R. Daniel Feldman on the Bestseller List

My wife brought to my attention that R. Daniel Z. Feldman's The Right and the Good made it to the Country Yossi Magazine bestseller list for two months in a row.

Check out no. 11:


Check out no. 19:

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Is the World Good?

R. Shalom Carmy, "Tell Them I've Had a Good Enough Life" in R. Shalom Carmy ed., Jewish Perspectives on the Experience of Suffering, pp. 107-111 (available online here):

What is the source of man's perennial optimisim? One possibility is that we consider the good of the world to outweigh the bad because our survey of the world has demonstrated this to be the case. According to the Rambam, the preponderance of the good is questioned only by the ignorant populace... Rambam goes on to argue that the truly bad things that happen to people are not God's fault but, in the majority of cases, their own...

Among the rishonim, Rambam's view is not beyond dispute. Thus, for example, Saadia contends that belief in reward after death is rationally necessary because all good in this world is mingled with bad and the sadness outweighs the joy. Only the prospect of future existence reassures us that "after all in the end justice is done."...

At first blush, it would appear that Rambam's cheerfulness and Saadia's somber diagnosis stand in straightforward contradiction and that only a stubborn, harmonizing piety would undertake to bridge the gap between them... Nonetheless, the dejection about the state of this world that we encounter in Saadia is not altogether incomprehensible from Rambam's viewpoint.

The crucial point is that Saadia does not claim that man looks upon creation and beholds, contrary to the seeming implication of God's judgment on the sixth day of creation, that it is more bad than good. The world that Saadia investigates and finds wanting is this life, when viewed in isolation from the reality of the world to come. Real life is the whole, comprising both this world and the other one... [T]he standpoint of eternity suffuses our experience of this world... In short, the value of this world is contingent on the meaning inculcated by our vision of the world to come.

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Lawrence Education Proposal II

The educational director of HAFTR more-or-less agrees with me (from the Forward):

Rabbi David Leibtag, educational director of the Hebrew Academy of the Five Towns and Rockaway - the school most likely to be targeted by organizers - said the proposals underestimate the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to Jewish education. "Jewish education is not just teaching students in a prescribed amount, it is a general culture," he said, that should even pervade "general studies."

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To My Wife

I think she's only read this blog once, at her sister's house. And that's probably for the best. Nevertheless, let me say I told you so!

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Happy Anniversary!

I received a phone call last night from Menachem Butler, in which he started off the conversation by saying "Happy Anniversary!" As any married man would do, I immediately started worriedly wondering whether I had actually committed the grave sin of totally forgetting my anniversary. It turns out I didn't because my anniversary isn't for another few weeks [CORRECTION: Week and a half. I should have known that.]. As should have been obvious, Menachem meant the anniversary of Austritt. 129 years ago today, the German government enacted a law that permitted Jewish sub-communities to secede from the majority Jewish community for theological reasons. Oh, how the time flies. Whether or not austritt was a good idea, I'll leave for another time.

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R. Mordechai Breuer's Biblical Scholarship

Some online resources that discuss and evaluate R. Mordechai Breuer's approach to biblical scholarship:

1. R. Moshe J. Bernstein, "The Orthodox Jewish Scholar and Jewish Scholarship: Duties and Dilemmas" in The Torah u-Madda Journal, vol. 3 pp. 23-24 (link)

2. R. Shalom Carmy, "Introducing Rabbi Breuer" in Shalom Carmy ed., Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations (link). Note that this volume also had a presentation by R. Breuer and a critique by R. Shnayer Leiman, neither of which are currently available online.

3. Meir Ekstein, "Rabbi Mordechai Breuer and Modern Orthodox Biblical Commentary" in Tradition 33:3 (1999) (link)

4. R. Moshe Lichtenstein, "Ahas Diber Elokim, Shetayim Zu Shamati?" in Daf Kesher Le-Talmidei Yeshivas Har Etzion no. 851 (link)

5. R. Yoel Bin-Nun, "Ahas Diber Elokim, Shetayim Zu Shamati!" in Daf Kesher Le-Talmidei Yeshivas Har Etzion no. 863 (link)

6. R. Mordechai Breuer, "Bikores Ha-Mikra Ve-Ha-Emunah Ba-Torah Min Ha-Shamayim" in Daf Kesher Le-Talmidei Yeshivas Har Etzion no. 864 (link)

7. R. Chaim Navon, "Biblical Criticism" (link)

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How Ethics Can Help Your Pocketbook

R. Aaron Levine, whose new book Moral Issues of the Marketplace in Jewish Law is in production by Yashar Books and will be released shortly, was kind enough to share with me a short article of his that is set for publication in the Journal of Economic Psychology. In this article, he critiques an article by Morris Altman in the same issue of that journal that proposes a major revision to neo-classical economic theory.

One of the many points that R. Levine makes in his critique is that honesty and integrity in the marketplace serve to mitigate default risk. Presumably, he is referring more to consumer default risk (e.g. credit cards, auto loans, mortgages to a lesser degree) than corporate default risk. Both segments of default risk contain a combination of financial and ethical risk--will the entity have the ability to repay loans and how hesitant will the entity be to default on a loan. I suspect, though, that the ethical component is much more prominent in the consumer segment than the corporate.

R. Levine's point--that ethics can benefit the public by reducing default risk--can be easily seen when considering the example of credit cards. Anyone who is more than 60 days overdue with a payment (details vary based on the issuing bank) will be hit with an onerous interest rate. Why? Because there are thousands of people who declare bankruptcy each year and whose loans will never be repaid to the issuing banks. It is the rest of the consumers who must foot that bill and repay those loans to the bank (otherwise, the bank will simply exit from the market). Currently, many people, when realizing that bankruptcy is imminent, take the opportunity to max out all of their available credit before announcing the intent to default. That is unethical. Some, hopefully only few, build up significant debt with full intention of declaring bankruptcy and not repaying the loan (state laws vary on the efficacy of such bankruptcies). All of these losses are paid by the rest of the consumer base and is built into their interest rates. If these unethical defaults no longer occur, credit card interest rates will drop significantly to the benefit of many if not all consumers.

So there you have it: If people were more ethical, the economy would be better because of less default risk. And that is without even getting into eliminating actual fraud.

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Busted by the New York Times II

I finally got the latest issue of The Jewish Observer. In it, there is a long letter by R. Yechiel Eckstein disputing an article in the previous issue that strongly took him to task for, among other things, providing financial support for organizations in Israel that missionize to Jews and allowing his Christian contributors to contact recipients of their largesse and missionize to them. R. Eckstein disputed all of these charges and strongly took the author and the magazine to task for its lack of journalistic integrity in investigating and reporting on this subject. The author responded with a comprehensive, point-by-point defense of her article, relying on published and publicly available material.

This is not a good week for the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews.

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Yeshiva Tuition

About 10 years ago, I think in '94, R. Feivel Cohen (author of the Badei Ha-Shulhan) returned from a convention of Agudath Israel of America somewhat upset. It seems that there was a big discussion at the convention about what some were calling a "tuition crisis." R. Cohen pointed out that the Gemara in Beitzah 16a states the following:

All of one's livelihood is determined from Rosh Hashanah through Yom Kippur except for what one spends on Shabbos, on holidays, and one's children's Torah education because [for these three things] if one reduces [the expense] they reduce [one's income] and if one adds [to the expense] they add to one's income.

Clearly, said R. Cohen, there cannot be a tuition crisis. The more you pay for tuition, the more one receives as income to make up for that expense. At least according to the Gemara and "We know what we call people who do not believe what the Gemara says."

I suggested to him that secular education, transportation and other incidental items are probably not covered by this promise but he disagreed. Because they are necessary for the Torah education, they are also included in this promise.

R. Hershel Schachter, via TorahWeb, makes the same point. Pay the tuitions and have faith. If you need to reduce other expenses, that would have happened anyway.

While he does not say this, I would say that the Torah education of one's children is so important that one should make do without what are considered necessities in today's world. Sell your furniture to pay for tuition; eat tuna from a can for 7 days a week; wear second-hand clothing. Nothing should come before giving your children the best Torah education possible. Our grandparents understood this importance of education. How did we forget it?

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Laws of Charity IV

Continuing with where we left off in last year's slightly abridged translation of Shulhan Arukh's laws of charity (I, II, III)...

Ch. 251

1. One is not obligated to support or lend money to someone who is an intentional (and frequent--Shakh) sinner in one of the Torah's commandments and has not repented.

Rema: We support the non-Jewish poor with the Jewish poor (and even not with the Jewish poor--Shakh), because of "the ways of peace."

2. One is not allowed to redeem from captivity someone who is a spiteful sinner, even on only one commandment such as eating non-kosher meat when kosher is available.

Rema: However, one may redeem one who sins out of desire if one desires, but there is no obligation to do so.

3. It is considered to be tzedakah to give money to one's over-age children (over the age of six--Shakh) in order to pay for their Torah education for the boys or proper guidance for the girls; similarly, one who gives present to his needy father. Additionally, these poor relatives must have preference over other poor people. Even a relative who is not one's child or parent has preference over others. A brother through one's father has precendence over a brother through one's mother. The poor of one's household have precedence over the city's poor, and the poor of one's city have precedence over the poor of another city.

Rema: Those who are established in the city are considered the poor of the city. They have precedence over the poor who come from other places.

Shulhan Arukh: Those who live in Israel have precedence over those who live outside of Israel. (See this post)

Rema: One's own livelihood takes precedence over other people and one is not obligated to give charity until one has one's own livelihood. After that, one must give precedence to the livelihood of one's parents, if they are poor, and they come before the livelihood of one's children. After one's parents come one's children, who have precedence over one's siblings. The siblings have precedence over other relative, and these other relatives have precedence over neighbors. The neighbors have precedence over the people of one's city, and the people of one's city over the people of another city. This also applies if they are captured and one must redeem them.

4. We obligate a father to feed [i.e. support] his son. Even if the son is and adult, we obligate the father more than other wealthy people in the city.

5. One who gave money to the charity treasurers, neither he nor his heirs have control over the money and the community leaders should do with it as is proper in the eyes of God and man.

Rema: However if, before the money arrives in the hands of the treasurer, the donor vowed to give charity without specifying to whom, we give to his poor relatives because we assume that his intention was to his relatives. However, this is only if he had poor relatives at the time of his vow. But if he had rich relatives who later became poor, we do not give this money to them. This is all speaking about when he donates money alone. However, when he donates money with other residents of the city, he vowed with the intent of following the city's residents and whatever they want to do should be done.

6. One should make the poor members of one's household.

7. One must feed the hungry before clothing the naked.

8. A man and woman who come to ask for food, the women receives preference over the man. Similarly if they come to ask for clothes. Also if a male and female orphan come to receive money for their weddings, we give precedence to the female orphan.

9. If there are many poor people before you and not enough money to support, clothe or redeem all of them, the Cohen has precedence over the Levi, the Levi over the Israel... This is only talking about when they are equal in wisdom but if a mamzer Torah scholar and an ignorant Cohen come before you, the mamzer Torah scholar has precedence (Rema: Even if the scholar requires only clothing while the ignorant one requires even food. And a scholar's wife is considered like a scholar.) Whoever is greater in wisdom has precedence. If one is a greater scholar than one's father or mentor, the father or mentor still have precedence over their greater student/child.

10. One who comes and asks to be fed, we do not investigate him to see if he is deceiving us but, rather, we feed him immediately. If he comes and asks to be clothed, we investigate to see if he is deceiving us. However, if we recognize him then we clothe him immediately.

12. Two poor people who are obligated to give charity, can exchange equivalent money with each other.

13. A community that has to hire a rabbi and a cantor but cannot afford both, if the rabbi is an expert in laws and giving rulings, he has precedence. If not, the cantor has precedence.

Rema: One should not support the city's rabbi from charity money because it is a disgrace to him and to the people of the city. Rather, they should support him from another fund.

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Reading Harry Potter

I sent this in to Avodah yesterday but should probably have posted it here first.

Someone asked: The possible issur in reading HP that comes to my mind stems from the shulchan aruch in orach chaim 307, where "sifrei milchamos" are deemed inappropriate. Opinions anyone? Does this apply to HP? Heterim? What is the nature of the issur?

Here is my response (lightly edited):

The Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 307:16) gives the following reasons for the issue:
1) Moshav Leitzim (a sitting of scorners)
2) Al tifnu el ha-elilim (turning away from God)
[3) Giruy yetzer ha-ra (enticing one's evil inclination) applies to romance novels]

Regarding 2), the Magen Avraham and Bi'ur Halakhah hold that this prohibition only applies to looking at something made for the sake of idolatry. It does not apply to reading history or fiction. Regarding 1), the Magen Avraham points out that this applies equally to attending a circus or theater. That is why I wrote on my blog that "[l]et us assume that your rabbi is lenient and allows going to baseball games and reading Harry Potter." Generally speaking, the two issues go hand in hand.

The Arukh Ha-Shulhan (Orah Hayim 307:10) writes that the Rema is lenient on this issue. He holds that the only potential problem is the decree against reading shtarei hedyotos (business documents) on Shabbos. But if the decree does not apply, e.g. if the book is in Hebrew, then it is permissible to read these books. By implication, during the week it should be entirely permissible in any language. The Eliyahu Rabbah (307:40, cited by the aharonim) writes that books from which one can grow in fear of God are permissible to read on Shabbos. If you can derive yiras shamayim from a Harry Potter book, then according to the Eliyahu Rabbah you may read it on Shabbos.

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List of Previous Posts

I fixed up the list of select previous posts on the right side of the blog. It's now divided into three sections, with the two larger ones alphabetized.

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Learning vs. Knowing II

Nedarim 8a:

Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who arises early and says, "I will study this chapter or this tractate" has made a great vow to his God. But is he not already sworn [to do so from Sinai] and a vow does not fall onto a vow?... We see that since he could have exempted himself by reciting the Shema in the morning and at night, therefore the vow fall onto him.

What does it mean that he could have exempted himself by reciting the Shema in the morning and at night? The Ritva offers two answers: 1) He could have exempted himself from learning by, for example, having to work for a living. 2) He could have spent his time learning the passage of the Shema and not learning the passage about which he vowed.

Without looking at the later commentaries, it seems to me that there are a number of different ways to explain the point of divergence of these two approaches. One way is to say that the debate is whether the obligation to learn Torah is to constantly learn some part of Torah or it is to master all of the Torah. The second answer of the Ritva can be said to hold that one must simply learn Torah, regardless of what part of Torah. Therefore, one has not sworn to learn this particular chapter or tractate, because one can, at least theoretically, spend one's entire life studying the passage of the Shema and never move on to other areas of Torah. The first answer, however, holds that one is obligated to learn every minute part of Torah and, therefore, had to come on to the exemption of earning a living.

Now look at the Ran's comments on this matter. He is clearly of the view that the obligation is to learn every part of Torah and, therefore, uses a complex argument about whether the source of an obligation is explicit in the Bible or derived to explain the above passage.

On this subject, see this post.

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Busted by the New York Times

The NY Times has a long article about R. Yechiel Eckstein with a lot of interesting information on his history and the extent of his operations.

However, much to his chagrin, the following happened in front of a NY Times reporter:

The newest staff member at the meeting was Sandy Rios, who was hired a couple of days earlier as vice president for programming...

Eckstein invited me to ask Bauer a few questions.

''A lot of Jews think Christian support for Israel is a trick,'' I suggested. ''They hear 'evangelical' and think 'anti-Semite.' What do you say to them?''

''There's a lot of history we'd like to do over,'' Bauer said smoothly, ''but this is a new era. Today, Jews are safer living in countries where Christianity is vibrant than they are anyplace else.''

''What about the Armageddon scenario?'' As Bauer knows, a great many Jews believe that evangelicals want to gather Jews in Israel to bring on the ''End of Days,'' a Book of Revelation big bang that includes the return of Jesus and a Jewish mass conversion.

Bauer dismissed this as the "odd belief" of an insignificant minority. "Most evangelicals support Israel for national-security reasons,'' he said. ''After 9/11 there is a strong interest in foreign affairs, and we have a tendency to identify Israel as good guys."...

Throughout this conversation, Rios was clearly eager to join in. And as soon as there was a pause in the discussion, she did. ''You know,'' she said, ''the truth is, Christians do want to convert Jews.''

Eckstein and Mamo exchanged glances. ''Not by some bait-and-switch trick,'' she said. ''But we believe it's part of God's plan.'' Eckstein winced the way he had when Pastor Munsey called him a born-again Christian.

Busted! Rios was fired shortly thereafter because, clearly, some things are better left unsaid.

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The Fat Lady Sings

From R. Dr. David Berger, via R. Dr. Jeffrey Woolf:

A yeshiva bochur asked his rebbe if it's muttar to go to the opera. The rebbe replied, "You're not over till the fat lady sings."

To understand this one line, you have to know about kol isha, you have to know yeshivish, and you have to know the American expression about the fat lady.

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More on Disengagement II

An interview with R. Yaakov Meidan, soon to be co-rosh yeshiva at Yeshivat Har Etzion:

Do you truly believe the secular elite has risen up against you in order to destroy you?

"Yes."

So from your point of view the disengagement is not a strategic move - justified or not - but a deliberate attempt to break the religious Zionist movement?

"I must be accurate: for part of the secular elites breaking religious Zionism is the goal. For others, breaking us is not the goal, but a price they are willing to pay. And to pay easily. When someone rises up against you, it is a pain of a particular kind. When someone does not care at all whether you are broken and does not care where you will wallow after being broken, that is pain of a different kind."...

Did you draw operative conclusions?

"Yes. In order to forge an alliance with the secular elites, we neglected our more natural alliance with the Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] public. Today I think that was a mistake. In the future we will behave differently. In the past, with all the disagreements, I thought there was also something we could learn from the secular elite. After I saw the secular elite stick a knife in my back and turn away from its own values - democracy and human rights - I have no more to learn from them. After all, from the standpoint of democracy, what happened here is a disgrace; and what happened here from the viewpoint of the judicial system's protection of human rights is a shame. The courts, the press, the research institutes - no one heard us. No one heard our outcry. But it is not just us. The democratic elite did not remain loyal to the values in the name of which it spoke all these years. Therefore there are no positive values I can get from them. I have a serious problem with them."...

What you are actually telling us is that if you were a soldier and you were ordered to demolish a synagogue structure, you would not carry out the order. You would not do it.

"I find it very difficult to see how I would be capable of doing it."

And when a student of yours asks you how he should behave during the disengagement?

"I hope the IDF will have the wisdom now to have soldiers who feel this is their milk and their blood do it. I am against refusing orders. I think it is important for our soldiers to be there. Especially so they can calm down the situation. But whoever sends soldiers to drag people from their homes is assuming a very heavy responsibility. He is committing an act without both reason and heart. I want to see [Chief of Staff] Dan Halutz drag his mother from her house. Is he capable of that? Let him not demand that others do what he is not capable of doing."...

For years people on the left manned checkpoints because of the settlers, served as warders because of them, guarded your settlements. That seared their hearts no less than the disengagement is searing your hearts.

"There is no resemblance. The checkpoints guarded Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The detention facilities did not protect the occupation, but security. It is true that left-wing people guarded the settlements, but there is no comparison between the difficulty they had and the difficulty of removing good people from their homes and demolishing them."

You show consideration for the feelings of your public, but have no pity at all for the feelings of others.

"Uzi Dayan told me explicitly that if he received an order to remove Arabs from their homes, he would refuse to obey it. And he was a candidate for chief of staff. Everyone on the left and in the center says that if he were told to expel Arabs from their homes, he would refuse. We are not even talking about refusal. We are only asking you not to force us to trample our values."...

You are absolutely walking on the brink. You are endangering Israeli statehood. The rabbis of religious Zionism - Rabbi Eliahu and Rabbi Shapira - are encouraging refusal on the part of soldiers.

"With all my smallness, with all the fact that I am ignorant and small compared to them, I am ready to say the complete opposite of what those rabbis said. I think a religiously observant soldier should not refuse to obey an order. I say so explicitly: I do not accept refusal to obey an order. It is totally unacceptable to me. But when I am asked whether I would be capable of doing these terrible things I say that I do not know whether I would be capable. And I think when I say that I am not crossing the red line. Because if I do nothing, that will also have a price. If we are too afraid and leave Gush Katif without opposition, that will mean the destruction of Zionism. That is something we are forbidden to do. It is forbidden. Our loyalty to the land and to settlement obligates us to carry out a large protest."

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The Flood Narrative III

(continued from here and here)

Another way to respond to the findings of source critics is to deny their most basic claims. Biblical commentators have, for centuries, explained the flood narrative as a flowing, continuous passage. Even many modern commentators with a traditional bent ignore Bible criticism and follow the path of the pre-modern commentators. However, it is possible that they are able to view the passage as a whole because they ignore, intentionally or not, some of the points raised by source critics. There are some modern commentators, though, who are fully cognizant of the detailed arguments of source critics and still see the narrative as one flowing text. Chief among these scholars is Prof. Umberto Cassuto.

Cassuto first brought to light the literary structure of the narrative by dividing it into smaller, discreet units and showing that each section is a direct progression from the previous, in addition to being a part of a larger literary unit. Subsequent scholars have continued his work, including William Shea, who has an essay on this subject posted online. I will present here this basic approach.

I. Units

The general passage of the flood lends itself into division, although there are places where there is room to debate the actual cut-off points. Shea divides the flood narrative into 17 units as follows:

1. Primary Genealogical Inclusio: 5:32
2. Prologue: 6:1-8
3. Secondary Genealogical Inclusio: 6:9-10
4. First Divine Speech, Pre-Diluvial Covenant: 6:11-22
5. Command to Enter the Ark, Preservation of the Animals: 7:1-5
6. Preservation of the Animals: 7:6-10
7. Entering the Ark: 7:11-16
8. Flood Waters Rise: 7:17-24
9. Apex and Climax of the Flood 8:1-5
10. Flood Waters Abate: 8:6-12
11. Leaving the Ark: 8:13-19
12. First Purpose for the Animals: 8:20-22
13. Second Purpose for the Animals: 9:1-7
14. Last Divine Speech, Post-Diluvial Covenant: 9:8-17
15. Secondary Genealogical Inclusio: 9:18-19
16. Epilogue: 9:20-27
17. Primary Genealogical Inclusio: 9:28-29

Shown in a diagram to reflect the chiastic literary structure of the entire passage, the units take the following impressive form:

1. Primary Genealogical Inclusio: 5:32 2. Prologue: 6:1-8 3. Secondary Genealogical Inclusio: 6:9-10 4. First Divine Speech, Pre-Diluvial Covenant: 6:11-22 5. Preservation of the Animals, Preservation of the Animals: 7:1-5 6. Preservation of the Animals: 7:6-10 7. Entering the Ark: 7:11-16 8. Flood Waters Rise: 7:17-24	17. Primary Genealogical Inclusio: 9:28-29 16. Epilogue: 9:20-27 15. Secondary Genealogical Inclusio: 9:18-19 14. Last Divine Speech, Post-Diluvial Covenant: 9:8-17 13. Second Purpose for the Animals: 9:1-7 12. First Purpose for the Animals: 8:20-22 11. Leaving the Ark: 8:13-19 10. Flood Waters Abate: 8:6-12
9. Apex and Climax of the Flood 8:1-5

The connections between corresponding sections are not only thematic, but often linguistic as well. Thus, for example, sections 4 and 14 both use forms of the word "shahas," "mabul," and "b'ris."

As mentioned earlier, the dating of the flood follows a similar chiastic pattern:

1. 7 days of waiting for the flood (7:4) 2. 7 days of waiting for the flood (7:10) 3. 40 days of flood (7:17) 4. 150 days of water prevailing (7:24)	9. 7 days of waiting to send next dove (8:12) 8. 7 days of waiting to send dove (8:10) 7. 40 days of waiting to send raven (8:6) 6. 150 days of water waning (8:3)
5. The flood cresting, the ark resting, God remembers Noah (8:1)

The ability of the narrative to further the story, unit by unit, while still maintaining this overall chiastic structure is stunning. Cassuto wrote about this:

[T]he section in its present form cannot possibly be the outsome of the synthesis of fragments culled from various sources; for from such a process there could not have emerged a work so beautiful and harmonious in all its parts and details. (From Noah to Abraham, p. 34)

II. Repetition

All of this overall structure is lovely, but it has only bypassed some of the more basic questions that source critics asked without actually answering them. Why is there so much repetition? Why do the different recurrences of similar passages appear differently?

Cassuto (Me-Noah Ad Avraham, pp. 25-26) answers by claiming that this form of narrative with frequent repetition is common in ancient Near Eastern literature and, therefore, should not strike the reader as indicating multiple authors or sources. This response is not, necessarily, contrary to traditional Jewish beliefs. The Rambam explains at length, in his Moreh Nevukhim, that some commandments have as a primary reason that they were directed against common practices in the world of the original recipients of the Torah. The Torah was given to them as well as to all future generations. It is not unthinkable to suggest that the Torah was written in a language and style that would be familiar to those original readers (see here for an essay on a similar topic by R. Chaim Navon).

Furthermore, each repeated phrase is unique in its wording to reflect its position within the plot's progression. Thus, for example, the list of animals is repeated in 6:19-20, 7:2-3, 7:8-9 and 7:15-16 (see this post section I.2). The second list has the unique characteristic of referring to a pair as "husband and wife" rather than "male and female." The reason for this is that this list is part of the unit in which Noah was commanded to bring 7 pairs of animals to the Ark. Were it to say "male and female" in regard to 7 pairs, one might have thought that one male and many females or one female and many males is sufficient. "Husband and wife" is an economic way of making the point that the number of males and females must be the same.

Additionally, both the second and third lists distinguish between "clean" and "unclean" animals. The corresponding units to the sections in which these two list are mentioned discuss the sacrifices that Noah brought after the flood and the permission to eat animals. It is, therefore, not surprising that "clean" and "unclean" animals are mentioned.

However, while the repetitions in the narrative can be attributed to literary style, this does not imply that they have no deeper meanings. It only means that the style should not surprise us. These additional meanings have been expounded throughout centuries of biblical commentary. However, the style of repetition itself, that caused critics to investigate multiple sources, is a common feature of ancient Near Eastern literature.

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Daylight Savings Proposal

(UPDATED A FEW TIMES. SEE BELOW.)

Steven Weiss tells us about a proposal to extend Daylight Savings Time for an extra month in the spring and an extra week in the fall. In Weiss' article in The Forward a few months ago, he reported:

Abba Cohen, head of the Washington office of the ultra-Orthodox organization Agudath Israel of America, noted that an extension of daylight-saving time in some American cities, such as Cleveland and Detroit, could lead to sunrises in November after 8:30 a.m. In New York City, sunrise would take place at about 8 a.m.

What does this mean? (Note that the following is being written from memory, so I reserve the right to be mistaken. As always, ask your rabbi before putting anything mentioned here into practice.)

We are, technically, allowed to pray before sunrise in cases of need, such as when going on a trip. The standard practice, and this is what I was told by my rebbe when I had to commute from Brooklyn to yeshiva in uptown Manhattan every day, is that someone who has to travel to work or school is considered as if going on a trip and may pray before sunrise. However, there are still two limitations.

First, he may only pray after dawn and, second, he may only put on tallis and tefillin after there is enough light to recognize a friend at a distance of four amos. The first time -- dawn -- is generally calculated either as 72 minutes before sunrise or when the sun is 16.1 degrees below the horizon (which on the days in question, is earlier than 72 minutes before sunrise). The second is more complicated. The most lenient position of which I am aware is that of the Peri Megadim, who holds that the earliest time of tallis and tefillin is 60 minutes before sunrise (if I remember correctly). The strictest is the view of R. Moshe Feinstein, that the earliest time is 30 minutes before sunrise. I believe R. J. David Bleich quotes an opinion that the time is 45 minutes before sunrise (R. Bleich has a comprehensive treatment of this subject, ke-darko ba-kodesh, in the first volume of his Contemporary Halakhic Problems).

What is commonly done is that people who need to pray early put on tallis and tefillin before the earliest time (according to R. Moshe Feinstein, with a blessing, but according to most other authorities without) and begin praying, making sure to reach the blessings of Shema after the time for tallis and tefillin. In other words, according to the most lenient opinion, you start services up to 75 minutes before sunrise and only reach the Yishtabah part of services at 60 minutes before sunrise. In another 15-20 minutes, everything is finished. So, according to the most lenient position, you can be out of the synagogue in the morning by about 40 minutes before sunrise. According to R. Moshe Feinstein's position, 10 minutes before sunrise.

UPDATE: (I messed up calculating the times)

The following is a table of UPDATED sunrise information I collected on the web for the dates under question (first Sunday in November 2005 and first Sunday in March 2006):

City Sunrise on November 6, 2005 + 1 hour Sunrise on March 5, 2006 + 1 hour

New York 7:32 am 7:24 am

Detroit 8:12 am 8:01 am

Cleveland 8:04 am 7:55 am

This means that the latest sunrise that this proposal causes (in the cities mentioned above) is on November 6, 2005 in Detroit. On that day, according to the strictest position, men can be out of the synagogue by approximately 8 am.

Am I missing something, or is this not such a big deal? I am sure that some people will have to change their daily routines. But this does not seem quite earth-shattering.

FURTHER UPDATE: Steven Weiss commented that his article was mistaken and the proposal is to extend it to the last Sunday in November. The revised chart looks like this:

City Sunrise on November 27, 2005 + 1 hour Sunrise on March 5, 2006 + 1 hour

New York 7:56 am 7:24 am

Detroit 8:37 am 8:01 am

Cleveland 8:30 am 7:55 am

This definitely has the potential of making life difficult for people who have to be at work by 8:30 am (or have to be at work by 9:00 am and have more than a 30-minute commute). It will make for a few weeks of difficulty, i.e. either having to come to work late or leave work for a short time to pray.

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Davening and the Disengagement

Lamed shows this picture of protesters and soldiers joining together to pray.

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Happy Moon Day

Dov Bear informs us that today is Moon Day, the anniversary of the first landing on the moon. In honor of the auspicious day, I'll link to my post titled Rabbis and Traveling to the Moon.

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The Bach on Belief

As I review the galleys for R. Elijah J. Schochet's biography of the Bach, Rabbi Joel Sirkes: His Life, Works and Times (Expanded Edition) (should be in stores before the High Holidays), I came across the following interesting passage on page 50:

Religion was in many respects a simple matter for Joel Sirkes. His problems of philosophy and faith were few, if any at all. Rabbi Joel was a determined antagonist of all philosophic study, equating it with heresy. He regarded faith in the existence of God as an obvious self-evident truth, apparent to anyone by the power of logic as well as the testimony of tradition.

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More on Disengagement

Interesting essay on Torah Currents.

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Disengagement and Soldiers' Refusing to Obey Orders

(See also these posts - I & II)

R. Aharon Lichtenstein has a lengthy essay in Ha'aretz about the disengagement and refusing orders. As usual, his analysis is profound, comprehensive and utterly incomprehensible to most readers due to length and complexity.

He points out the appeal of opposing disengagement, the position's "simplistic acuity." This is, presumably, not a jab at those thinkers who espouse the position but more an explanation of its appeal to many less profound (or non-) thinkers. This does ring true in my ears.

Why must a soldier obey orders? I try here to organize excerpts and outline them to make R. Lichtenstein's position clear.

[I]

At one relatively pragmatic level, even someone who thinks that it is his halakhic and civil right and obligation to refuse to obey a certain order, without any fear regarding the transgression of rebellion, must gravely consider the repercussions and effects of taking a stand which, even if justified on the isolated level, could yield destructive results and even bring disaster on the army and/or society... In this context, at least three risks should be noted.

[1.] One, there is a fear of a proliferation of the phenomenon... Everyone has his own principles and reasons, and the more pervasive the phenomenon, the more significance it has in terms of the actual endangering of lives. The army's hands become increasingly tied, its ability to do its job internally and externally eroded, and its status as a deterrent factor affected, with all that implies for national security. Harm at this level may be likened to the loss of a vessel of war, to the destruction of an inventory of tanks or planes.

[2.] However, there is another level, since we are not discussing a purely military or operation aspect, but also the human and social aspect. Unity of the army, bearing the common burden, bringing people closer together and deepening mutual understanding and concern - all of this is an invaluable national asset whose influence extends far beyond the ranks of the army, on all of society... Sectarianism is liable to unravel this fabric and turn constructive contact into a segregating and divisive force.

[3.] Three, there is also an internal price, which the national-religious public is paying. National unity is not only a need of the army or the state; it is a social and spiritual need of the Torah- and mitzvah-observant public itself. The values of unity of the Jewish people and the obligation of mutual responsibility were not brought to the beit midrash (house of Torah study) from foreign fields. They were spawned under the canopy of the Torah. This is the case for the entirety of the Jewish people in its Exile, but as the Maharal (a 16th century religious leader) explains in regard to the Talmud in Sanhedrin 43b, it carries even more weight in the Land of Israel, where the organic existential connection is conspicuous. And as hinted at in the Jerusalem Talmud in Sota 7:5, it is of especial consequence when a Jewish government is sovereign in Israel.

[II]

The second level is practical and focused. To what degree, when we disregard the indirect implications, is the refusal to obey orders justified, if at all, and does the requisite justification exist in the case of the disengagement?

As for the outlining of a policy of principle, our moral and halakhic lines are clear. There may, by all means, be circumstances in which refusing to obey orders is not only an option but also an obligation...

[Argument to disobey #1.] Anyone disputing this conclusion can take one of two stands. It may be argued that, as the late Rabbi Goren said when he called for refusing to obey an order - in a different context - that the integrity of the Land of Israel is more important than saving lives...

[Argument to disobey #2.] Alternatively, it could be claimed that the government's predictions should not be taken seriously, either because of a deep belief and certainty that the Guardian of Israel will not rest and will not slumber, or because even an objective and completely secular analysis will lead to the conclusion that it is no more than wishful thinking...

[Response to #1.] As for the first argument, it fits in with a more general landscape of weighing the sanctity of human life against the sanctity of land, and determining the status of people and land, and this is not the place to go into this subject in depth or breadth. I will only note that I will admit without embarrassment that I come from a beit midrash that some of my adversaries consider to be tainted by a Diaspora mentality, that is very sensitive to human life in particular and to the human aspect in general...

[Response to #2.] But the question is not whether it is clear that the objectives will be achieved, but whether it is clear they will not be achieved. The conclusion of the issue of saving a life as it appears in the tractate of Yoma (85b) is that even the uncertain possibility of saving a life overrides Sabbath observance, and this is the practice embraced by every Jewish community... There are no grounds to support statements emanating from certain quarters, which assert that there is no chance for success, or that it is a blatantly unlawful initiative over which a black flag is flying. Clearly, no one can speak of guaranteed success, but it is also clear that predictions of guaranteed failure are erroneous.

[III]

In regards to refusal to obey orders related to disengagement, herein lies the critical point. When the root of the argument is more factual than normative, it is inconceivable for every soldier or every officer, as long as he is in uniform and serving the country, to make decisions for himself and usurp - he or his rabbi - the chief of staff, foreign minister, defense minister and prime minister. This does not entail any denial of the status or conscience of the individual; there are certain circumstances and questions of specific principles and values to which they apply. This does not constitute a call to blind obedience in every situation and at every price. What there is here is a sense of limiting its extent, renewing awareness of legitimate authority and encouraging sensitivity to collective responsibility.

(Thanks to Lamed)

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The Malbim

To my knowledge, there is no book-length English biography of R. Meir Leib (Malbim) Weiser. R. Nosson Kamenetsky, in his The Making of a Godol, refers to the Malbim with last name Weiser. Yisrael Dubitsky confirmed for me that this was the Malbim's last name, or at least his father's last name, according to Noah Rosenblum. The following is an excerpt from his entry in Encyclopedia Judaica:

MALBIM, MEIR LOEB BEN JEHIEL MICHAEL (1809–1879), rabbi, preacher, and biblical exegete. The name Malbim is an acronym formed from Meir Loeb ben Jehiel Michael. Born in Volochisk (Volhynia), Malbim was a child when his father died. He studied in his native town until the age of 13, with Moses Leib Horowitz, among others. He married at the age of 14, but after a short time divorced his wife. He went to Warsaw, where he became widely known as the "illui from Volhynia." From there he went to Leczyca, where he married the daughter of the local rabbi Hayyim Auerbach, who maintained him, and he was thus able to devote himself to literary work. In 1834 he traveled to Western Europe to obtain commendations from contemporary rabbis for his Arzot ha-Hayyim (1837), visiting, among other places, Pressburg, Amsterdam, and Breslau. In 1839, on the recommendation of Solomon Zalman Tiktin of Breslau, he was appointed rabbi of Wreschen (district of Posen), where he remained for seven years. From there he went to Kempen and was therefore sometimes referred to as "The Kempener." While in Kempen he was invited to the rabbinate of Satoraljaujhely in Hungary but refused the offer. He finally agreed to accept the call of the Bucharest community, and in the summer of 1858 he was officially inducted as chief rabbi of Rumania.

Because of Malbim's uncompromising stand against Reform, disputes broke out between him and the communal leaders of the town, leading to his imprisonment. He was freed only on the intervention of Sir Moses Montefiore and on condition that he leave Rumania and not return. M. Rosen has published various documents which disclose the false accusations and calumnies Malbim's Jewish-assimilationist enemies wrote against him to the Rumanian government. They accused him of disloyalty and of impeding social assimilation between Jews and non-Jews by insisting on adherence to the dietary laws, and said, "this rabbi by his conduct and prohibitions wishes to impede our progress." As a result of this the prime minister of Rumania issued a proclamation against the "ignorant and insolent" rabbi for his effrontery in "publishing libelous letters against those eating meat from any butcher shop and he has preached against the idea of progress and freedom." In consequence the minister refused to grant rights to the Jews of Bucharest, on the grounds that the rabbi of the community was "the sworn enemy of progress" (from the official newspaper Moniturul March 6, 1864). Determined to refute the false accusations made against him, Malbim went to Constantinople to lodge a complaint against the Rumanian government, which was then under Turkish domination. Following the rejection of his appeal and his failure to obtain the help of the Alliance IsraMlite Universelle (in transmitting a memorandum written in 1864 in Paris in which Malbim, with the help of Adolphe CrMmieux, addressed himself to the Rumanian ruler, stressing his patriotism), he was compelled to leave Rumania (1864). During his wanderings in the following years he suffered persecution and calumny. He served as rabbi intermittently in Leczyca, Kherson, and Mogilev and was persecuted by the assimilationists, the maskilim, and the Hasidim. He was invited to Mainz, and on his way stopped at Koenigsberg, where he remained for about four years. In 1879 he received an invitation from Kremenchug, Poltava oblast, to serve as its rabbi, but died in Kiev on his way there.

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Studying From Old Tests

A year or two ago, on a private e-mail list, I stated that I did not think there is anything wrong with collecting old tests that a teacher has given and studying from them, even if the teacher is known to regive old tests. Others, however, considered it unethical.

R. Yisroel Belsky discusses this in a column for Torah.org:

It is hard for me to say that it's ossur (prohibited) or that it's immoral. It's a higher level of morality not to do it, and study. But it's definitely not something that you could even taint by saying it's ossur or by saying it's immoral, because it does lead to a good knowledge of the material. It provides a pretty decent review.

If there are only one or two tests, then the teacher is a fool. The students will just copy the test and not learn anything. But if there are five, six or more tests, a teacher worked very hard for several years making the tests, and if you go through all the teacher's tests, you'll probably learn a lot.

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Feminism and the Daughters of Zelophehad

Were there daughters of Zelophehad, who argued with Moses and demanded to be counted equally in inheriting from their father (Num. 27:1-7), early models of feminists? Granted, they only asked to be allowed to inherit if the father has no sons. However, they demanded at least some rights that bordered on equality.

R. Elhanan Samet (here, and in Hebrew here [RTF]) argues that they were not asking for their own rights, but for their father's rights:

Should we see the struggle of the five daughters of Tzelofchad to inherit their father as an example of an ancient feminine struggle? Now that we have uncovered their motivation, as expressed by the question "Why should the name of our father be eliminated?" - it is clear that the answer is negative. They were not motivated by their own rights, and their own welfare, nor was equality of inheritance rights for women what lay at the root of their demands, but something else entirely - the concern for the name, the memory, the continuity of their father, which will continue to exist through his daughters and grandchildren who will live on the land which he received from God. These five women are not trying to bring about a revolution, not even a small one. Their arguments arise deeply from within the conceptual world of the Tanakh concerning the establishment of a man's name over his land, and they are arguing for the extension of this biblical principle and its precedence over the general laws of inheritance.

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Substance Abuse in Adolescents: Detection, Treatment and Prevention

Substance Abuse in Adolescents: Detection, Treatment and Prevention by Rabbi Dr. Abraham J. Twerski

Some choice excerpts:

"Why are so many adolescents using drugs today? Because they emulate adults. For whatever sociologic and psychologic reasons, alcohol and drug use among adults is very prevalent, and the kids are simply following the pattern set by adults."

"Which youngsters are at risk of getting into trouble with alcohol or drugs? All of them! Chemicals are an 'equal opportunity destroyer.' The idea 'We are a fine, loving family' or 'We are a Torah observant family' should not lull anyone into thinking, 'It can't happen in my family.' It can and it does. I have treated youngsters from the finest families and from families that were completely Torah observant. We must remove our blinders. Drugs are used by youngsters in yeshivas and in religious girls' schools. Kids are using drugs and are dealing drugs."

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Strolling Down The Beach

A responsum from R. Shlomo Aviner, originally printed in the 1985 edition of R. Shmuel Katz's Kedoshim Tihyu, p. 236 and reprinted in R. Shlomo Aviner, Gan Na'ul, p. 265:

Question: May girls dressed according to halakhah attend a mixed beach?

Answer: Apparently, there is no prohibition in the girls' actual attendance, as in the previous question; however, it might be that we must prohibit it because of mar'is ayin [appearing to sin], similar to what is written in the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 11b), that it is prohibited to travel on a path that is dedicated to travel to a specific city in which there is an idolatrous celebration. In our situation, also, there is mar'is ayin on those girls, i.e. [people thinking] that they are going to participate in mixed swimming.

However, if there is a practice like this, that many women walk to a mixed beach and remain there dressed, it is possible to say that there is no mar'is ayin (R. Moshe Feinstein wrote similarly on a different topic in Iggeros Moshe, Orah Hayim vol. 3 no. 25). However, it seems to me that there is no such practice. Perhaps, if a woman walks with a young child there is no mar'is ayin because people will assume that she is just bringing the child. However, regarding young women, there is certainly mar'is ayin.

However, since this is a new question to me, and I did not see anyone else discussing it, I can only tell to where my opinion leans.

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Tradition Online

Steven Weiss -- you remember, the journalist not the rabbi, whose blog contains material that is not for my more sensitive readers -- is trying to get a discussion going on how the RCA's journal Tradition can embrace the web. I was involved in discussions about this a while back and I don't have many good ideas. Feel free to get involved and offer input. Your suggestions will be read by those with power to act on them!

Discussion here

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Religious Zionism Debate X

The Three Oaths, Part II

(see here for Part I)

R. J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 1 pp. 14-15:

The prime argument cited in objection to the War of Independence, and indeed to the very establishment of the state itself, is based upon a literal understanding of the Talmud, Ketubot 111a. In an aggadic statement, the Talmud declares that prior to the exile and the dispersal of the remnant of Israel, God caused the Jews to swear two solemn oaths: (1) not to endeavor to retake the Land of Israel by force, and (2) not to rebel against the nations of the world. Rabbi Zevin [Torah She-be'al Peh 5731] maintains that these talmudic oaths are not binding under circumstances such as the ones which surrounded the rebirth of the Jewish state. In support of this view he marshals evidence from a variety of sources. Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De'ah, II, 454:56, notes that there is no report in any of the classic writings regarding an actual assemblage for the purpose of accepting these oaths, as is to be found, for example, in the narrative concerning the oaths by which Moses bound the community of Israel prior to the crossing of the Jordan. The oaths administered before the exile are understood by Avnei Nezer as having been sworn by yet unborn souls prior to their descent into the terrestrial world. Such oaths, he argues, have no binding force in Halakhah. Similarly, the Maharal of Prague in his Commentary on the Aggada, Ketubot 111a, and in chapter 25 of his Nezah Yisra'el, interprets these oaths as being in the nature of a decree or punishment rather than as injunctions incumbent upon Jews in the Diaspora. There is obviously no transgression involved in attempting to mitigate the effects of an evil decree. A third authority, R. Meir Simchah of Dvinck, author of the Or Sameah, accepts the premise that these oaths do apply in a literal sense. However, he expresses the opinion that following the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration, establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine no longer constitutes a violation of the oath concerning rebellion against the nations of the world. The text of Or Sameah's statement on this improtant issue is reprinted by Z. A. Rabiner, Toledot R. Meir Simhah (Tel Aviv, 5727), p. 164. Rabbi Zevin adds that this argument assumes even greater cogency subsequent to the United Nations resolution sanctioning the establishment of a Jewish state.

There is yet another line of reasoning on the basis of which Rabbi Zevin denies the binding nature of these oaths at the present juncture of Jewish history. He advances a forceful argument which, particularly in the present post-Holocaust era, must find a sympathetic echo in the heart of Jews who have witnessed an unprecedented erosion of all feelings of humanity among the nations of the world which permitted the horrendous oppression and torture of the Jewish people. The Talmud, loc. cit., records that the two oaths sworn by the people of Israel were accompanied by a third oath which devolved upon the nations of the world; namely, that they shall not oppress Jews inordinately. According to Rabbi Zevin and others who have advanced the same argument, these three oaths, taken together, form the equivalent of a contractual relationship. Jews are bound by their oaths only as long as the gentile nations abide by theirs. Persecution of the Jews by the nations of the world in violation of this third oath releases the Jewish people from all further obligation to fulfill the terms of their agreement.[4]

---

[4] See also R. Aaron Soloveichik and R. Meir Blumenfeld, Shanah be-Shanah, 5734. For additional sources regarding the applicability of these oaths, see R. Menachem Kasher, Milhemet Yom ha-Kippurim (Jerusalem, 5734), pp. 63-83; and R. Shmuel ha-Kohen Weingarten, Hishbati Etkhem (Jerusalem, 5736). R. Chaim Vital, Ez Hayyim (Jerusalem, 5723), p. 3, quotes Beraita de-Rabbi Yishma'el, Pirkei Heikhalot, which declares that the oath remained in effect only for a period of one thousand years; see also Zohar, Parshat Va-Yeira, p. 117a.

UPDATE:
Note that this contradicts what Frumteens says about R. J. David Bleich:

Refutation # 3 - There is no shita in the world that says if some nations get togethr and vote that Jews should get EY they can. The shita says that if they can take EY peacefully without resistance then it would not violate the Oath. But that did nto happen here. There was a war - the war of '48, where 6,0000 Jews were killed. The Arabs, who were living in and around the land, did not give the Jews any permission to take it. Other countries did, and there is no such halachic status that the UN is like some kind of Sanhedrin Hagadol that can bind other nations to its decisions (any Zionist can tell you that). In any case, there is no comparison to a Coresh or any other "peaceful ascent", since - hello!! - in order to create the State of Israel they had to fight a bloody war with the Arabs!!!. So why in the world is that called a "peaceful ascent"?

If the Zionists were weaker they never would have been able to create a State - it all depended on their Yad Hachazakah.

No shitah ever found or imagined ever permitted such a thing. Not the Avnei Nezer, not R. Meir Simchah, nobody.

In fact, rabbi J. David Bleich - of YU, NOT Satmar, had long ago pointed out this absurd usage of Rav Meir Simchas letter. Quote:

"This observation (of Ohr Someach) is entirely inappropriate in the context of this discussion. This observation, uttered upon promulgation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine in a peaceable manner with full permission of the mandate authority would not contravene the Three Oaths. The statement is both unexceptional and entirely inapplicable under other circumstances. Moreover, it explicitly recognizes the binding nature of the oaths." (Journal of Halachah and Contemporary Society XVIII p.108). His point is that the circumstances that the Ohr Someach's statement was referring to were not the circumstances that came about.

That is not what R. Bleich wrote in that journal. His brief comment was in response to a critique of a previous article of his on giving back territory to Arab countries. R. Bleich wrote that the Three Oaths can be seen as permitting giving back the land. Someone responded that according to the Or Same'ah the oaths no longer apply. R. Bleich answered that, according to the Or Same'ah, the oaths do still apply but never prohibited the establishment of the state of Israel.

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FYI from Amazon.com

From: Amazon.com
To: gilstudent@gmail.com
Cc: order-update@amazon.com
Date: 14 Jul 2005 12:30:12 -0700
Subject: Your Harry Potter Order Is on Schedule (#104-6616109-7521601)

Hello from Amazon.com.

We're happy to let you know that we've begun preparing your order for
"Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince" for delivery.

We're working hard to make sure you get your order as quickly as
possible. However, please note that we can't guarantee that your
book(s) will be delivered on July 16.

You'll receive our usual shipment confirmation e-mail after your package
leaves our fulfillment center.

Thanks for shopping at Amazon.com, and happy reading!

---

UPDATE:
From: Amazon.com Payments
To: gilstudent@gmail.com
Cc: payments-mail@amazon.com
Date: 15 Jul 2005 05:47:24 -0700
Subject: Your Amazon.com order has shipped (#104-6616109-7521601)

Greetings from Amazon.com.

We thought you'd like to know that we shipped your items today, and that
this completes your order.

Thanks for shopping at Amazon.com, and we hope to see you again soon.

---

For the record, we are going to be away for Shabbos (Teaneck, again) and will not have the opportunity to open the book on Shabbos. Not that I would have allowed it anyway. Patience is a virtue.

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Conservative Judaism on Decline II

(See this post)

Last week, The Jewish Week featured an opinion piece by Prof. Judith Hauptman about the declining ranks of Conservative Judaism. She argued that by failing to mandate egalitarianism, the Conservative movement gave a message that it is unfair and hypocritical. This, she claimed, drove off members. (Here is the article. Note that she is not Orthodox and the opinion piece does not reflect Orthodox views. Do not read the following quote if you are not prepared for a non-Orthodox view.):

It was at this point that the Conservative movement lost its moorings. In the wake of its egalitarian transformation, the leaders needed to actively advocate the point of view that this change fulfilled the mandate of the founders, that it was the highest order of good...

But they failed to do so. Instead of aggressively promoting equality for women as a grand and welcome new ethical truth, the leaders gave a choice to Conservative synagogues: to integrate or not to integrate women into leadership roles. Both options remained equally valid.

If the Conservative movement wants to stop losing members, it needs to clarify its moral vision. It must withdraw permission to be anything other than fair to women. Talmudists like me know with precision that feminist changes, and others on the agenda like the ordination of gays as rabbis, are all doable within the framework of halacha. Persuasive books have been written on the subject.

From where I'm sitting, this evaluation seems to be almost totally divorced from reality. Rabbi Alan J. Yuter has proven, once again, in a letter to The Jewish Week, that there are few people more entertaining that disgruntled former Conservative rabbis. He writes in this letter (note that, while Orthodox, he is not right-wing and those sensitive to left-wing Orthodoxy should not read the following quote):

If Professor Hauptman insists upon denying its traditionalists the right to be different by viewing morality, modesty and rabbinic legislation differently than she does, Conservative Judaism will lose its most intensely committed adherents, with little evidence that it will be embraced by non-observant feminists. This policy will also undermine Conservative Judaism's claim that unlike Orthodox Judaism, it accepts religious pluralism. The issues on which Conservative Judaism compromises and the issues where it draws lines in the sand will determine its actual rather than professed identity.

There is no lower blow than calling a liberal "intolerant." In this case, though, the label seems to fit.

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Lawrence Education Proposal II

The Lookjed e-mail list is currently discussing this proposal as well. Here is the beginning of the discussion, with links at the bottom of the post. Note, in particular, the posts by R. David Derovan on his own experiences in public school and R. Eliyahu Teitz, a yeshiva administrator.

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Kiruv in the Parashah

This week's Torah portion tells us of the immorality some Israelites performed with Midianite women in the desert:

Just then one of the Israelites came and brought a Midianite woman into his family, in the sight of Moses and in the sight of the whole congregation of the Israelites, while they were weeping at the entrance of the tent of meeting. (Num. 25:6)

The midrashic tradition tells us that the Israelite man was Zimri, the leader of the tribe of Simeon, and the Midianite woman was a princess named Kozbi. What is the background story to this incident?

R. Moshe Shternbuch, in his Tuv Ta'am Va-Da'as (ad loc.), homiletically offers the following background story: The Israelite men were attempting to reach out to the Midianites and bring them to faith in the Jewish God. However, in order to accomplish their lofty goal they needed to breach the chasm between the two divergent lifestyles. Therefore, they embraced some of the Midianite attitudes so as to be better able to influence the Midianites and bring them to the true faith. This corrupted the well-intentioned Israelites and led Kozbi, a Midianite princess, to convert to Judaism for purposes of marriage rather than belief. Zimri went to publicize his successful outreach program by showing off his recently converted Midianite wife.

However, this accomodation was nothing more than a distortion of Judaism that led to disastrous results. This program of outreach was so abominable that it led to the conclusion of the story -- the zealotrous Pinehas killed the two sinners who had brought Midianite attitudes and practices into the Jewish people.

R. Shternbuch continues to apply this to some outreach-oriented people in our day (without naming names) who, in our great sins, accomodate foreign attitudes in order to reach out to others. He strongly disapproves.

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Lawrence Education Proposal

Journalist Steven I. Weiss has been following a new education proposal circulating in Lawrence, NY (I, II, III - note that he is not a rabbi and the general content of his blog has not been rabbinically approved). As the proposal currently stands, after significant evolution from its original form, students will attend a local yeshiva for Torah studies in the morning and then be bussed to a public school for secular studies. The Orthodox students will stay after-school for an extra period of secular studies to make up for the missed morning. The Orthodox students would be together in classes in a separate track from the rest of the public school due to their different schedule. If this passes all of the legal hurdles, it will significantly relieve the financial burden of tuition. This is the (lightly edited) comment I left on Weiss' blog and does not even address the serious tzeni'us issues involved:

Some of the most important but also most subtle religious influences on Jewish students in school is from the secular studies faculty. In my own experience, I had a rabbi teaching me AP Math and Physics in twelfth grade and an Orthodox tenth grade Chemistry teacher (among many others) who impressed upon me not only that science does not contradict religion but that fully Orthodox Jews can be knowledgable and worldly.

The proposal discussed in this post is anti-Torah u-Madda and anti- the ideals of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch. The message it sends to the students is that Torah is for the Jews and everything else for non-Jews. Those who strive for some sort of integration of religion and the world, in the many different versions currently circulating, should be opposed to this proposal. The ideal is to have Orthodox Jews teaching all subjects so that the teachers can be role models to students on how to integrate everything one learns into one’s life and worldview. Instead, this proposal will have students studying religious subjects under rabbis in the morning and then entering a different universe, one legally mandated to be secular, in which the rest of the world is explored. It is spiritually dangerous and ideologically unsound.

The need for affordable schooling is very real. However, we need to abandon this potentially disastrous plan and focus our considerable creativity and energy on one that is more sound.

UPDATE: Steven Weiss reports that a third proposal is now being entertained.

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Realism and Cynicism

The Summer 2004 issue of Tradition is out and it is a Festschrift for R. Emanuel Feldman. R. J. David Bleich has an article in which he puts forth a proposal, based on a suggestion of R. Moshe Sofer (the Hasam Sofer), that will prevent almost all instances of a father secretly marrying off his daughter and refusing to reveal the name of the groom. A few years ago, this seemed like an ominous, new way to coerce a mother into agreeing to a divorce under extremely unfavorable terms. While the practice has not been repeated, even one new case is too many.

R. Bleich's proposal requires a communal ban against:

1) any person who accepts an object of value in order to effect a marriage with his minor daughter; 2) anyone who presents an object of value to a father for that purpose; 3) anyone who encourages or counsels such an act; 4) as well as against anyone who serves or agrees to serve as a witness to such an act.

But R. Bleich is no fool. He is a realist, or as some like to call a realist--a cynic. He concludes:

This writer knows full well that this proposal for obviating the possibility of kiddushei ketanah will be dismissed as utopian. It is indeed utopian in nature. Since the Jewish community lacks a central authority such a proposal cannot be implemented unless the required communal edict is promulgated on a local level in each and every community. Only in that manner could a disgruntled husband be prevented from achieving his desire by arranging such a marriage in a locale in which the practice has not been banned. Implementation of the proposal is within the realm of halakhic possibility but would require the cooperative efforts of all segments within each community. Given the present splintered nature of the Jewish community even such ad hoc cooperation may be unachievable.

Those reflections merely underscore the state of halakhic as well as social impotence that exists simply because we lack prescience and fortitude in instituting a kehillah system similar to that which existed in virtually every city and hamlet in the Europe of days gone by. As a result we are condemned to live with many forms of social malaise, not because the problems are intractable, but because we refuse to establish the mechanism by which they might be ameliorated.

Ouch!

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Hogwarts Shabbos III

I spoke with one of my rabbe'im who is a recognized posek. He does not want to be associated with Harry Potter so I agreed not to publicize his name. He thinks that from the standpoint of the laws of Shabbos, it is permissible to cut the tape on the box, remove the book and read it. However, he does not necessarily recommend reading Harry Potter on Shabbos or during the week, and he points out that there are posekim who would rule strictly. But as he said, if this were a box of napkins that came in the mail, he'd allow it to be opened.

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Hogwarts Shabbos II

I retract my conclusion from this post. As was pointed out to me, the problem is that the delivery is on behalf of the sender. When a Jew sends a package, the mailman is acting on his behalf. If the package arrives on Shabbos, then the mailman is delivering it on Shabbos on behalf of a Jew, which is prohibited. But if a non-Jew sends it, then the delivery is permissible in itself.

However, when a Jew orders something to be delivered specifically on Shabbos, then the delivery is also on behalf of the orderer and is forbidden. That might be the case here. However, the majority of orderers are not Jewish, so perhaps the deliveries are on behalf of a group that is mostly not Jewish.

So my revised conclusion is that I'm not sure whether it is permissible to open the packages of Harry Potter. Ask your rabbi.

ANOTHER POINT: I neglected to mention that you are not allowed to take a package directly from the hand of a mail carrier. Ask him to put it down. From experience, I can say that mail carriers in Brooklyn are used to this and don't think twice about it.

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Bloom County Classics IV

Intolerance of the "other," even by those who are suffering from intolerance. My, my, sounds familiar, no?



(click on the image to see it enlarged)

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Hogwarts Shabbos

This Shabbos is unique in that it is the official release day of Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (Book 6). This post will not deal with whether one may, in general, read Harry Potter during the week or on Shabbos. Let us assume that your rabbi is lenient and allows going to baseball games and reading Harry Potter. The question here is about the laws of Shabbos. Stores are timing the release of the book so that those who have ordered in advance will receive it in the mail (or via UPS) this Shabbos. May an observant Jewish family receive, open and read the book this Shabbos or will they have to wait until after Shabbos (and, if so, how long)?

Because there are so many opinions on this issue, everyone is advised to ask their own rabbi. In this post, I will be following the position of R. Yehoshua Neuwirth in his Shemiras Shabbos Ke-Hilkhasah (SSK).

I. Mail on Shabbos

Jews are obligated to rest from creative labor on Shabbos. Gentiles, of course, are not. Can a Jew, therefore, ask or hire a gentile to perform all of his needs for him on Shabbos, thereby circumventing the laws? No. There is a specific rabbinic prohibition against doing that-- called amirah la-nokhri--that closes the loophole (although it is left open in certain circumstances, one which we will see shortly).

Therefore, a Jew cannot give work to a gentile on Friday afternoon, e.g. giving a suit to a dry cleaner, and demand that the work be complete by Saturday night because the gentile will be forced to work on Shabbos for the Jew. However, if the Jew gives it to the gentile on Friday afternoon and demands that it be done by Monday morning, the gentile can choose when to perform the work and, if he decides to do it on Shabbos, it is his own choice and not prohibited.

Centuries ago, the question arose about the status of mail on Shabbos. Can a Jew send a letter? On the one hand, the postal worker is delivering the Jew's letter on Shabbos. On the other, the Jew does not care whether it is delivered on that day or a later day. The consensus is that regular mail is allowed to be sent (unless the postal service is staffed largely by Jews, as was the case a few decades ago in NY and is currently in Israel) but any mail that is sent to be delivered specifically on Shabbos, i.e. express or overnight mail, is not allowed (SSK 31:20).

Similarly, mail that arrives on Shabbos is not considered as if a prohibition was performed on it and is not, therefore, inherently forbidden for use on that Shabbos (SSK 31:22). This is so even if the package was brought through a place that has no eruv [such as Flatbush ;) ] or from outside of one's tehum Shabbos boundary (SSK 31:23).

II. Opening a Package on Shabbos

The Mishnah Berurah (340:41) generally prohibits opening letters (and, by implication, packages) on Shabbos because the containers are reusable. The SSK (28:4) quotes this ruling in the text, but in footnote 15 quotes R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as questioning the reason for this prohibition, since the envelope is generally disposed and not reused. If one intentionally opens the package in such a way that the box is no longer usable and must be thrown out, this should be entirely permissible. This is also the position of the Hazon Ish and R. Shlomo Fisher (cited in Piskei Teshuvos 340:29). (Assuming, of course, that the letter or package contains no muktzeh information, such as financial statements or bills.)

However, even the Mishnah Berurah agrees that one may tell a gentile, such as a nice neighbor or a random passerby, that one may not open the box because it is Shabbos. This should be enough of a hint that the gentile will open the box for you. This is allowed despite the general prohibition of amirah la-nokhri mentioned above (SSK 31:22).

III. Harry Potter on Shabbos

Given all the above, may one open up the Harry Potter package delivered this Shabbos? Let me quote from the official English translation of SSK, Shemirath Shabbath: A Guide to the Practical Observance of Shabbath (31:23, p. 495):

a. One may use on Shabbath the contents of a parcel delivered that day by a non-Jewish mailman.

b. This is so provided that the sender was not particular that the parcel should be delivered on Shabbath.

In my estimation, the bookstores are very particular that this book be delivered on Saturday, July 16. I suspect that if many people do not receive their books on this day, there is going to be a big stink and someone somewhere is going to be fired.

Given this point, it seems to me that one may not open the Harry Potter package on Shabbos. Not only that, one must wait after Shabbos enough time for a delivery to arrive, so one does not benefit timewise from the Shabbos delivery (Mishnah Berurah 515:68). I'm not sure how long that should be, perhaps the amount of time it takes to drive to your nearest UPS warehouse of post office (maybe 15 minutes to half an hour).

UPDATE: See this post.

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Important Research Tool

UPDATE:
Doh! Reproduced from elsewhere:

Google Is Your Friend

All Smart People Use Google

You Appear Not To Be One Of Them



Someone thinks you are an idiot because you were too stupid to check Google
before asking a question. They gave you a link to this site as a joke. The fact that
you followed it pretty much proves the point.

Hope that helps.

Have a nice day.

I don't know why I didn't think of this in the first place.

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Godol Hits Gold

Great post by the SpongeGodol SquarePants Hador about why he believes and what doubting Jews can do. I can't recommend the rest of the blog but this post alone is excellent. Not that I necessarily agree with everything in it, but I can recommend reading it.

I'll also commend him for taking a cue from the Meharher and using a bold outline in a long post. Here's his outline:

1. Must a Jew Believe Anything?
2. Faith and Doubt
3. Value
4. Proofs
        Prophecies in the Torah
        Success of the Basic Ideology
        Other Religions
        Unique History
5. Study
Conclusion

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Mixed Theology

When people are eclectic and mix concepts from different thinkers, there is always a danger that they will end up combining contradicting ideas (I recently praised R. Baruch Simon for not doing this). Here is an example:

When confronting the problem of suffering and evil in the world, many turn to the idea that God intentionally hides his presence. The earliest Jewish source in which I can recall seeing this concept is the writings of R. Moshe Hayim Luzzatto (Ramhal). God's presence is intentionally somewhat hidden because, otherwise, His obvious presence would force us to believe in Him, thereby removing our free will.

On the other hand, when dealing with Creation or evolution, people argue that the "intelligent design" of the universe proves that it was created.

When confining the theories to different subjects, the contradiction is not always obvious. But when looked at comparatively, it is clear that these two worldviews are entirely incompatible. One could reconcile them by, for example, stating that "intelligent design" only implies a creator but does not prove it, thereby leaving room for free will. As we have seen in past posts, however, there are those who believe that one can and must actually prove God's existence, and not merely decide that it is the most likely alternative. To them, such a reconciliation is meaningless. If they adopt the Ramhal's view that God's presence is hidden to allow for free will, they are contradicting themselves.

This is the danger of eclecticism.

Using a Christian variant on the above ideas, Douglas Adams ably mocks such inconsistent thinkers in his The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, p. 60:

Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that anything so mind-bogglingly useful could have evolved purely by chance that some thinkers have chosen to see it as a final and clinching proof of the nonexistence of God.

The argument goes something like this: "I refuse to prove that I exist," says God, "for proof denies faith, and without faith I am nothing."

"But," says Man, "the Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn't it? It could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, so therefore, by your own arguments, you don't. QED."

"Oh dear," says God, "I hadn't thought of that," and promptly vanishes in a puff of logic.

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Our Right To Speak Out On Israel II

R. Jeffrey Saks pointed me to a number of statements by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik on this topic in his recently published letters, Community, Covenant and Commitment: Selected Letters and Communications:

"I never declared any opinion on issues [of territorial compromise in Israel] that according to my view only those Jews who are defending the borders of the land with their blood have a right to deal with." (p. 231)

"[However,] since I am not a resident of Eretz Yisrael (a point I emphasized), it is impossible for me to publicize my opinion. Diaspora Jews should not involve themselves in the internal affairs in Israel." (p. 198)

"[Q:] Do you support the peace proposal of Dr. Henry Kisssinger...?

[A:] I do not live in Eretz Yisrael and I have no right to express my opinion on these matters." (p. 235)


(An additional thanks goes to Joel Rich who also brought these to my attention)

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Our Right To Speak Out On Israel

In the current issue of The Jewish Week, Chananya Weissman discusses the reasons some claim that Americans may not voice an opinion on Israel's policies and attempts to rebut them. Unfortunately, he seems to have neglected the primary argument that I have always heard:

You cannot properly understand the situation in Israel without living there.

He somewhat addresses it with this statement:

If we have educated ourselves sufficiently to contribute to the discussion, it would be wrong for us to withhold these viewpoints. Who is so sure of himself to declare that a Jew in the diaspora cannot offer a fresh perspective or even the smallest insight that deserves to be considered?

But who says that we are not just fooling ourselves? Who doesn't think that they already know enough to offer an opinion?

I think that the only proper response to the above argument is that people living there tend to extrapolate from their own personal circumstances and (usually mistakenly) think that his situation is reflective of the entire country's. Often, people in the middle of a situation cannot see the whole picture. That is why history written by participants is often entirely wrong; those involved cannot possibly know the entire goings-on. Not only can an outsider see multiple points of view and have access to external information, he can be (but not necessarily is) more objective.

Not that I have an opinion on what's going on in Israel. I plead ignorance of the details. But many people with whom I speak are drowning in details but only of limited pieces of the puzzle (not to mention being misinformed from unreliable news sources). As the truism goes, a little knowledge is dangerous. Perhaps ignorance is better.

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Flatbush Eruv III

(Continued from here and here)

From R. Chaim Jachter, Gray Matter (n.p., 2000), pp. 174-177:

During the 1970s, the contruction of the eruv in Flatbush (a neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York) aroused great controversy. To this day, its permissibility remains disputed. The Va'ad Harabanim of Flatbush permits carrying inside the Flatbush eruv, while many rabbis and rashei yeshivah there, such as Torah Vodaath's Rav Yisroel Belsky (personal communication), forbid its use.

Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (Kitvei Hagaon Rav Y.E. Henkin 2:25) strongly encourages the construction of eruvin in New York's five boroughs, including Brooklyn (whose population easily exceeded 600,000 already in hsi day). Although Rav Henkin does not explain why these places are not reshuyot harabim [official public domains - GS], a number of arguments have been offered to support his cotnention that Flatbush is not in this category. First, Rav Shlomo David Kahane's argument regarding the Warsaw eruv seemingly applies to Flatbush, too, because no street within the Flatbush eruv runs straight from one end of the city to the other.[6]

Second, the ruling of Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinski and the Chazon Ish also seems to apply to Flatbush. The faces of the buildings and the fences along the Belt Parkway appear to constitute the majority of a wall on three sides.[7] (Ironically, this lenient consideration is most often applicable in densely populated urban areas rather than smaller suburbs, which frequently have much empty space between buildings.)

Third, the Aruch Hashulchan's unique (but highly questionable) approach might be taken into account (Orach Chaim 345:19-24)...

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 4:87) vigorously disputes the Aruch Hashulchan's argument, citing a proof to the contrary from the Gemara (Shabbat 96b). The Divrei Malkiel (vol. 3, p. 267) also writes that one may not rely on the Aruch Hashulchan's novel insight... Rav Aharon Lichtenstein conveyed sentiments similar to those of the Divrei Malkiel and Rav Moshe...

A fourth defense of the Flatbush eruv is the opinion of Rav Efraim Zalman Margoliot (Beit Efraim, Orach Chaim 26) that only pedestrians count when determining that 600,000 people travel in a street. He argues that the requirement for 600,000 people is based on a comparison to the encampments in the desert. The comparison can thus be made only to pedestrians, as the 600,000 people who were in the quintessential reshut harabim were all pedestrians... Both Rav Moshe (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:139:6) and Rav Binyamin Silber (Teshuvot Az Nidberu 6:70) reject this argument, pointing out that wagons (agalot) were used in the desert encampment's thoroughfares. [I believe the Mishkenos Ya'akov, a contemporary of the Beis Efraim, also disputes this position - GS]

Despite all of the arguments in favor of being lenient, Rav Moshe did not endorse the construction of the Flatbush eruv (see Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 4:87-88). He explicitly rejects all of the arguments presented and rules that the 600,000 people who regularly travel the streets of Brooklyn render it a reshut harabim.[10]

---

[6] Even Flatbush Avenue and Bedford Avenue bend at various points; Ocean Parkway does not extend from one end of Brooklyn to the other.
[7] The Chazon Ish (O.C. 107-5-7) requires that there be at least one street in the town that either bends or ends inside the town. Brooklyn meets this requirement, as we have explained in the previous footnote.
[10] Rav Moshe's concern was not for the 600,000 residents but for 600,000 people traveling the streets at any time (drivers and pedestrians) within an area that is twelve mil (approximately eight miles by eight miles). He thus requires that the population be so great that 600,000 people are regularly found in the streets. Rav Moshe estimates that this requires at least 2.4 million residents. Rav Moshe is the lone authority who requries such a large populations, and even he (O.C. 4:87) expresses reservations about his view, noting that no other authorities mention it. Nevertheless, Brooklyn is so populous that even Rav Moshe considers it a reshut harabim.

I should note that volume 2 of Gray Matter is currently in production with Yashar Books.

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Slifkin This Sunday

(download flyer here)

SCIENCE and TORAH

An Advanced Seminar for Adults

RABBI NATAN SLIFKIN

Best-selling and controversial author of Nature's Song,
Mysterious Creatures, Seasons of Life, The Science of Torah,
and The Camel, the Hare and the Hyrax

Sunday, July 10th

Schedule:
11am-12:30pm Untangling Evolution
1:30-3pm Mysterious Creatures: Chazal and Zoology
3:30-5pm The Camel, the Hare and the Hyrax

At Congregation Etz Chaim of Kew Gardens Hills
147-19 73rd Avenue
* Cost: $10 per lecture * For more details, write to
zoorabbi@zootorah.com or call 516-673-1103

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Bloom County Classics III

Echoing Proverbs 9:17...

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Shaking Hands With Women III

Another correction:

I was incorrect in stating R. Yisroel Belsky's view on the subject. This is what someone involved in kosher supervision, in a position to know R. Belsky's view, wrote to me:

Rav Belsky holds that, generally, a mashgiach should NOT shake the hand of a female factory official. He holds that the Hetter should be used ONLY in isolated incidents--and when accompanied by personal protective acts to restore the level of pre-deviation zehirus and to maintain kedushah.

Also, Toby (Bulman) Katz wrote of her father's (R. Nachman Bulman) position:

My father zt'l permitted shaking hands if the woman extended her hand, to avoid embarrassing her. A man should not put out his hand first.

I see that R. Zvi Lampel relates his personal experience with R. Reuven Feinstein:

I asked R' Reuvain Feinstein, shlita, and he insisted that Rav Moshe permitted handshaking with a woman where she extends her hand first, on the basis of avoiding the issur of embarrassing her.

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