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Tuesday, November 30, 2004
Ga Ga Over Google
The J-blogosphere (e.g. I, II) has been taking notice of Google Scholar, a new service by Google that allows the searching of academic journals.
However, I believe that a development of far more significance is Google Print.
Google Print puts the content of books where you can find it most easily; right in Google search results.I know of at least one Jewish publisher that will be participating in this program.
To use Google Print, just search on Google as you normally would. For example, do a search on a subject such as "Books about Ecuador Trekking," or search on a title like "Romeo and Juliet." Whenever a book contains content that matches your search terms, we'll show links to that book in your search results. Click on the book title and you'll see the page that contains your search terms, as well as other information about the book. You can also search for other topics within the book. Click "Buy this Book" and you'll go straight to a bookstore selling the book online.
A Defense of Chosenness
God's Beloved: A Defense of Chosenness by R. Meir Soloveichik
At this point the objection may understandably be raised: Does this mean that Judaism rejects the equality of man before God? Can a Jew indeed affirm the democratic ideal, according to which "all men are created equal" on account of rights "endowed by their Creator?" The answer is that while Judaism argues against the universality of God’s love, it does insist upon the universality of God’s justice, and affirms the equality of all men before it.
Beruriah's Fate
From Sefer Ha-Hayim:
Beruriah, the scholarly wife of the Tanna R. Meir, is mentioned a handful of times in the Talmud, always in a very positive light. It is therefore surprising that Rashi, in his commentary to Avodah Zarah (18b), should relate a very negative story about Beruriah in which she ends up committing suicide. There is no extant earlier source for this story, yet anyone familiar with Rashi's style of commentary knows that it is not in his nature to create stories.
R. Zevi Hirsch Chajes (AKA Maharatz Chayes) offers an explanation of this puzzle... (continued here)
Monday, November 29, 2004
Ittur Soferim
Marc B. Shapiro, in his book The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides' Thirteen Principles Reappraised p. 111, states that R. Ashier ben Yehiel (the Rosh) is of the view that the Men of the Great Assembly (scholars around the time of Ezra) removed various letters in the Torah, a process called "Ittur Soferim." Additionally, the Netziv cites this Rosh approvingly, implying that this great rosh yeshivah also agreed with this view.
I found this hard to believe because the Gemara (Nedarim 37b) calls Ittur Soferim a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, something told to Moshe at Mt. Sinai and passed down in tradition. So I looked up the Rosh. What he really says is that Ittur Soferim are letters that were removed from the Torah but should have been in it. He never says who did it. One could easily (and more plausibly) read the Rosh as saying that there was a tradition from Sinai that certain letters that, grammatically, should have been in the Torah were never put in, i.e. they were removed from the sentences at the time of writing. See also the Arukh (`ATR 2).
Today's Hanukah
Dr Jeffrey Woolf argues that the make-up of contemporary society in Israel mirrors that of the time of Hanukah.
Sunday, November 28, 2004
On Egalitarianism and Halakhah
I pulled out a somewhat-old issue of Tradition (Summer 2002) to look up an article on stem cell research and realized that I had never finished reading a different article in that issue. So I took the time this morning to read it. The article is "On Egalitarianism and Halakha" by Marc D. Stern. I remember being disappointed that the article seemed too abstract, and that is probably why I never finished it.
Upon re-reading and finishing it, I found the article to be at once eloquent, forceful and convincing, and also confused, impractical and unfocused.
The author argued that egalitarianism, the equality of all people, is a fundamental concept of modern societies and underlies much of what we take for granted in the contemporary world. It has benefited us as Jews greatly and is something we would sorely miss. It is also not going anywhere. It is extremely popular in America and throughout the world, and is considered a fundamental value by all modern courts and governments (even if implemented unevenly). For all that, I give the author a yeyasher kohakha for a job well done.
The author then points out that halakhah is not egalitarian; it is decidely particular.
What to do? Well, since egalitarianism is not merely a trend but a lasting principle of the modern world, we have to change halakhah to be more egalitarian. Not, he is careful to say, willy-nilly changes with total disregard for the sacred. Rather, small changes in customs and rabbinic practices in ways that are consistent with the halakhic process. He is quick to point out that there have been halakhic changes before due to changes in economic and social circumstances: e.g. the herem of Rabbenu Gershom, the increases of dowry and shetar hatzi zakhar for female inheritance, the sale of hametz, and of course the Meiri's attitude towards Christians.
He even gives examples of changes that have taken place: the RCA pre-nuptial agreement and R. Moshe Feinstein's ruling that a Jewish company in America charging interest only to non-Jews is impossible.
However, there is a profound leap of logic in his article. Granted, egalitarianism is important in the world and is here to stay. But who says that we have to absorb it into our world view? Certainly, we have to recognize its importance to the world and frame our interaction with the outside world with that realization prominent in our minds. But why do we have to accept it as a positive and absolute value just because everyone else does? Maybe we should be taking our values from the Torah rather than trying to force the Torah to fit external values. Or, accepting that many times in history we have accepted values from the outside world, we have never done such in an obvious and self-negating way that gives the impression that Torah is secondary to contemporary social values.
In my opinion, calls for revising halakhah based on outside trends in morality are doomed to failure. The changes first have to be un-selfconsciously absorbed into the Orthodox world and, only then, will changes in attitude that yield minor differences in halakhic practice follow suit. It is already occuring. However, attempts to bring it to our attention are counter-productive. When we become self-conscious of outside influence, we instinctively react against it. Let it happen without our recognizing it. Or at least let us pretend not to recognize it.
Friday, November 26, 2004
Citation of Non-Orthodox Scholars IV
An Addendum:
In 1940, Prof. Samuel Atlas of Hebrew Union College published in London the novellae of Ra'avad of Posquierres on Bava Kamma with his critical notes, along with some notes from his friend R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg. In 1963, this was reprinted in Jerusalem and New York. In 1971, the question was posed to R. Menashe Klein whether one may utilize this commentary that was published and annotated by a non-traditional Jew. He responded by discussing two issues that were raised in previous posts (Mishneh Halakhos, 2:212-213).
He first begins by addressing the issue of confirming sectarians, presumably because he considers utilizing the written works of a non-Orthodox Jew to be a confirmation of his position, a tenuous argument at best. R. Klein cites a responsum of R. Ya'akov Sasportas (Ohel Ya'akov 68, cited by Gilyon Maharsha, Yoreh De'ah 246) in which the latter insisted that the Sabbatean practice of dukhening every day be stopped because it confirms the Sabbatean heretics in their practice. As proof, R. Sasportas quotes the Radbaz who rules that one may not quote Torah from a non-traditional scholar. If so, certainly one should not imitate his practices, even if they are inherently praiseworthy. R. Klein further cites R. Yehezkel Landau (Noda Bi-Yehudah 1:Hoshen Mishpat:16) who briefly rules similarly.
R. Klein then proceeds to directly address the issue of utilizing texts of non-traditional origins, which touches on the subject discussed in this thread. Interestingly, he quotes R. Ya'akov Reischer in his Iyun Ya'akov on Avodah Zarah (17a), where R. Reischer explains that R. Eliezer was punished for receiving pleasure from the halakhic insight of a sectarian. Evidently, one may not do so, which should preclude the utilization of the Torah insights of non-traditional Jews. However, that this aggadic insight should be halakhically binding is a difficult argument to accept.
R. Klein, a Hungarian, then proceeds to note a debate between two Hungarian halakhists of the 19th century - R. Moshe Schick and R. Hayim Halberstam's father-in-law - about Bibles with translation and commentary by non-traditional Jews (presumably, Mendlessohn's Bi'ur). According to R. Schick, one may use the Hebrew text of the Bible and Rashi while according to the latter, one must put the books in genizah (R. Halberstam disagrees and rules that one should burn the books). R. Klein rules that the books should be put in genizah but that one who wishes to be lenient may follow R. Shick and use the books without looking into the commentary (or, even better, to cut off or blot the commentary).
Interestingly, at no point does R. Klein point out that the commentary under question was published with the notes and support of R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg, who presumably disagreed with this entire ruling. According to our analysis, R. Weinberg seems to be following in the tradition of R. Yosef Zechariah Stern and R. Klein in the tradition of R. Moshe Stern. They both might also agree with R. Shlomo Kluger, each one arguing over whether the time requires being strict on this matter.
Thursday, November 25, 2004
Halakhic Wills
I wrote a long post on the subject of wills in halakhah but decided not to post it. The issue is serious and the lack of a will may cause children to fight over money during a time of mourning and possibly violate the prohibition against stealing.
For the proper way to write a will according to halakhah, see this article and, with much more practical detail, Kuntres Mi-Dor Le-Dor (in Hebrew and English) by R. Feivel Cohen, published in 1987 and currently out of print (the author allows people to photocopy the book if they send him $10).
Wednesday, November 24, 2004
Conformity
The incident between Shekhem and Dinah, and the subsequent reaction of Dinah's brothers, seems quite puzzling at a first reading. The Midrash Rabbah tells us that Shekhem had seduced Dinah into sleeping with him.[1] Thus, we are speaking of a consensual relationship. Even according to the view that Shekhem initially forced Dinah, the Gemara in Yoma (77b) implies that certainly afterwards Dinah was interested in continuing the relationship.[2] Thus, even if the relationship started off improperly, after the incident the hurt was mended and Dinah was willing to forgive the offense. This hardly seems like an atrocity. Even if there were charges to bring against Shekhem, Dinah was not interested in pressing those charges. Yet, the reaction of Ya'akov's sons implies that the offense was tremendous and unforgivable.
When Ya'akov's sons heard about the incident with Shekhem and Dinah they cried out, "Such a thing may not be done!" (Bereishis 34:7) Rashi explains that following the Flood the nations instituted among themselves various stringent rules regarding relations. While they may not have followed all of the laws of the Torah, they tried to maintain a high level of morality regarding relationships between men and women.
Indeed, this can be seen in Avraham's fear that Pharoah and Avimelekh would kill him in order to marry his wife. Because of this, he and Sarah lied and said that they were not married. Evidently, even murderers who lacked basic fear of God still maintained a respect for the sanctity of marriage and would not sleep with a married woman. Despite all of their other lackings, these people continued the post-Flood societal norms regarding relations.
Therefore, even though there was no actual law prohibiting a single man from sleeping with a single woman, it was not allowed based on this post-Flood custom. When Shekhem and Dinah slept together before marriage, they violated perhaps one of the few universal norms of the time. This disregard for societal standards is what appalled Ya'akov's sons. Indeed, the Midrash Lekah Tov states that Shekhem was the first in history to violate the societal norms set after the Flood.[3]
Society is bound together very tenuously by the sometimes unspoken standards of the community. Our interaction depends on a sustained trust of proper responses and behaviors. When everyone follows all of the rules then society functions as expected. However, when someone breaks even one of the rules he opens a floodgate that can be closed only by tremendous effort, if ever. Until Shekhem, the societal norms remained binding. However, once Shekhem violated an accepted standard of behavior he opened the door for others to violate this and other standards. An inviolable law is honored by all. A rule that has exceptions is followed only by those who choose to. Everyone else will find their circumstances to be important enough to merit exceptions.
Shekhem was the first to discover situational ethics. He decided that his situation was an exception to the official rule. Two consenting people in a mutual relationship, who could object to that? Society could object because Shekhem broke down the ties that connect the community. After him, societal norms were no longer binding.[4]
The midrash tells us that two of the things for which the Jewish people merited redemption from Egypt were that they maintained distinct Jewish names and language.[5] This is somewhat surprising because there is no actual obligation to use a Jewish name or speak a Jewish language. Based on the above, however, we can understand that the Jews maintained their own community and were able to sustain their societal norms throughout their long sojourn in Egypt.
In our own lives we face similar societal norms on different levels. However, in our world that so values independence we can choose whether to conform or not. We must recognize that sometimes conforming to accepted patterns of speech and styles of dress is not meaningless but is an affirmation of the unspoken rules of the society in which we live. Granted, communities in every time and place are different. However, every society has norms and conforming to them is not mindless but an act of upholding the community.
Every person is created in the Divine image and is unique just like God. It is part of our duty in life to nurture our own talents and personalities. However, we must balance this with a need to be part of a community. "It is not good that man be alone" (Bereishis 2:18). Aside from the mitzvos one can only fulfill as part of a larger group, it does, indeed, take a proverbial village to raise a person. Not only through one's childhood, but throughout one's life one needs to be part of a community for both physical, psychological and spiritual support. For this reason, if not for the sake of others who clearly need societal support, one must overcome one's natural selfishness and, in areas specific to each community, conform to societal practices for the greater good.
[1] Koheles Rabbah 10:8. Cf. Targum Yonasan; Pardes Yosef in the name of Siah Yitzhak.
[2] Cf. Rashi, Yoma 77b sv. mi-bi'os aheiros
[3] Brought down in Torah Shelemah, Bereishis ch. 34 no. 22 in the notes.
[4] This is all in addition to the objections of the family members who were affected by the entire relationship that, to outsiders but not to the couple, seemed abusive.
[5] Vayikra Rabbah 32:5; Bamidbar Rabbah 20:22; Shir HaShirim Rabbah 4:12; Tanhuma, Balak 16; Mekhilta on Exodus 12:6 (Bo, par. 5); Torah Shelemah on Exodus 1:1, vol. 8 p. 9 n. 26.
Tuesday, November 23, 2004
Thanksgiving
Everyone always seems to need to revisit the issue of Thanksgiving, so here's the article. Knock yourselves out.
Musar and Benjamin Franklin II
Courtesy of R. Ari Waxman, more at Sefer Ha-Hayim on Musar and Benjamin Franklin, plus R. Eliyahu Dessler and Dale Carnegie, and a funny story with R. Aryeh Carmel and his wife.
Monday, November 22, 2004
Midrash Halakhah
The written and oral Torahs are generally connected, even if that connection is not always clear. Oral laws were given as a tradition to Moshe and were transmitted over the generations. However, it is not always easy to remember lists of laws so various generations sought to support these laws from the biblical text. Some place the generation of Ezra, when a religious revival took place, as a time when there was a major effort to connect the two Torahs. Regardless of the timing, this leads to a division among oral halakhos. The Rambam, in his introduction to his commentary on the Mishnah[1], distinguishes between oral laws that have no connection to the biblical text at all (described by the Mishnah in Hagigah as "floating in the air"), laws whose connection to the text was given to Moshe and transmitted along with the law and laws whose connection to the Bible was found afterwards. This connection to the text does not mean that it is merely a fiction useful for study. It is very real. As the Vilna Gaon emphasized, almost all halakhos can be found in the Bible. The methodologies used show how we could have derived them from the text had we not already known them.
There is a fourth category of oral laws, at least according to the Rambam. There exist laws that are created by the Sages through biblical exegesis. Using accepted methodologies, the rabbis derive laws from the Torah that were previously unknown. It is this last category that we will discuss here.
While the Rambam acknowledges that such a category exists, others deny that the Sages ever created new laws through hermeneutics. R. Sherira Gaon, in his famous epistle about the history of the oral Torah, mentions derashos that support existing laws but does not mention derashos that create laws[2]. Similarly, his son, R. Hai Gaon, wrote in a responsum[3] that derashos only support the law and do not create it. Thus, while the Rambam agrees that there are derashos that only support the law, he argues that there are also derashos that create laws while the Geonim deny that such derashos exist.
For example, everyone agrees that the "peri etz hadar" one must take on Sukkos is a citron. The varying derivations of this law in the Talmud are only ex post facto supportive derashos and not attempts to create a new law through hermeneutics. However, when Beis Shammai say that one must lie down at night and stand up in the morning while reciting the Shema (Berakhos 10b), were they extracting this idea from the verse or merely assuming that the existing practice was obligatory rather than just customary? Similarly, when Beis Shammai say that a man can only divorce his wife if he finds in her a devar ervah (Gittin 90a), is that a law derived directly from the verse or was the verse used only as a proof? This is the debate over whether derashos are creative or merely supportive.
In his Sefer Ha-Mitzvos (shoresh 2), the Rambam repeats that there are derashos that create halakhos but implies that such laws are only of rabbinic force. The Ramban, in his glosses, agrees that there are laws created in such a fashion but argues strongly that they are of biblical force. The standard resolution of this debate is offered by Ramban's descendant, R. Shimon ben Tzemah Duran (Rashbatz), in his Zohar Ha-Raki'a[4]. He suggests that the Rambam also meant that these laws are of biblical status but that their origin is from the rabbis. The only difference between the Rambam and the Ramban, then, is how to identify laws that were created rather than supported.[5] While this explanation is the most accepted, there are some who believe that the Rambam was of the view that halakhos cannot be created through hermeneutics other than on a rabbinic level.[6]
Throughout the ages, various scholars have taken sides on this issue. For example, Hakham David Nieto (1654-1728) in his Mateh Dan - Kuzari Sheni (3:5-14) argues that creative derashos were used, but only in the case of a forgotten law or when a new situation arose that had not been previously addressed.
This debate continued to modern times among both traditional rabbinic scholars and university academics. R. Meir Leibush Weiser ("Malbim") wrote a commentary to the Torah, Ha-Torah Ve-Ha-Mitzvah, that attempted to show the hermeneutical methodologies of derashos. His work can be seen as being on either side of the debate, as even those who claim that derashos only support laws agree that the derashos must be methodologically sound. However, in the introduction to his grammatical preface to his commentary to Vayikra, Ayeles Ha-Shahar, Malbim goes one step further and states that most derashos are creative. In response to this, and to earlier academics like Krochmal, Frankel and Weiss who agreed, R. Yitzhak Isaac Halevy wrote at length[7] on this subject in which he harshly[8] condemned this approach and argued that almost all derashos are supportive. I emphasize "almost all" because his position is frequently misquoted in the literature on this subject. Halevy did not disagree with the Rambam because he allowed for creative derashos in the very limited context of an authorized Sanhedrin. Even he, the most extreme of all scholars on this subject, allowed for some creative derashos. However, he strongly denied that, for example, the derashos of R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish were anything other than supportive exercises.
In terms of academic scholars, it is noteworthy that R. Ya'akov Nahum Epstein accepted Halevy's thesis[9]. However, as already noted, the early academic scholars of Torah took a wider approach to creative derashos and that has generally remained dominant in the field. Hanokh Albeck[10] brings a number of strong arguments in favor of creative derashos, albeit accepting that many - perhaps most - are supportive. Ephraim Urbach[11] adopts an innovative theory that there were two opposing factions throughout the Second Commonwealth and the Tannaitic era, one favoring creative derashos and the other opposing. During various times throughout that period one faction might have been more influential than the other, but overall the creative faction gained dominance in the final generations of the Tannaitic era. Ultimately, his theory is too elegantly contrived to withstand scrutiny and remains, to this writer, more a figment of Urbach's imagination than an historical reality.
R. Avraham Weiss also accepts that derashos can be creative[12]. Building on this, his student R. Hayim Yitzhak Levin notes the following phenomenon. A derashah can be brought as support for a pre-existing halakhah. However, when that support is accepted as adequate, when it is decided that had we not known of this halakhah beforehand this derashah would have been sufficient to create this law, then the derashah can be used to create new details of this law[13].
The methodologies of halakhic midrash are complex and require a sensitivity to the biblical text as well as a legal outlook. Not everyone recognizes the subtleties that underly derashos. However, it is crucial for any student to recognize that not all derashos were used to create laws. Many were ex post facto attempts to synthesize the oral and written Torahs. Even if this is not true of all derashos, it is quite possibly true of most and perhaps almost all of them. This recognition may not be important to many people. However, students who find derashos implausible should keep in mind 1) that there is a sensitivity required to appreciate the methodologies of derashos and 2) by and large, these derashos are supportive and not creative.
[1] Qafih tr., vol. 1 p. 11. Cf. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Mamrim 1:1.
[2] Levin ed., p. 39
[3] Teshuvos Geonim, ed. Assaf, no. 14. Cf. however, Hanokh Albeck, Mavo Le-Mishnah, p. 54 n. 21 who harshly criticizes Epstein's interpretation of this responsum.
[4] Cited in the commentaries to Sefer Ha-Mitzvos, shoresh 2, e.g. Megillas Esther no. 2.
[5] On this, see Doros Ha-Rishonim, vol. 5 p. 503 ff.
[6] E.g. R. Yosef Qafih, Kesavim, vol. 2 p. 549 ff.
[7] Doros Ha-Rishonim, 1:3 (vol. 2) pp. 307-311, vol. 5 pp. 467-543.
[8] R. Nosson Kamenetsky, Making of a Godol, p. 14 n. n records that R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky took offense at the harshness of this criticism.
[9] Mevo'os Le-Sifrus Ha-Tanna'im, pp. 501-515
[10] Mavo Le-Mishnah, ch. 3
[11] "Ha-Derashah Ki-Yesod Ha-Halakhah U-Va'ayas Ha-Soferim" in Tarbitz 27
[12] Le-Heker Ha-Talmud, p. 13
[13] "Al Yahas Ha-Halakhos Ve-Ha-Derashos" in Sefer Ha-Yovel Le-Rav Avraham Weiss
Sunday, November 21, 2004
Friday, November 19, 2004
Musar and Benjamin Franklin
From Sefer Ha-Hayim Blog:
Conventional wisdom among "those is the know" is that a classic Musar work that was enthusiastically supported by R. Yisrael Salanter, Sefer Heshbon Ha-Nefesh, is a Hebrew translation of Benjamin Franklin's memoirs. This, of course, does not diminish the utility of the book. Any book can be helpful if written with wisdom and insight, regardless of the author's identity. However, this little-known "fact" of the book's real author is somewhat jarring to those uninitiated to the secret.
The truth, however... (continued here)
The Perils of Blogging
Dilbert aptly expresses the difficulty in blogging:
One of the downsides of writing a blog is that there are always people who know more, are smarter, think more clearly, are more articulate, and are more polished than the blogger. At least that is true in my case. So, when faced with contrary views, I have three options: admit defeat, defend myself, or model myself after my program director, who advised us and proclaimed himself to be "frequently wrong, but never in doubt" and ignore them. I choose the second path where ever possible.I'd add that it is also difficult to come up with decent posts every day when you are busy and often preoccupied with more important things.
So I apologize to all readers whose time I have wasted with incorrect or boring posts.
Ya'akov's Altar
Ya'akov had an amazing dream that awed and inspired him. He recognized God's presence in the place where he was sleeping. Clearly, this was a moment of spiritual inspiriation. So what did Ya'akov do? He went back to sleep and then woke up early the next morning to build an altar. Why did he go to sleep? Why didn't he immediately dedicate the place to God by building the altar? He surely could have lit a fire, and even without a fire he could have simply taken the rock on which he slept and dedicated it as an altar to God.
The Meshekh Hokhmah (Bereishis 28:18) explains that building the Temple or any of its parts is prohibited at night. Since one may only build it in the daytime, Ya'akov had to wait until morning before engaging in his plans.
The Panim Yafos (ad loc.) suggests in a slightly different way that offering a sacrifice is forbidden at night so Ya'akov had to wait for the day.
These are clever lomdishe answers but are problematic simply because this altar (assuming not like the Ramban, who says that it was not an altar) did not have the status of the Temple nor did its sacrifices have the status of Temple sacrifices. Furthermore, as the Rinas Yitzhak (ad loc.) points out, it is a dispute between the Rambam and Ramban in the Sefer Ha-Mitzvos whether the rules of building the Temple apply only to the walls or also to the utensils. According to the Rambam (aseh 20), the utensils of the Temple are included in the mitzvah to build the Temple. But according to the Ramban (aseh 33), they are not. Therefore, according to the Ramban, the rules regarding the building of the Temple do not necessarily apply to the altar. Furthermore, the Arukh La-Ner (Sukkah 41a) explains that, even according to the Rambam, the rules of building the Temple only during the day apply only to the walls of the Temple.
So why didn't Ya'akov dedicate the altar at night? Why did he wait for early morning to build it? Give your answers in the comments section.
Thursday, November 18, 2004
Mathematics and Religion
Once, while I was being examined for entrance to a fairly right-wing yeshiva, the rosh yeshiva asked me what my college major was. When I answered math, he told me that most great talmudic scholars have a natural affinity to math. I had always assumed that this was due to the logic aspect of math and its similarity to talmudic logic, but there might be something deeper to it. The following is from Bertrand Russel, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 37:
Mathematics is, I believe, the chief source of the belief in eternal and exact truth, as well as in a supersensible intelligible world.
Geometry deals with exact circles, but no sensible object is exactly circular; however carefully we may use our compasses, there will be some imperfections and irregularities.
This suggests the view that all exact reasoning applies to ideal as opposed to sensible objects; it is natural to go further, and to argue that thought is nobler than sense, and the objects of thought more real than those of sense-perception...
The combination of mathematics with theology, which began with Pythagoras, characterized religious philosophy in Greece, in the Middle Ages and in modern times down to Kant.
In Plato, Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, there is an intimate blending of religion and reasoning, of moral aspiration with logical admiration of what is timeless, which comes from Pythagoras, and distinguishes the intellectualized theology of Europe from the more straightforward mysticism of Asia.
Wednesday, November 17, 2004
Birthdays
I never really understood the point of celebrating birthdays. Sure, everyone needs a time to reflect on the accomplishments and failures of the previous year and make decisions about the year to come. But for us, that's Rosh Hashanah not your birthday.
The Torah (Bereishis 40:20) tells us of Pharoah's birthday celebration and on that verse the Midrash Sekhel Tov states that standard practice is to celebrate one's birthday, but is it referring to standard Jewish practice? I don't think so.
R. Matis Blum, in his Torah La-Da'as vol. 6 p. 260, tries to find sources for a Jewish practice of celebrating one's birthday. He notes that the Ben Ish Hai records such a practice in two places - Ben Yehoyada, Berakhos 28a and Ben Ish Hai, year 1 Re'eh no. 17. He states that some, including his family, have the practice of treating a birthday as a personal holiday. But it seems to me that a 19th century record of such a practice lacks authority.
R. Blum also notes that the inimitable R. Moshe Kolodny showed him a newspaper clipping that describes the celebration in Jerusalem of R. Shmuel Salant's 93rd birthday in 1909 (R. Hayim Berlin sent him a big cake).
I still don't get it. There are certain milestones that indicate significant achievement, such as reaching the age of mitzvos (12/13), the age beyond premature death (60; cf. Mo'ed Katan 28a), old age (70; cf. Responsa Havas Ya'ir no. 70) and strength (80). I can see celebrating those. But the age of 24, for example, why celebrate that birthday? Unless you are looking for reasons to have a party. That is not how I approach life.
Tuesday, November 16, 2004
Torah Time II
The exact timeline of the Flood is complex and I will surely confuse and bore readers if I delve to deeply into it (see here for a discussion but be forewarned). However, an interesting point emerges from Ramban's (Bereishis 8:4) explanation of the Flood chronology. Ramban's method of reconstructing the timeline assumes months of 30-day lengths, i.e. solar months and not lunar months.
It seems that Ramban assumes that the calendar followed a solar cycle rather than the lunar cycle which is currently in use. In other words, before the Torah was given, or before the commandment to utilize lunar months was given in Egypt (Shemos 12:2), the de facto calendar was solar. Perhaps one could say that the natural calendar is solar while the Torah calendar is lunar. This corresponds to what explained in an earlier post that natural days are from sunrise to sunrise while Torah days are from sunset to sunset. When the Torah was given, the ways of measuring the calendar was changed.
This view of the Ramban that pre-Torah months were solar is confirmed by the Mekhilta De-Rashbi and Midrash Ha-Gadol on Shemos 12:2: "'This month is for you' - The forefathers did not count from it." Similarly, the Mekhilta (De-Rabbi Yishma'el) says on that verse: "'This month is for you' - Adam did not count from it." The late Midrash Sekhel Tov on Bereishis 34:25 states explicitly that solar months were used until God commanded us to use lunar months. (For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Torah Shelemah, vol. 13 ch. 1.)
New Editor at Tradition
I congratulate R. Shalom Carmy on his new position of editor of Tradition, as reported in The Commentator.
Some interesting excerpts from the article:
Rabbi Carmy has already agreed to expand the breadth of the journal's reach to tackle "fundamental questions" facing the Orthodox community.
Both men, for example, would like to see the journal produce historical and contemporary models of the Orthodox rabbinate as a leader and authority in the Jewish community.
Rabbi Herring noted that the journal should also monitor the direction of Orthodoxy in America and its ability to confront obstacles like assimilation.
For his part, Rabbi Carmy cited three more areas in which he would like to see the journal grow. First, the journal needs to expand upon the work that Rabbi Shmidman began on incorporating the academic scene in Israel into the pages of TRADITION. Second, the journal's board needs to more efficiently referee Jewish law material submitted to the journal. And third, Rabbi Carmy would like to reach out to younger voices on the editorial committee to allow them more input on the journal's agenda. Already, Rabbi Carmy has appointed a number of younger advisors to the journal's board.
Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine, professor of economics at YC, who worked previously on the journal's board, has been named an associate editor. And as a newcomer, Associate Professor of Jewish Studies Yaakov Elman has joined the journal's editorial committee.
I wish R. Carmy much success in his undertaking.
Monday, November 15, 2004
Tinok She-Nishbah
The status of a non-observant Jew in the worldview of traditional Judaism is complicated by the fact that society has changed so much since the Talmud that finding the proper talmudic category for such people is a complex matter. However, when was the major point of change? Was it the turn of the modern era and the rise of secularism or earlier than that? As we shall see, R. Yehuda Henkin points to nineteenth century Germany as the turning point.
In talmudic times there were certainly Jews who seceded from the community of traditionally observant Jews. However, they were generally either apostates who adopted idolatrous practices or sectarians who actively rejected the dominant form of Judaism... (Continued here on the Sefer Ha-Hayim Blog).
Sunday, November 14, 2004
Carlebach Minyan
It's confession time. Let me get the following out into the open so I no longer have to remain in the closet:
1. I organize the occasional Carlebach-style Kabbalas Shabbos in my synagogue (about 3 or 4 times a year), although there is not much organizing to do.
2. Spiritually, I get very little out of these minyanim.
Thankfully, we have a gentleman in our neighborhood who is willing and able to lead such a service. His voice is beautiful, and strong enough to drown out the rest of us who sing along in the key less traveled.
However, and it may just be the Kalter Litvak inside me, I gain nothing in terms of kavanah from these services. It's a fun sing-along with kosher songs and shukkeling. During Kabbalas Shabbos I'm singing along and usually struggling against the impulse to open a book, thinking about a sugya or cringing at the people clapping or banging on the table to the tune (I know, they have posekim on whom to rely). During the following Ma'ariv, for which one must actually have kavanah, I can control my mind to some degree but I do not have any extra intent due to the singing.
So what's the point of the sing-along Carlebach-style Kabbalas Shabbos? Other than breaking the monotony of long, cold winter Shabbosim and a little kosher fun, I don't really know.
My rabbi speaks every Friday night between Kabbalas Shabbos and Ma'ariv, even when the evening is Carlebach-style. The first time we experimented with this, he spoke about how when he was in Lakewood, and the time arose to sing a song, it was almost always a Carlebach song. This, he said, implied that one was allowed to utilize the songs of such an individual (ve-hameivin yavin). Afterwards, I showed him a responsum from R. Moshe Feinstein that is clearly (although not explicitly) on this very subject - Iggeros Moshe, Even Ha-Ezer vol. 1 no. 96 - in which R. Feinstein also rules leniently.
Friday, November 12, 2004
Literary Criticism and Countermissionaries
Anyone who has ridden the New York City subway on a daily basis for years has surely come across a Christian missionary of one sort or another. The wise thing is to just ignore him and leave him in boredom rather than give him the satisfaction of an engaging debate. Nevertheless, there are some Jews who choose to engage them. This is even more common in online forums where misionaries feel free to enter Jewish areas and proselytize. One argument that I have seen frequently is the usage of modern literary criticism to dissect the Christian "New Testament" into historical layers and present an evolving model of Christian theology in which many core beliefs were created by later characters within the text. This is standard modern scholarship of the Christian Bible, but is it a legitimate counter-missionary argument?
This has always left me uneasy. I reject literary criticism of the Jewish Bible because, I believe, the methods assume human authorship of the Bible. If one rejects that assumption then all of the conclusions about multiple strata and the evolution of theology fall to the wayside. If I reject these methodologies on the Jewish Bible, can I then argue that they show flaws in the Christian Bible? For that matter, can I accept the conclusions of literary criticism on any form of literature - from Homer to Shakespeare - if I reject its conclusions on the Jewish Bible?
I believe that the answer is yes and no. On the one hand, it is entirely consistent for me to claim that critical literary techniques apply to all human documents but, since the Jewish Bible is not a strictly human document, these techniques do not apply to it. The fundamental assumption of literary criticisim is not applicable to it. Since I consider Homer and the Christian "New Testament" to be entirely of human origin without any bit of divine inspiration, the fundamental assumption does apply to them and, therefore, the methodologies of literary criticism are legitimate.
On the other hand, the argument of literary criticism is not particularly powerful. Anyone who believes that the Christian Bible is of divine origin will simply respond to all literary arguments the same way that I do in respect to the Jewish Bible. Such a believer will simply reply that the argument is based on an assumption - strictly human authorship - with which he disagrees. End of discussion.
The only time in which the argument has power is with someone who is deciding whether to believe that the text is of human or divine origin. In that case, if one can demonstrate that the most plausible conclusion is arrived at using critical literary techniques then one can convince another that the text has literary strata of different origins. In other words, for such an argument to make sense one must phrase it as: "Do you really believe that God wrote this? Consider the evidence to the contrary..." Otherwise, you are either being inconsistent or simply arguing against an unshakable belief.
Thursday, November 11, 2004
Democracy in Judaism
R. Sol Roth discusses Judaism and political theory in his Halakhah and Politics: The Jewish Idea of a State (YU Press: 1988). In chapter 11 of that book, he tries to show that democracy is consistent with traditional Jewish values. Those unfamiliar with Jewish texts will assume that this is obvious, while those more familiar will believe it to be ludicrous. The following is my summary of his arguments:
1. The principles of democracy have two components: decisions by governmental representatives have consent of the electorate, the majority determines the outcome
2. Are governmental representatives authorities in their own right or merely agents of the public? This is certainly a matter of dispute in American politics - should representatives follow their own conscious or what their constituents want? This same debate can be found in rabbinic sources. Are communal leaders sovereign (with a din of malkhus or shofetim) or agents of the community (with a din of shelukhim)?
3. While communal leaders are not elected by the public, they may not be appointed without the approval of the public (cf. Pis'hei Teshuvah, Hoshen Mishpat 3:8).
4. Based on a responsum of the Rosh (6:5), the rule of majority seems to apply not only to halakhah but also to communal matters.
R. Roth concludes:
It is clear that the fundamental principles of democracy, namely, representative government and rule by majority, inhere in Jewish tradition. Though their applciation is more restricted ina Torah community than in a democractic society, their employment in Jewish life reflects principles that are essentially halakhic in nature.What he did not note, though, is that this only applies to the pre-Messianic era. Once the kingship is restored in the redeemed world of the Messianic era, the government will no longer be representative but will revert to the ideal - monarchy with a judiciary.
Wednesday, November 10, 2004
Rejoicing at Death II
The Gemara in Berakhos (10a) quotes Beruriah, R. Meir's learned wife, who pointed out that the verse says "May sins be removed from the earth" (Psalms 104:35) and not "May sinners be removed from the earth" (although the grammatical basis of this point is highly suspect). The implication being that one should pray for the wicked to repent and not to die. The Gemara in Megillah (10b) relates the famous story of angels reciting praise at the downfall of the Egyptians in the Reed Sea and God rebuking the angels because "My creatures are drowning in the sea and you are singing praise?"
However, it is important to note that, despite that, the Jews did sing praise even if the angels did not. Additionally, the Gemara in Berakhos (ibid.) states that King David saw prophetically the downfall of the wicked and, at that point, sang praise to God. On the one hand, we see that the death of the wicked is not something desirable or joyful. On the other, we see that it is. How do we resolve these two trends in rabbinic thought?
R. Yehezkel Landau, in his Tzelah to Berakhos ad loc., points out that there are other places in rabbinic literature in which the verse cited by Beruriah is understood contrary to her explanation. He concludes, therefore, that when the wicked are alive we should desire their repentance. However, absent their repentance, their death is the best outcome for the world. It is unfortunate that they die still wicked, but it is better than if they remain alive. It is a good thing, but is it something about which to be happy and to sing praises of God?
R. Hayim Volozhiner resolved the matter of reciting praise at the drowning of the Egyptians as follows. The Jews, who were personally saved by a miracle, were able to - more likely, obligated to - sing praise to God over their miraculous salvation from peril. The angels, however, were not saved and, therefore, should revert to the normal rule of not being joyful at the death of the wicked. Applying this to our current situation, no one is being saved by a miracle when a terrorist like Arafat lives to the ripe old age of 70+ and then dies of natural causes. This is not a miracle and no one is saved by this. Therefore, it seems to me, that we are like the angels and should not sing praise.
R. Avraham Minsker, in his Ahavas Eisan to Ein Ya'akov, Berakhos ad loc., offers a number of resolutions to the contradiction noted above:
1. It is proper to sing praise when God's patience with the wicked has ended and his complete wrath comes down upon them, i.e. the final Messianic destruction of evil. (Not relevant to today)
2. It is proper to sing praise for the raising of God's glory when He defeats evil. (Not relevant to Arafat dying of natural causes. If he were struck by lightning, then maybe.)
3. When a righteous person sees that he is saved because of his own merit, he realizes that he is righteous and, on this, sings praise to God. (Unfortunately, definitely not relevant today.)
In conclusion, there is no miracle in Arafat's death and, therefore, no impetus to sing God's praises. Because of this, we must revert to the angel's position of silence and perhaps contemplate why we did not merit a miracle.
Rejoicing at Death
The loss to the world of a wicked person who has committed countless murders and caused immeasurable damage to thousands if not millions of people, is not a cause for sadness. Quite the opposite. Scripture tells us: "In the good of the righteous the city exalts, and at the destruction of the wicked praise" (Proverbs 11:10).
However, before we rejoice we must recognize our current position in the world and in history.
The following is a (loose) translation of the Vilna Gaon's commentary to the above verse:
In the good of the righteous the city exalts - When God saves his nation, Israel, from their enemies, He redeems them and bestows good upon them first and then extracts their revenge from their enemies. This is what happened in Egypt, when God first redeemed the Jews and then destroyed the Egyptians in the sea. This also happened with Haman. God first bestowed good upon Mordekhai and only afterwards defeated Haman. This is in order that the enemy himself see the great salvation of Israel and that God is the Lord over the entire world.Considering the current world situation, the death of one wicked man is not yet "at the destruction of the wicked praise." Our enemies are still very much alive and powerful.
Thus, when God firsts bestows good upon the righteous, the entire "city" is exalting but still not singing and praising God. However, afterwards, when God defeats the enemies who have risen against us, then they praise God.
An additional consideration from R. Avraham Grodzinski, Toras Avraham, p. 319*:
"At the destruction of the wicked praise" - Not everyone is worthy and prepared for this. A person requires great care that he not be considered "glad at calamity" (Proverbs 17:5). A purity of heart is needed for this mitzvah, more than that which is needed for all of the other mitzvos in the Torah. If those who left Egypt recited a song of praise over the fall of Egypt, that was because of the lofty spiritual status that they had at that time. [Hazal tell us:] "A maidservant at the sea saw what Yehezkel ben Buzi did not in his prophecy." When they reached this level of prophecy, they reached the highest level of purity, the greatest level of love for all creatures. Their hatred for evil-doers was a hatred for evil - a pure and simple hatred that is appropriate for fearers and lovers of God.Is that really where we are holding today?
* Note that this was published in the journal Knesses Yisrael in Tishrei (Sep.-Oct.) 1939 in Lithuania, as World War II was breaking out.
Tuesday, November 09, 2004
Converts and Positions of Communal Authority
I. Loving Converts
Converts are Jews just like the rest of us, except that they are not like the rest of us. They have very different backgrounds from the typical Jew and made tremendous life changes in order to join the Jewish people. In most aspects, they are treated just like every other Jew. However, there are ways in which they are treated differently.
The Torah enjoins us to love specifically the convert (Devarim 10:19). We have to recognize that a convert has no Jewish family to support him in his new community and, therefore, we all must substitute as his family. Just like a widow and an orphan, a convert relies on the community for emotional sustenance and we must make extra effort to ensure that this is realized.
II. Positions of Authority
However, there is another way in which a convert is treated differently. A convert may not hold a position of Jewish communal authority (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Melakhim 1:4). This is clear from the sources and, even if not always put into practice, is a rule of how Jewish communities should conduct themselves. I understand that there are places in which this rule is overlooked - sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes out of convenience and other times out of ethical misgivings. I sympathize with those who choose not to follow this rule but do not condone their practice. Torah is to be followed, even if we have questions.
Why are converts restricted from holding positions of communal authority? We can only guess, and that is what any reasoning offered for this rule is - a guess. However, I offer the following two speculations:
1. An outsider who joins the community has a different background from the standard community member and that adds greatly to the fresh ideas and perspectives available in the community. However, that outsider-turned-insider never fully understands the realities of the insiders' lives because the convert never attended Jewish day schools or never had Jewish siblings etc. Because of this lack of the typical experience within the community, the outsider lacks the experience to be a leader of that community. (But what about someone who converts as a baby? Or someone who was raised Jewish, found out later that he was not and converted? Or a Jew who was raised as a Gentile? All good questions but sometimes rules are put in place even if they do not cover every case.)
2. Despite the ideals for which we strive, the reality is that many people are unfairly prejudiced and will never fully trust a convert. While this is to be abhorred, it is still a reality in which we live and a community must function in reality not theoretical ideals. Just like a prophet must be wealthy and tall so that people will respect him and listen to him (cf. Derashos Ha-Ran, no. 5), so too must a communal agent be someone respected by the masses. (The Bah actually writes in responsum 52: "A rosh yeshiva, who is equivalent to a high priest, needs to be wealthy in order that his teachings be respected.")
Regardless of the reason for this law, we must follow it. However, other questions that arise are:
1. What is a community?
2. What is a community position?
In previous eras, communities were single units. A town had one community, one rabbi, one charitable organization, etc. It was clear what was a community, which positions were funded by the community, etc. Nowadays, however, this is generally not the case. Communities overlap and are difficult to define. Is a yeshiva an arm of the communal organization or is it an independent organization? Are charitable organizations? Are synagogues? Tough questions.
R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah 2:44) discusses whether a kashrus supervisor is a communal position or not, and concludes that it depends on who hires and pays the supervisor. Regarding teaching or even running a yeshiva, R. Feinstein (ibid., Yoreh De'ah 4:26) writes that in today's time these are not communal positions and a convert may serve in them.
The Tzitz Eliezer (19:48) quotes a Meiri who implies that a convert may not serve in a lone communal position but he may serve on a communal committee. Therefore, the Tzitz Eliezer suggests that a loophole for many circumstances is to appoint someone to serve with the convert in any given position in order to make it into a committee. However, he suggests that this only be done if the convert is also willingly accepted into his position by the community.
III. Ordination
In times gone by, rabbinical courts were very clearly communal organizations. Therefore, the rule is clear that a convert may not serve on such a court (Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 7:1, Yoreh De'ah 269:11). If so, can a convert even be ordained? The Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Sanhedrin 4:8) writes that the Mosaic ordination may only be given to someone who, in theory, can fulfill any rabbinic function. If a convert may not serve on a court then perhaps he may not be ordained either.
R. Ya'akov of Lissa (Nesivos Ha-Mishpat, 7:1) writes that since a convert may serve on a rabbinical court that judges another convert, therefore he can fulfill all rabbinic functions and may be ordained. This is different from a woman who may not serve on a court, even to judge a woman, because women's exemption from testifying precludes their serving as a judge.
However, even if ordained, the convert may not serve as a pulpit rabbi. Presumably, teaching in a school is permitted as is serving in charitable organizations which, despite sometimes being called communal organizations, are nothing of the sort.
IV. Historical Proof
The beginning of Mishnah Avos lists the pairs - zugos - who led the Jewish community in the early Second Commonwealth as the nasi and the head of the Sanhedrin. Among the list of pairs are Shemayah and Avtalyon (1:10). The commentators note that these two were converts and, if so, how could they be appointed to such important positions of communal authority. The answers given differ in significant ways.
1. The people voluntarily accepted this pair upon them. As a general rule, even someone who is entirely invalid for serving on a religious court may still serve if both parties accept him as a judge. Thus, the people accepted Shemayah and Avtalyon to sit on the great court (Kenesses HaGedolah, Hagahos Beis Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 7:1). However, R. Yonasan Eybeshutz (Urim Ve-Tumim) points out that this only explains how they could serve as judges on monetary cases. The Sanhedrin ruled on other issues as well. Rather, he explains, because the king appointed them and the king retains power over people's lives, they could also serve on cases regarding life and death. [Note: R. Eybeshutz uses the phrase "Torah U-Mada" in his comments on this issue.] However, this does not explain how they could preside over the Sanhedrin in ritual matters, e.g. determining the laws of Shabbos or food blessings. R. Yitzhak Sorotzkin (Gevuras Yitzhak, Avos 1:10) distinguishes between positions of authority and positions of Torah. Ruling on ritual matters is a position of Torah, and that is open to converts (cf. R. Elhanan Wasserman, Kovetz Shi'urim, Bava Basra no. 59). Additionally, the Noda BiYehudah (Doresh Le-Tziyon 3, cited in Tzitz Eliezer 19:47:5) points out that the biblical text seems to indicate that we may not appoint to convert to such positions even if we want to, i.e. we ac.cept him
2. They were the most qualified candidates.R. Shimon ben Tzemah Duran (Magen Avos 10:1) suggests that because there was no one else as qualified as these two, they could serve despite being converts. This is an important exclusion to the general prohibition. When a convert is hands down the most qualified candidate for a position of communal authority then he may serve in it. R. Meir Don Plotzki (Hemdas Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 89, cited in Tzitz Eliezer, ibid. 7) quotes the Semag as taking this approach as well.
3. They were not converts. The Maharal, in his commentary on Avos (cited approvingly in the Tosefos Yom Tov, states unequivocally that Shemayah and Avtalyon were not converts because otherwise they could not have served as the Nasi and Av Beis Din. There are no exceptions to this rule. All the talmudic evidence, according to the Maharal, only points to this pair being descended from converts but not necessarily converts themselves.
Monday, November 08, 2004
Haredim on Neturei Karta
I got this in an e-mail. It may or may not be legitimate.
URGENT MEDIA STATEMENT
FROM
UNITED ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES OF NEW YORK
Re: NETUREI KARTA
Further to our public announcement dated 21 April 2002 [9th Iyar 5762], we hereby reiterate and declare that Charedi/ Chassidic/ Orthodox Jews everywhere absolutely reject the treacherous and contemptible conduct of that insignificant and irrelevant group of misfits and Mechalelei Hashem [desecraters of G-d's Name], who have again raised their ugly heads and besmirched and blackened the reputations of observant Jews worldwide.
Their joining in vigils and 'prayers' for the arch-terrorist Yasser Arafat [May his name be blotted out] with Jew-haters of all manner, is an outrage that we cannot ignore and will not forgive. We again demand that rabbis and community leaders of all communities ensure that members of this group are refused entrée to all houses of prayer..
These nefarious associates of Jewry's enemies have unfortunately again succeeded in their crazed hunger for publicity and are being depicted in local and international media - outfitted in their religious attire - bewailing the impending demise of a mass-murderer - side-by-side with Palestinian Jew-haters. The shame and embarrassment to decent religious Jews worldwide is unbearable.
We repeat: this contemptible and minuscule gang of traitors to Judaism, were decades ago barred from our Synagogues and communities. Their refusal to abide by the pronouncements of religious and lay leaders of our communities has made them persona non grata.
Under no circumstances should the media insinuate that ANY of their actions are associated with the Charedi or Chassidic community.
We urgently request all media outlets to highlight this fact in any report on this group's actions and to clearly state that the Neturei Karta and their advocates have been excommunicated by virtually the entire spectrum of Jewry.
Brooklyn, N.Y.,
24 Cheshvan 5765/8 November 2004THE UNITED ORTHDOX COMMUNITIES OF NEW YORK IS A COALITION OF MAJOR ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS IN BROOKLYN, NYC, UPSTATE NEW YORK and NEW JERSEY
Representing:
Anshei Sfard, Satmar, Bobov, Emunas Yisroel, Ger, Belz, Bnei Yehuda, Nitra, Viznitz, Munkacz, Vien, Klausenburg, Viznitz, Torah Vodaas, Novominsk, Torah Temimah, Chasan Sofer, Kiryas Joel - Monroe, Pupa, Young Israel of Brooklyn, Cong. Shomrei Shabbos, United Lubavitch Organizations of Crown Heights, Kamenitz, Agudath Israel 14th Avenue, United Jewish Organisations of Williamsburg, Boro Park Jewish Council, Debrecin, US Friends of the Edah Charedis, Lakewood Yeshiva
Giving a Get
R. Shlomo Aviner makes an important statement about how Jewish men should respond in the unfortunate case of a divorce:
Jewish divorce is not a system of monetary extortion. It is a way of separating when there is no choice, so that each partner can build a new home. Therefore, if you have already made up your mind that you are getting divorced, please give your wife her “get” that same day. You can deal with the money matters afterwards, taking all the time you need.Then he makes a statement that would be wonderful if it were true. Unfortunately, it is not yet true:
If you abuse her, I will abuse you. We will all abuse you. The entire Jewish People will abuse you. We are a delicate people. We cannot bear injustice. We cannot tolerate someone’s extorting his fellow man, let alone his spouse. There are some people who own nothing but their own freedom, and enjoy no luxury but their own freedom, and precisely that you would steal from them!
Sunday, November 07, 2004
Choosing a Rav
Reb Lazer lists 10 qualities to look for in choosing a personal spiritual guide. Here are the criteria that I've used in the past in choosing a rabbi to whom to address my questions:
1. Is he fluent in the entire Talmud, Shulhan Arukh and standard commentaries?
2. Does he have good manners and treat everyone with respect?
3. Does he let me argue with him?
4. Is he smarter than me?
1. If I can catch him not knowing a basic halakhah anywhere in the Shulhan Arukh or not knowing a famous Gemara somewhere, then I can't respect him as a posek. I want a rabbi who can finish off the talmudic quotes that I start, and name the tractate and approximate page number. I have caught my current rabbi at being off by a page or two in his memory, but that is nothing to be ashamed of. It is very rare to be able to remember everything exactly. And since he knows the entire Bible by heart, I let the page thing pass.
2. I have yet to find a serious pulpit rabbi (at least one that I consider serious) who has bad manners. But I have had bad experiences in yeshivas so I keep this criterion high on my list, because it is very important to me. The Gemara actually states that one should only learn Torah from someone who resembles an angel. I interpret that to mean someone with impeccable manners and respect for others.
3. I have stopped asking my questions to a major posek because he would not let me argue with him. He would just respond with weak answers to get me to leave him alone, so I found someone else.
4. What can I say? I am impressed by a quick mind. I frequently speak in half sentences when I'm thinking hard and I need someone who can keep up with me and be one step ahead.
Inconsistency
I once heard R. Mayer Twersky say the following: "The only thing worse than being inconsistent is being consistently wrong."
Beautifully said!
(Note that he is not condoning inconsistency; he is denouncing it. But he is pointing out that human frailty is not an excuse to go totally off the right path. It is best to be entirely right. Next to that, it is better to be partially right than totally wrong.)
Friday, November 05, 2004
Thursday, November 04, 2004
Arafat
POLITICAL DIGRESSION: All the Jews I know seem to be relishing the prospect of Arafat's death. I dread it. The obituaries for this Nobel Peace Prize winner are likely to be so frustratingly full of lies and misinformation. I doubt that any major newspaper will mention his net worth and from where he obtained it.
Get ready for some overtime.
Halakhah From Women
There is famous Magen Avraham (263:12) in which he cites R. Yehoshua Falk in his Derishah who quotes his mother as an halakhic source. The question is whether one should light holiday candles after reciting the blessing or before. His mother said that the blessing comes first and then the candle lighting. The Magen Avraham disagrees with this and subsequent commentators debate the subject at length. This is a most fascinating example of the use of a woman in the transmission of halakhah.
Another rabbinic authority who inquired from women about practice was R. Yitzhak of Dampierre, the famous Ri Ha-Zaken, Ri Ba'al Ha-Tosafos. He was a devoted student and nephew of Rabbeinu Tam. After they parted ways and moved to different cities, the Ri would frequently write to and visit Rabbeinu Tam to learn from him. He also asked the women who had lived in Rabbeinu Tam's house how he had ruled on certain matters. Interestingly, Ri would expend all of this effort to find out Rabbeinu Tam's position and would still sometimes disagree with him on those very rulings.
For example, Tosafos (Shabbos 111b) records that Ri "heard from the women" that Rabbeinu Tam allowed a woman upon whom a baby urinated to wash her hands and then dry them on her clothes, thereby cleaning them a little (Ri dissented, however).
Teshuvos Maimoniyos (printed in the back of Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Ma'akhalos Assuros, no. 5) relates that the Ri asked Rabbeinu Tam's widow how she used to bake in her house and he understood that as being Rabbeinu Tam's ruling on the matter.
It is certainly important that these were all cases of practice and the women were only testifying to what they did. Nevertheless, it is still interesting.
Wednesday, November 03, 2004
Torah and Popular Culture
Torah U-Mada is one of those terms that means different things to different people. Dr. Lamm, in his classic book of that name, offers a number of different models for Torah U-Mada. One model that does not get much respect is that of Torah and popular culture.
What can be valuable in popular culture? After all, it is just shmutz, noise and distortions of all that is sacred (Britney Spears being exhibit #1). I cannot disagree with that, but there is still much to be gained from popular culture for those daring (or foolish) enough to try.
Let's take a step back. There is much debate over what R. Samson Raphael Hirsch's true position was on the secular world, and I have no interest in arguing about it. But let me state that his philosophy of Torah Im Derekh Eretz was one that saw beauty and wisdom in the culture of his time. Classical music, theater, poetry, literature, etc. could all refine a person and teach him about the world and about human nature. Few would object to the statement that one can better understand the human condition by analyzing Shakespeare's works.
The same applies to Jerry Seinfeld's works. In his own way, Seinfeld was also a commentator on the human condition. There is much understanding to be gained from insightful comedy. Can that same understanding be gained elsewhere, such as in Shakespeare's works? Perhaps. It can also be gained from learning Torah. But not everyone sees the same insights in the same place. Some people (like me) gain very little from Shakespeare because of a pitiable lack of background and interest. Sure, if Rabbi Carmy or R. Aharon Lichtenstein spell out a valuable tidbit from Milton then I will grasp it. But, sadly, I lack the interest in searching for such insights myself.
Of course, there is good pop culture and bad pop culture. Maybe someone can find deep messages in Stephen King but I can't. Isaac Asimov's writings, on the other hand, contain many fascinating areas of interest, often explicitly dealing with human psychology. Harry Potter, I believe, is very telling. (Stay tuned for a post comparing spells to blessings.)
And who, pray tell, can inform us more about human nature than that dysfunctional cartoon family The Simpsons?
It is my belief that Torah Im Derekh Eretz (which Dr. Lamm classifies as a form of Torah U-Mada) includes contemporary popular culture. The only reason to exclude it is old-fogeyism and cultural bias. Is there bad pop culture? Yes. Is there bad 19th century literature? Yes. Are there aspects of pop culture that are assur? Same thing goes for 19th century culture. The bold TIDE-nik will find the gems and utilize them for positive purposes.
Let me note that one young talmid hakham who is quite adept at finding meaningful lessons from pop culture is R. Daniel Z. Feldman. However, his online lecture titled "Simpsons in Halakha" is merely a discussion of halakhah and is not relevant to my point. I anxiously await a lecture of his about meaningful lessons on human nature in The Simpsons.
Additionally, someone pointed out to me the following passage in an article by the complex and controversial R. Mayer Schiller. He points out the inherent value in comedy in his article titled "Torah Umadda and The Jewish Observer Critique: Towards a Clarification of the Issues" in The Torah U-Mada Journal, vol. 6, pp. 81, 89n26.
Recently I sat with a prominent mitnagdic Rosh Yeshiva who waxed rhapsodic over Ebbets Field, Happy Felton's Knothole Gang, "Campy" and "Pee Wee" and, yet, felt obligated to declare those wondrous memories of his youth "shtusim".[26]Not quite what I was getting at but still worthy of mention.
[26] Another mitnagdic Rosh Kollel told me that a trip to Niagara Falls would be "bittul Torah". However, when reminded of the Abbot and Costello routine of "Niagara Falls", he laughed so hard that he could barely catch his breath. I asked him what he thought God felt about the joy he experienced at that moment and he was at a loss to answer.
Tuesday, November 02, 2004
The Hazards of Leading
Steven I. Weiss, in his latest blog The Canonist, directs readers to a website named ChillulHashem.com that has pictures depicting just how tough it is to be a Jewish leader.
The subject of the signs in the picture to the left is none other than R. Aharon Leib Shteinman, great talmudic scholar from Bnei Brak and heir to R. Elazar Schach.
Praying for the Right Thing II
Marvin Schick:
I care not about what titles or offices they hold. Those who in veiled and sometimes not so veiled language say that Israel's Prime Minister can be killed because he wants to withdraw from Gaza or other territory should be arrested and put on trial.
The "Missing" Nun in Psalm 145
R. Shalom Carmy in "The Manufacture of Sulphurous Acid: Of Wisdom as a Catalyst in Torah Study" in Wisdom From All My Teachers, pp. 79-80:
Psalm 145 (widely known as "Ashrei" after the verses that preface it in liturgical usage) is an alphabetical acrostic. The verse corresponding to the letter nun is missing. The simple explanation is that the acrostic scheme is sometimes adhered to irregularly. [1] R. Yohanan (Berakhot 4b), however, proposed that the absent verse referred to nefilah (falling) and was omitted in order to avoid its negative associations. The following verse (15), which states that God supports those who fall, confirms the hypothesis that we have here a euphemistic elision. In this harmonious psalm, the calamity from which God rescues one is indicated by its noticeable omission.UPDATE: After posting this, I thought it would be nice to include a link to Auden's poem. Here it is. Looking at stanza 6, I wonder if Rabbi Carmy misinterpreted the pattern. I'm no poetry maven, but it seems to be consistent to me.
How seriously can one take this interpretation at the peshat (simple meaning) level? Is it likely that the author of a twenty-two-line poem would deliberately breach the poetic form of the composition in order to make a subtle point that is likely to be lost on the casual reader? Is R. Yohanan not reading an idea into the text that has no purchase on the text?
This issue was far from my mind the day I read W.H. Auden's "Atlantis." The poem, comprising seven twelve-line stanzas, which exhibit a complicated pattern of rhyme and meter, describes the effort and resourcefulness required to reach the mythical islan of Atlantis. The voyage culminates in a scene where the traveler, having overcome many ordeals, collapses: "With all Atlantis shining/ Below you yet you cannot/ Descend." At this precise point in the poem, the rigid pattern is violated: line 7 of stanza 6 does not exist. The explanation seems obvious: the poet's "failure" to fully satisfy the complicated technical feat he has undertaken parallels the failure of the poem's protagonist to consummate his journey. The intertwining of form and content in the work of a twentieth-century master craftsman renders more persuasive the notion of a similar phenomenon in the psalm.
[1] See Ps. 25:2, 5, 17, 34:6, 9-10. The 11Qpsalms Scroll supplies the missing verse (likewise the Septuagint). This verse, however, is close to v. 17, except for the initial substitution of ne'eman for tzaddik and the replacement of the Tetragrammaton with Elokim. Hence this version is presumably a scribal solution to the problem of the absent verse, rather than an original alternative. See also Amos Hakham, Da'at Mikra: Tehillim, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1984) 578f. and note 23.
FURTHER UPDATE: Menachem Butler asked Rabbi Carmy and reports the following: The line "Even to have been allowed" (found on the online version of this poem) does not appear in the print version of Auden’s Atlantis. Thus, it is as Rabbi Carmy wrote, "line 7 of stanza 6 does not exist."
Vote
When I was in yeshiva, there was a particularly crass youg man running for student government president who was garnering the menuval vote. The evening before the election, the mashgi'ah went into the beis medrash and gave a short speech. Without endorsing any candidate (which would have been inappropriate for a faculty member), he simply reminded students that if they do not vote then they have no right to complain about the results of the election.
As a Jew, I shudder at the thought of losing the right to complain. So go vote.
Monday, November 01, 2004
Washing at Weddings and Elsewhere
One is not allowed, at least ab initio, to wait a long time between washing for bread and eating the bread. Nor is one allowed to leave one building and enter another even if done quickly. (See Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 161 and commentators.)
This leads to a familiar dilemma at weddings where the washing station is frequently across the hall from one's table. The same is the case in many restaurants. Similarly, this arises on Sukkos when one washes indoors and then must trek out to one's sukkah to eat. In my synagogue, we wash for se'udah shelishis right outside the bathroom and then have to walk down the hall to the women's section where we eat. What is one to do in such a scenario? There are three possible solutions:
1. According to the Shulhan Arukh Ha-Rav and the Arukh Ha-Shulhan, when one can only wash in a distant place then the delay is considered necessary for the meal and is not problematic. This is not a popular position among posekim but is certainly valid.
2. Wash and eat at the washing stations. There are frequently little pieces of bread left at the washing stations so people can eat them after washing. This is problematic because:
1) It is extremely unsanitary.
2) People frequently say the blessing on the bread, stick it in their mouth and then walk away. They must really remain in the same relative place until they swallow the bread.
3) I have a serious problem with people eating standing up or walking. It may not be halakhically prohibited, but a ba'al mussar only eats sitting down.
4) Whenever possible, one should recite the blessing for bread on a whole or large piece of bread. You have one waiting for you at the table, so why recite a blessing on such a small piece?
3. The Oneg Yom Tov (no. 18) notes that drying one's hands is the completion of the washing. Therefore, if one washes far away and then walks to one's table, all the while drying one's hands, one is not delaying after the washing because the washing has not yet finished. This way, there is no delay between the washing and eating the bread. The Piskei Teshuvos (ad loc., n. 19) points out that one should recite the blessing on the washing near the washing station and then proceed to the walking/drying.
