(Continued from these posts: I, II)
CHAPTER THREE: PREDICTIONS AND FULFILLMENTS
Prophecies in the Bible are intended to teach us lessons about the consequences of proper and improper behavior. Prophecy is all about mussar -- how should we act and what happens when we do or don't act that way? The Sages tell us that there were many prophecies that were not included in the Bible because they do not contain lessons that are relevant to later generations, i.e. their mussar was limited to their times. While this primary aspect of prophecies is clear, when the prophecies we retain in the Bible have come true in subsequent history they also teach us about the truth of prophetic revelation. This ancillary aspect is one that some use to prove the Torah's truth.
In this chapter, Gold argues more or less correctly with the position that you can prove the Bible's truth by observing that its predictions have come true. This is an argument embraced by R. Dovid Gottlieb that Gold rebuts at length. However, contrary to Gold's claim, he has not disproven the Bible. What he has done is used a mistaken premise on which to base his argument.
Click here to read moreThe truth, as I see it and as I believe Orthodox Judaism has taught for millennia, is that the Torah's predictions are correct but -- like the rest of the Torah -- have to be properly interpreted. Since interpretations are to some degree subjective, it is hard to argue that the Torah has been proven correct because its predictions, as we interpret them, have come true. That is a fairly flawed logical argument. Nevertheless, the requirement of interpretation is the authentic Orthodox position.
For example, the punishments promised in Deut. 28 for disobedience of the Torah require interpretation as to their specific meaning and the time of their intended occurrence, particularly in contrast with the similar predictions in Lev. 26. Prof. Yishayahu Leibowitz (Sheva Shanim Shel Sichos Al Parashas Ha-Shavu'a, pp. 894-897) quotes three views on to which historical events these predictions point:
If there is disagreement about what events these prophecies foretell, then either history has proven one interpretation correct and the other wrong or there is wiggle room in understanding these predictions and they therefore cannot be considered indisputable proof of the Torah's truth.
A cynical person might find the wiggle room afforded by interpretation to be awfully convenient but there is nothing I can do about that. I think an honest person who has spent any amount of time studying the Torah with commentaries will recognize the importance of interpretation in understanding even the plain meaning of the text. And this has been a tradition of Judaism from time immemorial. Recent studies have even emphasized intrabiblical interpretation, in which passages in later books of the Bible can be shown to be interpretations of earlier passages.
What follows, then, is that these predictions are neither verifiable nor disprovable. Interpretation can always be used to call verification hindsight and to reinterpret (or choose alternate interpretations of) predictions that do not come to pass. So while Gold is correct that these prophecies cannot be used to prove the Torah's truth, his disproofs of the literal prophecies are also insufficient.
However, to the traditional reader of the Bible all of this is merely a sidepoint. The true focus of the prophets was on moral and religious behavior, lessons that last for eternity.
CHAPTER FOUR: REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
This chapter is probably the weakest in the entire book. For starters, Gold repeatedly uses the rhetorical trick of "argumentum ad Holocaustum" by accusing those who accept that suffering is due to Divine punishment as saying that the Holocaust was deserved and the Nazis were God's messengers. Once he raises the Holocaust and accuses his opponents of being soft on it, he presumes to win the argument. However, all Gold does is raise a number of basic philosophical points but fail to look at the Orthodox literature that grapples with them.
Does God's punishing a person for sinning make God immoral (p. 61)? Was the Holocaust punishment for sins (pp. 61-62)? And if it was, does that mean that Hitler was right in what he did (p. 62)? The medieval version of this last question is: If God decreed that the Jews should be enslaved in Egypt, why were Pharaoh and the Egyptians punished? There is a whole literature on this, generally agreeing that Pharaoh et al were wrong (e.g. they were too harsh, someone had to enslave the Jews but not necessarily those particular Egyptians, etc.). Entire books have been published about Orthodox responses to the Holocaust that are much more thoughtful than Gold seems to be able to grant Orthodox thinkers (e.g. Theological and Halakhic Reflections on the Holocaust).
As to the morality of punishment for sins, there are medieval thinkers who believe that the word "punishment" is a misnomer. According to them, God simply fails to protect those who sin from the vagaries of nature. According to others, suffering is a natural outgrowth from sin that is not a punishment (on these issues, see this essay of mine: link). However, I believe that, setting all this aside, Gold's premise is incorrect; punishment is not immoral. It is a basic parenting technique that God uses to encourage people to do what is right.
Gold writes, "I hold with the ancient Greek philosophers, who believed that virtue should be followed because it is intrinsically worthwhile" (p. 60). This is actually a very Jewish concept. The Mishnah in Avos (1:3) teaches us, "Do not be like servants who serve their master for the sake of receiving a reward." The ideal is to do what is right for its own sake but that is a high ideal for everyone to live up to. Not only are not all people capable of being so altruistic, individuals vary throughout their lives. Sometimes temptation is so strong that fear of punishment or promise of reward help a person do the right thing. That is why Judaism has a two-tier approach to observing the commandments -- observance from fear and observance from love. The former is a lower level but certainly better than nothing. On these issues, see R. Yitzchak Blau's article "Purity of Motivation and Desiring the World to Come" in The Torah U-Madda Journal vol. 14 (link).
Gold also raises here the issue of whether Judaism believes that morality is defined by God's word (i.e. the Euthyphro dilemma). He disagrees with what he considers an idea that is "fundamental to Orthodox doctrine", that "[T]hey know [that stealing is wrong] because God established a standard of absolute morality in which stealing, among other things, is and... you can't have a standard of absolute morality unless it comes from outside the human existence, unless it comes from God" (p. 61). This actually raises two points: 1) Do we know morality only because God taught it to us? and 2) Is morality possible without religion?
Regarding the first issue, the truth is that there are different views about this within Orthodox Judaism but there is a strong current that asserts that there are inherent moral obligations that come prior divine law (e.g. not murdering). The literature on this is vast but two important discussions of the subject are R. Aharon Lichtenstein's essay "Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha?" in Leaves of Faith vol. 1 and R. Avraham Grodzinski, "Toras Ha-Seikhel" in Toras Avraham. Suffice it to say that beginning with R. Nissim Gaon and continuing through great scholars today there is a view that people are expected to intuit certain basic moral principles and abide by them as religious principles.
On the second issue, it is clear that there are other paths to morality and that this does not pose any kind of challenge to Orthodox Judaism. It is not, as Gold claims, any kind of fundamental tenet. A good discussion of this very topic can be found in R. Yitzchak Blau's "Ivan Karamazov Revisited: The Moral Argument for Religious Belief" in The Torah U-Madda Journal vol. 11 (link) and see also the exchange of letters (including one from me) in the following issue, which does not seem to be available online.
When all is said and done, there is no challenge to Orthodox Judaism in this chapter. Gold simply misunderstands the depth and complexity of it.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE CAMEL, THE HARE & THE HYRAX
In this chapter, Gold argues that the Torah is factually incorrect regarding its description of animals and kosher signs. I understand his confusion but he needs to immediately obtain a copy of R. Natan Slifkin's book The Camel, the Hare & the Hyrax (currently out of print, so find your way to a library), where he will find answers to all of his questions. Gold is hopelessly out-of-date when he quotes Plaut's almost 40-year old writings on the subject.
Sunday, June 15, 2008
Freedom from Bondage III
9:34 PM
Gil Student
