Glatt Yacht

In the early 90s, there was a ship called the "Glatt Yacht" that provided short dinner cruises on the Hudson River with glatt kosher food. A controversy ensued when the agency that provided kosher supervision revoked the Glatt Yacht's kosher certification because it allowed mixed dancing. I recently saw that R. Aaron Levine, whose forthcoming book Moral Issues in the Marketplace and Jewish Law will be published shortly by Yashar Books, discusses this issue in his book Case Studies in Jewish Business Ethics, pp. 49-59. His main interest is in whether Glatt Yacht, actually he changes the name to Glatt Boat to protect the innocent, must state its dancing policy in its marketing material, but in the process he discusses the permissibility (or not) of such a cruise.

R. Levine accepts that mixed dancing is prohibited (see here on this subject). The question then boils down to whether the owners of the Glatt Yacht are allowed to provide a venue for this prohibited dancing. R. Levine quotes a responsum from R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah 1:72) about whether a caterer may allow his hall to be used for a wedding that will definitely include mixed dancing. R. Feinstein permitted it for two reasons:

1. A. Since other caterers will provide a hall if this caterer will not, there is no biblical prohibition of lifnei iver.
   B. Since the dancers are intentionally violating the prohibition, there is not rabbinic prohibition of mesaye'a yedey ov'rei aveirah.
   C. Furthermore, if this caterer refuses to provide his hall, people might use other caterers whose kashrus is less reliable

As R. Levine points out in an extensive note, this reasoning is somewhat controversial because there are those who disagree with both A & B (see here). Nevertheless, R. Feinstein ruled leniently on these issues.

2. Lifnei iver only applies to objects that are primarily used for prohibitions. However, objects (such as pots and pans) that are primarily used for permitted activities but might be used for prohibited activities (such as cooking non-kosher food) do not fall under this prohibition. Therefore, renting a hall for a wedding and dinner that will also be used for dancing is permissible.

R. Levine proceeds to apply these two rationales to the case of the Glatt Yacht. According to the first reason, it all depends on whether someone else will create the equivalent service in the absence of the Glatt Yacht. If so, then the owners of the Glatt Yacht are allowed to provide that service. Since the closing of the Glatt Yacht, the kosher cruise industry has blossomed and I would be (pleasantly) surprised if those cruises do not allow mixed dancing. However, I do not believe that short dinner cruises around Manhattan exist. This would imply that the first rationale does not apply and the owners of the Glatt Yacht are not halakhically allowed to provide the opportunity for mixed dancing.

However, R. Moshe Feinstein's second rationale seems to apply entirely to the Glatt Yacht. The owners are providing a nice dinner on a boat. "If customers choose to use their access to the vessel to engage in social dancing, the owners would then be technically disassociated from the activity and therefore would not be regarded as abetting transgressors" (Levine, p. 51).

Therefore, R. Levine concludes, "Halakhah does not compel Glatt [Yacht] to adopt a no-dance policy."

HOWEVER, the above applies to a theoretical case that is not publicized. Once it has been made famous, as the case of the Glatt Yacht, there are other issues to consider. If rabbis were to permit the Glatt Yacht now, after the whole controversy, it would imply that mixed dancing is permissible. There is little question that such a move would be interpreted in that way by many in the Jewish community. Therefore, I would suggest that the case has changed and involved more subtle and complex issues. However, had it never made it into the newspapers then the above analysis would apply.