Friday, December 31, 2004

Non-Kosher Quotes

From Sefer Ha-Hayim:
I received some online and offline comments about the title of a recent post on Hirhurim, the origin of which is in the Christian bible.

R. Yehuda Henkin has an interesting teshuvah (#26) in volume 4 of Bnei Banim on the subject of whether those who believe that the Lubavitcher Rebbe is the messiah are considered to be heretics... (continued here)


Thursday, December 30, 2004

Shehitah Controversy V


Moshe and Mada

The naming of Moshe raises a number of questions. Recall that he was discovered in the water by Pharoah's daughter and was nursed by his mother. The Torah then tells us, "When the child grew up, she brought him to Pharoah's daughter, who made him her son. She named him Moshe, explaining, "I drew him (meshisihu) out of the water" (Ex. 2:10). The question begs itself - how was Pharoah's daughter making a clever play on words in Hebrew? The story of Joseph in Egypt implies that even the Egyptian royalty did not speak Hebrew (as is emphasized in the midrashic literature), so we are left somewhat perplexed as to how Pharoah's daughter knew Hebrew. There is a midrash that she converted to Judaism and learned Hebrew, which has little textual evidence and seems somewhat farfetched on a literal, historical plane.

The commentators grappled with this difficulty (cf. Ibn Ezra, Da'as Zekeinim, Abarbanel, Torah Shelemah, Ex. ch. 2 n. 73). One possibility the Ibn Ezra suggests is that Moshe is a Hebrew translation of his Egyptian name. R. Meir Leibush Weiser (Malbim), in his commentary to Ex. 2:10, quotes Philo of Alexandria in the introduction to On the Life of Moses (1:4) and Josephus in Antiquities of the Jews (2:9:6) as explaining that in Egyptian the word mo means water and the word sheh means removing. That would make the word Moshe etymologically ancient Egyptian, and the similarity to Hebrew only coincidental.

R. Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin (Netziv) quotes a R. Shmuel of Bohemia who seemed to be very current in his ancient languages. He correctly states that the word Moshe is related to the ancient Egyptian word for "son." Thus, being the son of the princess, he would be called "the son." Why would he, the son of a Jewish slave, be called "the son"? Because Pharoah's daughter "made him her son" since she "drew him out of the water," with the latter explaining how Moshe became her son, not the etymology of his name. It is noteworthy that the New JPS translation of the Torah has a footnote explaining: "Heb. Mosheh from Egyptian for 'born of'; here associated with mashah 'draw out.' "

Contemporary historians agree that Moshe is an Egyptian word meaning "the son of," the only question being whether the word's root is the Egyptian msi or mose. James K. Hoffmeier writes in his Israel in Egypt, pp. 140-142:
There is widespread agreement that at the root of the name of the great Hebrew leader is the Egyptian word msi ["to give birth"], which was a very common element in theophoric names thorughout the New Kingdom... While the acceptance of the word msi as the root for Moses' name is overwhelming among scholars of the Pentateuch, problems remain... [T]he active form also corresponds to the Egyptian word mose, meaning "son" or "child," another pun on the same name.


Wednesday, December 29, 2004

Talking in Shul

MoChassid links to two articles about talking in shul. R. Moshe Weinberger points out that the statement "When you make G-d comfortable in your home, you can make yourself comfortable in His" is ludicrous and contrary to halakhah.


Kahn v. Lee

My article "The Ongoing Conundrum of Yeshiva College" in current issue of The Commentator.


Tuesday, December 28, 2004

Blau on the Prowl II

Now you know how I had access to an early copy of the new issue of The Torah U-Mada Journal and knew that R. Yitzi Blau tears apart some letter-writers. I give in. He's right and I'm wrong.


Devastation and Death

My heart goes out to those affected by the terrible disaster that occurred this weekend. Frankly, I don't know what to say or do. I am just blown away by the enormity of the tragedy.


The Ordination of Women

There are currently two main types of semikhah. One is called a heter hora'ah and the other has no real name but is colloquially referred to as a rabbi's driver's license. The former is a license to issue halakhic rulings. The latter is essentially a letter stating that the holder is worthy of holding the title rabbi and being a leader (manhig, which can also mean driver). I do not know the historical origin of this type of ordination but I know that it was given in Hildesheimer's Seminary in Berlin (with a heter hora'ah only given to the most accomplished graduates) and, to my knowledge, is what JTS has always given.[1] YU gives a heter hora'ah. Hayim Berlin and, in the past, Ner Israel give the driver's license. The question we will address is whether either of these two types of ordination may or should be given to women.

This is not a new question. It was addressed extensively in the 1980s by scholars of the Conservative movement, and my presentation here is generally informed from those analyses.

I. Serarah

To my surprise, I did not see any Conservative scholar raise the issue of serarah. As we discussed in regard to converts, neither they nor women may be appointed to positions of communal authority. The majority of contemporary posekim rule that women may not be appointed to such positions.[2] Therefore, it would seem to follow that women may not serve as pulpit rabbis which, presumably, is the quintessential communal position. R. Moshe Shternbuch[3] addresses the question of whether a convert may serve as a pulpit rabbi and ruled that he may not but, R. Shternbuch suggests, someone else should be appointed to that position and the convert can have a different title while fulfilling the role but not the position of the rabbi. While this is informing, it is not a viable model to be used on a large scale.

II. Rabbinic Functions

A woman may not perform many of the functions normally performed by rabbis in many synagogues. For example, rabbis, particularly in small synagogues outside of the main metropolitan areas, are called upon to lead services and read from the Torah. Almost all rabbis are called upon to perform weddings. Women may not perform these functions. Thus, a woman is automatically prevented from taking a large portion of rabbinic positions.[4]

If a woman cannot be hired as a pulpit rabbi and cannot fulfill some of the functions of a pulpit rabbi, it seems clear that a woman cannot be ordained to be such a rabbi. Therefore, the driver's license permitting one to serve as a communal leader should not be given to women. There is another option, we will get to at the end.

III. Rabbis and Judges

The heter hora'ah is part of a chain of a centuries-long tradition. As Prof. Saul Lieberman demonstrates in his responsum on the matter,[5] semikhah was traditionally given as permission to rule and to judge. Even today, when there are certain institutions that give special ordination to serve as a judge (yadin yadin), to my knowledge it is standard practice (at least in the US) for rabbis lacking such special ordination to sit on rabbinic courts. The heter hora'ah is considered to be sufficient for serving as a judge.

Women, due to their exemption from forced testimony, are barred from serving as judges. They may not sit on any official rabbinic court, even though they may judge on an ad hoc basis when both litigants accept them. Because of a woman's inability to receive ordination for judging, she was barred from the official type of ordination that dates back to Moshe.[6] Additionally, a woman should not be ordained because she cannot sit on an official rabbinic court and the heter hora'ah is considered license to do so. Even if we choose to disregard the historical requirements of "true" semikhah, which is probably not the ideal approach,[7] we may still not give women the standard semikhah that is used today because it is considered license to sit on a rabbinic court.

IV. Practical Considerations

It could be argued that women who are worthy of the title "rabbi" should be trusted not to act improperly. They are certainly religious and will therefore only accept rabbinic positions that will not force them to compromise their values. Even if so, granting women rabbinic ordination in which they will be severely limited in their professional options will create an extremely imbalanced field of employment that will be rightly called discriminatory and will put unfair economic pressures on female rabbis. If the current situation is considered unfair, the resulting situation will appear to be much more discriminatory. Men, some significantly less capable than their female peers, will have greater employment options and more opportunities for professional experience (thus leading to pay imbalances). This situation will not last long and women will inevitably begin taking rabbinic positions that will cause them to compromise (or, more likely, change) their religious values. The ordination of women based on very specific limitations will unquestionably lead to the erosion of those limitations.

V. Communal Considerations

It must be remembered that a substantial segment of the Orthodox community considers the advanced learning of the Oral Torah by women to be forbidden. This is not an obscurantist position but a well-established halakhic view that is amply supported by traditional sources. This segment of the community cannot accept female rabbis or Torah teachers. The ordination of women will effectively cut off all ties to this portion of the Orthodox world. Communities with female rabbis will be considered beyond the pale of Orthodoxy. Setting aside the not-altogether-meaningless subject of denominational titles, is this further fragmentation of Kelal Yisrael a positive outcome? Should we not be striving for communal unity rather than driving unbreakable wedges between our sub-communities?

VI. Confirming the Heterodox

In an earlier series of posts,[8] I outlined the prohibition to confirm the Heterodox in their positions. It is very likely that ordaining women as rabbis falls under this prohibition and, therefore, must not be done. The contra-halakhic trends of egalitarianism are still very much with us and we may not support them, even indirectly or unintentionally. Let us not be naive about these very real matters.


VII. Other Options

Rather than ordaining women as rabbis, the most viable suggestion is to create a new title that reflects advanced scholarship but lacks the history of the title rabbi. This title will designate women as scholars who are qualified to teach. There might even be differing levels, including a teacher and an halakhic scholar. I see no reason why a woman cannot rule on halakhic matters to those who ask her,[9] even if others will ignore her rulings. If institutions start offering programs to grant women the titles of melamedet (instructor) and poseket (halakhic decisor), I suspect that they will be somewhat successful. I doubt that they will be graduating posekim on the level of R. Moshe Feinstein, who, in addition to his inherent talents, was preparing incessantly for his position since his early childhood, but they will certainly train women qualified to rule on basic matters. Certifying an advanced melamedet is certainly uncontroversial. Regarding a poseket, though, the question remains whether this is a confirmation to the non-Orthodox and, therefore, should be delayed to a generation that does not have the same recent past as ours.

UPDATE:

A further consideration that I initially neglected to raise, but which I consider to be of primary concern, is that of tzeni'us. Should women be rising to roles of public leadership, not to mention speaking publicly in front of large gatherings of men? This is one that is mixed with both halakhic and meta-halakhic issues. Because I assume that those on "the left" will automatically reject such considerations and those on "the right" will consider them decisive, I will leave the discussion of this matter for a later date.

[1] See David Ellenson, After Emancipation, p. 189 n. 11; R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh (Jerusalem: Mossad Ha-Rav Kook, 1969), vol. 4 p. 133.
[2] For an extensive review of the literature, see R. J. David Bleich's chapter on women serving on synagogue board in Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 2
[3] Teshuvos ve-Hanhagos 3:305
[4] That a woman may not lead services and read from the Torah was a major point of debate in the Conservative discussion but the only serious voice among the lenient, Prof. Joel Roth in his "On the Ordination of Women as Rabbis" in On the Ordination of Women, did not, in my opinion, make a convincing case. Prof. David Weiss Halivni, in his unpublished article on the subject available in the JTS library, argued that women may not perform weddings. He was not particularly convincing but see Rema, Yoreh De'ah 242:14 (and Pis'hei Teshuvah, Even Ha-Ezer 49:2) and set aside the circularity issue. If women cannot be rabbis for other reasons then they may also not perform weddings.
[5] Printed in Tomekh Ka-Halakhah, vol. 1
[6] See the discussion in this post regarding converts on this issue
[7] Prof. Lieberman writes, "[W]e should not empty the title 'rav' of its meaning from the way it has been understood by the Jewish people throughout the generations." But note that his institution only gave the "rabbinic driver's license" and not a "heter hora'ah"!
[8] "Adoption of Heterodox Practices" I, II, III, IV
[9] See the responsum of R. Moshe Shternbuch in note 3 regarding a convert ruling on halakhic matters.


Monday, December 27, 2004

Ta'us Akum

I spent this past Shabbos in the heart of Brooklyn, attending a popular Agudath Israel synagogue. On Friday night, the rabbi, an up-and-coming figure in the Agudah world and a very popular speaker, related to the entire congregation the following question he was recently asked:

Someone had bought a new computer and it arrived functioning less than perfectly. He called up the company and they agreed to send him a new computer and shipping labels for him to return the other computer. The new computer arrived without shipping labels. He called and waited for about an hour until someone could understand his complaint and agree to send him shipping labels. They still haven't arrived. Does he have to continue pursuing this or can he just keep both computers?

The rabbi said that there is a leniency not to return an item to a negligent gentile who fails to properly retrieve it. However, as the Be'er Ha-Golah points out (I'm relaying this as the rabbi said it, regardless of precision), this is a leniency that should almost never be used. Give it back, even if you have to go well out of your way to do so. This gentleman should take the time to continue calling the company in the interest of returning the computer, and it wouldn't hurt if he mentioned that he is an Orthodox Jew and has religious objections to keeping something that rightfully belongs to the company. However, he added that if the gentleman is honestly busy and cannot find the few hours it takes to convince this company to take their computer, he does not have to do this but he will be losing out on a great mitzvah.

I found this very refreshing. Not the portrayal of the black hat world you'd find in, say, the NY Times.


Friday, December 24, 2004

Jacob the Eternal Forefather

Is Ya'akov Avinu still alive? From the way some describe it, he is even though the Torah says that he died.

See here (PDF) and here (PDF) for lengthy citations of standard commentators who state that Ya'akov Avinu did die, as the Torah states.


The Truth Shall Set You Free

When I started this blog, there was a genuine reason for writing it under a pseudonym. However, that reason is long gone and the fake anonymity -- most readers already know my real name -- is getting tiresome. From here on, the pseudonym Simcha is being retired.


Thursday, December 23, 2004

Jesus in the Parashah

The following is from Nitzahon Yashan, translated by Dr. David Berger as The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages, p. 60:
A certain apostate argued that the Hebrew verse, "Until Shilo comes and to him..." (ad ki yavo Shilo ve-lo [Gen. 49:10]) contains an acrostic for Jesus (Yeshu). The answer to this is in the very same verse, for the Hebrew verse, "The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, until Shilo comes and to him..." [lo yasur shevet mi-Yehudah u-mehokek mi-bein raglav ad ki yavo Shilo ve-lo] is an acrostic for the Hebrew phrase, "There is no blemish as evil as Jesus" [lo yesh mum ra ke-Yeshu].


Mathematical Proof of God

Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was a self-important philosophe who arrogantly thought he knew everything. This story is one of my favorite anecdotes. It is taken from The Little, Brown Book of Anecdotes, p. 168:
In 1773 Diderot spent some months at the court of St. Petersburg at the invitation of the Russian empress, Catherine the Great. He passed much of his time spreading the gospel of atheism and materialism among the courtiers, until it was suggested to the empress that it would be desirable to muzzle her guest. Reluctant to take direct action, Catherine requested the aid of another savant, the Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler, a devout Christian. As Diderot was almost entirely ignorant of mathematics, a plot was hatched to exploit this weakness. He was informed that a learned mathematician had developed an algebraical demonstration of the existence of God, and was prepared to deliver it before the entire court if Diderot would like to hear it. Diderot could not very well refuse. Euler approached Diderot, bowed, and said very solemnly, "Sir, (a+b^n)/n=x, hence God exists. Reply!" Diderot was totally disconcerted, and delighted laughter broke out on all side at his discomfiture. He asked permission to return to France, and the empress graciously consented.


Wednesday, December 22, 2004

Debunking the Kuzari Proof

Rabbi Micha Berger (I, II) takes on the Kuzari proof for the truth of the Jewish tradition. He argues that it is not what the author of the Kuzari meant, simply illogical and contradicted by historical examples.

Remember when faith was enough and we didn't feel the need to prove our religion to be correct?


Gloves on Shabbos

As the winter approaches, it is worth reviewing the little-known rules about wearing gloves on Shabbos. The Shibbolei Ha-Leket (107) writes that it is best not to wear gloves because it is very common for someone, while walking in public, to automatically remove a glove in order to scratch or otherwise use one's hand. At that moment, one would be carrying that glove in public, a biblical prohibition. This concern is very real; I see it happen on Shabbos not infrequently. (Of course, this entire issue does not apply in places where there is an eruv.) However, the Shibbolei Ha-Leket states that if one sews or ties the gloves to the coat then one may wear them on Shabbos.

The Shulhan Arukh (301:37) rules according to this Shibbolei Ha-Leket, although many question why sewing to tying the gloves accomplishes anything (cf. e.g. Bi'ur Ha-Gra). The Eshel Avraham (Butchatcher; ad loc.) says that this must be referring to a permant or long-term sewing/tying in which the gloves become a part of the coat. Otherwise, one would still be carrying.

Note that this is not technically a gezeirah and, therefore, exceptions can be made. Based on my experience, though, this is a very reasonable ruling because this is a very common occurence. I know that I frequently do this when I wear gloves during the week, and I have seen people who wear gloves on Shabbos do this. However, because it is not a gezeirah, there is room to say that when this concern does not apply, such as when it is freezing and one would not expose one's hands to such cold, then one may wear gloves. This is, indeed, how the Arukh Ha-Shulhan (ad loc. 105) and others (cf. Piskei Teshuvos, ad loc. 18) rule.

The Bah and Magen Avraham (50) state that people are lenient because there is no reshus ha-rabbim nowadays, but that it is proper to be strict. However, in areas where the accepted pesak is that there is a reshus ha-rabbim nowadays (e.g. Flatbush), this leniency does not apply.

Bottom line, as my former rav said to me: Bnei Torah don't wear gloves (unless they are permanently sewn onto the coat).

So how do you keep your hands warm? Pockets.


Tuesday, December 21, 2004

Joe Schick Has A Baby

Mazel tov to Joe Schick on the birth of his first child. May you merit to raise him to milah, Torah, huppah and ma'asim tovim!

(thanks to the anonymous commenter who gave me the tip)


Goldstein Revisionism II

Marvin Schick also strongly objects to defenses of Baruch Goldstein's multiple murders:
Whatever his motives and whatever his background, Baruch Goldstein was a murderer. What he did was evil. His killing of Arabs did not result in a single Jewish life being saved, nor in Hebron's Jews or any other Jews being more secure. Indeed, one immediate consequence was that Israeli Jews were less secure. Nor did his actions result in Jews having greater access to our holy sites. As my son Yosef has noted on his blog, Goldstein's actions led directly to the reduction in Jewish access to the Cave of the Patriarchs.

We in religious Jewish life must understand that it is no mitzvah to justify wrongdoing and it is certainly not a mitzvah to make excuses for murder. When we do so and even when we allow ourselves to be intimidated by those who preach hatred, we are turning other Jews away from our glorious heritage.


The Judeo-Christian Dilemma

The most recent issue of Jewish Action contained two opposing articles regarding the proper attitude to take about maintaining close ties with "the Christian right." R. Michael Skobac, a professional counter-missionary with Jews for Judaism wrote the article to which I had an a priori leaning, arguing that we need to be very hesitant and cautious about the intentions of "the Christian right." Arguing on the other side was R. Daniel Lapin of Toward Tradition. He had the harder sell but he wrote so beautifully that he almost had me convinced. Well, not really.

The bulk of R. Lapin's article is an expression of the closeness between Judaism and America. As he attempted to demonstrate, America was built on Jewish (or Judeo-Christian) values: democracy, justice, Bible, Hebrew. The Protestants of that time were exploring Judaism and, in their rebellion against the Catholic Church, incorporating Jewish views on a variety of subjects into their belief system. The only posible response to that is "So what?" Actually, another possible response is to compare such statements with what German Jews were writing in the 1920s. The similarities are eerie and speak to a cherry-picking mentality that only looks for the positive aspects and remains blind to the obvious blemishes. Additionally, R. Lapin's claim that American society is biblical is simply outdated. Maybe it once was but it certainly no longer is. American society is secular.

R. Lapin further argues that American Christians fall into the Meiri's category of lawful non-Jews rather than polytheists and the American legal system fulfills the biblical mandate for gentiles to establish justice. Again, "So what?"

The real concern is the evangelical need to proselytize, and particularly to Jews. Regarding this, R. Lapin makes some very astute points. First, it is not only Christians who proselytize to Jews. We lose more Jews to Hinduism, Scientology and secularism than to Christianity. Why do we focus on Christians and not the others? It seems like we have an anti-Christian bias. This seems like a good argument but it is not. 1) Christians in America are the majority. When the majority proselytize to the minority, they are much more powerful than when another minority tries to convert us. 2) Christians target Jews specifically, much more than any other minority group. It is a special prize to convert a Jew. 3) Christians - albeit not all of them - are deceptive in their proselytizations of Jews. They even created a deceptive pseudo-religion - "Messianic Judaism" - to bring Jews into their faith. And I am sure I need not remind readers of the organization Jews for Jesus, who we see every summer handing out pamphlets in specifically Jewish sections of New York City. Their operations are much more extensive. (As an aside, this website of former members of J4J is very interesting.)

R. Lapin then makes a particularly strong argument. Jews fall prey to missionaries largely because of their own ignorance. Why do we blame Christians for converting us when it is really our fault for neglecting the education of our co-religionists? He is entirely right, while still being completely wrong. We are to blame for the sinful ignorance of most Jews. But that does not exonerate those who specifically and deceptively target Jews for conversion. Furthermore, we have to deal with reality and not a blame-game. The simple reality is that the closer we bring evangelical Christians to our community, the more Jews there will be who are exposed to them and who convert. Regardless of who is at fault, we cannot let that happen.

The following quote from R. Lapin sent shivers up my spine:
On occasion a sincere Christian, wanting to share something he considers to be of inestimable value, has invited my children to contemplate a relationship with Jesus. My son and my daughters responded politely and respectfully while firmly declining. Their faith was not threatened for a moment. This is because my wife and I made it an absolute priority to introduce our children to God from their earliest years.
Personally, I would have punched the guy and told him to get off my property before I get out my shotgun.

Setting aside the personal offense at such an act, the simple reality is that not everyone can be the children of rabbis. That is not how a community can work. There will always be those less-learned and less-committed. R. Lapin seems to be saying that it's tough on them if their children become victims of Christian missionaries. Furthermore, what about when children decide to rebel or are feeling lonely and, at that particular time, a missionary approaches them? Parents can educate their children from here till tomorrow but if a missionary hits at the right time, when children are most vulnerable, then some of those children will make life-altering decisions.

(Flattery gets DovBear a link.)


Monday, December 20, 2004

Blau on the Prowl

R. Yitzi Blau published a critique in The Edah Journal of Dr. Alan Brill's earlier article "Judaism in Culture." I don't quite get what Dr. Brill says, but it seems to me that R. Blau is making cogent arguments and Dr. Brill is just responding with statements that are all over the place and not really relevant. I assume that it's just me, but Dr. Brill just seems to be spouting a lot of gobbledy-gook words that sound good but don't make much sense when put together.

Also, I saw an early copy of this section and the next issue of The Torah U-Mada Journal (forthcoming in a matter of weeks) has R. Blau responding to letters about an earlier article of his in which he tears the letter-writers to pieces.


Spousal Abuse

From Sefer Ha-Hayim:
Yashar Books is proud to announce that we will shortly be publishing R. Daniel Z. Feldman's The Right and the Good: Halakhah and Human Relations in a significantly revised and expanded edition. The erudite volume discusses topics regarding interpersonal mitzvos, presenting the various hakiros (analyses) on the subjects and the lomdus (theory) behind them with encyclopedic breadth. Chapter eleven of the book deals with the issues of hitting someone else and, as an addendum to the chapter, the author concludes with a very brief discussion of hitting one's spouse... (continued here)


Friday, December 17, 2004

Shehitah Controversy IV

Questions about the (illegally produced) PETA videotape, after I did a bit of research and consulted with experts on the subject:

The video shows a cow that continues to walk and wail (presumably in pain) even after its kosher slaughter.

One questions whether:

1) an animal whose windpipe has been cut, as is the case in kosher slaughter, can bellow to the extent shown in the video and

2) a slaughtered cow can walk after both carotid arteries have been severed, as is the norm in kosher slaughter. After an animal's carotid arteries are severed, it loses balance and falls to the ground within seconds (8-10, after which it starts to involuntarily spasm). This animal did not.

One can only conclude that the slaughter shown in the video is an aberration - an invalid slaughter that was subsequently declared non-kosher. Like all human beings, slaughterers sometimes make mistakes and kill the animals improperly or perhaps fail to initially kill the animal.

If an animal is properly slaughtered it will react in the same way as a person whose jugular vein is cut, going into shock and feeling nothing. This has been verified by use of electroencephalograms. In that case, when shehitah is done properly, further cutting of the throat causes no additional pain because the animal is in shock and will fall to the ground within seconds. (I've been injured and in shock, and I vividly remember not feeling any pain at all and just touching my blood and looking at it. It took a good minute until I started to feel the pain.)

The USDA classifies a slaughterhouse that maintains the percentage of improper slaughters below 5% as "good" and kosher slaughterhouses, because of the financial incentive to maintain the kosher status of the animals, are well below this 5% mark.

PETA's use of this video to characterize all slaughtering by Agriprocessors is unfair and misleading. Before we accept the video as representative, we must investigate whether it shows the standard practice or merely an unfortunate mistake. So far, inspections by kosher certifying agencies and other knowledgable officials have deemed it an aberration. Therefore, the condemnation belongs not at the doorstep of Agriprocessors, for inhumanely slaughtering, but at the address of PETA, for misleading the public.


Ride to a Dance II

Assuming that mixed dancing is prohibited, am I allowed to drive someone to a dance where she will violate that prohibition?

I. Lifnei Iver

As most readers know, there is a prohibition against causing another to sin - lifnei iver. The classic example is giving a cup of wine to a nazir, who may not drink wine. If the wine is otherwise inaccessible to the nazir then my giving him the cup is enabling his sin and, therefore, prohibited. However, if he has other means of reaching the cup then I am not enabling the sin and may even give it to him.

Thus, it would seem that since in the case I discussed in my previous post the girl's parents could drive her to the dance then, presumably, I would be allowed to do so as well. However, the Mishneh La-Melekh (Hilkhos Malveh Ve-Loveh 4:2) writes that even if the potential sinner has other ways of committing his sin, if all those ways include violating the prohibition of lifnei iver then it is not considered as if he has other means of performing the sin. Thus, if the only way a nazir can reach the cup of wine is if another Jew gives it to him, then whoever passes him the cup does violate the prohibition of lifnei iver. I remember being told that the Hazon Ish agrees with this Mishneh La-Melekh. The Kesav Sofer (Yoreh De'ah 83)* disagrees and adduces strong arguments to the contrary. The Darkhei Teshuvah (151:16) cites this Kesav Sofer without any dissenting opinion, implying he agrees with it. I have not systematically searched through the modern responsa literature on this subject to see which opinion is more accepted, but my impression is that the Kesav Sofer's is (see, e.g., R. Hayim Binyamin Goldberg, Bein Yisrael Le-Nokhri, Yoreh De'ah 27:26 and in n. 45). However, R. Howie Jachter quotes R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv as concluding that the majority of posekim are strict on this matter.

If so, the matter would hinge on whether this girl has non-Jewish neighbors or friends who would drive her to the dance. If so, she has other means of going and there is no issue of lifnei iver in my taking her. If not, we enter a matter of dispute between the Mishneh La-Melekh and the Kesav Sofer. Note that a car service driven by a non-Jew is insufficient unless I charge her an equivalent amount. Once I am giving her a significant better deal then the other option is insufficient to alleviate the problem of lifnei iver (cf. Minhas Elazar 1:53).

II. Mesaye'a

Let us assume that she has non-Jewish neighbors who would drive her if she asked. There is still a question of a rabbinic prohibition against assisting a sin (as opposed to the biblical prohibition against causing a sin) - mesaye'a yedey ov'rei aveirah. Even if someone can perform a sin in other ways, one may still not take part in that sin. However, the Shakh (Yoreh De'ah 151:6) rules that this rabbinic prohibition does not apply to someone who is non-religious. R. Yehezkel Landau (Dagul Me-Revavah, ad loc.) modifies this to mean that this rabbinic prohibition does not apply to someone who intentionally violates a prohibition. One may only not assist an accidental sin. If so, then there would be no issue of mesaye'a in driving this girl to the dance.

However, there is a school of thinking that disagrees entirely with the Shakh and solves the textual problems that led him to his conclusion in a different (and, in my opinion, much more convincing) way. This includes the Binyan Tziyon (15), the aforementioned Kesav Sofer and the Netziv (Meshiv Davar 2:31-32). However, contemporary posekim seem to follow the Shakh and Dagul Me-Revavah on this (cf. Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah 1:72; although R. Howie Jachter cites R. Feivel Cohen as ruling like the Binyan Tziyon et al.).

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, if the girl had non-Jews who could drive her to the dance (for free) then I would be allowed to as well. If not, the matter is a dispute that I am not qualified to resolve.

* In my mind, there are two responsa on the topic of lifnei iver that one absolutely must see. The above-mentioned Kesav Sofer and Minhas Elazar 1:53.


Thursday, December 16, 2004

The Kedushah and the Pitfalls

The December 2004 issue of Jewish Observer has a very courageous article that is sure to ruffle some feathers. The article discusses the difficulties involved in making aliyah and even encourages some people not to make aliyah.

What is at issue is the vast cultural divide between communities outside of Israel and that in Israel (note that the JO understandably focuses only on the Haredi communities). In Israel, affiliation with a group and belonging to it is much more important than in America. Furthermore, the groups in Israel expect strict compliance to their social norms and lack of conformity leads to a degree of ostracization. While many adults can deal with that, children frequently have great difficulty with that. Generally, they either need to adjust completely to Israel or be able to live in relative isolation. Especially those who make aliyah in their teen years, when social patterns and cliques have already developed, have difficulty fitting in. Many - too many, end up leaving the Orthodox community entirely.

Rabbi [Zev] Oratz estimates that between ten and twenty-percent of children who make aliya in their teenage years end up going off the derech, meaning that a family that moves with three children in their teens (not an uncommon scenario) has a fort percent chance of one of their children abandoning Yiddishkeit...

[Rabbi Noach Orlowek] quotes Rabbi Nachman Bulman zt"l as having said that the time for families to come to Eretz Yisroel is either before the children are born or after they're married. "I would certainly say," he adds, "that parents who bring children here over the age of 6 or 7 are taking a big chance."
R. Orlowek suggests that the children who have the least problems adjusting are those who are "confident, socially stable, and have no language problems."

R. Avrohom Weinberg is quoted as saying "If a bachur follows professional sports in America, for example, he may not be looked at as doing anything wrong. Here, such a thing can get a boy kicked out of yeshiva." That is, understandably, a very difficult adjustment for a child who was forced to leave his home and friends.

Additionally, the article points to the difference in standards of living and that foreigners may not have realistic expectations of what living a "kollel lifestyle" entails. Finances are no small issue in shalom bayis and need to be looked at realistically.

The article starts out saying: "There are few zechuyos as great as the opportunity to live and raise a family in Eretz Yisroel." This is true, but one must enter such a situation fully aware of both the pros and the cons. This article is another in a string of very important articles in the Jewish Observer over the past few years.


Wednesday, December 15, 2004

Choosing a Name

R. Yosef Reinman (co-author of the excellent but controversial book, One People, Two Worlds) received a letter from an aspiring convert with a question about the name he wants to choose. R. Reinman asked how blog-readers would respond to the letter. The following is a brief excerpt and the response I would send.

I am thirty-eight and am going through a non-Orthodox conversion...

I need to pick a Hebrew name. Can you see any serious problem in these turbulent times with a convert to Judaism taking the name Yishmael ben Zion?

Dear X,

I thank you for your letter and commend you on the seriousness with which you treat every matter. I certainly do not want to insult you but I find it my duty to say that if the rabbi under whom you are studying for conversion has not properly explained how you will be viewed post-conversion by Orthodox Jews then you should investigate the matter. It is important that you understand the situation into which you are entering. Should you wish to further discuss this, please feel free to call me at 718-555-1212.

Regarding your question, the main issue with choosing the name Yishmael is whether will you be naming yourself after a wicked individual or group of people. Particularly since, as a convert, you will be know as "Yishmael ben Avraham," are you giving yourself the same name as our patriarch Avraham's wayward son? Additionally, as you pointed out, Muslims are frequently identified in midrashic literature as Yishmael. The answer, I believe, is that there is no technical problem with giving yourself this name. There are two reasons for this. First of all, we are taught that the original Yishmael repented at the end of his life.* Second, and perhaps more important, is what the great talmudic commentators whose teachings comprise the Tosafos taught us on this matter. They explained that one may not use the name of a wicked person only if there was never a righteous person with that name also.** Since there was a great sage of the Mishnah named Rabbi Yishmael, you may take his name and proudly wear it. If anyone asks from where you chose your name, you can explain the linguistic derivation as well as point out the great sage in whose path you have chosen to follow.

I wish you success on your journey and offer you my blessing, for what little it is worth, that you someday reach the level of spiritual succes of your namesake, Rabbi Yishmael.

With Torah blessings,***

"Simcha"



Note that I would not give mareh mekomos in this letter. The following are only for the sake of the blog.

* Rashi, Bereishis 15:15, 25:9.
** Tosafos, Yoma 38b sv. de-lo
*** I stole that sign-off from R. Yehuda Henkin


Tuesday, December 14, 2004

Ride to a Dance

I. The Question

A number of years ago, I was visiting non-observant family and, as I was leaving, they asked me to do them a favor and drive their teenage daughter to a dance that was entirely on my way to where I was going. This presented me with a dilemma. Was I allowed to drive her to this dance or would I have to politely refuse, which would annoy (although not offend) these kind non-observant relatives? I was saved by a call from one of the young woman's friends informing us that she was able to get control of her (the friend's) parents' car and drive my relative to the dance. But let us analyze the issues, probably in two posts.

II. Mixed Dancing

The first issue is whether there is anything wrong with mixed dancing. The way I see it, mixed dancing can be broken down into three types:

1. Dancing without touching
2. Dancing with non-affectionate touching
3. Dancing with affectionate touching

Dancing among teens (at least in the late 80s and early 90s) generally involved types 1 (fast dancing) and 3 (slow dancing). Type 2 is more of the ballroom dancing or "Israeli dancing" in circles.

III. Affectionate Touching

It is clear that affectionate touching (that is involved in slow dancing) is prohibited for two reasons. Since the young women are in the category of niddah this is prohibited touching - according to the Rambam biblically prohibited, and according to the Ramban rabbinically. That, alone, should be sufficient to render the driving of a young woman to a dance impermissible.

Non-affectionate touching is a matter of significant debate. The most common occurrence is handshaking. Whether or not it is permissible is debated, see Otzar Ha-Posekim to Even Ha-Ezer 25. Those who would permit shaking hands, however, would not consider "Israeli dancing" to be prohibited touching (assuming that it really is non-affectionate).

That notwithstanding, dancing with non-affectionate touching or without any touching is still problematic. In the past, mixed dancing has generally been of type 2 and, therefore, there is a literature on this subject spanning centuries. R. Shlomo Aviner has convenient excerpts from a long list of sources in his Gan Na'ul, pp. 157-169. R. Shlomo Katz has a more limited number of excerpts in his Kedoshim Tihyu (2nd edition), pp. 47-52.

IV. Ban on Mixed Dancing

It seems that in the times of the Rishonim there were a number of decrees banning mixed dancing. The Kol Bo cites in the name of R. Meir of Rotenburg that such a decree existed and was binding. This is related by other Rishonim and it seems to have been a recurring problem that the rabbinic authorities tried to stamp out. This was, presumably, referring to type 2 dancing and the ban applied to all such dancing. Does this imply that the dancing is otherwise permissible, were it not for the ban? Certainly not. It is commonplace to find medieval bans that served to forcefully reiterate biblical and rabbinic prohibitions.

R. Yehuda Henkin forcefully argues in his Bnei Banim, vol. 1 no. 37 part 9 that this ban is still in effect and applies to all types of mixed dancing.

V. Additional Considerations

Furthermore, there is an issue of seeing women improperly dressed and, even if properly dressed, dancing. A man at such a dance is looking at things that he should not be. Does this prohibition also fall on the women? We'll leave that discussion for a later time.

Additionally, there is a serious problem of hirhurim. Women, when dancing, are generally swaying and moving in ways that are suggestive to men and cause improper thoughts that are prohibited. This is no small concern.

Finally, the reality is that for all of the above reasons, and probably sociological reasons as well, dances are places of immorality. To be blunt - there's usually some hanky panky going on either at the dance or among people who "hook up" at the dance. If so, it is absolutely forbidden to be in a place of immorality.

Even those who are not dancing but are just there are violating halakhah (this is explicitly stated by the Sedei Hemed, vol. 7 Ma'arekhes Hasan Ve-Khalah no. 12 p. 422 ff.).

VI. Sources

Some random Aharonim on [what I believe is] type 2 dancing:

Binyan Tziyon 139 considers it to be an abizrayhu of arayos; Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayim 529:7 writes that it is from the great sins and that the punishment of those who do it is great; Peri Hadash, cited in Sedei Hemed, Ma'arekhes Heih 2, vol. 2 p. 43; the Hafetz Hayim in his Ahavas Hesed, 3:6 p. 102 and in his Bi'ur Halakhah, 339 sv. le-hakel; R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggeros Moshe, Even Ha-Ezer 2:13, 97; R. Hayim David HaLevy, Aseh Lekha Rav, no 73, Mekor Hayim, vol. 5 p. 44.

Some random Aharonim on type 1 dancing (most posekim are unclear about the type of dancing so I do not assume that they refer explicitly to this type):

R. Yisrael Salanter in his Iggeros U-Mikhtavim, no. 39 p. 49; Ben Ish Hai, Mishpatim 18.

The next step in this discussion is to analyze whether, given that mixed dancing is forbidden, would I have been allowed to drive someone to such a dance?

(B"n, to be continued)


Monday, December 13, 2004

Cross Currents

Some prominent Orthodox personalities have taken to blogging. Cross Currents looks very promising.


American Jews at 350

Marvin Schick points out what is missing in Jonathan Sarna's history of American Jewry.


Sunday, December 12, 2004

A History of the English Bible

This is a good history of English Bible translations, although it omits all mention of Jewish translations. It would be interesting to see an essay on Jewish translations of the Bible into English.


Friday, December 10, 2004

Shehitah Controversy III

The OU and Israeli Chief Rabbinate have issued statements declaring that Rubashkin slaughter is considered kosher shehitah. In other words, those homes and stores that have Rubashkin meat may still eat it and need not kasher all of their utensils. This is a significant statement.

Shmarya is unsatisfied with this response. He writes:
In Jewish law, the ends do not justify the means, and a technically correct shechita that regularly involves tzaar baalei hayyim both immediately before and immediately after the ritual slaughterer makes his cut should not be sold as kosher.
This is incorrect. I challenge anyone to find a normative source in posekim that justifies such a statement. Perhaps, as a matter of policy, it would be proper to act that way. But that is public policy and, in our case, the public policy setters disagree with Shmarya's judgment.

Shmarya continues:
Kosher consumers, ask yourselves the following question: Can rabbis who disregard the laws of tzaar baalei hayyim/cruelty to animals be trusted for kosher supervision?
Interestingly, the Gemara and Shulhan Arukh answer "yes" to this question. The general rule is that "mumar le-davar ehad eino mumar le-khol ha-Torah kulah," loosely: someone who violates one law of the Torah is not suspected of violating all of the laws of the Torah. There are exceptions, but tza'ar ba'alei hayim is not one of them.

Furthermore, the OU announced that "the OU and AgriProcessors, Inc. have worked together to make certain changes, namely that the trachea will no longer be removed following shechita, and that any animals that appear to have survived the procedure will be promptly stunned or shot [and not sold as kosher]."

Problem solved. Thank you PETA for bringing this to our attention.


Bigotry

About 10 years ago, David Klinghoffer wrote an excellent letter to the editor of Tradition about bigotry in the Orthodox community. Worth reading.

(With thanks to the two Rabbis Shalom - Carmy and Berger)


Thursday, December 09, 2004

Seating Arrangements at Weddings

From Sefer Ha-Hayim:
R. Yehuda Henkin wrote a lengthy analysis of seating practices at weddings in the first volume of Bnei Banim (no. 35; dated 2 Adar 5737 [1977]). In it, he concluded that... In the most recent volume of Bnei Banim... R. Henkin partially retracts his earlier ruling... (full text here)


Wednesday, December 08, 2004

R. Shimon Romm zt"l

The Commentator has two articles remembering R. Shimon Romm (I, II), a wonderful man I was privileged to know well.


Tuesday, December 07, 2004

Academic Study of the Talmud

I. History

There are three main forms of academic study of the Talmud. The first focuses on the historical aspects - the realia and its correlation to other historical information; the language and its development; the history of the Jewish community of that time; etc. This be practiced giving rabbinic literature credibility in the matter or by over-valuing external sources of information and giving little credibility to rabbinic literature. It all depends on the scholar.

II. Form

The second deals with literary analysis of the Mishnah and Gemara. Studying the literary structures - the words used most heavily and most sparingly, the placement of passages, the "flow" of the text - and trying to deduce the intent of the author/redactor in utilizing those literary techniques. For example, one might study the organization of chapters in a tractate; why is a particular Mishnah included in a chapter that seems to be on a different subject? Or why did the redactor choose to order the chapters in this particular way? When dealing with Gemara, the analysis becomes even more sophisticated. Why did the redactor(s) ask these questions on a passage in this order? Why was this question, which is easily answered, asked at all but another, more difficult question that can be found elsewhere in the Talmud was not asked at all? Additionally, no literary analysis is complete without noticing the numerical patterns in the flow of the passage. Why are groups of three used more frequently than two or four?

This type of analysis generally fails (in my opinion) because it assumes that the texts were put together consistently and with great thought, rather than haphazardly and in a disorganized fashion. If the case is the latter, then any patterns found are just random. Questions were not asked simply because they weren't. There is no underlying theme. That's just the way it was. Occasionally, literary analysis will come up with a good question and - rarely - a good answer. But it is usually of the "Oh, that's mildly interesting" fashion.

III. Source

The third type of academic study of the Talmud is where all the excitement is at, if you can call it that (personally, I find academic study of the Talmud to be deathly boring). This is the identification of various strata within the Talmud, noting who said what and when. In itself, this is very helpful in understanding talmudic passages and is intuitively done to some extent by all veteran Talmud students (at least those who actually understand the text). The next step, though, is to analyze how the earlier sources are treated by later scholars, comparing parallel texts and how the statements differ in various places. Thus, an early Tanna might make a statement that is repeated differently in various contexts, and then later Amora'im debate what he actually meant, focusing on only one version of the statement and frequently limiting it to very specific cases. The source critic would isolate the original Tannaitic statement and differentiate it from the later Amoraic reinterpretations. Used sparingly and cautiously, this is not religiously objectionable. Indeed, there are a number of examples of the classic commentators doing this. However, doing this consistently demonstrates (in my opinion) a lack of faith in the Amora'im and a rejection of talmudic methodologies.

I was recently speaking with a biographer of Prof. Saul Lieberman (the book is set to come out next year) and he emphasized how strongly Prof. Lieberman was opposed to such source criticism. Even though he was careful not to criticize his students (with the exception of Jacob Neusner), he frequently told his students not to "[surgically] operate on the Gemara," which all understood as an instruction to steer clear of Prof. Halivni's source-critical methodology. Prof. Lieberman has an excellent article (titled "Tanna Heikha Kai") in the 1940 memorial volume for Moshe Schorr in which he demonstrates that we only have brief Tannaitic statements that really come from rich contexts that were not preserved in the written tradition. As he shows, implausible reinterpretations of Tannaitic statements by Amora'im are actually attempts to place the statements in their original contexts. In the rare occasions in which we can identify those original contexts, we can see that what looked like a far-fetched reinterpretation is actually the true meaning. Of course, sometimes we do not know the original context and the Amora'im struggle to try to discover it. But rather than being a reinterpretation, it is an authentic search for truth.

R. Yitzhak Hutner (Pahad Yitzhak, Hanukah 1:3) explains that when the Tanna'im decided to codify their Oral Torah they did so sparingly, retaining only the bare minimum and keeping out the larger contexts, as well as phrasing their words to incorporate complex meanings in as few words as posible. This was intentional in order to keep the Oral Torah as oral as possible and was understood by the Amora'im, who read the Mishnah with this history in mind. Looking at the Mishnah and the Gemara as purely written texts is both anachronistic and untrue.


Hazal and Pants

Did the Sages of the Talmud wear pants? The question itself is a bit overly simplistic because the Sages of the Talmud lived in (at least) two different areas of the world over a number of centuries. It is quite possible, indeed probable, that their styles of dress differed from one era and place to another. Nevertheless...

Rashi (responsum no. 262) wrote that the Sages did not wear pants, but rather wore some sort of robe, and brought evidence for his assertion from the Mishnah in Shabbos (120a) that list eighteen items of clothing one may save from a fire on Shabbos and pants are not a part of the list.

My rabbi noted that the Gemara in Shabbos (12a) states that one may not use a candle on Shabbos to be able to detect between one's clothing and one's wife's. Rashi (s.v. mida yadi) explains that men's clothing is shorter because they work in the field and women's have wider handles etc. Nowhere does he mention that men wore pants.

I thought I could bring a proof from Bekhoros 44b that, when the need suddenly arises and there are no other options, one may urinate in public. If one is wearing pants, the only way to do so without soiling oneself is to lower the pants, thereby exposing oneself in public. I find it hard to believe that the Gemara was permitting that. However, if one is only wearing a robe, one can merely aim down and urinate without exposing oneself (pardon the graphic description). However, upon closer examination, from the fact that Shmuel seems to have urinated in public under cover of his cloak and his father complained that the average person lacks a cloak, it is possible that the Gemara actually permits exposing oneself in order to avoid the physical danger of "holding it in" for too long. So no proof.

R. Daniel Sperber (Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah, Shalom Carmy ed., p. 199) points out that the Mishnah about the eighteen garments, in the Yerushalmi, lists something called "avrikin". The Arukh (s.v. berikin) explains that this word corresponds to the Latin braccae (similar to "breeches"), i.e. trousers. There is evidence that some people in Roman times wore pants.

R. Sperber also points out that pants are listed as a garment in the Mishnah in Keilim (27:6). However, that could merely list it as a known garment at that time - since the priests wore pants in the Temple service - and does not indicate that it was normally worn (outside the Temple service).

However, note that both of R. Sperber's proofs are from the Mishnah. It could very well be that this is only indicative of Rome-influenced Palestine and not Persia, or of the Mishnaic era and not the Talmudic period.


Monday, December 06, 2004

Solving the Rubik's Cube

Direction for Solving the Rubik's Cube

It's a good feeling to solve the cube, even if you are reading directions right off of a piece of paper. And I'm my kids' hero, even though they see me reading the directions.


Migo Misunderstood

From Sefer Ha-Hayim:
What is migo? It is a common talmudic legal device that gives litigants believability when they otherwise would not have it. Since - migo - he could have lied and claimed X and been in a better position, the fact that he did not claim X means that he must be telling the truth. This never sat well with me. In a footnote to R. Michael J. Broyde's The Pursuit of Justice and Jewish Law, the author explains in contemporary legal terms how a migo works... (continued here)


Sunday, December 05, 2004

Goldstein Revisionism

The most recent issue of Jewish Action has a letter in which the author, responding to a criticism of her previous article, attempts to defend -- or at least raise the possibility of a defense of -- Baruch Goldstein's 1994 massacre of Muslims in Hebron. I applaud Jewish Action for printing this letter because it highlights a cancer that is growing in our midst.

The writer points out that there was very credible warning of an Arab attack on Jews in Hebron on Purim and suggests that Goldstein was merely carrying out a pre-emptive attack, something that has ample precedent in military ethics. She also notes that an extensive book (with 714 footnotes!) has been published on the incident, and this book raises all sorts of facts and questions.

This defense is indefensible and inexcusable.

1. That a book has been published that carefully sifts through the facts and points out all sorts of inconsistencies and injustices is irrelevant. Long books are published about every crazy subject. Conspiracy theories that deconstruct history and point out inconsistencies abound. Just look at all that has been written about the JFK assasination, the alien landing in Roswell and even the 9/11 attacks. Any event can be deconstructed and testimony can always be found to be inconsistent. That is the nature of evidence. I recall that one of the prosecutors of OJ Simpson, whose case was torn apart by defense attorneys who found errors and inconsistencies in the prosecutorial evidence, resigned after the trial, noting that this had been the strongest case he had ever prosecuted. When we start believing every conspiracy theory that is created, and accept every "inconsistency" without looking at the broader context, we have surrendered our minds to propagandists.

2. There is a difference between a military pre-emptive attack and a solitary vigilante striking out on his own. In the latter, a single person takes it upon himself to evaluate all of the evidence, devise an appropriate strategy and carry out a dangerous task. His emotions and biases will unquestionably effect every step of the process. Furthermore, he frequently lacks the knowledge to properly evaluate the evidence, he certainly lacks the training -- both diplomatic and militaristic -- to devise a strategy, and the probability of a miscalculation that distorts his mission is high.

3. Did he know who was going to attack? Pre-emptive strikes are only on military targets. He indiscrimintely killed whomever happened to be there at the time.

I remember in the 1980s when Bernard Goetz went to jail for shooting his NYC subway muggers. He was known as the Subway Vigilante. He had many supporters, but that was for attacking people who had already robbed him. Despite that, he still went to jail. Goldstein attacked people who may or may not have planned to attack him in the future.

4. Goldstein attacked people in a house of prayer during prayer time. Yes, there were illegal weapons found there. But that does not change the fact that he killed civilians who were praying in a holy place.

To use a frequent phrase of R. Ahron Soloveichik's, the entire attack was "morally reprehensible." There is simply no excuse for the indiscriminate murder that Goldstein perpetrated. His memory is not a blessing for us, and our attempts to justify his massacre only serve to underscore the moral ambiguity that is plaguing our nation in this time of crisis.

UPDATE: Joe Schick has a good analysis of this issue on his blog.

FURTHER UPDATE: Regarding the use of R. Ahron Soloveichik, let me be clear that I was only borrowing a phrase of his and have no direct knowledge of his position on Baruch Goldstein's actions. However, it is worth reading his grandson's article The Virtue of Hate. Note the following sentence:
"We who hate must be wary lest we, like Goldstein, become like those we are taught to despise."


Friday, December 03, 2004

Dew and Rain

From the Ezras Torah calendar:
MOTZEI SHABBOS,

Dec. 4, 22 Kislev

At Maariv of Motzei Shabbos, we begin to include "Vesain Tal Umatar" into the Shemonah Esrei. If one became aware, after he had completed the Bracha M’vorech Hashunim, that he had omitted "Vesain Tal Umatar" he should wait to insert it right before "Ki Ata Shmaye" of Shema Koleina. If he had already completed the Bracha Shomeya Tefillah, he may insert it before saying "Retzei". If he had already begun "Retzei" he must return to the Bracha "Berech Aleinu", which is the proper place for "Vesain Tal Umatar". If he had already completed the Shemonah Esrei and stepped backward, then he must repeat the entire Shemonah Esrei. In any situation in which a person must repeat the entire Shemonah Esrei, he may fulfill his obligation by listening to every word of the Chazzan's Repetition from begining to end, with the intention of thus fulfilling his obligation.

(It is advisable to repeat 101 times [at the very least 90 times]: Ves Kal Minei Svuasa Letova Vesain Tal Umatar" so as to make the inclusion of "Vesain Tal Umatar" habitual and fluent, thus eliminating any future doubt as to whether one included "Vesain Tal Umatar" in the Shemonah Esrei or not.)


Rules of Pesak

The following is my translation of the Rema in Hoshen Mishpat 25:2. As you can see, it has significant practical relevance:

I. Following the Greater Scholar

If [the dispute among halakhic decisors] is in a ruling on the permissible and the forbidden (issur ve-heter) and it is a matter of biblical law, one should be strict. If it is a rabbinic law, one should be lenient. However, this is only if the two disputants are equal. We do not rely on the words of someone [relatively] small [in scholarship] against the words of someone greater in wisdom and years, even in a time of need, unless there is a great potential [financial] loss.

II. Following the Majority

Similarly, when there is a solitary view versus a majority, we always follow the majority even if the majority do not agree on a reason but each have their own; since their legal conclusions agree they are called a majority and we follow them.

III. Local Customs

If there was a custom in a city to be lenient because a scholar ruled for them that way, they follow his view. If another scholar comes and forbids what they had permitted, practice this prohibition.

IV. Use of Manuscripts

Any place in which the words of the early scholars are written in a book and famous, and the later scholars disagree with them, as sometimes occurs with the decisors who disagree with the Geonim, we follow the later decisors because the law follows the later scholar subsequent to Abaye and Rava. However, if we sometimes find the responsum of a Gaon that was not recorded in a book and others disagree with it, we need not follow the later scholars because it is possible that had they did not know the words of the Gaon and had they known they would have retracted [their position].
Note that there are subsequent commentaries on this Rema, notably the Shakh here and at the end of Yoreh De'ah 248, the Urim ve-Tumim, the Birkei Yosef and the Arukh Ha-Shulhan. Since this matter is only of practical relevance to a posek, I trust he will be familiar with the sources and not need to rely on a blog. Any posekim who have questions on this subject can feel free to e-mail me.


Shehitah Controversy II

Shmarya deserves a link for scooping me on the OU's take on this issue. Actually, even the NY Times scooped me. Lamed links to a radio interview by R. Tzvi Hersh Weinreb, executive director of the OU.


Like I wrote in my earlier post, these are good people. Just give them a chance to evaluate the situation and discuss the options. Real organizations do not respond in real time (which raises questions about the term "real time").


Thursday, December 02, 2004

Ha-Makom Yenahem


Soldiers Disobeying Orders

(Similar to this post)

Rabbis Norman Lamm, Aharon Lichtenstein and Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron issued a joint statement against soldiers disobeying orders.


Wednesday, December 01, 2004

Shehitah Controversy

There is currently a controversy raging about the practice of one particular slaughterhouse. I have intentionally ignored the e-mails I've received about this for the following reasons:

1. I don't know enough about the facts in this case. Even a legitimate video put out by a respected non-partisan organization (and no one can honestly
call PETA respected or non-partisan) needs to be analyzed and considered. Knee-jerk reactions by either side are rarely a good thing.

2. I know the people at the OU and they are good people. They are not going to pass non-kosher meat off as kosher, regardless of the amount of money or the number of jobs at stake. On the other hand, if they think there is a problem they will do more than just say that there is a problem. They will look to fix it if possible or find other alternatives.

3. I have broached the subject with my contacts and they are being wisely cautious. When I hear something and I get permission to post it, I will. Right now, all I've got is what the journalists have written and they are not to be believed on complex matters of halakhah, particularly in defaming people who have earned (not they need to earn it) the benefit of the doubt.

UPDATE:
News articles from both sides of the story (I & II).


Chosen People II

I saw that the most recent Jewish Action has been put online. The symposium on Jewish Chosenness discussed in this post can be found here.


Rabbis and Traveling to the Moon

The 1969 landing on the moon was a monumental achievement for mankind, and the leading Torah scholars of the time were as impressed as everyone else in the world. Here are some interesting reactions to this event.

I. May Man Travel to the Moon?

R. Hershel Schachter writes in the name of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik (Beis Yitzhak Journal, no. 26 [5754] pp. 193-194):
"The heavens and the earth" (Gen. 1:1) - [R. Soloveitchik] was asked about Judaism's view of man's traveling to the moon, with the questioner suspecting that it might be forbidden because it is written "The heavens are the Lord's but the land He has given to mankind" (Ps. 115:16). [R. Soloveitchik] responded that one can distinguish in the definition of heavens and earth. The term "heavens" can be explained in two ways — as something high and/or distant, as it says "It is not in the heavens" (Deut. 30:12), according to which the moon is considered a part of the "heavens." Alternatively, the term can be defined as including everything that is beyond human understanding, including the entire spiritual realm. According to this second understanding, the stars and most distant galaxies — and certainly the moon — are considered part of "earth." Therefore, [according to this latter interpretation,] there is no contradiction between traveling in space or scientific studies of the cosmos and the verse "The heavens are for the Lord and the land for mankind."
II. Is the Moon a Living Being?

R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky (Emes Le-Ya'akov al Ha-Torah,Gen. 1:1, 5761 revised edition pp. 15-16):
As an aside, we learn from these words of the Ramban [on Gen. 1:1], and in particular from what he concluded in the continuation of his words on verse 8, that everything that exists in the creation in the entire world, including the sun, the moon and all the heavenly hosts, are not called "heavens." The "heavens" are only things that have no physical bodies, such as angels, hayos and the merkavah. However, anything that has a physical body is included in the name "earth" in verse 1...

These words of the Ramban are what carried me when we saw men descending from a space ship on a ladder onto the surface of the moon. I thought to myself: "What would the Rambam, who wrote that the moon has a spiritual form, answer now?" I thought that at that point Kabbalah defeated Philosophy, and comforted myself with the words of the Ramban...

We are forced to say that what the Rambam told us in these chapters [Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah, chs. 1-4] is neither ma'aseh merkavah nor ma'aseh bereishis. Rather, he wrote those four chapters from his deep mind and from his knowledge of secular wisdom, i.e. not from the wisdom of Torah but only from Philosophy... and the Rambam only wrote these as an introduction to the Mishneh Torah while the main part of the book begins with chapter 5...
R. Menahem Kasher tried to defend the Rambam in what I can only call a bizarre and forced way.

R. Menahem Kasher, Ha-Adam Al Ha-Yare'ah, ch. 4:
Question: Is it correct what many are currently saying — that when man reached the moon and dug from it dirt and stones, it was proven wrong what the Rambam wrote in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah 3:9 and Moreh Nevukhim 2:5, and brings proof (to Aristotle's position) from Biblical verses and sayings of the Sages, that the heavenly spheres have souls, knowledge and understanding, and live, stand and recognize He Who said and the world came into being?

Answer: I wrote... the early sages R. Sa'adia Gaon, R. Yehudah Ha-Levi, R. Hisdai Crescas, R. Yitzhak Ibn Latif, the author of Akedas Yitzhak (end of essay 1) and the Abrabanel strongly reject the position of Aristotle and the Rambam... R. Ya'akov Emden, in his book Migdal Oz writes about Aristotle's position, "It is all nonsense and lies." And so the Maharal wrote in the introduction to his book Gevuras Hashem, that the Rambam's position is "nonsense"...

In the pamphlet Ge'ulas Yisrael of the Maggid of Koznitz, the author attempted to defend the Rambam. He explains [that the heavenly spheres] "are intellects without free will"... We can explain this idea based on what R. Hayim Vital wrote in his book Sha'arei Kedushah (3:1) based on the principles of Kabbalah, that just like there is a soul in a living creature, so too there is a "soul" in an inanimate object. This is the force that combines the four elements... The position of the Rambam is that just like there is knowledge and intellect among the angels, which does not refer to the intellect we have that is connected to our five senses but rather is a spiritual intellect according to their level, we can say the same for the Tohu. [This Tohu] was the first power created by the will of God and remains forever in various forms, at first in the Bohu, i.e. atom, and later in elements and bodies. This force is also called an angel because it is an agent of God to be made into matter. It is not impossible that this force has its own intellect and rules according to its level and recognizes its creator and master...

We can add that the "intellect" of an item is the rules by which it acts with God's will and is the essence of its existence. The "soul" of an item is the force that preserves its existence, with God's will, and is the energy inside it.


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