Giving Away Books Online

Fulfilling our promise with Open Access, we have posted a full book online for free download. Israel Salanter: Religious-Ethical Thinker is available for download as part of The Open Access Project. Those who enjoy the book and wish to have a copy for their private library, can buy it at their local bookstores or online.

Download here.

Please tell your friends and don't keep this a secret.

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Passion

Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, pp. 21-22:

A man who finds it entirely natural to denounce other men cannot have our conception of humanity; he does not see even those whom he aids in the same light as we do. His generosity, his kindness are not like our kindness, our generosity. You cannot confine passion to one sphere.

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Single Women and Shabbos Candles

In the early 1980s, the late Lubavitcher Rebbe began a campaign to encourage single women to light Shabbos candles. While there are obvious sociological benefits to this practice, there are three halakhic issues that arise with it. Here, we are talking about single women and girls who live with their parents. Should they start lighting their own candles, in addition to their mothers' candles?

I. Changing Customs

The campaign was aimed largely at Jews who are not observant of Jewish law. However, there was also encouragement given to those who are fully observant. Such women, however, have family customs and if their custom is that the single women do not light their own candles then they should certainly not deviate from their custom. Ve-al titosh toras imekha has multiple meanings in this case.

However, the halakhic questions that were raised at the time by those opposed to this practice had to do with whether even those women (and girls) requiring kiruv may light their own candles and, specifically, whether they may recite a blessing over those candles.

II. Existing Light

If a mother lights candles first and then her daughter wishes to light her own candles, there is a question of whether the second candles add anything to the mitzvah. The reason for lighting the candles is to ensure that there is light in the house for Shabbos. Once light has been established by the mother's candles, there seems to be no mitzvah need for the daughter's candles.

A similar case is discussed in Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 263:8) in which two families are eating in the same room. Should the families light their own candles, even though one set of candles would provide sufficient light? The Shulhan Arukh cites two opinions on the matter and rules that only one family should recite a blessing over the candles due to the doubt. This would seem to indicate that a daughter may not recite a blessing on her own candles.

However, the Rema notes that Ashkenazic practice is to allow both families to recite a blessing because the second set of candles adds light to the room. Indeed, this is the reason that today, when we have electric lighting in our homes, we still recite a blessing over the Shabbos candles -- the candles add light to the room. Absent this gloss of the Rema, it would be questionable whether anyone today would be able to recite a blessing over Shabbos candles without first turning off all of the electric lights in the room. Furthermore, the Kaf Ha-Hayim states that Sephardic practice also follows this view, despite the ruling of the Shulhan Arukh. All of this implies that there is no problem with a daughter reciting a blessing over her own candles because the candles are adding light to the room.

Furthermore, the Arukh Ha-Shulhan (263:6) rules that if the two families light candles at exactly the same time, then all agree that they may both recite the blessing. The only question is when one family lights first. Therefore, if a mother and daughter light their own candles at the same time, they definitely may both recite the blessing.

III. Family Lighting

The Shulhan Arukh Ha-Rav (263:15 and in kuntres aharon, 5) equates the obligation of Shabbos candles with that of Hanukah candles, in the sense that both are obligations on the household rather than the individual. Therefore, a woman who is a guest at another family's house "is not at all obligated to light a candle there because the obligation to light a Shabbos candle does not fall on her since she is included in the family of the homeowner." He goes on to state that if the homeowner lights candles and recites a blessing, then the guest may not light with a blessing even if the homeowner tells her to do so and makes her his agent for a particular room. In other words, the obligation of lighting candles falls on the household, not on any individual. Once the household has fulfilled its obligation, there is no need, and thus no right, for additional candles to be lit. The Arukh Ha-Shulhan (263:5) seems to take a similar approach.

Therefore, it would seem that a daughter may not light her own candles and recite a blessing on them because the household has already fulfilled its obligation with the mother's candles. However, standard practice does not follow this position of the Shulhan Arukh Ha-Rav and Arukh Ha-Shulhan, as guests regularly light Shabbos candles with a blessing when staying and eating in someone else's home. But those who follow this approach (such as me), would not allow single women to light candles with a blessing in their parents' home.

IV. Ma'aseh Rav

R. Hershel Schachter, Mi-Peninei Ha-Rav, p. 75:

The Lubavitcher Rebbe spoke in public about the importance of lighting candles on Shabbos eve, even for single women who live in their parents' home, and the Hasidim made a big controversy over this. When one of the students asked [R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik] for his opinion on the subject, he responded that he does not understand what innovation there is in this matter. That was the practice in Europe, even in [R. Soloveitchik's] town, and that is how [R. Soloveitchik] practiced with his daughters when they were single -- they lit their own candles, with a blessing, even when his wife also lit candles with a blessing.

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Irony of Ironies

I recently returned to Brooklyn from a meeting in Manhattan. I could not get to my office because there was a bomb threat on this mostly residential block. They evacuated some of the buildings and would not let anyone enter the perimeter. It turned out to be a hoax.

The irony, though, is that this has never happened to my sister in Israel.

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Conservative Judaism on Decline II

Confirmed to be false:
Steven Weiss posted a shocking news release from JTS. Some important items:

As a part of our ongoing support for pluralism and forward-thinking, the Conservative Movement will begin ordaining Gay and Lesbian rabbis by 2010... The Seminary eagerly awaits the outcome of the Committee on Jewish Laws and Standards' discussion next month on the place of gays and lesbians in our movement. In anticipation of the Committee‘s decision, the Seminary commits to welcoming all students with open arms, regardless of sexual preference.

In other words, JTS is bypassing the Conservative movement's Halakhah committee and unilaterally deciding to ordain homsexuals. (insert sarcastic remark here)

The Conservative Movement is committed to dignity and respect for all persons, and by 2010, all institutions affiliated with the Conservative Movement will be required to be fully egalitarian...

And thus ends the Conservative Movement in which I was raised.

I expect to see, in the near future, some more obituaries for the movement by disgruntled former-Conservative rabbis, some of the most interesting people with whom to speak.

Here's a thought. As Prof. Halivni approaches retirement, maybe one of his former students from JTS will follow his lead, resign in disgust, and take over the Talmud department in Columbia. However, these types of politics include a good deal of personality issues from which I am too distant to evaluate. But it makes for interesting speculation.

UPDATE: Steven Weiss reports that this might be a hoax.

UPDATE: This press release may be a scam. While a related event is scheduled for tonight, it appears that this release may have been an intentional attempt to deceive Jewish news outlets from someone not officially affiliated with JTS. The individual responsible for the release, a Lisa Goldberg, maintains that this will still take place at tonight's JTS event. Whether it will have the sanction of JTS remains to be seen.

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The Eternity of the Torah VI

R. Yosef Albo, in his Sefer Ha-Ikkarim (3:16), cites a number of midrashic statements that, at least superficially, imply a sentiment contradictory to the eternity of the Torah. On the verse in Psalms (146:7) "The Lord sets the prisoners free (matir assurim)," the midrash states that, in "the next world" (most likely a latter stage in the messianic era), God will permit prohibitions (matir issurim). Another midrash states that the pig will become kosher at some unspecified future time. There is another midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 13:3) that states that in the messianic era animals will slaughter a Leviathan with horns, an invalid method of slaughter, and the righteous will eat this seemingly unkosher meat. This same midrash states that whoever did not eat unslaughtered animals (neveilos) in this world will eat it in "the next world." All of these midrashim imply a change in the Torah's laws, something that the principle of the eternity of the Torah would not allow.

I. Kosher Pigs

R. Bahya ben Asher, in his commentary to Leviticus (11:7), explains the midrash about a pig becoming kosher allegorically. As we see elsewhere in the midrash (e.g. Vayikra Rabbah 13, end), the nation of Edom is referred to as a pig (in the context of various nations being compared to different animals). This midrash is telling us that our archenemy in this world, the nation of Edom, will become a friend of ours, "kosher," in the peaceful messianic era. This is also how R. Menahem Recanati explained the midrash in his commentary to Leviticus, how the Ritva explained it in his novellae to Kiddushin (49b), and how R. Yitzhak Abarbanel explained it in his Rosh Amanah (ch. 13). (Cf. however, Responsa Ateres Paz, part 1 vol. 2 Yoreh De'ah no. 6.)

R. Hayim Ibn Atar, however, took this midrash literally in his Or Ha-Hayim (Lev. 11:7). Nevertheless, this does not contradict the principle of the eternity of the Torah because, rather than the law changing and a non-kosher pig becoming kosher, the pig will change. Currently, pigs do not chew their cuds and, therefore, are not kosher. The midrash is referring to a change in the pig's anatomy so that it will chew its could and, therefore, will become kosher. It is not Torah changing but nature. This is also how R. Menahem Azariah di Fano (Asarah Ma'amaros, Ma'amar Hikur Ha-Din 2:17, 4:13) explained this midrash, as did R. Moshe Sofer (Toras Moshe, end of Re'eh).

R. David Ibn Zimra (Radbaz) offered two different approaches in his Responsa Radbaz (vol. 2 no. 828). The first is to take the midrash as an exaggeration. In the messianic era people will partake of so many different kinds of wonderful foods that it will be as if everything, include pig, will be eaten. However, non-kosher food will not actually be permitted or eaten. In a similar vein, the Or Yekaros notes the passage in Hullin 109b that states that the shibuta fish tastes exactly like pig and the passage in the introduction to Eikhah Rabbasi (ch. 4) that the shibuta fish did not return from the Babylonian exile, i.e. we no longer had access to it and lost track of it. Combining these two passages with the midrash above, the Or Yekaros suggests that, in the messianic era, we will find the shibuta fish and will once more be able to taste pig, albeit from a kosher source.

Radbaz's other approach is kabbalistic in nature. He pointed out that the angel Hazriel (similar to hazir, pig) is the heavenly prosecutor of the Jewish people. However, in "the next world," he will turn into our defender. He repeated this, with slightly more explanation, in his Sefer Ta'amei Ha-Mitzvos (no. 185).

R. Yitzhak Abarbanel (Rosh Amanah, ch. 13) offered another suggestion. Noting that in the time of the original conquest of Israel, soldiers were permitted to eat non-kosher, including pig (cf. Hullin 17a), Abarbanel suggested that this temporary permission will also be the case during the time period discussed in the above midrash. Temporary abrogation of a law does not contradict the principle of the Torah's eternity.

However, the entire premise of this discussion, that a midrash states that pig will someday become kosher, has been subjected to scrutiny. It seems that this midrash is extant nowhere in the voluminous midrashic material available to us. R. Shmuel Yafeh Ashkenazi, in his Yefeh To'ar (unabridged) to Vayikra Rabbah (13:3), disputed the existence of such a midrash. R. Yehiel Heilprin, in his Erkei Ha-Kinnuyim (hazir), agreed with this conclusion as did some others (e.g. Bnei Yissakhar, Ma'amarei Hodesh Adar 7:2).

II. The Lord Permits Prohibitions

The above explanation of the Abarbanel, that there will be a temporary abrogation of the kosher laws during a specific, limited time period in the future, like there was during the original conquest of Israel, can also explain the midrash that God will permit prohibitions in the future. This, Abarbanel explained, refers to a limited, temporary permission -- a hora'as sha'ah -- and not an abrogation of an eternal Torah law. This was also the approach of the Yefeh To'ar (ibid.) to this passage, R. Tzvi Hirsch Chajes in his Toras Nevi'im, Ma'amar Hukas Olam (Collected Writings, vol. 1 p. 76), and R. David Luria in his glosses to Vayikra Rabbah, ch. 13 no. 5.

R. Menahem Azariah di Fano, as cited above, explained that God will not actually change the prohibitions but, rather, will change the physical reality so that the law's application will change.

III. Invalid Slaughter

Regarding the invalid slaughter of the Leviathan that will be eaten by the righteous, R. Ya'akov Moshe Ashkenazi, in his Yedei Moshe (Vayikra Rabbah, loc. cit.), explained that the details of the laws of slaughtering only apply to human slaughterers. We have human frailties that include imprecision, which is why there are so many detailed laws about how to slaughter. However, when God Himself does the slaughtering, the detailed laws do not apply and the slaughter is kosher even if done non-traditionally. This will not be a change in the laws of the Torah because that even applies today, if God were to slaughter an animal.

R. Pinehas Zevihi, in his Responsa Ateres Paz (part 1 vol. 2, Yoreh De'ah, addenda no. 1, p. 42), offered an original explanation. As he explained, only animals that are born naturally require kosher slaughtering. However, animals that are miraculously created are not subject to the laws of slaughtering (cf. the Shelah, cited in Pardes Yosef, Gen. 37:1). Therefore, he suggested, the animals in "the next world" of which the midrash is discussing were created miraculously and, therefore, will not require kosher slaughtering.

(B"n more to come)

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Abortion III

R. Tzvi Hersh Weinreb, "Orthodoxy in the Public Square" in Tradition 38:1 (Spring 2004), p. 34:

But in actual practice the Orthodox Jewish view of abortion is very different from the conservative views of the Catholic Church and from the liberal views of the [non-Orthodox] Jewish groups. It is nuanced, complex, and depends upon such a variety of factors that categorizing Orthodox Judaism as either pro-life or pro-choice is almost a caricature of our position.

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Conversation with a BT

This is an edited version of a conversation I had tonight with someone at whose house I stopped by to drop off some tzedakah money he is collecting for a visitor in need. He's a long-time ba'al teshuvah who has struggled greatly to raise children in the yeshivah community.

Him: Did you see this? I know you're selling his books. (Hands me pashkevil against R. Nosson Slifkin that was put in his father-in-law's house in Boro Park)

Me: Do you know what this is all about? They are saying that believing that the world is millions of years old is kefirah.

Him: But that's not a problem because you can read the Torah that way. I remember in yeshiva...

Me: No, now that's kefirah.

Him: What do you mean? In yeshiva they taught me...

Me: No, they taught you kefirah according to those Gedolim.

Him: So what am I supposed to believe?

Me: Do you remember at the wedding a few weeks ago when I was talking to your rosh yeshiva? I was speaking with him about this. He told me, and I quote, "The Gedolim are wrong on this. Don't listen to them."

Him: What do you mean? I'm supposed to listen to the Gedolim but now they're telling me that I'm a kofer and my rosh yeshiva is saying I shouldn't listen to the Gedolim! Why is this world so crazy? So who am I supposed to listen to?

UPDATE: After further consideration, here is a short and incomplete list of moderate gedolim:

1. The Roshei Yeshiva at YU, including: R. Hershel Schachter, R. Mordechai Willig, R. Mayer Twersky, R. Michael Rosensweig, R. J. David Bleich. If there is anything to learn from this controversy, it is that the moderate yeshiva crowd is less welcome in the yeshiva world. It is time to embrace YU, despite all of it flaws. (I don't quite know whether to list R. Gedaliah Schwartz with YU or not.)

2. R. Yisroel Belsky (he's not listed first because of alphabetical order), R. Dovid Cohen, R. Shmuel Kamenetsky, R. Aharon Schechter, R. Aharon Feldman, R. Yaakov Perlow (to some degree). Granted, they all have their own unique personalities. But they are the voices of moderation, the current representatives of traditional Litvish openness.

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Thank You Sir, May I Have Another Hundred Thousand II

A month and a half ago, just prior to the outbreak of the latest controversy, this blog received its 100,000th hit since June 2, 2004, the day I installed the hit counter.

In just two and a half months, less than a year from when we started counting, we are reaching 200,000 hits. There is only one person responsible for this so, Rabbi Nosson Slifkin, I thank you.

Please feel free to buy his books as a show of thanks. (Yes, that was a joke)

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Passover Sanity II

The OU's guide to Passover.

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Esther and the Canon

In Megillah 7a, Shmuel voices his view that scrolls of Esther do not render the hands impure because it was divinely inspired to be said but not necessarily to be written. However, throughout the tractate, Shmuel can be found expounding on verses from Esther (e.g. 11a, 13a). So, according to Shmuel himself, which is it? Was the book of Esther a sacred part of the Bible or not?

See here for an answer.

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Rabbinic Comments

Rabbis Aryeh Carmell, Zev Leff and Berel Wein on the Slifkin controversy (here).

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Face Watching

Some of the looks on people's faces that I have been privileged to witness:

1. The impressed look on my (then) eight year old daughter's face when I showed her a verse that explicitly states that Mordechai was Esther's cousin (uncle's daughter), not uncle.

2. The look of surprised disgust on my wife's face when she tasted Lime Coke, or as we call it, Windex Coke.

3. The look of colliding worlds on my Israel-born-and-raised mother when my older son, intent on showing off his newly acquired skill of reading Hebrew, started reading to his unsuspecting grandmother in yeshivish Hebrew with the "oy"s and the "ess"es.

4. The look of unrestrained horror on Dr. Haym Soloveitchik's face when, in response to a query as to whether I had read a particular essay written by CS Lewis, I said "I don't read his stuff because it is all just about Christianity anyway."

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Barukh Dayan He-Emes

The funeral of the Bobover Rebbe, R. Naftali Tzvi Halberstam zt"l will take place this evening at the Bobover Beis Midrash in Boro Park, 15th Ave. between 47th & 48th Streets, at 9:30 PM.

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Orthodoxy and the Public Square

It's back! Yes, the ambiguity over my denominational affiliation has returned with the most recent issue of Tradition (Spring 2004 -- they're catching up!).This issue begins with a symposium on "Orthodoxy and the Public Square." The questions addressed to the panel are as follows:

1. How (or does) Orthodox thought compel our participation in the public policy debates of the broader society in which we live?

2. Where in our tradition's sources do we look for "answers" to the public policy questions of the day?

3. What is the role of rabbis in this process? How do we determine what is a "halakhic issue" requiring formal pesak?

4. What are the parameters of operating in coalitions with other communities and organizations (including other Jewish denominations and non-Jewish religious groups) in the pursuit of our community's interests and values in the public policy arena?

Six scholars addressed these topics, including R. Meir Ya'akov Soloveichik (yay!!!). However, the author with whom I most agreed was R. Chaim Dovid Zwiebel, which leads me once again to think that maybe I'm not MO.

I. I can't seem to get past question #1. Should we, as an Orthodox Jewish community, be adding our voice to the public policy debates in our country? I just can't see why the answer is yes. Who really cares what we have to say? Are we going to change anyone's mind on the subject when we tell them that the Talmudic tradition values X over Y? Christians aren't going to care. Secularists aren't going to care. Non-Orthodox Jews might care a little. The only ones who are going to care are Orthodox Jews. Of course, I'm exaggerating. There will certainly be interest by a wide variety of people but it will only be intellectual curiousity. They use their own moral compasses to decide on these crucial issues and not our complex religious principles. Do you really think that Congress will be swayed by the argument that Halakhah prohibits the removal of feeding tubes from vegetative patients? There is a certain arrogance, or perhaps misplaced confidence in our communal standing in the world, in thinking that we can be an "or la-goyim" (light unto the nations) just by telling people what our tradition has to say on current political issues. If anything, we just become one of dozens of different voices on the subject; certainly not a particularly bright light.

II. This is not to say that there are not pragmatic reasons to sometimes voice opinions on subjects. We do not want to appear, and we certainly should not be, indifferent to the problems of our times. If occasionally releasing public policy statements adequately shows our concern, then that is what we should do. It is probably only, if at all, part of the solution. We also do not want the non-Orthodox movements to become the de facto spokespeople for Judaism. If we need to counter their voices, then it is appropriate to do so. And, of course, since we need to speak out on issues that concern us, we do not want to appear callous to other people's suffering (which we are not). So despite the little value our opinion has in changing public policy, sometimes it is necessary simply to show our support. I think the real solution is individual participation. When Orthodox Jews as individuals take part in the political debate, not as sole representatives of thousands of years of tradition but as concerned individuals, then we are properly showing our concern and adding to the public sphere.

III. Da'as Torah is crucial. As R. Soloveichik points out, we are frequently dealing here with over-arching halakhic values and not merely paragraphs in the Shulhan Arukh. It takes complete mastery of the halakhic and aggadic tradition to reach some of the decisions on these matters. As R. Dov Zakheim also points out, the Da'as Torah is worthless if it is not well-informed in the intricacies of the subjects. But I believe that R. Zweibel is entirely correct that gedolei Torah have to be setting these public policy directions. Which leads to the next point.

IV. There is no single Da'as Torah. If the Council of Torah Sages (whose exclusive membership has always been based largely on political concerns) votes 5-3 on position X, there is clearly little room to state flatly that "The Torah supports position X." Evidently, the Torah is ambiguous about the subject and there are different valid views. It pains me to see so many different people, all great scholars, stating without qualification what the Torah view is on a particular subject. They are almost never correct simply because they fail to say "In my opinion" or "Based on my analysis of this subject." Granted, doing this leaves room for the unlearned to feel free to disagree, and that is a serious danger in today's world of arrogant and ignorant independence. But failing to do so is also dangerous because the frequent and obvious contradictions lessen our respect for Da'as Torah. If we think "They can't both be right," we will end up lacking respect for one or both of them. And that is a serious problem in our community today.

UPDATE: Back to I, I think it's most likely that I don't know what I'm talking about in terms of who wants to know what he have to say and whether it will change their view. But it sure is nice to pontificate without having a clue.

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Hazal and Biblical Characters

I saw elsewhere that the question was raised why Hazal, in a far-fetched manner, equated Memukhan and Haman (Megillah 12b). This question is very timely, and not only because Purim is this week.

A few days ago, I was speaking with R. David Shapiro, the former principal of Maimonides in Boston, and mentioned to him my plans to reprint R. Zevi Hirsch (Maharatz) Chajes' Mevo Ha-Talmud in English -- The Students' Guide through the Talmud, and he immediately said what a classic it is, particularly chapter 20. Standing there at the time, I could not for the life of me remember what was in chapter 20, but the moment I returned to my office I looked it up and saw that it does, indeed, it contains a very important lesson. The book is split into two parts, the first dealing with halakhic history and methodology in the Talmud and the second with aggadic methodology. Chapter 20 is an important statement of one of the principles of Aggadah (keep in mind that this is about aggadah and not peshat study of the Bible):

The Rabbis had likewise a tradition, as far as possible to praise the conduct of godly men, to demonstrate their worth and weigh it against their failings in the scales of merit, and to endeavour in every way possible to justify the doings of the good. It is in view of this principle that they state that anyone who maintains that David sinned is in error, and similarly anyone who maintains that Solomon sinned... [T]he Rabbis teach us that we ought to stress the good deeds of the righteous and show that all their acts were performed in the most perfect manner...

On the other hand, they follow a similar important principle when referring to the evil doings of the wicked, viz. they charge them with all other possible abominable deeds, deducing their charges from the context in each case. Thus, for example, they charge Achan also with the desecration of the Sabbath and with the violation of a betrothed damsel (Sanhedrin 44a)...

The motive which prompted the Rabbis to adopt this method in these aggadic expositions was their desire to strengthen in the people's minds the great principle, which the authors of the Mishnah had laid down, that 'precept draws precept in its train, and transgression draws transgression'. Consequently, the Rabbis charged the public lecturer with the duty of inculcating this idea as thoroughly as possible, and of teaching the people that the man who walks in the way of the Torah finds it becomes second nature to him, so that it is easy for him to practice all other good deeds and nothing causes him any difficulty any longer. Even when we find these people doing something wrong we should try with the help of the exegetical method to put a favourable construction on their action and to adduce such mitigating circumstances as to show that there was, indeed, no crime at all committed as, for example, in the case of David and Bath-Sheba...

They wished, in the second place, to teach by this method another important lesson--viz. that as soon as a man deviates, however slightly, from the way of the Torah, he at once needs more caution and more encouragement, because of the threatened danger that one transgression will draw after it another and, if he is not on his guard to resist the temptation to evil that threatens him, and which has already seduced him to taste of the forbidden fruit, he will expose himself to the practice of all sorts of abominations.

In other words, in order to teach religious lessons the Rabbis stressed the religiosity of biblical heroes and the wickedness of biblical villains. R. Chajes does not say this, but it seems to me that his theory can be traced to the Mishnah in Avos 1:6 to judge a person fairly. The Rambam, in his commentary to that Mishnah, writes that we are obligated to assume that a person we know to be righteous does not sin, and even if it appears that he did we must assume that this appearance is incorrect. However, regarding a person we know to be evil, we must assume that he acts wickedly even if his actions appear to be good. This, it seems to me, is very similar, if not identical, to R. Chajes' principle of aggadic interpretation.

Now, with this introduction in hand, to our point. Rabbi Chajes addresses it specifically in chapter 21:

For the reason quoted above, namely that the Rabbis had the definite principle in their homiletic interpretations of praising, so far as possible, the deeds of the virtuous and of disparaging the doings of the wicked in every available way, they further adopted as one of their methods that of calling different personages by one and the same name if they found them akin in any feature of their characters or activities if they found a similarity between any of their actions. Even where there was only some resemblance in the names of different persons, they blended the two in one, as we see in the following cases (Meg. 15a): 'Malachi and Ezra are one and the same person, for, in the prophecy of Malachi, it is written "He hath married the daughter of a strange God", while in the book of Ezra, it is written "We have broken faith with our God and have married strange women!" Similarly, they held that Hathach and Daniel are one; that Pethahiah is the same as Mordecai, and Sheshbazzar the same as Daniel. Again, they said that Cyrus, Darius, and Artaxerxes are all one (R.H 3b)...

De Rossi, in his Me'or `Enayim, chap. xviii, has collected the statements quoted above, showing how the Rabbis identified several different persons with the name of one man who was outstanding either in virtue or vice...

The main reason for this method is to be found in the chief principle which the Rabbis laid down as a cornerstone or basis for their exegetical expositions, viz. that the lecturer may in all possible ways enhance the praise of righteous and pious men, and wherever he finds reference in Holy Writ to the worthiness of a particular righteous man he should attribute any other virtue to him which is found in any other outstanding personality, if only this can be given Biblical support, however far-fetched. In this way we find the 'righteous' adorned with every worthy quality and virtue.

Similarly in the case of the wicked man, the Rabbis strove to expatiate upon his sinfulness as far as they could and, even in cases where wickedness was not expressly stated, they derived it from other cases where wickedness was categorically affirmed, to prove that an evil man is capable of anything, and they supported their expositions even with the slightest and remotest of indications...

To summarize, the equation by Hazal of different biblical characters is in line with their general homiletic methodology of heaping praise on the righteous and scorn on the wicked. They did not intend to state the these characters are literally one and the same, but only used this as a homiletic device for their important religiosu message.

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Slifkin in the News

NY Times on the Slifkin issue.

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Quick Thoughts on Jewish Action

I received the Spring issue of Jewish Action on Friday. Two of the articles I read surprised me greatly.

1. R. Yitzchok Adlerstein, in his column "Bytes & PCs", writes a glowing review of FrumTeens. I like R. Adlerstein. A lot. Nevertheless, call me irrational but I cannot bring myself to praise someone who shares -- with highly impressionable teenagers -- gems such as that Rav Soloveitchik was responsible for the majority of tumah in America and that Zionism is avodah zarah. In my opinion, people who spew hatred like that should be removed from positions of influence.

2. I was offended by R. Lawrence Kelemen's satirical critique of contemporary yeshivos. Using colleges as a metaphor, R. Kelemen harshly criticizes yeshivos for failing to prepare their students for marriage, raising children and living life after graduation. He raises the significant phenomenon of depression in yeshivos and condemns the intense intellectual competition among students, to the extent that nervous breakdowns are not uncommon (I've witnessed it). He does not do the math explicitly, but given the hundreds of thousands of college students, he implies that suicide rates in yeshivos might be comparable. I do not know where he was going with the sex and drugs, but perhaps that was only there to make the metaphor more realistic. Overall, I am surprised that a man of his well-known ideological leanings would write such a harsh critique.

UPDATE: R. Adlerstein responds here.

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Post That Used To Be Here

I took down this post because:

1. This is not a news blog
2. See the Sema, Hoshen Mishpat 2:8

I still applaud all efforts of responsible organizations to maintain standards in public and private life, and to remove potentially dangerous individuals from positions of authority.

(By the way, I am disappointed in all those who could not refrain from posting comments to a post requesting that you not do so. Is it so hard to respect my wishes and e-mail me instead?)

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Browser Wars

For a few months now, I've been using three browsers in parallel: Internet Explorer, Netscape and Firefox.

I like Netscape the best--by far--for two reasons:

1. Adware and spyware seem to work mainly on IE. When I use either Netscape or Firefox, I get almost no pop-ups at all. I hate pop-ups and the anti-pop-up software I use is never 100% successful. When I use Netscape or Firefox I have no problem but the moment I start IE the pop-ups start coming.

2. Netscape has this feature where you can create tabs within the same window so you can look at different websites without opening new windows. You can then use the familiar Excel keyboard short-cuts to navigate from one tab to another. I really like that.

The preceding was an unsolicited and unpaid advertisement for Netscape, my favorite internet browser.

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Archeology and Halakhah

R. Chaim Jachter has a series of essays on the use of archeology in determining halakhah (I, II, III, IV).

His one line summary:

"[A]rchaeology can possibly play a role when there is no Mesorah (tradition). It certainly cannot uproot a tradition."

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Mysterious Creatures

Good news! Yashar Books has replenished its previously sold-out stock of Mysterious Creatures. Feel free to buy it or ask for it in your local Judaica or Jewish book store. It is also available on Amazon.com.

The Science of Torah remains out-of-print and its price seems to be rising.

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Passover Sanity

The following policy statement (PDF) from the Chicago Rabbinical Council confirms what I have been whispering to people for years. Even in my family, which contains a close student of a descendant (whom The Jewish Press editorial page refuses to name) of a famous rabbi, these policies are only whispered. Goodbye, Rabbi Blumenkrantz.

POLICY ON MEDICINES, COSMETICS AND TOILETRIES FOR PESACH

Medicines

• All pill medication (with or without chometz) that one swallows is permitted without special hashgocha.


• All chewable pills that have kitniyos are permitted. If the chewable pills have chometz and no substitute is available, one should call one's local Rabbi.


• All liquid medications that have chometz should not be used. If it is just a question of kitniyos, it is permissible. Before discontinuing liquid or chewable medicine, you must consult with your Rabbi and Doctor.

Cosmetics and Toiletries

• All varieties of body soaps, shampoos and stick deodorants are permitted for use on Pesach regardless of its ingredients.


• All types of ointments, creams, nail polish, hand lotion, eye shadow, eyeliner, mascara, blush, foot and face powders, and ink and paint may be used regardless of its ingredients.


• Colognes, perfumes, hairspray, shaving lotions and deodorants that have restorable denatured alcohol should not be used. This only applies to products in a pure liquid state.


• Lipstick that contains chometz should not be used

Rabbi Gedalia Schwartz
Av Beis Din of cRc

Rabbi Shmuel Fuerst
Dayan of Agudas Yisroel of Illinois

Rabbi Chaim T. Goldzweig
Cong. Tifereth Moshe

Rabbi Dovid Zucker
Rosh Kollel, Lakewood Kollel

As always, ask your rabbi before acting on anything you read on the web.

UPDATE: I'll add that my rabbi thinks that there is no problem with any kind of paper towels.

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Woops!

It seems that yesterday was this blog's birthday. But that's not really a big deal anyway.

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Reciting Korbanos

In the first chapter of Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim (1:4-9), the author that "it is good" to recite daily specific biblical passages about the Temple sacrifices. He explains in his Beis Yosef that the source for this practice is the following Gemara (Megillah 31b):

Avraham our forefather said to God: What if Israel sins before You, will You do to them like You did to the generations of the Flood and the Dispersion? He replied: No. He said to Him: "How will I know" (Gen. 15:8)? He said to him: "Bring me a heifer three years old..." (Gen. 15:9). He said to Him: That applies to when there is a Temple standing [and sacrifices can be brought], but what will happen to them when there is no Temple standing? He said to him: I already arranged for them the order of [the passages] of sacrifices. Whenever they read them, I look upon them as if they had brought before Me sacrifices and I forgive all of their sins.

From this Talmudic passage, we see that when sacrifices cannot be brought and we read the Torah passages about those sacrifices, it is as if we had brought them. For this reason, Rabbenu Yonah even goes so far as to say that we are biblically obligated to recite the passage of the daily Tamid sacrifice just like, if the Temple were standing, we would be obligated to bring the Tamid.

R. Tzvi Pesah Frank (Responsa Har Tzvi, Orah Hayim 1) points out that reciting the passage is not literally as if one had brought the actual sacrifice. When the Temple is rebuilt, one will still have to bring the sin-offerings for which one is liable even if one had already read the passages. This is explicit in Shabbos 12b:

R. Yishmael ben Elisha said: I will read (on Shabbos using an oil lamp) and will not move [the candle]. One time, he read and went to move the candle... R. Nassan said: He read and moved it, and wrote in his notebook: I, Yishmael ben Elisha, read and moved a candle on Shabbos. When the Temple is rebuilt I will bring a fat sin-offering.

If reading the Torah passage about a sin-offering is like bringing a sacrifice, why did he not merely read the passage? Clearly, then, reading the passage is not the equivalent and is only a way of delaying God's wrath until a sacrifice can be brought.

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Open Access Poster Contest

WANTED

Your ideas for the first Open Access Project Poster Contest!

Help get others involved in the Open Access Learn-Ware Project. Enter our poster contest. Create a poster that could go up on a library, computer room, student center or dorm room wall.

See the sample poster (here - PDF) for the information to include. (Stick to the same text, or come up with something better!) Remember to keep it respectable (this is a Torah project!) but the more catchy and fun the better. Yes, that seems to be contradictory, but paradoxes are something Torah scholars learn to live with.

Rules:
1. Create your poster in a downloadable standard letter size (8.5"x11"), but sharp enough to blow up.
2. Do NOT use any copyrighted text or graphics or photos of people in your poster. (You and we don't need tzuris.)
3. Use any program you like to create the poster, but please send only Acrobat PDF files. Don't have Adobe Acrobat? Create Adobe® PDF Online (http://tinyurl.com/3l4m9) from Adobe lets you make PDFs over the Web. First five PDFs are free!
4. Send your finished design to Poster@YasharBooks.com.
5. Decision of judges (that's us) is final.
6. Winner will receive a gift certificate for a free book from Yashar Books, PLUS, winner will receive a seat of honor on the "Eastern Wall" in the virtual Open Access Beit Midrash (See www.YasharBooks.com/Open/index.html#honor). The Open Access "Eastern Wall Roll of Honor" will feature Open Access Ambassadors who have done the most for spreading the word about Open Access. See your name in lights!

UPDATE: The deadline for submissions to the contest is Rosh Hodesh Nissan, April 10 2005.

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Citation of Non-Orthodox Scholars V

Addendum B:

The Gemara in Megillah 23a, in discussing the number of people called to the Torah on various days, relates the following:

Ya'akov Mina'ah said to Rav Yehudah: The six [called to the Torah] on Yom Kippur are based on what? He replied: The six who stood to the right of Ezra and the six who stood to his left, as it say "The scribe Ezra stood on a wooden platform that had been made for the purpose; and beside him stood Mattithiah, Shema, Anaiah, Uriah, Hilkiah, and Maaseiah on his right hand..." (Nehemiah 8:4).

Tosafos (s.v. Ya'akov) struggle with how the Gemara could have quoted Ya'akov Mina'ah - Ya'akov the Apostate. After all, does it not say in Proverbs (10:7) "The name of the wicked will rot"? Tosafos conclude that this man's real name was Ya'akov Metza'ah, and Mina'ah was a scribal error. (In a similar vein, R. Ya'akov Emden suggests that the man's hometown was Mina and that is why he was called Mina'ah.) However, there are problems with this theory, as noted on the margins of the Vilna Talmud.

The Gemara in Avodah Zarah (27a ff.) deals with when one is allowed to use an idolater as a doctor for healing (out of fear that they might kill us if they have the opportunity). On 27b, the Gemara points out that R. Abbahu was healed by Ya'akov Mina'ah. The context of the statement makes it clear that he was an apostate/heretic/idolater. If so, we must ask Tosafos's question: How could the Gemara mention his name? And if it is mentioning his name here, why not in Megillah also?

The Gemara in Hullin (84a) relates the following question and answer:

Ya'akov Mina'ah said to Rava: We hold that a hayah (domesticated animal) is similar to a behemah (wild animal) in regard to the kosher signs [as listed in Deut. 14:6 in regard to a behemah]. So, too, a behemah should be similar to a hayah in regard to covering its blood. He replied to him: On this [or on you] it says "You shall pour it [the blood] out on the ground like water" (Deut. 12:16). Just like water does not need to be covered, so too [a behemah's blood] does not need to be covered.

We see Ya'akov Mina'ah quoted again, which raises the same questions as above.

R. Reuven Margoliyos, in his Nitzotzei Or (Megillah, ad loc.), suggests that the Talmud would quote a heretic only in the context of disparaging him or when his identity is halakhically relevant (see also Seder Ya'akov to Avodah Zarah 28a). Thus, in Avodah Zarah it was necessary to note his status and in Hullin, the heretic was cynically questioning the halakhah and was forcefully answered in return.

However, R. Yitzhak Isaac Haver, in his glosses to Hullin, R. Wolf Boskowitz, cited by R. Avraham Shlomo Blum in his Yisa Verakhah to Hullin, and R. Aharon Hyman, in his Toledos Tanna'im Ve-Amora'im (vol. 3 pp. 780-781), implicitly reject R. Margoliyos' reading of the passage in Hullin and revise the text to say Ya'akov Metza'ah, like Tosafos do in Megillah.

The conclusion, though, is that according to Tosafos one may not quote a heretic unless there is a specific benefit in noting his name.

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Conservative Judaism on Decline

From Associated Press:

The branch of American Judaism that occupies the middle ground between those who buck tradition and those who fully embrace it have been confronting the dwindling appeal of their movement in a meeting this week in Houston.

Members of the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly, at their annual convention, say their seminaries and day schools have been educating more and more Jews, only to see them flee to other Jewish movements.

Rabbi Ismar Schorsch, chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary, the leading Conservative school, said the exodus of young Conservative Jews with strong religious educations is a key reason the movement is floundering. "I deem that to be the most critical loss," he said, in a phone interview from the meeting, titled "Reinventing Conservative Judaism."

Schorsch partly blames the trend on the poor quality of worship in Conservative synagogues, which he says are so geared toward "entry-level Jews" that those with more religious knowledge leave for the stricter Orthodox congregations. Schorsch says he often worships at an Orthodox synagogue on Friday nights, the beginning of the Jewish Sabbath, because of the beauty of the service...

To the many Conservative rabbis who believe that they are being very lenient in halakhic matters to keep Jews from drifting even farther away from tradition, the move of more observant Jews to Orthodoxy is somewhat a bittersweet success. The Conservative movement has succeeded with those Jews, and the greatest success is to see them move into a community that does not adopt many of the "leniencies" deemed necessary in this time of emergency. This is similar to Orthodox rabbis in small, out-of-town communities who find that their congregants who grow the most in religiosity tend to move to neighborhoods or cities with larger Orthodox populations. Their greatest successes are those who move away. This is very difficult for a rabbi, but most are able to come to terms with this bittersweet definition of success.

So I congratulate the Conservative movement on "graduating" many Jews into Orthodoxy.

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Judaism, Amalek and Racism

This coming Shabbos is "Parashas Zakhor," in which we read the passage about remembering Amalek's attack on us in the desert and how we want God to destroy that nation. One of the 613 commandments is to destroy the nation of Amalek. The question raised in today's social climate is whether that is a racist command. Is the Torah racist in demanding that we kill people who are genetically, through no fault of their own, Amalekites?

R. Ari Kahn addressed this is an essay in his weekly column, later published in his book Emanations. He makes a number of important points:

1. An Amalekite is not destined for doom by his ancestry. If an Amalekite formally accepts upon himself the seven Noahide commandments then he loses his status as an Amalekite and no longer falls under the commandment to destroy Amalek. In fact, an Amalekite can convert to Judaism and even become a prominent rabbi. Historically, we know that descendants of Amalekites have become rabbis.

2. Additionally, according to R. Hayim Soloveitchik, the wording of the Rambam implies that the status of Amalek can be earned by someone not genetically related to the original Amalekites. R. Soloveitchik claimed that one who acts like the original Amalekites gains that status.

Thus, the command to eradicate Amalek is not necessarily race-related because someone from the Amalek race can remove himself from the status and someone from outside the race can gain the status.

However, this is not necessarily sufficient. It all depends on how you define racism and, perhaps more importantly, what your goal is in asking this question.

1. If you define racism as condemning someone to a position because of his race, then Judaism has been proven not to be racist. An Amalekite is not condemned to his status because of his ancestry.

However, if you define racism as applying preconceived categories to an individual, then this does apply to the command to eradicate Amalek. An Amalekite is assumed to be in that status, based on his birth, until he removes himself from that status. Imagine a law forcing all Jews to go to prison unless they convert to Christianity. This is discriminatory simply because it forces us to reject our heritage and renounce our ancestry in order to avoid punishment. The same thing applies to an Amalekite. Even a "non-religious" Amalekite, one who has no sympathy for the wicked acts of his ancestors, might still be uncomfortable about "converting" away from his heritage much like a secular Jew would feel uncomfortable about converting to Christianity.

2. We must go back to the reason for asking this question. If we accept the current notion that all people are individuals and are not at all conditioned by their upbringing or their ancestry, then we would have to say that this commandment is unjust. However, this assumption is patently and demonstrably false. Certain traits are genetic. Furthermore, biases are definitely passed on through upbringing. But even more to the point, people who discover their ancient ancestry are often moved to adopt some practices and behaviors from their forebears. There are Christians in New Mexico who, upon discovering that their ancestors from 400 years ago were Jewish, have begun to affiliate with Judaism. The same could very well happen with Amalek.

So what are we left with? Amalekites are not condemned to their status because they can remove it if they choose. However, absent that, Judaism discriminates against them. Is that bad? It certainly is not politically correct, and I doubt that it will sit well with many people, myself included. But it is not our place to judge the Torah; our is simply to try to understand it.

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Purim Shtik II

Someone in the comments asked if I ever smile, implying that I lack a sense of humor. Someone else asked if I ever wrote Purim shtik. I'll relate the following story, which will probably indicate different things to different people.

In R. Nosson Kamenetsky's recent speech in YU, he mentioned that his father-in-law, R. David Lifschitz, used to make sure that a sign was hung in the YU beis midrash every year during Adar that said something like: "When Adar enters we increase our happiness" "There is no happiness like Torah" Therefore, one should strengthen and increase one's learning during Adar.

It's been a few years and I don't remember the exact language, but it was something like that. One year, I copied the very distinct writing in those signs and wrote different signs about how a man is like a tree and the first three years of a tree's life its fruits are forbidden orlah. Therefore, you should make sure not to learn during Torah your first three years in yeshiva. I hung copies all over the beis midrash for Purim. The forgery was good enough that most people did not look twice at the signs and assumed they were the standard ones. But I saw R. Hershel Schachter and R. Meir Goldvicht reading them before Ma'ariv on Purim night and laughing. I don't think R. David was amused.

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Purim Shtik

If you've never read R. Eli Clark's Purim shtik before, now is the time to start.

http://the-eisens.com/jat.doc

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Metzitzah IV

I came across the following book at SeforimLiquidators.com for less than half price. I have not read it, though, so I cannot offer an opinion on its contents. But it definitely looks interesting.

Sanctity and Science - Metziza B'peh
Rabbi Yonason Binyomin Goldberger Translated by Rabbi Avrohom Marmorstein

Translated from the original in Hebrew, Sanctity and Science offers the reader a glimpse of the illuminating and fascinating Torah teachings about the mitzvah of B'rit Milah. The author describes the ceremony and its role as the beginning of a child's spiritual life. Contains a review of the latest scientific research demonstrating the safety and desirability of b'rit milah as performed by the traditional method.

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Next Time...

Next time you are in your local seforim or Judaica store, look to see if they have any books from Yashar. If they don't, please ask them to stock them and give them our website www.YasharBooks.com.

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ATID In The News

ATID scored a nice write-up in this week's New Jersey Jewish News.

(Lamed)

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Avodah Zarah Wigs IX

The report from the ground here in Brooklyn is that a large portion of the community has long stopped caring about the source of wigs. The unofficial pesak from R. Yisrael Belsky, who has very convincingly spoken on this subject before a number of groups of rabbanim, is that there is no problem with wigs whose hair originated in India. He, and his colleagues, have even convinced R. Elyashiv that they have the right to investigate this matter on their own and reach their own conclusions. The matter, I've been told for months, will be publicly settled shortly when an official "American" beis din convenes to rule on this matter. The only questions that remain are who will be on this beis din and where it will convene. I don't know why this is taking so long. But it is largely irrelevant because people who are going to follow that ruling are already doing so.

A few weeks ago, the weekly Halacha Berurah, emanating from R. Yisrael Belsky's students and personally reviewed by him, contained a long write-up explaining the issues and carefully refusing to rule but showing how and why one would be lenient. A reader sent it to me in PDF format and it can now be seen here.

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Reb Nosson and Torah U-Madda

When I was a student in YU, the saintly figure of the elderly R. David Lifschitz graced the beis midrash every day. On rare occasions, his sons-in-law would visit for Shabbos. One son-in-law, R. Nosson Kamenetsky, would spend Shabbos in Yeshiva when he was visiting from Israel. His he'aros (always only after davening) to the ba'al koreh in the beis midrash, the grammatically aware R. David Komet, were everything one would expect from a son of Reb Ya'akov Kamenetsky. It was a learning experience just to hear afterwards what comments and corrections he had offered.

One time, it was either Shavu'os or a Shabbos in June (after college had concluded), R. Kamenetsky ate with us students in the cafeteria and gave a devar Torah to the crowd. His Torah-only message was clearly not an endorsement of Torah U-Madda, even if it was respectful and non-confrontational.

Yet, after his very public censorship in the yeshiva world to which he belongs, he is being welcomed back to YU as a guest speaker at a Torah U-Madda lecture:

Yeshiva University presents a Torah u-Madda Lecture:

"Of Bans, Earthquakes, and Tsunamis"
A lecture by Rabbi Nathan Kamenetsky (noted author, lecturer and Rosh Yeshiva)

Thursday, March 10, 2005
8:00 PM - Furst 501

Yeshiva University - Wilf Campus, 500 West 185th Street, New York, NY

Refreshments will be served

For more information please email MenachemButler@hotmail.com

I will, unfortunately, not be able to attend but I encourage anyone who can go to do so. I am certain that the talk will be not only informing but also entertaining.

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The Hazon Ish and Understanding Aggadah Literally

I saw the following story posted on a website:

[The CHazon Ish said] "anybody who says that there is in CHazal even one thing that is "laav davka"("not exactly true") , is "mekatzetz b'netiyos" . . . he would even refrain from eating chicen that was slaughtered by an expert and skilled shochet if he was one of those people ...

The CHazon Ish used to say, that someone who has warped hashkofos, is worse than someone who violates shabbos, regarding making his wine into yayin nesech. Rav S. Greimenam ZTL testified thusly in the name of the CHazon Ish, and added an incident that happened when the Chazon Ish was in Vilna. There was in those days a young man, an outstanding lamdan, that would stay by the Chazon Ish. Every Firday, he would bring the CHazon Ish a bottle of wine. He used speak a lot with the CHazon Ish in learning. Once, they were discussing a Chazal about Og Melech Habashan who uprooted a mountain to throw it on the Jews, and a miracle happened ... the young man commented: This is probably said as an exaggeration and a figure of speech. The Chazon Ish gave him a look, and said sternly: "Next SHabbos, do not bring with you any wine!" ...

"Casting doubts on the truthfulness of certain words of Chazal is like "giduf" against chazal. Someone who veers from this is, as per out tradition, like a Kofer in the words of Chazal; his shechita is trief, he is disqualified to be a witness etc."

I believe this story to be either entirely untrue or missing important background that significantly changes the story's meaning. R. Binyamin Yehoshua Zilber, in his Responsa Az Nidberu, frequently warns people not to believe stories they see and hear about the Hazon Ish. Based on the following, I seriously question the above story.

The implication of the story is that anyone who does not believe every Aggadic statement in rabbinic literature literally is a heretic. It could be that the background behind this story is that it occurred in a time and place where people would frequently leave Orthodox Judaism over such matters, so that questioning whether an Aggadic statement is literal really implies deeper theological doubts. However, taken at face value, it is virtually impossible for someone familiar with rabbinic literature to declare someone to be a heretic for questioning whether Og literally uprooted a mountain and threw it at the Jews.

The Rambam, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin, introduction to chapter Helek, lists three types of readers of Aggadic material:

The first class comprises the majority among those that I have come across and whose compositions I have read and of whom I have heard. They understand the word of the Sages literally and do not interpret them at all... They only do this because of their ignorance of sciences and their being distant from (various) fields of knowledge. They do not possess any of the perfection which would stimulate them (to understanding) of their own accord, nor have they found someone else to arouse them. Therefore, they think that the intent of the Sages in all their precise and carefully-stated remarks is only what they can comprehend and that these (remarks) are to be understood literally... This class (of thinkers) is poor (in understanding) and one should pity their folly. In their own minds, they think they are honoring and exalting the Sages, but they are actually degrading them to the lowest depths. And they do not perceive that. As God lives, it is this class of thinkers that destroys the splendor of the Torah and darkens its brilliance...

(Fred Rosner, Maimonides' Commentary on Sanhedrin, p. 140)

In no uncertain terms, the Rambam states that it is wrong and even offensive to understand every Aggadic statement literally. This attitude continued for centuries and was repeated in many different works. I have no need to quote from obscure works because this attitude is so prevalent that it is in books that occupy most home libraries. This was the approach of the Maharal, the Ramhal and, of course, the Vilna Gaon. There is a famous story about R. Yisrael Salanter in which he explained the allegorical nature of Aggadah through a parable about a newspaper story in which current events are referred to in easily understood idioms that are, to the outsider, entirely incomprehensible. The approach continues to our day, when R. Eliyahu Dessler, a respected colleague of the Hazon Ish, regularly lectured in that vein in the Ponevezher Yeshiva in Bnei Brak, as demonstrated in his Mikhtav Me-Eliyahu. His student and successor, R. Hayim Friedlander, continued in that path, as can be seen in his Sifsei Hayim. More recently, R. Aharon Feldman, currently the rosh yeshivah of Ner Yisrael in Baltimore, published a book titled The Juggler and the King: An Elaboration of the Vilna Gaon's Interpretations of the Hidden Wisdom of the Sages in which he expands the Vilna Gaon's Aggadic commentary of many Talmudic and Midrashic passages. R. Feldman writes in his overview (p. xxii):

[I]n Aggadata the message - often some of the most basic ideas of Judaism - is garbed in what appears to be parables, riddles or even practical advice without apparent religious content. In line with this, one great authority writes that the above-mentioned dictum, that a verse never departs its plain meaning, applies only to the Torah's verses and not to Aggadic statements; in fact, he writes, the plain meaning of Aggadata is usually not its true meaning.

Even though it is not necessary, since I have before me the galleys of the soon-to-be-reprinted The Students' Guide Through The Talmud, an English translation of the Maharatz Chajes' Mevo Ha-Talmud, let me quote from his chapter 17 (p. 142):

Now since the style which the Rabbis adopted in the Midrash and Aggadah is not understood by the average student, so that at first glance many strange idioms and extravagances appear to be contained in their statements, such as have afforded the critics opportunities to pass censure upon them..., I have set myself the aim to show the reader the methods employed by the Rabbis in these subjects, and to explain the many categories and definitions as well as the idioms and modes of expression which are used by them in the Aggadah...

Now, going to the specific midrash discussed by the Hazon Ish, it can be found in Berakhos 54b (I am using the Soncino translation out of laziness):

'The stone which Og, king of Bashan wanted to throw at Israel'. This has been handed down by tradition. He said: How large is the camp of Israel? Three parasangs. I will go and uproot a mountain of the size of three parasangs and cast it upon them and kill them. He went and uprooted a mountain of the size of three parasangs and carried it on his head. But the Holy One, blessed be He, sent ants which bored a hole in it, so that it sank around his neck. He tried to pull it off, but his teeth projected on each side, and he could not pull it off. This is referred to in the text, Thou hast broken the teeth of the wicked, as explained by R Simeon b. Lakish. For R. Simeon b. Lakish said: What is the meaning of the text, Thou hast broken the teeth of the wicked? Do not read, shibbarta [Thou hast broken], but shirbabta [Thou hast lengthened]. The height of Moses was ten cubits. He took an axe ten cubits long, leapt ten cubits into the air, and struck him on his ankle and killed him.

We are obligated, the story from the Hazon Ish implies, to believe that this literally happened. Og actually uprooted a mountain and tried to throw it at the Jewish people. Anyone who does not believe this literally is, evidently, a heretic.

However, anyone who looks in the standard commentaries will find that they did not interpret this literally. In fact, the Rashba, cited in full in Ein Ya'akov, took this passage as an opportunity to explain at length his allegorical approach to understanding Aggadah. The Rashba explains that the mountain symbolizes the patriarchs, and that Og was hoping to defeat the Jews with the merit he had acquired by assisting Avraham. However, with the combined merit of Moshe, the Jews and the patriarchs, they were able to withstand Og's merit.

Now, even if one were not going to bother ab initio looking in the Rashba or the Ein Ya'akov, once the Maharsha - the standard Aggadic commentary printed in the Vilna Shas - quotes it you probably would. The Maharsha, however, disagrees with the Rashba and explains it with a slightly different twist, albeit equally allegorically.

Additionally, no less an authority than the Noda Bi-Yehudah, in his Tzelah commentary on the Talmud, suggests a non-allegorical but also non-literal explanation in order "to bring the words close to the intellect and to nature." He suggests that Og had a big rock that he was planning on throwing at those few Jews who were carrying the Ark of the Covenant. He was a strong man and that was an unusually big rock, which is why it is so significant. However, unlike the Rashba and the Maharsha, the Noda Bi-Yehudah believes that there is a literal core to this exaggerated historical story.

To sum up, it is hard to believe that the Hazon Ish said that anyone who believes that an Aggdadah in the Talmud is not meant literally is a heretic. He surely knew what the Rambam wrote and, more importantly, what the commentaries on that very passage had to say. The story is either untrue or missing important information. Furthermore, it is misleading to tell such a story in public because it gives the incorrect impression that one must understand Aggadah literally. That is simply not the case.

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Interfaith Dialogue V

The Commentator published an essay by the late R. Dr. Walter Wurzburger about interfaith dialogue (here). Here are some interesting excerpts:

While the belief in the Trinity - classified by the Halakhah as Shituph - may not be regarded as downright prohibited to the non-Jew, we still cannot recommend it as the ideal way in which the non-Jew should relate himself to God.

We should point out that we regard belief in the Trinity as such an aberration that we would rather have a Jew remain an agnostic or atheist than accept these doctrines which for a Jew would involve apostasy or idolatry...

Matters of religious faith do not lend themselves to negotiation where in order to arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement both sides are ready to make concessions. Christians, especially after Auschwitz, may have compelling moral reasons to reconsider the propriety of theological tenets which resulted in the "teaching of contempt" with all its disastrous implications. But Jews have no corresponding legacy of theological hatred which they have to revise, and it is difficult to see, no matter how positive Christians become in their evaluation of Judaism, how Jews can go beyond this stage where Trinitarian belief is tolerated for non-Jews as an advancement over paganism. It is inconceivable that Jews should compromise on their eschatological ideal that all of mankind would ultimately accept the pure faith in a living God that is shown [shorn? -GS] of all such distortions as contained in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation or Trinity...

It must also be remember[ed] that with the notable exception of a few theologians (Tillich, Niebuhr, James Parkes, Roy Eckardt, etc.) the mainstream of Christian thinking still retains the hope for the ultimate conversion of the Jews. For that matter, many liberal Christian theologians maintain that the very kerygmatic character of Christianity would be compromised if the eschatological hope for conversion of the Jews would be surrendered.

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Calling Women to the Torah

Biur Chametz (I, II & III) reports on a recent discussion at Jerusalem's Kehillat Yedidyah synagogue between R. Dr. Daniel Sperber and R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin over whether women can be called up to the Torah as part of the synagogue service. It seems to me that the cards were stacked in favor of one position based on the scholars invited to speak. Granted, a Haredi rabbi would have been out of place. However, there are Modern Orthodox rabbis who are opposed to this practice (see below no. 7). R. Henkin is "in between" on this subject, against it in practice but only due to one or two secondary issues, and R. Sperber is in favor. There was no one there entirely opposed to the practice.

Regardless, there was much of interest reported by Biur Chametz about this discussion. I have no other source for what was said and am relying entirely on Biur Chametz's report. Please keep in mind that it could be imprecise or incorrect.

Some thoughts:

1. R. Sperber suggested that there was once a time in which women were called to the Torah before the Sages prohibited it. I do not believe that there is any evidence to that and, as I have pointed out elsewhere, Prof. Shmuel Safrai has rejected the textual inference that led to this assertion (Safrai, Eretz Yisrael ve-Hakhameha, p. 101).

2. R. Sperber seems to think that by accomodating women in this respect alone, we will be satisfying their sense of frustration and exclusion, thereby keeping them within Orthodoxy. I find this to be short-sighted. In the end, equality in the synagogue is impossible. Even if we can give a little here and a little there by bending the rules a bit, we will never be able to satisfy the egalitarian desire and will be just leading women down the path towards more frustration. Equal participation in the synagogue is halakhically impossible and, therefore, undesirable. I am not condoning exclusion for the sake of exclusion. However, feeding egalitarian desires is misleading and will h"v end in disaster when they run into an halakhic brick wall.

3. I find it hard to accept the quote from Rav Kook: "There is no need for concern about permitting something that is permissible according to the law of the Torah, even if in practice there was no previous custom to permit it." I don't know the context of the statement but it is extremely relevant because there is ample precedent for abiding by customary restrictions (see section III of this post).

4. R. Sperber has taken the legitimate concept of Kevod Ha-Beriyos and extended it well beyond the parameters for which there is any precedent. Would he allow, for example, a teenage girl to carry a nice purse on Shabbat (in a place where it is only rabbinically prohibited) so that she not be embarrassed to be insufficiently accessorized? Isn't that kevod ha-beriyos? Or what if I am at a business meeting and everyone is eating kosher salami with kosher swiss cheese? Should I eat it also since it is only prohibited rabbinically or should I refrain from eating it and be embarrassed in front of all my colleagues? There are clearly boundaries to this concept and he has gone significantly farther than anyone else has.

5. R. Henkin, in responsum 2 in his recently published Bnei Banim vol. 4 (responsum available online here), writes that women cannot be called to the Torah because it violates synagogue customs. Even in places and extreme situations where it would have been appropriate to call women to the Torah, we have never heard of it actually being done. Historically, synagogue customs have been considered by posekim to be of considerable weight and this is certainly one of them.

6. Reform (both capitalized and not) has always made the synagogue one of its starting points, which is one of the reasons we are so hesitant to make changes like this. Again, the historical precedent of Reform is telling. Many of the original reforms were not technically against halakhah but quickly led to serious halakhic infractions. Friends, we are all educated people. Do I need to say what happens to those who fail to learn from the mistakes of history?

7. There is also the halakhic consideration of confirming the Heterodox. See my posts on this subject (I, II, III and in particular IV). In note 42 I cite R. Yitzhak Yosef, R. Yehuda Henkin, R. Ahron Soloveichik and R. Moshe Meiselman (in a book reviewed fully before publication by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik) as opposing calling women to the Torah. I have since seen the following from R. Barry Freundel, who sits on the advisory council of Edah (Contemporary Orthodox Judaism's Response to Modernity [Ktav: 2004], pp. 272-273):

Beyond the borders of Orthodox acceptability are traditional egalitarian services and a very few others that allow women to be called to the Torah and, perhaps, also to lead some limited parts of the service. Though no halakhically persuasive argument has been advanced to support such services, the fact that some have tried to justify what is being done from our sources, however unsuccessfully, coupled with the desire of these groups to, at least initially, maintain the traditional liturgy, means that the challenge of the role of women in the synagogue is not over.

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R. Nosson Tzvi Finkel, the Alter of Slabodka

In my biased and unscientific opinion, the man who proved to be the figure most (posthumously) influential in the post-war Yeshiva world was R. Nosson Tzvi Finkel, the famed Alter of Slabodka. His disciples created and influenced a large number of yeshivos, proving to be the moving forces behind many of the institutions that rebuilt the yeshiva world to its current glory after the devastation of the Holocaust.

An anonymous blogger has taken on the task of rekindling interest in this great figure: http://deralter.blogspot.com

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Abortion II

In a comment to this post, someone suggested that since, within the Jewish worldview, gentiles are subject to an absolute prohibition against abortion, the nuanced permissions to Jews are irrelevant. We must oppose abortion because the overwhelming number of abortions in America are prohibited gentile abortions. Whether this is good policy, i.e. favoring a stance that, if adopted, will disallow abortions that are halakhically permitted and maybe even obligatory, is questionable. However, even more questionable is the claim that the prohibition of abortion for gentiles, i.e. Noahides, is absolute.

R. Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics, p. 187:

According to the Talmud and MAIMONIDES, as we have mentioned, the Noachidic dispensation regards the killing of an embryo as murder. Consequently, there is some doubt whether the sanction of therapeutic abortions can be extended to non-Jews, too. While TOSAPHOTH tended to recognise no difference between Jews and Gentiles in this matter, TRANI held that a Jew must not be an accomplice to the abortion of non-Jews...

R. Jakobovits seems to be saying that it is a matter of dispute whether therapeutic abortions are prohibited for gentiles. However, he does not delve into this matter in particular depth and it is not entirely clear to me that he quotes any source prohibiting it.

R. David M. Feldman,* Birth Control in Jewish Law, p. 261:

Therapeutic abortion is not, of course, included in this Noahidic restriction.[51] Many have specified, moreover, that an abortion during the first forty days of pregnancy is also not included.[52] A significant Responsum from eastern Europe of the eighteenth century dealt with the matter of B'nai Noah in its own way, offering us in the process a fine insight for the modern-day debate on the "human" status of the embryo:

It is not to be supposed that the Torah would consider the embryo as a person [nefesh] for them [Sons of Noah] but not a person for us. The foetus is not a person for them either; the Torah merely was more severe in its practical ruling in their regard. Hence, therapeutic abortion would be permissible to them, too...[53]

Abortion, to sum up the immediately foregoing, is not murder, neither for Israelites not for "Sons of Noah," except that by special decree, so to speak, capital liability attaches to the latter when the act is done without the justification of saving life. Presumably other justifications, defined below, would likewise be admissible.

[51] See on, Koah Shor and Tosafot. But cf. Minhat Hinnukh to No. 291, who raises theoretical queries. The author of Mishneh LaMelekh, in his Parashat D'rakhim, No. 2, cites Trani to the effect that B'nai Noah may not risk their lives to perform what is to them a mitzvah, based on ya'avor v'al yehareg in Yad, Y'sodei HaTorah 5,4. See also Jacob Ginzberg, Mishpatim L'Yisrael, pp. 161-231.
[52] Resp. Torat Hesed, E.H., No. 42:33 (although his line of reasoning requires the conclusion that the foetus has aspects of nefesh after forty days). Also, Resp. Beit Sh'lomo, H.M., No. 132; Zweig in Noam, II, 53; Weinberg in Noam, IX, 214. On the 40-day time distinction, see below, Notes 79-80.
[53] R. Isaac Schorr, Resp. Koah Shor, Vol. I, No. 20 (dated 1755).

And, more recently but more briefly, R. Aharon Lichtenstein, Leaves of Faith, vol. 2 p. 244 (from an article of about 15 years ago):

To return for a moment to the violation of homicide and the proof from Noahide law, it seems to me that the Noahide is liable in those instances where the fetus has developed to the point of independent viability (outside the uterus) at the time... In the early stages of pregnancy, however, the missing element of full human life is not merely that birth has yet to occur, but the absence of full development and the fact that in its current state the fetus is not viable outside the womb.

It is true that there is a great debate over whether abortion is ever murder, something that R. Lichtenstein outlines fairly clearly, even if without adequate footnoting. You should be able to detect different positions in the above quotes. Note that R. Feldman's institutional affiliations (discussed below) should not be assumed to be behind his view that abortion is never murder. I have heard the same in the name of unquestionably Orthodox sources (e.g. R. Mordechai Willig).

UPDATE: R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yabi'a Omer, vol. 4 Even Ha-Ezer no. 1 section 10, states that, like a Jew, a gentile may have a therapuetic abortion within the first three months of pregnancy to alleviate a non-fatal illness.

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* Some readers may question why I am quoting a JTS graduate who served in a Conservative pulpit his entire career. I play the denominational/ institutional-bias game very well (probably too well) but I've know R. Feldman for most of my life and know very well his erudition, honesty and acceptance in Orthodox circles. His book is considered a classic of Jewish medical ethics by anyone who knows anything about it.

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Metzitzah III

The theme this Shabbos was metzitzah be-feh. My rabbi spoke about it and someone came for se'udah shelishis who said that R. Feivel Cohen spoke about it at length in his shul. It seem the R. Elyashiv asked R. Feivel Cohen to investigate exactly what happened with the baby that died and whether there is a danger in doing metzitzah be-feh. R. Cohen looked into the matter and spoke with a number of doctors. His conclusion is that the medical consensus is that there is no danger in doing metzitzah be-feh although there are some doctors who think there is. R. Cohen also reviewed the halakhic matters and concluded that there is no reason to require metzitzah be-feh. He pointed out that R. Aharon Kotler opposed the practice after a baby died in Lakewood. R. Hayim Soloveitchik also would not allow it in Brisk. However, R. Cohen concluded that it is not forbidden because most medical experts say that there is no danger. (Note that I heard this all second-hand and not directly from R. Cohen)

[No details about R. Tendler's involvement will be discussed on this blog or allowed in the comments.]

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Secular Dates

My post from yesterday raised the issue of using secular dates. It is worth noting that the Rema in responsum 51 says that he is writing in December 1546 "le-misparam." The Havos Ya'ir (184) quotes a book published in 1428 "le-misparam." The Hasam Sofer in a responsum (Even Ha-Ezer 43) discusses a case about a soldier whose death was ascertained from various sources as being on either 29 October 1810 "le-misparam" or 13 October 1809 "le-misparam."

In Iggeros Soferim, in the letters of R. Moshe Sofer between pages 104 and 105, there is a copy of a letter written by the Hasam Sofer in German that is dated 8 November 1821. I am sure that the book has other examples of this.

(I should note that while I verified and corrected these citations, they were taken from R. Matis Blum's Torah La-Da'as, vol. 1 p. 264 ff. who, in turn, took them from Kol Bo Al Aveilus.)

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Abortion

R. Barry Freundel, Contemporary Orthodox Judaism's Response to Modernity, pp. 257, 260-262

[F]rom our earliest discussion of the subject, Judaism has never taken what one might describe as either a pro-choice or a pro-life position... A contemporary discussion that incorporates and illustrates many of the elements just detailed is the debate between Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg and Rabbi Moses Feinstein on aborting a fetus that tested positive for Tay-Sachs disease... Bearing such a child and watching it whither and pass away is, to say the least, emotionally difficult for the parents. But is that sufficient to allow abortion? Rabbi Waldenberg permits such an abortion until the seventh month of pregnancy. Rabbi Feinstein... does not.

It is here that the extent of the range of opinions on abortion can be seen. Neither Rabbi Waldenberg nor Rabbi Feinstein would prohibit abortion if the mother's life was in danger. Neither would permit abortion if the baby was healthy and the couple merely wanted to delay having children for a few years. Where the debate is joined is on the relative value of fetal life vs. parental distress...

Imagine a woman who is pregnant but who also, unfortunately, has cancer. If she takes chemotherapy for the cancer, the fetus will die, but this may be her only chance to survive. If she doesn't take chemotherapy, she may well die but the baby will have a chance... At least one contemporary responsum allows the mother's choice in such a case to be the determining factor...

Finally, this author is saddened that so many Jewish groups have aligned themselves with either the pro-choice movement (and this is by far the largest group) or (more rarely) the pro-life movement. As we have seen, Judaism accepts neither position.

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The Eternity of the Torah V

Months of the Year

I. Changing Months

R. Yosef Albo, in his Sefer Ha-Ikkarim (3:16) poses a number of challenges to the principle of the eternity of the Torah. Let us examine one of these questions.

He notes that the Torah (Ex. 12:2) commands: "This month shall mark for you the beginning of the months; it shall be the first of the months of the year for you." In other words, the month that we now call Nissan must be the first month of the year and we must count the months of the year beginning from it. Nissan must be the first month and, after it, the second month and then the third month, etc. And that is how the Bible consistently refers to the months - the first, the second,... This is all to remind us that God redeemed us from Egypt. Our counting dates from the time of the Exodus is meant to maintain in our minds that we were taken out of Egypt.

However, when the Jews returned from the Babylonian exile they retained the Babylonian names of the months - Nissan, Iyar, Sivan, etc. They no longer referred to the months as had been done previously in the Bible, by their orders, but by their Babylonian names. This seems to contradict an earlier command. Evidently, the commandment in Ex. 12:2, which obligates us to refer to the months in a way that causes us to remember that we were redeemed from Egypt, was changed when the Jews were redeemed from Babylonia. Instead of maintaining a calendar that reminds us of our redemption from Egypt, we now use a calendar that reminds us of our redemption from Babylonia. A mitzvah from the Torah has been switched! R. Albo points out that this is a clear challenge to the principle that the commandments are eternal and will never be switched.

R. Albo certainly based his question on the Ramban's commentary to Ex. 12:2. The Ramban is the one who explained that the rationale of the commandment to count months from Nissan is so that we constantly remember that we were redeemed from Egypt and he also pointed out that when the Jews returned from Babylonia they retained the Babylonian names for the months in order to remember that God redeemed them from that exile. See also the commentaries of Rabbenu Bahya ben Asher and the Tur (long commentary), ad loc. and the Derashos R. Yehoshua Ibn Shu'ib. The Ramban writes: "Every time we mention the months, the miracle will be remembered." The Tur adds: "When one says 'the first month' it means the first from the Exodus from Egypt. And so with the second and third, we always remember the miracle." Therefore, when the returnees from Babylonia changed the names of the months, they removed this obligated remembrance of the Exodus.

II. Establishing a Calendar

One answer to this challenge is simply that the premise is not universally acknowledged. It seems that there are rishonim who disagree with the Ramban that there is a commandment to refer to months in common usage by their order from the Exodus. A baraisa in Rosh Hashanah 7a states that the month of Nissan is the "new year" for years. The Rashba, in his novellae, explains that the practical relevance of this status for Nissan is that through it we can identify and anchor the times of the biblical holidays. The holidays in the Bible are located in the "the seventh month" or "the third month" and one might assume that we can start counting months at any point and determine the place of the holidays by counting from our arbitrary starting point. That is why we are commanded to begin counting from Nissan. It is the first month of the year for determining when the holidays occur. This is also the view of the Ran and the Ritva. According to these scholars, the commandment of making Nissan the first month is not that we have to refer in our daily conversation to all months based on their order from Nissan, but to determine the annual calendar by starting from Nissan. If that is the case, then R. Albo's question falls aside.

III. Counting Months

However, this question can be answered even according to the Ramban's view. R. Ya'akov Ibn Habib, in his Ha-Kosev commentary to the Ein Ya'akov (Megillah, p. 8 sv. od kasav), writes that we are obligated to count months from Nissan. However, assigning names to months does not reflect on that obligation because the names are not referring to months in numerical order. Even if we call the month Nissan, we are not changing it from the first to the seventh month. If, however, we were to call it the seventh month, then we would be violating the commandment to count months from Nissan. He adds that if we were to say that Reuven borrowed money in the month of March or April we are still not circumventing this commandment, as long as we do not refer to March as the third month or April as the fourth month. This is also the approach of the Maharal in Tiferes Yisrael, ch. 64.

Therefore, according to R. Ya'akov Ibn Habib and the Maharal, when the returnees from Babylonia retained the Babylonian names for the months, they did not in any way circumvent, violate or change the biblical commandment to count months from Nissan. Cf. Yefeh To'ar (unabridged) to Vayikra Rabbah 13:3.

While R. Ya'akov Ibn Habib answeres R. Albo's question, he stated something somewhat surprising. He clearly implied, and later posekim note this explicitly, that referring to March as the third month (i.e. counting months from January) is a violation of the commandment to count months from Nissan. Thus, to refer to today's date as 3/3/05 is prohibited. I find this difficult because a Jewish month (hodesh) is one lunar cycle. When counting days, there is no obligation to begin with Nissan. When counting weeks, there is no obligation to begin with Nissan. When counting years, there is certainly no obligation to begin with Nissan. Then why, when counting solar months, is there any obligation to begin counting from Nissan? March is not a hodesh but a solar month. Therefore, there should be nothing preventing us from calling March the third solar month.

The Pesikta De-Rav Kahana (ch. 5 p. 46a) states: "The nations of the world count according to the sun and Israel to the moon." [Cf. Torah Shelemah, Bo ch. 12 nos. 32, 34 and in the notes.] R. Eliezer of Metz writes similarly in his Yere'im (103) that "hodesh" specifically implies a lunar month. The Kuzari (3:35) writes that without the Oral Torah we might have thought that the verse (Ex. 12:2) refers to solar months but the Oral Torah teaches us that it does not - it only refers to lunar months. The Rashbatz (Magen Avos, part 2 ch. 2) repeats this. See also the Seforno's commentary to Deut. 16:3. If the commandment is only to count lunar months from Nissan, then there should be no reason to refrain from counting solar months from January. (I heard this reasoning forcefully argued by R. Lipa Geldwerth a number of years ago.)

IV. Prophetic Tradition

However, it seems that none of these answers are necessary, even if they are nevertheless true. The simple answer is that the returnees from Babylonia found prophetic dispensation to change the names of the month. Jeremiah (23:7-8):

Therefore, the days are surely coming, says the Lord, when it shall no longer be said, "As the Lord lives who brought the people of Israel up out of the land of Egypt," but "As the Lord lives who brought out and led the offspring of the house of Israel out of the land of the north and out of all the lands where I had driven them."

The prophet surely did not dispute a biblical commandment on his own. Rather, he must have had a tradition that the commandment is to use the names of the months as a way to remember the most recent Divine redemption. Since the prophet's words were not rejected as contradicting the Torah, there must have been an oral tradition on the matter and the prophet "came and connected it to a verse" (cf. Sanhedrin 22b).

This is the explanation that the Maharatz Chajes gives (Toras Nevi'im, Ma'amar Hukas Olam in Kol Sifrei Maharatz Chajes, vol. 1 p. 74), as does R. Hershel Schachter (Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon, ch. 2). With this approach, R. Schachter explains how certain laws - such as when a child becomes an adult and when the anniversary of a death falls out - can be affected by the name of the month (e.g. whether it happens in the first Adar or the second). There must have been an oral tradition about this matter that the prophet recorded and upon which the returnees acted.

Additionally, a careful reading of the Sefer Ha-Ikkarim reveals that R. Yosef Albo, in 3:19, also proposes this answer:

That Israel listened to Jeremiah to nullify the count of the months, as we said, it is possible that they did this because they found a verse and expounded upon it, as Tosafos wrote in the beginning of Megillah... and their intention was not to nullify the words of Moses but to make a memorial to the second redemption like they did to the first, for they had received a tradition that it was proper to make for it a remembrance as long as they do not uproot the Exodus from Egypt from its place.

(B"n more to come)

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