the ten sons of Haman were hung because they were commanders of the bands of Jew haters who sought to kill defenseless women and children (see Da’at Mikra to Esther 9:9 for a similar approach). Thus, it was of singular importance to hang these ten sons to serve as a warning to potential leaders of Jewish persecution.

Mordechai’s fourth achievement was the establishment of a new holiday in part to celebrate the renaissance of Jewish nationalism that arose in the wake of Haman’s decrees. Interestingly, we find in the ninth chapter of Megillat Esther some resistance among Jews to the establishment of Purim as a permanent holiday. Indeed, Mordechai and Esther had to send a second set of letters to the Jews to secure universal acceptance of Purim among Jews. It is possible that the resistance stemmed from concern that the establishment of a new holiday violates the prohibition of Bal Tosif, adding to the Torah’s commandments (see Megillah 14a for support for this suggestion). Nevertheless, in the end the proponents of establishing Purim as a permanent holiday “won the day”.

Read the rest of this entry »

Rally in Boca Raton

From Rabbi Efrem Goldberg:

Yesterday, over 85 people assembled to make the statement that withholding a GET, a Jewish divorce is simply unacceptable and intolerable. Were you among them?

Join us again today, Tuesday, February 27th at 12:30 pm outside of Dr. Abisror’s office at 1900 Glades Rd. He has not given a get for ten years leaving his wife an agunah, a chained woman unable to remarry and move on with her life.

Please note:

1. Do not park outside of the building at 1900 Glades Rd. There is parking at the building immediately beforehand or outside one of the stores in the area.

2. Please do not call Dr. Abisror’s office. It can be construed as harassment and could compromise our efforts.

3. Please bring a water bottle with you.

4. Please tell as many people as you can.

Thanks for your participation in this important mitzvah and effort!!

Letter from here (PDF):

To HaRav Herschel Schachter טילש " א ,
Re: A Request for help to procure a Get for Mrs. Naomi Baruch from her Husband Dr. David Abisrur

1. Mrs. Naomi Baruch is living in Israel.

2. A number of months ago Mrs. Baruch turned to the Chief Rabbi, Shlomo Amar טילש " א, to help her receive a Get from her husband who is living in Boca Raton, Florida.

3. The Chief Rabbi was very distressed from her situation that Mrs. Naomi has not been living with her husband for over ten years. She has been civilly divorced from her husband for over ten years and he refuses to grant her a Get.

4. The Chief Rabbi transferred this case to the director of the Rabbinic Beth Din, HaRav Eliyahu Ben Dahan טילש " א , in order to help Mrs. Naomi receive her Get and HaRav Ben Dahan asked me to come up with a resolution to this problem.

5. Since Mrs. Naomi is not a citizen of the State of Israel there is a legal formality that prevents the Beth Din from issuing a letter stating that the husband is obligated to grant her a Get.

6. It should be pointed out, that they were married a total of around two years. For the wife it was her second marriage and for the husband, his third. There are no children and no dispute over possessions. The husband is a psychiatrist and has a clinic in Boca Raton.

7. Two months ago we (I and HaRav Eliyahu Ben Dahan) travelled to Florida in order to try to meet with the husband. We were helped by HaRav Yehuda Ben Chamo טילש " א who married the couple twelve years ago and serves as the Rabbi of a congregation in Hollywood, Florida. Despite the fact that we tried many times to meet with him, including calling him on the telephone, we even went to his house, but the husband refused to open the door for us and ordered us to leave.

8. A month ago HaRav Ben Chamo was able to reach him and he felt from the conversation that he did not intend to give the Get and he just wanted to embitter his wife’s life.

9. Therefore, the only option left is to use communal pressure by means of protesting outside his clinic in Boca Raton and I am convinced that with the help of G‐d this will cause him to grant his wife a Get.

10. Therefore, I am turning to you that with the help of ORA, to help this women receive her Get.

HaRavShmuel Gamliel
Agunot Department

Read the rest of this entry »

Manhattan Eruv, part I

R. Adam Mintz on the history of the Manhattan eruv: link

Read the rest of this entry »

Follow-Ups: Siege and Triage

Following up on this post, I saw that the Tzitz Eliezer, in his Hilkhos Medinah vol. 2 5:7:2, agrees with R. Shaul Yisraeli's position that even the Rambam agrees that the rule about laying a siege only applies to a permitted war and not a mandatory war. I'm surprised that neither R. Yisraeli nor R. Goren quoted this.

And following up on this post regarding triage, I saw in the book Hatzalah Ke-Halakhah (no. 12) about halakhic questions that arise in the Hatzalah Volunteer Ambulance organization, that the author follows R. Moshe Feinstein's position and not that of the Tzitz Eliezer.

Read the rest of this entry »

Three Recent Passings

R. Avraham Blumenkrantz passed away last week (link). R. Mordechai Breuer passed away over the weekend (link). And R. Melech Schachter (father of R. Hershel Schachter) passed away this morning. May their memories be for a blessing.

Read the rest of this entry »

Rav Soloveitchik on Amalek: Peshat or Derash?

R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik (Kol Dodi Dofek, ch. 10) famously quoted his father, R. Moshe Soloveichik, as explaining the following discrepancy in the Rambam's Mishneh Torah. In Hilkhos Melakhim (5:4) the Rambam writes that we cannot currently fulfill the commandment to destroy the seven Canaanite nations because "their memory has already been erased", i.e. they have been mixed in with other nations and we cannot identify them. However, regarding the commandment to destroy Amalek (ibid. 5:5), the Rambam does not write that their memory has been erased. Why not? R. Moshe Soloveitchik explained that this commandment applies to any nation that acts like Amalek, i.e. tries to destroy the entire Jewish nation. [R. Joseph Soloveitchik proceeded to apply this category to the Nazis.]

Was this explanation meant literally and halakhically, or was it a homiletical tool to make an important point?

R. Nachum Rabinovitch (Melumedei Milchamah, ch. 3) argues the latter. He points out that in Moreh Nevuchim (3:50) the Rambam explicitly writes that the decree was against zera Amalek bilvad, only the descendents of Amalek. And in Sefer Ha-Mitzvos (positive commandment 187), the Rambam writes that just like the commandment to destroy the seven nations does not apply in every generation since they have been spread among the other nations and are unrecognizable, so too the commandment to destroy Amalek. Therefore, writes R. Rabinovitch, clearly the idea of "their memory has already been erased" also applies to Amalek and there is no halakhic concept of a "spiritual Amalek". Then why doesn't the Rambam write that Amalek's memory has already been erased? R. Rabinovitch explains that this is precisely what is implied when the Rambam begins discussion of this commandment with "and also" (ve-chen). The same clause that was stated about the seven Canaanite nations also applies to Amalek.

However, it is possible that a careful reading of R. Soloveitchik's words can answer these questions. I quote now from the Gordon translation, n. 23 (pp. 113-114):

I heard the answer from my father of blessed memory. Every nation that conspires to destroy the Jewish people is considered by the halakhah to be Amalek. My father added that as concerns Amalek itslef we were commanded to perform two mitzvot: (a) [for the individual] to blot out the memory of Amalek , which is incumbent on everyone [to slay] any individual member of Amalek [that he encounters], as expounded in the Torah portion of Ki Tetzeh, "You shall blot out the memory of Amalek" (Deuteronomy 25:19), and (b) [for the community] to engage in communal military preparednes for war against Amalek, as it is explained in the Torah portion of B'shalach, "The Lord will wage war with Amalek from generation to generation" (Exodus 17:16). With relation to any other nation that stands ready to destroy us, we are [now after the time of Sennacherib] commanded to wage war against it [even] whil it prepares for war against us, and our war against it is a "War of Mitzvah", in accordance with the command of the Torah that "The Lord will wage war with Amalek from generation to generation." However, the destruction of individuals, which is derived from the Torah portion of Ki Tetzeh, refers only to the biological descendants of Amalek. The words of Maimonides include the obligation to wipe out individuals, which does not apply to any other antion that plots destruction against the People of Israel. However, since the obligation of warring with Amalek pertains to such a nation (as well), he did not employ the phrase "And its memory has already been lost."

In other words, there are two aspects (dinim) to this commandment:

1. Wiping out Amalek's memory: This is learned from Deut. 25 and is an obligation on individuals. It only applies to descendents of Amalek, and therefore does not currently apply because "their memory has been already been erased."
2. Warring with Amalek: This is learned from Ex. 17 and is on the community. It applies even to a nation that acts like Amalek.

Thus, the Rambam compared the aspect of "their memory has been already erased" in Sefer Ha-Mitzvos because it does, to an extent, apply to the commandment regarding Amalek. However, it does not apply to the entire mitzvah, which is why the Rambam omitted it specifically regarding Amalek.

Read the rest of this entry »

Not Taking A Stand

A specific Left Wing Modern Orthodox yeshiva was recently maligned in a newspaper, as is being discussed on other blogs. I find many of the critiques unfair and this whole episode distressing. However, because there are significant areas with which I disagree with the yeshiva's policy, I choose not to defend it because of the risk of seeming to be one of its supporters. Instead, let me quote the following from R. Binyamin Yehoshua Silber's approbation to R. Moshe Tzuriel's Otzar Gedolei Yisrael (as translated by R. Daniel Eidensohn in Da'as Torah, p. 38):

[I]t is not surprising that there is in this era--immediately preceding the Messianic Era--an increased problem of internal splits and divisions between religious Jews supposedly for the sake of Heaven. Even if we are only lacking in this ability to communicate [without heated disputes] that itself is indicative of divisions and factionalism. Therefore, [to aid in achieving this full communication] it is important to be aware of the variety of legitimate approaches and therefore it is good to gather them together.... [Therefore] in this generation--standing at the very end ofexile--there is a greatly increased desire to create divisions. Consequently, we must strive to minimize the barriers to communications to fulfill the words of the prophet [Malachi (3:16), Then the religious people will speak to each other.]

(If it seems from this post that I am easier on Left Wing Modern Orthodox than Right Wing Charedi, then it is a misimpression. The opposite is the case.)

Read the rest of this entry »

The Sayings of Baruch II

A shortened version of this review of R. Baruch Simon's Imrei Baruch appears in this week's The Jewish Press: link

Read the rest of this entry »

Useless Theorizing

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 17a) lists as one of the qualifications for being appointed to the Sanhedrin the ability to declare pure an (impure) insect. Rabbenu Tam asks what need there is for this useless sharpness (charifus shel hevel). Why should we require a scholar to be able to theorize in an incorrect way? R. Reuven Margoliyos, in an article recently reprinted in Peninim U-Margoliyos (pp. 115-116), quotes a number of views on this subject.

The Meiri (Commentary ad loc.) says that the reason is that if a generation has various spiritual troubles a Sanhedrin member will know how to create new rules -- to add or to subtract as a temporary measure -- and to connect them to the text of the Torah.

The Rema (Responsa, no. 107) writes that the point is to minimize the impurity that the Torah legislated, not to abrogate it entirely. Therefore, it is a practical exercise and not merely theoretical.

The Maharal (Derush La-Torah, p. 24) writes that the goal is to better understand the essence of the insect. The insect has both aspects of purity and impurity within it, and the exercise is to find the aspects of purity so as to comprehend the creature from all of its aspects.

The Kovetz Al Ha-Rambam (Avodah Zarah 6:4) writes that this is an exercise in humility. Someone who knows that he can justify through logic even purifying an insect will know to be careful with his logic and not convict someone based solely on theory and logic.

Read the rest of this entry »

Medical Ethics And Jewish Politics

From my opinion piece in this week's The Jewish Press (link):

...Certainly we should not let our own agenda be set by conservative Christians. While they may admirably cherish life and spirituality, they still follow a very different approach to many of these issues. On many points, the conservative Christian view would not allow certain procedures that halacha would permit. Were we to advocate this Christian view in such cases, we would be preventing ourselves from following our religion.

Granted, there is a political advantage to aligning ourselves with a group of similar-minded people whose vast numbers dwarf ours. Such political expediency, however, cannot outweigh our religious obligations. Even if we know that the view of our small minority will never be adopted as law, we must still not misrepresent the Jewish tradition with which we have been entrusted. And we certainly cannot campaign against the Torah’s position.

Thus, slogans that conservative Christians have coined for their religious-political agenda should not be co-opted by Jews. It gives the impression that we share their exact views, and we do not, or at least we should not. They have a “culture of life” – an elegant term, but since it describes their positions, we cannot adopt it. To do so would be to imply that we agree with them entirely...

Full article here.

Read the rest of this entry »

Agudah Leader's Wissenschaft Online

I discovered that Agudath Israel leader R. Dr. David Zvi Hoffmann's commentary to Genesis and Deuteronomy are available online in Hebrew translation (Genesis, Deuteronomy). These books have been out of print for a long time, so this is great. However, you have to download the sections one chapter at a time.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Siege of Beirut

In the summer of 1982, the Israeli army placed a siege on Beirut in a successful attempt to force the PLO out of Lebanon. On August 6th, then Chief Rabbi of Israel R. Shlomo Goren published an article in the newspaper Hatzofeh in which he argued that, according to Jewish law, the siege must allow terrorists to escape the city. Understandably, this caused a bit of a furor and R. Shaul Yisraeli wrote a letter* in response. R. Goren responded in turn and the exchange was published in Hatzofeh on Sep. 17th. R. Yisraeli published an article on the subject the next year in the journal Techumin (vol. 4). [* The letter was intended to be private but due to a confusion at the newspaper was printed without R. Yisraeli's permission. This led to an exchange over whether one may publish Torah insights without permission from the author. See the above issue of Techumin.]

R. Goren's argument is as follows (as published in Toras Ha-Medinah, ch. 28):
Click here to read more
I. The Sifrei (on Numbers 31:7) extrapolates from the war on Midian that when laying siege, a Jewish army may only block off three sides but must leave a fourth side open for those under siege to escape. This is quoted as law by the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Melakhim 6:7), Ramban (Sefer Ha-Mitzvos, addenda to positive commandments no. 5) and Sefer Ha-Chinukh (527). The siege on Beirut, therefore must allow those under siege to escape.

II. The Ramban and the Chinukh state that this mitzvah only applies to a optional war (milchemes reshus), such as a war to conquer new land. But a mandatory war (milchemes mitzvah), such as war against Amalek, the 7 nations or to defend Jews, does not have such a requirement and a full siege may be placed. The Lebanon War was a defensive war and thus obligatory (see R. J. David Bleich, "Preemptive War in Jewish Law" in Tradition 21:1 [Spring 1983], sec. VII [reprinted in Contemporary Halakhic Problems vol. 3]). If so, then according to the Ramban and the Chinukh the siege on Beirut could be complete. However, R. Goren argues that the Ramban and the Chinukh were only referring to the first two types of mandatory wars -- wars against Amalek and the 7 nation -- when we are obligated to kill every single person. That is why we may not allow people to escape a siege. But a defensive war is similar to a milchemes reshus and the siege must allow people to escape.

III. The Minchas Chinukh asks how anyone can say that this rule does not apply to a mandatory war when its entire source is from the war against Midian, a mandatory war! R. Goren suggests that wars outside the land of Israel automatically gain the status of an optional war. Therefore, the war against Midian was technically an optional war. If so, the war in Lebanon is also an optional war and the rule regarding sieges should still apply.

IV. R. Goren compared this rule to that requiring that before we attack anyone we attempt to establish peace first. That is clearly a humanitarian commandment, attempting to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Similarly, the obligation to allow an escape route in a siege is also a humanitarian commandment to avoid war, i.e. let them escape and allow us to win. This comparison between the two commandments is evident in the Rambam's including both in the same chapter of Mishneh Torah and the Chinukh including them in the same commandment.

R. Shaul Yisraeli responded:

I. The Rambam, in formulating this rule in Mishneh Torah, writes that it applies when one sieges a city in order to conquer it. This implies that it only applies to an optional war, when the war is to conquer new land, and not a defensive/mandatory war. Thus, all three rishonim only apply this rule to an optional war, which the war in Lebanon was not.

II. This rule was extrapolated from the war against Midian -- a mandatory war -- because that war was historically unique and comparable to a contemporary optional war in that there was no command to directly kill the enemy. Thus, an escape route was required.

III. The Meshech Chokhmah (Numbers 31:7) points out that the Rambam does not list this commandment in Sefer Ha-Mitzvos while Ramban does. He explains that according to the Rambam this rule is a military tactic, i.e. the best way to create a siege is to leave a side open so the fighters have an escape route and do not need to fight to the end. Therefore, it is part of the laws of making war and not a mitzvah unto itself. According to the Ramban, though, this is a humanitarian law. Therefore, according to the Rambam this rule only applies when the tactic is appropriate but according to the Ramban it always applies (albeit, only to a permitted war). While R. Goren adduces problems for this explanation (e.g. the Rambam still includes the commandment in Mishneh Torah and we do not dismiss a commandment simply because its rationale does not apply), R. Yisraeli defends it. However, R. Yisraeli also suggests that according to the Rambam this rule is part of the law prohibiting killing an idolator who does not want to fight us, which is why the Rambam did not list it in Sefer Ha-Mitzvos.

IV. R. Yisraeli vigorously objects to R. Goren's connecting the commandments to request peace (before launching a war) and leaving an escape route in a siege as similar humanitarian laws. They are entirely unconnected. The former is to afford the enemy the chance to be surrender and be subjugated under Jewish rule while only the latter is a humanitarian law.

Three notes:

1. R. Goren concludes by noting that the Israeli army fulfilled this commandment in the siege of Beirut. I saw that R. Yehudah Gershuni, in his article in Arakhim Be-Mivchan Milchamah, implicitly agrees with R. Goren and notes that the siege in Beirut complied with this halakhah.

2. Everyone agrees that civilians must be allowed to leave a siege and the enemies may be prevented from entering a siege (or bringing in supplies). The only discussion is regarding soldiers that are under siege.

3. For what little it's worth, in this debate I generally found R. Goren to be more convincing, although R. Yisraeli does have some strong arguments on certain points.

Dr. Arye Edrei discusses this debate in part VI of his article "Divine Spirit and Physical Power: Rabbi Shlomo Goren and the Military Ethic of the Israel Defense Forces", available online here (PDF -- thanks to Menachem Butler for directing me to this article). I did not see his understanding of R. Yisraeli's position in R. Yisraeli's writings on this subject.

In the most recent issue of Tradition, R. Yitzchak Blau discusses this subject briefly in his article "Biblical Narratives and the Status of Enemy Civilians in Wartime" (link), pp. 17-18. However, his analysis does not take note of the debate between R. Goren and R. Yisraeli, although he apparently sides with R. Goren.

Read the rest of this entry »

Empowering Women

Most readers have probably heard about the woman in Jerusalem who was beaten because she refused to move to the back of the bus (link). In short, there is a growing trend of buses with separate seating, where men sit in the front and women in the back. While I do not believe that this is required by Jewish law, others can disagree and there is certainly room for local custom in this regard. As a woman I know tells me, some women prefer not to sit next to men so this practice suits them well. And it makes sense that women should be in the back of the bus rather than the front, so that men can't stare at them. In my experience, the back of the bus is also the most comfortable and the least crowded.

The problem with the arrangement in Israel is simply that the community there is incapable of controlling its hooligans. This should come as no surprise and has been a growing problem for decades. How widespread is this problem? I don't know. But as long as it exists, women have to be wary. Women and men can be and have been beaten for not being "frum" enough in certain situations.

Shira Leibowitz Schmidt (of Cross Currents) wrote an Op-Ed for JTA in defense of this separate seating, claiming that this seating arrangement empowers women (link). I often sympathize with the plight of apologists (a term that I do not use in a derogatory fashion), who sometimes find themselves defending practices that they find offensive in the name of the greater communal good. Regarding this case, I almost sympathized with Schmidt. But when she claimed that this practice empowers women, she lost me.

Separate seating does not empower women. It doesn't have to weaken them either, if the community is sufficiently responsible. Israeli society is definitely not sufficiently responsible, including (or especially) the Charedi community. I don't claim that women are routinely beaten or humiliated on buses, but anyone who has been in Israel for more than 25 seconds recognizes that politeness... I can't continue this sentence because it is too painful. But you know what I mean.

Separate seating does not empower women. A can of mace and a scream of "Rape! Call the police!" empowers women, and that is what I would recommend for any woman riding the buses in Jerusalem who is not willing to change her seat on demand.

Read the rest of this entry »

Mishenichnas Adar

Last year's YU Purim shpiel, featuring R. Daniel Z. Feldman as R. Zevulun Charlop and R. Hershel Schachter. And the guy who played R. Mayer Twersky nailed his accent and speech patterns.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Danger of Cellphones

From Yated Ne'eman (link):

Maran HaRav Yosef Sholom Eliashiv shlita announced that parents who use unapproved cell phones, which have been known to cause numerous stumbling-blocks, may not be able to enroll their children at talmudei Torah, girls' schools, girls' seminars and other educational institutions around the country.

Read the rest of this entry »

A Blind Aliyah

Can a blind man serve as the shali'ach tzibur (chazzan, precentor)? Many people would say no based on the famous Gemara (Bava Kamma 87a) that R. Yosef, who was blind, said that he would celebrate a holiday if someone would tell him that the halakhah is not like R. Yehudah, who held that blind people are not obligated in mitzvos. However, the vast majority of rishonim ruled against R. Yehudah and held the blind people are obligated in mitzvos. And so the Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 53:14) rules, that a blind man can serve as the shali'ach tzibbur.

After I discussed this recently with my good friend, R. Daniel Z. Feldman, he sent me a draft of a chapter from his forthcoming fourth volume of Binah Ba-Sefarim that discusses this topic. Characteristically, he charts the views among the acharonim regarding what R. Yehudah held -- are blind people only exempt biblically but obligated on a rabbinic level, does this apply to all mitzvos or only positive commandments, what about the Noahide laws, etc.

The Shulchan Arukh (ibid.) writes that a blind man cannot be called to the Torah. The Rema (Orach Chaim 139:3) adds that nowadays, when we are lenient to call to the Torah even an ignoramus who cannot follow the reading, we also call blind men to the Torah. R. Feldman discusses this at some length also, particularly regarding the maftir for special days.

(No, I don't know when the book will be come out. But you can bet that it will be at next year's SOY Seforim Sale.)

Read the rest of this entry »

Love Letters from a Rosh Yeshivah II

More on the non-existent love letters from a rosh yeshivah, from a reader (albeit edited):

Several days ago, I came across the following excerpts from a letter. Read carefully:

…I wish to remind you that which I commented to you about writing letters [to a fiancé]… Don’t try to find heterim for they are very serious matters, and Hashem leads a person in the way he wants to go, and he will find favor in any path that he will choose, and he should be as short as possible [in his letters], and he should remember that which Chazal said “whoever eats Matzah on Erev Pesach [it is as though he had relations with his fiancé in his in-laws' house]… and concerning this whoever increases his pleasure in words it is as though he ate matzah on Erev Pessach… It is only a parable, but it is to be understood that it is even more severe.

This letter was written by Reb Isser Zalman Meltzer. It is to be found in his recently republished biography in Hebrew by his grandson (Be-Derech Etz Ha-Chaim, vol. 2 p. 406). I contacted a close relative of the author, and he told me that the letter was not written to Reb Aron zt”l but to a different distinguished yeshiva bachur, who became a prominent talmid chacham and would not want his name released. Also, he added, Reb Isser Zalman did not see the letter that the bachur had written; he was upset merely at the length of it.

I think I can now reconstruct what happened. Reb Aron zt”l wrote a letter to his kallah, possibly a longish one. This is and was perfectly acceptable in Litvish yeshiva circles. Until a few years ago, before the cellphone generation, this was still being done by the best bachurim in Israeli yeshivas. Carefully worded letters and poems were exchanged between chassan and kallah. Reb Isser Zalman, being a “kanai” in this matter came running to complain to the Alter zt”l. According to the story printed in “The Making of a Godol”, the Alter responded that he never said that Reb Aron was “frum”. “Frum” in Slabodka jargon is actually a disparaging adjective. It connotes someone who is too emotional, doing things beyond his real level, etc. The Alter was actually defending Reb Aron zt”l. He was telling Reb Isser Zalman that he never claimed that Reb Aron was overly zealous.

Read the rest of this entry »

The End of Innocence

This week's The Jewish Press has a long article by Shlomo Greenwald on rabbinic sexual abuse (link). Here is an excerpt:

THE END OF INNOCENCE
Confronting Sexual Abuse in the Orthodox Community

We are not immune. The Orthodox community has abusers — sexual predators, wife beaters, child batterers — in its midst. And while many may have once preferred to believe otherwise, growing numbers of Orthodox Jews now seem ready to acknowledge that a problem indeed exists.

If acknowledgment of a problem is half way to a solution, as a psychologist might say, where does the Orthodox community go from here?

“We lack a process,” acknowledged Rabbi Yosef Blau, mashgiach ruchani of Yeshiva University and a leading advocate for greater communitywide awareness of abuse and assistance for the abused. “Our community doesn’t have a process, that’s the bottom line. If there’s an allegation, how does the yeshiva deal with it? Does the yeshiva know? Does the rosh yeshiva know?”

Rabbi Blau saw little likelihood of a single process being universally accepted in a fragmented Orthodox community, though “in order to have credibility, it needs to be widely accepted,” he said...

Shanda and shidduch concerns may be on the minds of many in the community, but perhaps the greatest obstacles to more Orthodox Jewish abuse victims coming forward are their feelings — as well as their rabbis’ positions — on four halachic issues: mesirah; bringing cases before secular courts; desecrating God’s name; and issues related to lashon hara (evil talk).

All four are intertwined in many ways. Mesirah refers to the rabbinic prohibition against informing on a fellow Jew to secular authorities — an act that in criminal cases will invariably lead to the second issue: bringing cases before secular courts.

Rabbi Michael Broyde, spiritual leader of the Young Israel of Toco Hills (Atlanta) and a dayan on the Beth Din of America, has written in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society that according to halachic authorities one may inform secular authorities about Jews who are “violent criminals or people whose conduct endangers other people or the community as a whole.”

In a footnote, he quotes from Nishmat Avraham, the encyclopedic work on medical halacha by Dr. Abraham S. Abraham, that according to Rabbis Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Yosef Sholom Elyashiv and Eliezer Waldenberg, one must report cases of child abuse, including sexual abuse. Rabbi Broyde also points out that no alternative opinion is quoted...

Note that an updated version of Rabbi Broyde's article can be found in his recently published The Pursuit of Justice and Jewish Law.

Read the rest of this entry »

More Legacies of the Rav

• Learning from the Rav: Preparing for Shiur by Dr. Shmuel Boylan


• The Rav and Rav Ahron by R. David Luchins


• Tuesday Evenings with the Rav by Morris Laub

And don't miss the article about TorahWeb

Read the rest of this entry »

The Literary Structure of Mishpatim

Joe M. Sprinkle, The Book of the Covenant: A Literary Approach, pp. 199-201:

Exod. 20.22-23.19 is not only well structured vis-à-vis chs. 19-24, as shown above, but individual pericopes within Exod. 20.22-23.19 are well structured within themselves and vis-à-vis one another.

Frequently chiastic or semi-chiastic structuring has been discovered, a feature that bespeaks artful crafting by the author/editor(s). The units that show this stylistic device are 20.23-26; 21.2-11; 21.28-36; 21.37-22.3; 22.6-12; 23.1-9. The chiastic or semi-chiastic character of each of these unit is shown under the discussion of ‘structure’ under each unit respectively. In addition, a parallel structure was found in 21.12-27 in which the four regulations of vv. 12-17 have parallels (though not chiastic ones) with the four regulations of vv. 18-27. A parallel structure also links 23.14-16 with 23.17-19.

It is even possible to see Exod. 20.22-23.19 as a whole being part of a chiastic structure:

A Moses ascends Mount Sinai (20.21)
B Prologue related to Israel’s past experience at Sinai (20.22)
C Cultic regulation: worship: images and altars with a promise of God’s presence and blessing (20.23-26)
D Sabbath principle: release of the עבד עברי on the 7th year (overlaps with what follows) (21.2)
E Humanitarian admonition to better the lot of bondsmen and bondwomen as a disadvantaged social class [related to Israel’s experience of bondage in Egypt] (21.2-11)
F Participially formulated, most serious offenses of man against man, structured on a principle of decreasing violence (21.12-17)
G Moral comment on legal matters: offenses of men against men (21.18-27)
H Moral comment on legal matters: offenses of a man’s property against a man (21.28-32)
H’ Moral comments on legal matters: offenses of a man’s property against another man’s property (21.33-36)
G’ Moral comments on legal matters: offenses of man against a man’s property (21.37-22.16)
F’ Participially formulated, most serious offenses again [God]-religion, structured on a principle of increasingly severe penalty clause (22.17-19)
E’ Humanitarian admonitions with special emphasis on bettering the lot of sojourners and other disadvantaged classes (widows, fatherless, poor) related to Israel’s experience as sojourners in Egypt--with an excursus in 22.28-30 on firstfruits/firstborn and holiness (22.20-23.9)
D’ Sabbath principle: release on sabbath year and day--overlaps with what follows (23.10-12)
C’ Cultic regulations: worship: sabbaths and pilgrim feasts with an exhortation to worship [God] alone (23.10-19)
B’ Epilogue related to Israel’s future entrance in the land after leaving Sinai (23.20-33)
A’ Moses descends Mount Sinai (24.1-3)

One justification for taking 22.20-23.9 together as a unit is because it is bracketed by precepts on sojourners having identical motive clauses: ‘for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt’ (22.20 and 23.9). Moreover, the ‘exodus’ theme also holds the subunits together.

Note that there is a double structuring principle in Exod. 22.20-23.19, chiastic with respect to 20.21-24.3 as a whole, but also a pattern of simple parallelism between 22.20-30 and 23.1-19 (as observed by Carmichael) in itself:

a Prohibition of oppressing sojourners and protection of other classes (widows and fatherless) (22.20-23)
b Protection of poor from oppressive loans at interest (22.24-26)
c Call to respect the morality of God as administered by human leaders (22.27)
d Offering of firstfruits and firstborn sons and animals [related to feasts of Harvest (firstfruits) and Passover (firstborn sons) and perhaps Tabernacles (firstborn animals?)] (22.28-29)
e Cultic prohibition of eating meat torn by beasts--perhaps because it is dehumanizing (22.30)
a’ Prohibition of oppressing sojourner and protection of other disadvantaged classes especially with regards to courts (23.1-9)
b’ Protection of the poor from starvation and exhaustion through sabbath year and day (23.10-12)
c’ Call to obey God’s word to the exclusion of other gods (23.13)
d’ The three pilgrim feasts including the offering of firstfruits at the feast of the Harvest and the Passover lamb [which served as a substitute for firstborn sons and animals] (23.14-19a)
e’ Cultic prohibition of cooking a kid in its mother’s milk--perhaps because it is dehumanizing (23.19b)

This secondary pattern creates some discontinuity in the overall chiasm since to maintain the parallelism there needs to be cultic material (22.28-30) in the middle of the ‘social justice’ section (22.20-23.9). Nonetheless, the overall chiastic pattern of 20.19-23.3 is fairly consistent and clear.

Read the rest of this entry »

Suffering from Success

In the latest issue of Jewish Action, R. Emanuel Feldman has a thoughtful article titled Of Shtieblach and Kiddush Clubs: Modern Orthodox, Yeshivah Orthodox and the Jewish Future. Among other things, R. Feldman laments that despite the great success Orthodoxy currently sees the movement in general fails to reach out to the non-Orthodox and has fighting between its own factions:

A Jewish fantasy: An emergency joint task force of the leadership of the Orthodox Union and the other MO institutions, and of Agudath Israel and other YO [Yeshivish Orthodox] institutions, is established. It has a single, circumscribed purpose: It will focus on ways to fight the onslaught of Jewish ignorance and intermarriage. Neither group necessarily accepts the other's worldview; perspectives on Torah and Jewish life remain unchanged. But in this critical eit la'asot situation... stereotypes and intolerance are put aside, and resources and energies are combined for this single objective.

I think that there is one main reason underlying why neither MO nor YO are able to adequately reach out to the non-Orthodox and continue to battle each other. The very success of Orthodoxy is based to no small extent on the trust in the judgment of the charismatic personalities who led our communities. We were taught to depend entirely on the decisions of the Gedolim and that their rulings are inviolable. Who in the YO world would dare to contradict an explicit directive of R. Moshe Feinstein and R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky? And who in the MO world would set aside an unequivocal ruling of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik? In other words, we are stuck in the 1950s and 60s, maintaining stances that were adopted then by the comunities' leaders based on the circumstances of that time. Even though the landscape has radically changed in many ways, as R. Feldman discusses, our very Orthodoxy and the conservatism it implies prevents us from charting a new course. This greatly hampers many of our attempts to unite and reach out. Some of the issues of legitimation no longer apply or, perhaps more significantly, apply differently than they once did. Yet, we are limited by the legacy of our great leaders from yesteryear for whom we have largely failed to find adequate replacements.

Sure, there are radicals in the various camps who are trying to change the stances. But, at least as things stand right now, they are finding much opposition and little success.

Let me add one more slightly unrelated comment on R. Feldman's article. In it, I believe R. Feldman makes a mistake of equivalence. He talks about the opposition to MO from YO circles and to YO from MO circles as if the phenomena are of the same magnitude. I understand the stylistic and rhetorical need to make such a statement. However, based on my experience, I believe this to be far from the truth. Yes, there is some opposition to YO within MO, but not that much and not of a particularly strong or widespread nature. Generally, YO is considered a valid alternative albeit maybe somewhat extreme. Rarely will you find someone who considers YO to be illegitimate. In YO circles, though, it is common to find the equation of MO with non-religious and the denigration of their rabbis. Can opposition be found on both sides? Yes, but, again, the phenomena are not on anywhere near the same magnitude. Maybe this is part of the attitude that anyone to the left of me isn't frum and anyone to the right of me is extreme -- one is more critical of someone non-frum than someone extreme. But, while that is perhaps a justification, it does not equate the two oppositions. (This isn't to say that there aren't very valid criticisms that can be made. I'm embarrassed to say that I'm probably the first to criticize both the MO and the YO camps, the MO more strongly. But that isn't the point.)

Read the rest of this entry »

New Book: Practical Halakhah for Lawyers

Yashar Books is pleased to announce the publication of Rabbi Michael J. Broyde's The Pursuit of Justice and Jewish Law: Halakhic Perspectives on the Legal Profession (Second Edition). In this book, Michael J. Broyde, Professor of Law at Emory University, founding rabbi of the Young Israel in Atlanta and a member dayan of the Beth Din of America, takes a fearless inside look at the ethical and halakhic issues facing the Jewish lawyer and anyone caught up in the American legal system.

What do you do when your religion conflicts with your obligations as a lawyer? This book systematically examines the ethical and halakhic issues raised by the many different facets of law practice, as well as other issues encountered by the Jewish lawyer.

Is a lawyer allowed to assist a client in pursuing claims contrary to Jewish law? May a lawyer cross-examine a witness he knows is telling the truth? Can he give advise a client to act in a way that is financially beneficial but constitutes a violation of Jewish law?

Broyde answers these questions with his characteristic clarity, broad knowledge of Jewish law and deep understanding of the ethical dilemmas facing lawyers.

“It's a ‘must-read’ for anyone interested in Jewish law or Jewish lawyers—or for anyone intrigued by the interrelationship of religion and the practice of law.”

—Prof. Steven H. Resnicoff, DePaul University College of Law

See here for more about the book. Order the book online or ask for it in your local Judaica store.

Read the rest of this entry »

Torah/Science Controversy Analyses

Thought provoking analyses of the Torah/Science Controversy:

Avakesh: I, II, III, IV

R. Ben Hecht: I, II, III, IV

Read the rest of this entry »

Electricity on Shabbos

The monthly European Yated Ne'eman reports (link):

Gedolei Yisroel shlita are calling on the public to continue supporting neighborhood generator initiatives by joining the ranks of chareidim who opt for kosher electricity on Shabbos, citing the need to avoid the use of electricity produced through chilul Shabbos.

R. Chaim Jachter has an essay on this subject in his Gray Matter volume 2. Here are some excerpts from his essay (pp. 54-66):

Rav [Yisrael] Rozen opens his essay [Techumin 16:36-50] by asserting that the State of Israel cannot function properly without electricity. Losing power in hospitals, army bases and outposts, and police stations clearly endangers lives. Furthermore, Rav Rozen claims that even lighting streets properly can be a matter of life and death. If streets were not lit, people’s safety and security would be considerably reduced. Moreover, refrigeration in many homes preserves medicines for people whose lives depend on them. Rav Rozen thus writes, “Cases of safek piku’ach nefesh (“possible threat to life”) are widespread throughout Israel, yet it is impossible to separate and direct the electricity exclusively to those individuals and institutions that require it for piku’ach nefesh.”

The workers and directors of the electric company cannot control electricity demand. Even if they wished to limit the use of electricity on Shabbat to essential needs, thereby eliminating unnecessary work at the power plant, there is little chance that the greater public would cooperate. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 2:15 and Tinyana 24) and Rav Shlomo Goren (Meishiv Milchamah 1:366–385) both therefore permit Israeli power plant workers to violate Shabbat in order to enable the plants to function properly.

Assuming that the power plant workers may maintain and repair what is needed on Shabbat, one could still question whether the general public may benefit for non-life-saving purposes from their work on Shabbat. Rav Shlomo Goren (ibid.) prohibits such benefit...

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (ibid.) takes a different approach. He writes that the situation regarding electricity production is far more analogous to another case that appears in the above Gemara. If one slaughters an animal to feed its meat to a dangerously ill person on Shabbat, the Gemara states that anyone may consume that meat, even during Shabbat... Rav Shlomo Zalman argues that the production of electricity is analogous to these cases, so one may benefit from the electricity of power plants in Israel...

While older power plants required the manual addition of fuel every eight hours, today’s power plants are fully automated. This seemingly diminishes Rav Goren’s concern that a Jew actually produced the power on Shabbat. Rav Rozen explains that electricity is generated automatically, and as long as demand is relatively stable, the flow of fuel and the regulation of steam production are entirely automatic...

Rav Halperin suggests that automated power plants might indeed alleviate the problem of benefiting from the desecration of Shabbat, as any individual non-observant Jew’s behavior only indirectly contributes towards the eventual adjustments in the fuel supply. Thus, the automated adjustment might be considered a mere indirect result (grama) of chilul Shabbat. Additionally, even if most changes in the demand for electricity result from chilul Shabbat, the “straw that breaks the camel’s back” and sets the automated adjustments in motion could well be the activity of a non-Jew or a timer...

Although Israel’s power plants regrettably do not run in accordance with Halachah, most authorities nevertheless permit benefiting from the electricity produced by them, especially in today’s age of automation. In addition, one need not avoid setting electric timers prior to Shabbat. Those who follow the Chazon Ish use a private generator for Shabbat because they consider it a chilul Hashem to benefit from the national power network. Rav Halperin concludes his essay by urging the observant community to express its dissatisfaction with the unnecessary desecration of Shabbat that often takes place in Israeli power plants. We should feel pained by the fact that a completely acceptable situation still does not exist and look forward to the day when every aspect of Israel will run according to Halachah.

Read the rest of this entry »

The End Of Conservative Judaism

In the current issue of The Jewish Week, R. Michael J. Broyde applauds the leftward movement of the Conservative movement because it it spells its own demise (link):

The Conservative Rabbinical Assembly’s Law Committee announced nearly three months ago that Conservative Judaism will ordain homosexual rabbis, and while a lot of ink was spilled explaining this decision and its ramifications, I saw little long-term analysis. This, hopefully will fill that gap. I view the leftward move of Conservative Judaism as a positive development for American Jewry — quite literally, it is the end of the beginning of Judaism in America and now we can finally grow into adulthood as a Jewish community.

The truth is that there is a grand divide in the Jewish community worldwide between two groups: those who think that Jewish law (halacha) is really, truly, binding and those who do not. This division is both religiously and culturally important — it reflects a basic worldview about what being Jewish really means. Throughout the world, other than in the United States, this distinction formed the basic denominational divide and one could well understand the need for almost a schism over this issue.

Not so in America. For many decades, Conservative Judaism sought to bridge this gap, with a promise that was too good to be true. You could obey Jewish law, Conservative Judaism claimed, but ultimately Jewish law was sufficiently malleable that whatever large segments of the Jewish community wanted was shown to be permissible, and whatever struck large segments of Conservative Jewry as wrong became prohibited...

Conservative Judaism is nearly finished as a movement, I suspect, and the decision to permit homosexual conduct will only hasten its demise. The reasons are historical and logical. As the generations of Jewry that recall and romanticize life in Europe — either directly or through a parent — age and ultimately pass, fewer and fewer people who do not observe Jewish law as a central component of their live have an interest in even being told that their conduct is consistent with Jewish law...

Continued here.

Read the rest of this entry »

Letters on Metzitzah

As I mentioned in an earlier post, there is a new issue forthcoming of the journal Hakirah (link). The editor sent me (among others) advance copy of the letters section regarding Dr. Shlomo Sprecher's article on metzitzah be-feh. With permission, I have uploaded the letters so you can read them (link - PDF).

Read the rest of this entry »

Reflections on Who is a Maskil

This past Sunday, while most of the country was watching some obscure sporting event, I visited the SOY Seforim Sale (again) and picked up an exciting new book -- R. Hershel Schachter's latest sefer, Ginas Egoz. This is his fifth book, following two collections of R. Soloveitchik's material (Nefesh Ha-Rav and Mi-Peninei Ha-Rav), a collection of his theoretical essays (Eretz Ha-Tzvi) and a collection of his halakhic essays (Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon). Of course, none of the books can be neatly categorized, but I did my best. And I am excluding the volumes of his unedited notes from R. Soloveitchik's lectures.

The latest book, Ginas Egoz, is a collection of many of R. Schachter's earlier articles. What is so delightful about the book is that I was previously unaware of almost every article! It's like discovering a goldmine of material. With the other books, I had seen and/or heard most of the material. Additionally, I've discovered in this book something that I sort of already knew but had just not registered it in my thick head.

The term "maskil" has different meaning to different people, particularly from those with varying backgrounds. In some circles, it is considered an insult, essentially calling someone a heretic. When I use the term, I do not automatically mean someone who is a heretic. To me, a maskil can be perfectly Orthodox or entirely not. A maskil is someone who has sustained interest in issues of what is generally (and often improperly) considered non-traditional aspects of Torah scholarship. For example, Hebrew grammar or Jewish history. Additionally, the development and categorization of different aspects of the Oral Torah. Among the early maskilim, there were both Orthodox and not-so-Orthodox scholars who investigated the history and development of the Oral Torah, classifying different aspects and phenomena.

There are certainly Orthodox scholars who have a passing interest in such matters. You can find a few comments by R. Yizchak Ze'ev Soloveitchik, the Brisker Rav, on this subject and even from his father, R. Chaim Soloveitchik. But there wasn't a sustained interest, so I wouldn't call either of them a maskil. The Netziv, however, spent a good deal of time on such issues throughout his writings and particularly in the introduction to his commentary on the She'eiltos. I would call him a maskil (again, with the term's connotations as I use it, and not as some others do). The Maharatz Chajes was a maskil. As ludicrous as this may sound, R. Elchanan Wasserman might possibly be called a maskil because of his Kuntres Divrei Sofrim. The Chida was a maskil.

I believe that R. Hershel Schachter has joined their ranks on this issue. His latest book contains many essays and discussions about the history and development of the Oral Torah -- when can a biblical law be abrogated (pp. 159-160), innovation of laws through exegesis (pp. 6-7), what types of commandments can have ab initio and post facto categories (pp. 9-13), the effectiveness of a rabbi's halakhic ruling (pp. 129-132) and more. This is not to say that the vast majority of the book isn't regular Torah scholarship, with R. Schachter's unique approach of Brisker analysis combined with a vast bibliographical knowledge. However, the hints of what I call maskilish interests, shared with the Netziv and others, that can be seen in past books are much more evident in this book.

Read the rest of this entry »

Mt. Sinai and Universalism

R. Chanan Morrison, Gold from the Land of Israel: From the Writings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaKohen Kook, pp. 133-134 (online here):

Where would one expect that God would reveal His Torah to the Jewish people? The logical place would be on the holiest mountain in the world — Jerusalem's Mount Moriah, the site of the Akeida, Jacob's holy "gate to heaven" [Gen 28:17], the spot where both Temples stood. Why did the revelation of the Torah take place outside of the Land of Israel, in the middle of the desert?

The fact that the Torah was not given to the Jewish people in their own land, but rather in a desert, in no-man's land, is very significant. This indicates that the inner content of the Torah is relevant to all peoples. If receiving the Torah required the special holiness of the Jewish people, then the Torah should have been given in a place that reflects this holiness. Revelation on Mount Sinai attests to the Torah's universal nature.

This idea is corroborated by the Talmudic tradition that "God offered the Torah to every nation and every tongue, but none accepted it, until He came to Israel, who received it" [Avoda Zara 2b]. This Midrash is well-known, but it contains an implication that is often overlooked. How could God offer the nations something that is beyond their spiritual level? It is only because the Torah is relevant to all peoples that their refusal to accept it reflects so harshly on them.

The Torah's revelation on Mount Sinai — as a neutral location belonging to none and thus belonging to all — emphasizes the disappointment and estrangement from God that the nations brought upon themselves by rejecting the Torah and its ethical teachings. For this reason, the Sages taught that Mount Sinai "brought enmity upon the nations of the world."

In the future, however, the nations will recognize and correct this failing...

Read the rest of this entry »

Looking for a Sephardic Hazzan

Unpaid job posting:

A Washington DC Sephardic synagogue is seeking an observant man with a melodious voice and pleasant personality who is well-versed in a variety of Sephardic traditional styles of melody. Preferably, he should be a competent Torah reader as well, and be capable of training Bar Mitsvah students. Duties would also include working with children in a "junior congregation" setting, and participating in the development of Sephardic-themed communal programs. The more knowledgeable the candidate, the better!

The position could be full or part time, depending on the individual's interest. It is an amazing opportunity to assume a central role in the epicenter of the Sephardic community in the nation's capital - the only Sephardic synagogue in the Washington DC area, in fact. In a few years time, we expect to establish ourselves as the national center for Sephardic Jewry, both in the United States and abroad. There is unbelievable potential for a career-minded young Hazzan to flourish there. And the neighborhood and local Jewish community offer outstanding resources too.

Those interested should contact Rabbi Joshua Maroof.

Read the rest of this entry »

More on Sideburns: R. Moshe Feinstein's Position

R. Avrohom Dubin reports:

I myself went to Rav Moshe Feinstein ZT"L and asked him why people shave above the bottom point of the ear. He responded that he interprets "lmata min haozen" to mean under the "top" of the ear (under the ear line, so to speak). Somewhat taken aback, I pressed him because that is clearly not the plain meaning of the language. He actually raised his voice to me and told me something which I have never forgotten because to me the rule he stated was more important than the actual psak. He said that "my interpretation cannot be true because the whole world holds otherwise." A rather breathtaking statement from the Gadol HaPoskim of the last generation.

Read the rest of this entry »

Sideburns

The Torah commands us (Lev. 19:27): "You shall not cut off the sides of your head, nor shall you destroy the sides of your face." The first part of this commandment is a prohibition of shaving one's sideburns. Let us leave for another post what is considered cutting off the hair on the sides of one's head and assume that it refers to any kind of removal, including cutting with scissors and applying depilatory cream. The question that remains is what are the borders of the sideburns -- sides of one's head. Let us address here only the bottom border of the sideburns, that one is forbidden from removing.

The Rivan (Pseudo-Rashi to Makos 20a sv. shetayim) writes that the sideburns continue to below one's ear, i.e. that one may not remove the hairs that grow along the side of the ear (but one may shorten them). However, immediately prior to that (sv. chayav) he writes that the bottom of the sideburns is on the side of the ear. This is also the view of many other rishonim (Ritva, Nimukei Yosef, Rashi to Shevu'os 2b).

The Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De'ah 181:9) rules strictly on this issue and considers the sideburn to end below the ear. Many acharonim follow suit and cite this view without dissent, such as the Chasam Sofer (Responsa 1:154) and the Mishnah Berurah (Bi'ur Halakhah 251 sv. afilu; cf. Nidchei Yisrael ch. 26 and Kuntres Tiferes Adam 1:3, both in vol. 2 of the Chafetz Chaim's Collected Writings).

However, there are also acharonim who follow the majority position in the rishonim, that the sideburns only continue until the side (middle) of the ear or the end of the hard part of the ear, notably the Kozhaglover Rebbe (to whom floor 5A of the YU library is dedicated) in Eretz Tzvi (3:5) and the Imrei Yosher (2:183:2).

Other topics worthy of discussion are how many hairs need to be retained on the sideburns -- all, majority or just a few; whether using scissors or an electric shaver violates this prohibition; and how wide must the sideburns be kept. For more on all this, see R. Yaakov Haber's article in Beis Yitzchak 24 (1992), p. 168ff.

The bottom line, however, is that it is very, very difficult to justify the practice of those who shave their sideburns above the middle of the ear. Not impossible, but very, very difficult. The big leniency, that only some follow, is to shave one's sideburns below the middle of the ear. But above that... ask your rabbi.

Read the rest of this entry »

Rav Soloveitchik: The Movie

Reviews are in from this weekend's Yeshiva University screening of Ethan Isenberg's new film about R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith (I couldn't attend but I am certainly curious and would love to own the DVD).

Thanbo: link
Curious Chana: link

Read the rest of this entry »

Interactive Online Torah Classes

Learn Torah without leaving your home (or office) – www.torahinmotion.org

Welcome to e-TiM, an exciting and powerful way to learn Torah

With this remarkable technology - you can see, hear and speak to the teacher from wherever you are; you have to see it to believe it!

You will be able to

• See and hear the a live shiur presented specifically for E-TIM participants
• Have the ability to talk to the speaker and be heard by all
• Have the ability to be seen on screen
• If you prefer you can write to the speaker comments and questions during the class
• You decide whom you want to see your written words (i.e. speaker, another participant, everyone)

Scheduled programs:

Cutting Edge Halachic Issues
Rabbi Howard Jachter
Mondays 9:00pm-10:00pm Eastern Time (4am-5am Israel Time) / Starting Feb. 12 for six weeks

Sefer Yirmiyahu: When Politics and Religion Clash
Rabbi Menachem Leibtag
Tuesdays 12:30-1:15 pm (19:30pm-20:15pm Israel Time) / Starting Feb. 13 for five weeks

Movers and Shakers in Post-War Orthodoxy
Dr. Marc Shapiro
Wednesdays 9:00-10:00 pm (4am-5am Israel Time) / Starting Feb. 14 for six weeks

Jewish Medical Ethics- Past Present and Future: From Transplanted Mummies to Face Transplants
Rabbi Dr. Eddie Reichman
Thursdays 9:00-10:00 pm (4am-5am Israel Time) / Starting Feb. 22 for four weeks

Click here for more information

Read the rest of this entry »

The Reed Sea

James K. Hoffmeier, Ancient Israel in Sinai, pp. 81, 84-85:

Readers of the Bible may be confused when it comes to understanding the name of the body of water to which the exodus story refers. First, some passages call the sea in question simply "the sea" (hayyam) (Exod. 14:2, 9, 16, 21, 23; 15:1-4; Num. 33:8; Ps. 78:13). In other texts, yam sup is used in the Hebrew (MT) of Exodus 13:18; 15:4b, 22; Joshua 2:10; Psalm 136:13, 15. Sup clearly means reeds or rushes, as can be seen in Exodus 2:3 when the mother of Moses places him in a basket among the reeds (sup) on the Nile's shore. Isaiah 19:6 also mentions reeds (sup) in the Nile. In the Septuagint, the Greek translations of the Hebrew Bible, sup is rendered as "red," and this is the tradition followed in the Latin Vulgate, where the sea is called mari Rubro. Moshe English translations have followed this translation tradition (e.g., KJV, AV, RSV, NRSV, NASB, NIV), but a few have followed the Hebrew reading (e.g., JB, NJPS). There is no convincing explanation for why the Greek translators did not literally translate sup, although it might have been their aim to locate the sea at the place they thought the text was indicating, that is, the Red Sea, the present-day Gulf of Suez.

Despite the uncertainties surrounding the reasons for the Septuagint's translation of sup, and the inability of scholars to explain why the Gulf of Aqaba should be called yam sup (e.g. Deut. 1:40; I Kings 9:26), one thing is certain: that the word sup derives from the Egyptian word twf of twfy... What is equally important is that there is a geographical term known in Ramesside period texts called pz twfy, which is thought to have been somewhere in the northeastern Delta or the Isthmus of Suez area...

[E]arly exegetes and commentators of the book of Exodus did suggest this meaning [sea of reeds] for the Hebrew sup without knowledge of ancient Egyptian. Included here would be Christian scholars such as John Calvin and Martin Luther, as well as such Jewish sages as Jonathan Ben Uzziel and Rashi. Even earlier evidence for understanding yam sup as meaning "Sea of Reeds" is found in the Bohairic (Northern) Coptic translation of Exodus...

Clearly the modern discovery of the Egyptian word twfy is not the only reason modern scholars translate yam sup as "sea of reeds." There is a long history of rendering the Hebrew in this manner. The realization that Hebrew sup is the proper writing for the Egyptian term twf--regardless of whether it is originally a Semitic loanword into Egyptian--simply confirms the translation, and adds an important Egyptian background element to the story.

Read the rest of this entry »

Ravnet

I'd appreciate it if someone who is subscribed to Ravnet can contact me. Thank you.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Miracle of the Splitting of the Sea

More from R. Jonathan Sacks (link):

We have here two ways of seeing the same events: one natural, the other supernatural. The supernatural explanation - that the waters stood upright - is immensely powerful, and so it entered Jewish memory. But the natural explanation is no less compelling. The Egyptian strength proved to be their weakness. The weakness of the Israelites became their strength. On this reading, what was significant was less the supernatural than the moral dimension of what happened. G-d visits the sins on the sinners. He mocks those who mock Him. He showed the Egyptian army, which reveled in its might, that the weak were stronger than they - just as He later did with the pagan prophet Bilaam, who prided himself in his prophetic powers and was then shown that his donkey (who could see the angel Balaam could not see) was a better prophet than he was.

To put it another way: a miracle is not necessarily something that suspends natural law. It is, rather, an event for which there may be a natural explanation, but which - happening when, where and how it did - evokes wonder, such that even the most hardened sceptic senses that G-d has intervened in history. The weak are saved; those in danger, delivered. More significantly still is the moral message such an event conveys: that hubris is punished by nemesis; that the proud are humbled and the humble given pride; that there is justice in history, often hidden but sometimes gloriously revealed...

The genius of the biblical narrative of the crossing of the Reed Sea is that it does not resolve the issue one way or another. It gives us both perspectives. To some the miracle was the suspension of the laws of nature. To others, the fact that there was a naturalistic explanation did not make the event any less miraculous. That the Israelites should arrive at the sea precisely where the waters were unexpectedly shallow, that a strong east wind should blow when and how it did, and that the Egyptians' greatest military asset should have proved their undoing - all these things were wonders, and we have never forgotten them.

Read the rest of this entry »

Consistency, Computers and Kids

R. Mordechai Willig on TorahWeb (link):

In today’s world, the yetzer hara is closer than ever, accessible with the click of a button. Pornographic offerings flood the internet. Many have strayed after their eyes, and some have become addicted. One precaution is to prohibit yichud – seclusion – with the internet. The computer screen should be in a public part of the house, and its activity should be traceable by another person.

No precaution can prevent a committed sinner from achieving his goal. We must be proactive in avoiding this behavior pattern and the only way to do so is to increase Torah study and a deep commitment to a Torah way of life.

Parents are duty-bound to take appropriate precautions to protect their children from succumbing to the ever present yetzer hara. New technology demands greater vigilance. More importantly, parents must serve as proper role models for their children. Yosef was saved by the image of his father Yaakov. Every parent must play such a role.

While none of us can be as great as Yaakov, we must do our best to create an image which will deter our children from sinning. This requires greater involvement in Torah study and practice, and total avoidance of impropriety in matters relating to arayos. Children are acutely aware of any indiscretion in this area. A father who tells, or even smiles at, off color jokes (see Shabbos 33a) or a mother who dresses provocatively do not provide images to deter their children from doing likewise or worse. One who converses with or touches a man/woman in a manner proscribed by halacha implicitly encourages one’s children, who have no established borders, to violate even greater aveiros.

Even worse are parents who claim to be totally virtuous, and demand that their children do likewise, while surreptitiously talking, looking, or acting in a halachically prohibited way. The hypocrisy leads to a greater degree of disrespect by children towards their parents.

While youngsters are attracted to permissive lifestyles, they leave halachic practice not so much because of this attraction but rather because of repulsion from the Torah way. This is the essential thesis of the recently published work “Off the Derech” (by Faranak Margolese, Devora Publishing). Hypocrisy and inconsistency of parents (and teachers) in any area is devastating. In the realm of arayos such behavior’s impact on children is even more damaging.

Indeed, the only way to avoid the pitfalls of the yetzer harah is by placing greater emphasis on Torah and yiras Shomayim...

Read the rest of this entry »

Triage: A Case of Ladies Second?

The Mishnah in Horiyos (13a) states: A man comes before a woman in matters of life (le-hachayos) and to return a lost item, and a woman comes before a man for clothing and redemption from captivity.

The implication of the first item is that if a man and woman are drowning, one should save the man first and then the woman. This has practical implications in triage situations. When, for example, EMTs are called for two emergencies at the same time and have to decide which one to pursue, should they always take the call for man over the woman? Or when an ER doctor has to decide which patient to treat first, should he always take that man before the woman?

Two great recent posekim address this issue in different ways: R. Moshe Feinstein answers by limiting the rule in the Mishnah while R. Eliezer Waldenberg rejects it entirely.

R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat vol. 4 [I don't have the book in front of me right now so I can't name the exact responsum]) writes that the rule of the Mishnah only applies when all other things are equal. Thus, if both emergency calls are of equal distance, and both diseases are equally treatable, etc. Only then, in the rare case in which all things are equal, does the rule of the Mishnah apply.

R. Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 18:1) notes that the rule of the Mishnah is not mentioned in Mishneh Torah, Tur and Shulchan Arukh. Why? To answer this, he proposes a new interpretation of the Mishnah. He suggests that "matters of life (le-hachayos)" refers to feeding from charitable funds. Of course, he writes, when there is a literal case of life and death then we do not differentiate between people. However, when prioritizing limited charity funds and there is only enough food for one person, then according to the Mishnah the man receives priority over the woman. This ruling, however, is contradicted by a baraisa in Kesuvos (67b) in which it is stated that, when there are limited funds for food, women are given priority over men. Thus, R. Waldenberg suggests, the posekim followed the conclusion in Kesuvos which contradicted the ruling in the Mishnah.

Despite this approach being contrary to a Shakh and Taz, R. Waldenberg felt sufficiently confident in his ruling to utilize it in practical situations.

Read the rest of this entry »