Sunday, October 31, 2004

Triumph of a Leniency

7:31 AM Gil Student

My synagogue rents a room in a local yeshiva (elementary school), right near the building's catering hall. This week there was a bar mitzvah in the catering hall. On Thursday night, the father of the bar mitzvah called up my rabbi asking for help. It seems that his father, the grandfather of the bar mitzvah boy, has great difficulty walking and usually uses a wheelchair. He wanted to be able to have the Gentile helper who pushes his wheelchair to also open and push the buttons on the elevator so the elderly man would not have to walk down all of the stairs to the bar mitzvah. However, the yeshiva was refusing to allow them permission to use the elevator on Shabbos. Could my rabbi get involved?

My rabbi said that the old man has the status of a sick individual and, therefore, a Gentile may perform any labor on his behalf including running the elevator. So he called up the yeshiva's administrator and discussed the issue with him. No luck. The yeshiva's posek had told them not to allow it. Who is the posek, so my rabbi could speak with him? The administrator did not want to say. But it was easy to figure out. So my rabbi called up this posek, who is by all accounts world-renowned, extremely capable and generally strict.

The posek agreeed that it was permissible but said that the yeshiva wished to set its own policy and he saw nothing wrong with a policy that never allowed the use of the elevators. My rabbi boldly argued with this posek that if halakhah permits the use of the elevators then you cannot prevent this grandfather from attending his grandson's bar mitzvah. The posek agreed, called up the administrator, and the policy was changed.

The posek concluded the discussion with a joke. The community leaders of Bnei Brak wished to institute a policy that contained a leniency in it but the laity were protesting. The leaders then stopped their plans because ein gozerin kullah al ha-tzibbur she-ein rov ha-tzibbur yekholin la'amod bah. (sorry, it gets lost in the translation)

My rabbi ended his speech by saying that, being part of the same community, we can criticize each other without being vicious or mean-spirited. Outsiders, however, have another tone and intent when they voice the same criticisms.

UPDATE: I should add that this rabbi is not Modern Orthodox by any account. His ordination is from none other than the Beth Medrash Govoha of Lakewood.


Friday, October 29, 2004

Praying for the Right Thing

1:23 PM Gil Student

R. Mayer Twersky preaches against praying for or desiring the death of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
Recently, there have been reports in the press of individuals wishing for the death of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. By no means am I assuming the veracity of such reports. (Moreover, even these reports attribute such malevolent wishes to an isolated few.) Thus I am commenting on the issue, not on any specific persons or alleged remarks. Harboring such violent wishes is absolutely antithetical to Torah. Avraham Avinu had no sympathy for the perversions practiced by the people of S'dom. He abhorred the torture to which the young girl who had extended hospitality to a guest was subjected. Nonetheless, Avraham Avinu attempted to intercede to save the people of S’dom. He wished for their rehabilitation, not their destruction.
Voices of reason like this are very necessary in today's climate. Note also his healthy skepticism of media reports.

(See also this related RCA statement, thanks to Man from Mars for reminding me of it)


Candy on Halloween II

9:42 AM Gil Student

Reader Chana Luntz sent me the following in an e-mail (posted with permission). My original post will be italicized. Her comments will be indented, mine not.

When I first saw this, many years ago, I pointed out to R. Broyde that according to Tosafos in Avodah Zarah (26a), eivah only allows one to violate a rabbinic prohibition and not a biblical prohibition - and that is how later posekim rule.

I realise that this is a complex issue being summarised in a few sentences, but is that really the case - how about allowing non Jews to take leckcha shifcha and peah (or are you distinguishing here between eivah and darchei shalom)?
That is an entirely separate issue. In that and similar cases, Hazal are not permitting one to actively violate a biblical prohibition. In that specific case, Hazal did not require one to chase away Gentiles who wished to collect leket, etc. But they certainly did not permit one to violate a biblical prohibition be-yadayim.

Only eivah that entails real danger to human life can allow one to violate a biblical prohibition.

This is presumably meant to bring in all the cases of doctors being mechallel shabbas, but is the distinction as clear cut as you have made it, not to mention that it is somewhat ambiguous whose human life you are referring to here.
You are correct that the danger is somewhat vague and undefined. However, the posekim who permit such violations do so because despite that vagueness they believe that there is a real piku'ah nefesh issue involved. If one believes that the same is involved with Halloween, then one should absolutely permit giving out candy. I do not believe that to be the case.

On the main issue under discussion, ie Halloween, please note that as I live in England and grew up in Australia this is not halacha l'ma'ase for me, because people don't generally trick or treat in either place, nor for that matter do we even have candy, as they are called sweets and biscuits here.
OK I made sure to post this so readers understand this.

On the other hand, my problem with the discussion whenever it comes up every year especially as we are frequently in the parsha is this:

If visitors had shown up on Avraham's doorstep looking for candy (by whatever name) do you think he would have turned them away?

That is, giving food to visitors is about as Jewish as one can get and turning them away seems about as unJewish as one can get.

It is one thing if the act in question is one with dubious origins. But giving candy to visitors is hachnasos orchim, and I sruggle to see how the pagan origins of tricking or treating (ie the reason these people happen to turn up at one's door) operate overrule the obligations of hachnasos orchim (if the goyim that Avraham entertained happened to be travelling in the desert due to some pagan festival, as is more than likely, are you saying he would not have invited them in?)
This is a very important argument. If I may rephrase it, even Tosafos, the strictest rishon on this issue, allow one to perform a Gentile practice if it is mentioned in Scripture. Is the Halloween practice really the same as Avraham's, which would make it kesivah be-Oraisa and therefore permissible? No.

1. I suspect that Avraham would have insisted that these children take off their costumes (i.e. wash their feet of idolatrous dirt) and thank God for the candy before eating it.

2. This is simply not hakhnasas orehim. That mitzvah is when one invites guests to stay in one's home or people who are guests elsewhere to eat a meal in one's home (see Terumas Ha-Deshen, part 1 no. 72; Rema, Orah Hayim 333:1 and commentators). Giving nosh to neighborhood kids is not any mitzvah of which I know. Hessed? Not really; these aren't kids in need. Tzedakah? Certainly not; these children are not poor.

So this is not kesivah be-Oraisa nor is it the fulfillment of any other explicit or implicit mitzvah.

I can however see the merit in making it clear to one's guests what we do and don't keep (as Avraham did in asking his visitors to bless HaShem) - eg stating (as you give the candy) something like "Jews don't celebrate Halloween, but we are happy to give candy to visitors whatever the day".
Is that true? Do you keep candy near your door every day for when the neighborhood kids come by asking for it? Once you make such a statement, you'd better. Because the kids will come. Every day.

UPDATE: Keep in mind that there are still other reasons to be lenient, as explained in my previous post on this subject.


Thursday, October 28, 2004

Thought vs. Philosophy

9:27 AM Gil Student

Jewish scholarship has had many great thinkers throughout the ages, many of whom have pondered and explored the standard existential and metaphysical questions of philosophy. Would it be correct to refer to them as philosophers? For example, was R. Eliyahu Dessler a Jewish philosopher or merely a Jewish thinker? (For those wondering, I have no serious answer to the question of why anyone should care other than whether one can include R. Dessler in a curriculum of philosophy.)

The answer, of course, lies in how one defines philosophy. The very first sentence of Heidegger's essay "The End of Philosophy" is: "Philosophy is metaphysics." Such a narrow definition is then used to for the author's purpose of limiting philosophy. This, in my opinion, is silly. Philosophy literally means "the love of wisdom" and until the modern era included such subjects as mathematics, economics and all of the sciences. The question, though, is what philosophy means in the modern era and, I think, metaphysics is too narrow a definition.

I would say that philosophy is the examination of the world within the Western philosophical tradition. In other words, R. Dessler could have been a Jewish philosopher without changing his worldview one iota had he subjected his thought to analysis of prior philosophers and attempted to show similarities and differences, or at least precedents. However, thinking in a vacuum, or at least outside of the Western philosophical tradition, while valuable in itself, is not philosophy. In other words, in order to philosophize you have to be a part of the world of philosophy.

I found an essay by Emil Fackenheim in his book Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy in which he says something similar. In a tribute to Pinchas Peli, Fackenheim writes "Generally, I would define a Jewish philosopher (as distinct from a Jewish thinker) as one... who exposes his Jewish commitments to general philosophy, and the latter to his Jewish commitments" (p. 107). While I see in that statement a bit of an inclination towards modifying one's worldview based on general philosophy, something of which I do not approve, I think the general idea is correct.

You cannot claim to be a philosopher if you ignore every other philosopher in history. Lots of people arrive at creative and independent ideas. However, the evaluation of those ideas, the description of them and how they relate to ideas of the past, is philosophy. Merely setting forth a worldview is thought but not philosophy.

(Note that I fully acknowledge the bias towards Western Christian-Roman-Greek culture.)


Wednesday, October 27, 2004

Comments on the New Commentator

10:28 AM Gil Student

A new issue has been released of the Yeshiva College undergraduate newspaper The Commentator. Allow me to highlight a few articles and make a few comments. (Do not assume that I did not enjoy the articles I omit here.)

1. You saw it here first, folks.

2. Berakhah ve-Hatzlakhah. You're going to need it.

3. From the editor: An Evil Empire:
Even the most high-brow of Jewish blogs - whose bloggers offer self-righteous meanderings and other mind-blowing insights into modern Judaism - are part of the sensationalistic blog culture.
I think I should be offended.

4. From R. Mayer Schiller: His Association with Modern Orthodoxy and YU. Good comments about the "shift to the right." Also, he mentions something that I thought I was the only one to notice - the acceptance within the Religious Zionist camp of secular Jewish (i.e. Jabotinsky-style) ideals. The best, though, is his penultimate paragraph:
Yes, the YU radical left ideologues (not too many of these, though!) may slip into pluralist notions that reject truth itself and our right seems to lack a bit of understanding and love for all -- not to equate these two errors! - but it is here, within minarets and futurist cubes, that so much of the drama of contemporary Torah faith is grasped, lived and presented to Jewry and mankind.
5. Tributes to the inestimable R. Shlomo Drillman and the indefatigable Prof. Louis Feldman.

6. The Chancellor, R. Dr. Norman Lamm, makes probably the wisest statement of the YUdaica series, in a speech delivered 25 years ago:
At this time of jubilee reunion, instead of being satisfied with reviewing the past and indulging in self-gratulation over what we have accomplished in American and world Jewry and in the community-at-large, it is more constructive for us to turn to the future and speak about what we are planning for the years to come.


Tuesday, October 26, 2004

Jewish Calendar Seminar

5:20 PM Gil Student

There are two types of people in the world - those who find the details of the intercalation of the Jewish calendar to be an extremely arcane and dull subject and those who delight in its intricacies. For the latter group, I report the following (note the refreshments):
=======================
Jewish Calendar Seminar
=======================

The first meeting of the seminar this year will take place, IYH,

(when) Wednesday, 19 Marcheshvan (Nov. 3), at 4:00 pm
(preceded by refreshments at 3:45 pm)

(where) Room 331 (Math Dept Seminar Room),
Math and CS Building, Bar-Ilan University

Eng. Yaaqov Loewinger
(Tel-Aviv)

will talk about

"The 8th in the 19-year cycle of the Hebrew calendar:
another look at "Al ha-Sheminit'"


Note: This talk, as most others in this seminar, will be held in Hebrew.
Talks are held once every two weeks.

Abstract:
---------
On Rosh ha-Shana 5765 we entered the 8th year of the 304th 19-year cycle of the Hebrew calendar. It is well-known that the intercalation of this year (and of some other years as well) poses some serious calendric problems: it seems this intercalation is not necessary in order to achieve the main objective of the Hebrew calendar, namely to cause the relevant days of Pesah 5765 to fall after the Vernal Equinox.

In the year 5746 (1986 CE), the 8th year of the previous cycle, we investigated this problem in a special booklet called "Al ha-Sheminit". We analyzed there also the essence of the intercalation rule of our calendar, established its sources and drew conclusions regarding the possible date of its establishment. We formulated there also the Basic Rule of the Hebrew Calendar and its mathematical build-up. This enabled us to fix some simple mathematical formulae for the necessary calendar calculations, especially fitted for calculator and computer usage.

In our talk we will review the essence of the above booklet, and point to some principles which were severely criticized by some important calendar authorities, and need to be revised or at least re-formulated.


Candy on Halloween

11:42 AM Gil Student

The question arises every year whether one's children may collect candy on Halloween and whether one may dispense candy to other children, whether Jewish or not, who come to your house collecting. R. Michael J. Broyde presents the following analysis:
[T]he question about Halloween is whether Jewish law allows one to celebrate an event that has pagan origins, where the pagan origins are still known and celebrated by a very few, but not by the vast majority of people who engage in this activity...

Rabbenu Nissim (Ran) and Maharik disagree and rule that only customs that have a basis in idolatrous practices are prohibited. Apparently foolish -- but secular -- customs are permissible so long as they have a reasonable explanation (and are not immodest). Normative halacha follows the ruling of the Ran and Maharik. As noted by Rama:
Those practices done as a [Gentile] custom or law with no reason one suspects that it is an idolatrous practice or that there is a taint of idolatrous origins; however, those customs which are practiced for a reason, such as the physician who wears a special garment to identify him as a doctor, can be done; the same is true for any custom done out of honor or any other reason is permissible.
Rabbi Isserless is thus clearly prohibiting observing customs that have pagan origins, or even which might have pagan origins. His opinion, the most lenient found in normative halacha, is the one we follow.

Of course, independent of the halachic obligation to avoid Gentile religious customs, Jewish law forbids a Jew from actually celebrating idolatrous religious events himself.

Based on this, in order to justify candy collection on halloween, one would have to accepts the truthfulness of any of the following assertions:

1] Halloween celebrations have a secular origin.

2] The conduct of the individuals "celebrating Halloween" can be rationally explained independent of Halloween.

3] The pagan origins of Halloween or the Catholic response to it are so deeply hidden that they have disappeared, and the celebrations can be attributed to some secular source or reason.

4] The activities memorialized by Halloween are actually consistent with the Jewish tradition.

I believe that none of these statements are true.

Conclusions

Applying these halachic rules to Halloween leads to the conclusion that participation in Halloween celebrations -- which is what collecting candy is when one is wearing a costume -- is prohibited. Halloween, since it has its origins in a pagan practice, and lacks any overt rationale reason for its celebration other than its pagan origins or the Catholic response to it, is governed by the statement of Rabbi Isserless that such conduct is prohibited as its origins taint it. One should not send one's children out to trick or treat on Halloween, or otherwise celebrate the holiday.

The question of whether one can give out candy to people who come to the door is a different one, as there are significant reasons based on darchai shalom (the ways of peace), eva (the creation of unneeded hatred towards the Jewish people) and other secondary rationales that allow one to distribute candy to people who will be insulted or angry if no candy is given. This is even more so true when the community -- Jewish and Gentile -- are unaware of the halachic problems associated with the conduct, and the common practice even within many Jewish communities is to "celebrate" the holiday. Thus, one may give candy to children who come to one's house to "trick or treat" if one feels that this is necessary.
When I first saw this, many years ago, I pointed out to R. Broyde that according to Tosafos in Avodah Zarah (26a), eivah only allows one to violate a rabbinic prohibition and not a biblical prohibition - and that is how later posekim rule. Only eivah that entails real danger to human life can allow one to violate a biblical prohibition. Therefore, eivah cannot permit the following of a practice that has idolatrous origins. I believe his response was that the prohibition in this case is of rabbinic origin, but I no longer have the correspondence with his explanation.

I'll add that when I discussed this matter with R. Mordechai Marcus - an adam gadol in Brooklyn, he thought that #3 above is true, that "[t]he pagan origins of Halloween or the Catholic response to it are so deeply hidden that they have disappeared." This would, presumably, allow one to actually collect candy and not only to give it out. Not that I would recommend it.


Monday, October 25, 2004

Sarah, Wombs, Hazal and Science

9:50 AM Gil Student

The Torah tells us about Sarah (Bereishis 11:30) "Vatehi Sarah akarah,
ein lah valad - Now Sarai was barren, she had no child." The Gemara in Yevamos 64a-b learns from this verse that not only did Sarah not give birth, she did not have a "beis velad" (uterus) at all.

Bereishis Rabbah 53:5 and 63:5 says that Sarah did not have "ikar mitrin."

This all seems to imply that Sarah did not have a uterus. But if that is the case, how could she have menstruated? Aside from the midrashim that she menstruated (e.g. Bava Metzia 87a), the Torah tells us (Bereishis 18:11) that Sarah had stopped menstruating due to her advanced age, clearly implying that when she was younger she had menstruated. (Cf. Rashi, Bereishis 18:8 that Sarah miraculously regained her menses.) Is this a midrash that contradicts science as we now understand it or can the two be somehow resolved?

R. Yitzhak Weiss (Minhas Yitzhak 1:125:6-7) says that we cannot bring a proof le-halakhah from Sarah because this midrash contradicts the physical reality as we know it. He then suggests that perhaps part but not all of Sarah's uterus was damaged.

R. Ovadia Yosef in Yabia Omer vol. 3, Even Ha-Ezer 4:1 says about Sarah, "Therefore the text had to tell us that she did not have a 'beis velad' - she did not have a 'beis velad' at all." This is in implicit disagreement with the Minhas Yitzhak.

Dr. Shaul Weinreb has suggested that "she did not have a uterus" is not meant literally but that she did not have a functioning uterus.

Dr. Eddie Reichman suggested that these midrashim disagree with each other. This does not, however, explain how the midrash seems to contradict an explicit verse.

Dr. Josh Backon suggested that Sarah lacked eggs but had a uterus.

My rabbi, this past Shabbos, suggested that the midrash did not mean that Sarah literally had no uterus. It only meant that in shamayim it was decreed that she be incapable of giving birth.


Sunday, October 24, 2004

New York Water VI

10:22 AM Gil Student

Several readers have e-mailed me, requesting that I post a link to R. Dr. David Berger's article in The Jewish Press on the NYC water issue. Even though I am generally a huge fan of Dr. Berger's, I don't see anything new or particularly profound in this article. I do not understand how anyone can think that R. David Feinstein did not consider these matters before ruling strictly. He knows what he, his father and the gedolei Torah around whom he has lived his whole life have drunk in the past.
The real point, I think, is that from the time of mattan Torah until the invention of the microscope it was impossible to know that these organisms existed, and the notion that God would have forbidden something that no one could know about for thousands of years, thus causing wholesale, unavoidable violation of the Torah, offends our deepest instincts about the character of the both the Law and its Author.
This is a significant point, but one that insists that certain new information is inadmissible in halakhic decision-making, i.e. an anti-progressive view. I know that many reject this approach and believe in progressive halakhah that embraces modern discoveries and technology.

(As to the point that God would make sure that the righteous do not eat/drink something prohibited, perhaps the Almighty ensured that the water that R. Moshe Feinstein drank contained no copepods. A mystical question deserves a mystical answer.)

UPDATE: Dr. Melech Press adds:
I have not read David Berger's article, but if you have quoted him correctly he is simply mistaken about the facts. The copepods under discussion are visible to the naked eye, whether as moving specks while alive or, at times, as large enough to be visible even when dead. No one is discussing creatures who are invisible except when seen under a microscope. It should also be noted that those who are trained to look can find visible copepods in Brooklyn water.
I'll add that my rabbi, the one who is lenient, has tested his own water and consistently found copepods with his naked eye and without looking too hard.


Let me reiterate that I freely drink the water here in Brooklyn without filtering. My rabbi is convinced that the water is permissible on a number of grounds, and a renowned talmid hakham with whom I recently spoke agreed (but has no interest in making public statements).


Taxis after Shabbos

9:16 AM Gil Student

I distinctly remember as a teenager borrowing a sefer one Shabbos in shul from a friend who was always carrying around aharonim. Probably the first time I ever looked in a book of responsa, I came across the following issue. I stumbled upon it this Shabbos while looking for something else, and it brought back memories.

Here is the question: Can an observant Jew utilize the services of a non-observant Jew who has not ended Shabbos by reciting either the full havdalah or even the short blessing of "ha-mavdil bein kodesh le-hol"? If a Jew has not ceremonially ended Shabbos, then he may not do any work. If so, an observant Jew may not ask him to do work. Therefore, may an observant Jew use a taxi on Saturday night? This is not only relevant in Israel, but also in Brooklyn and Queens where many car service drivers are Israeli or Russian.

The Tzitz Eliezer (11:34) demonstrates that the prohibition against work before reciting havdalah is not a rabbinic extension of Shabbos but an extension of havdalah. Just like one may not eat before praying in the morning, one may not perform labor before reciting havdalah. Therefore, argues the Tzitz Eliezer, someone who is non-observant and will not pray at all is certainly not prohibited from eating. The prohibition only applies to someone who plans on praying. Similarly, the prohibition against doing work after Shabbos is over but before havdalah only applies to someone who will eventually recite havdalah. It does not apply to someone who will not.

R. Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvos Ve-Hanhagos, 2:161) writes similarly in the name of the Brisker Rav but also points out that the Vilna Gaon would disagree. Since, as indicated on the cover page of ever book of his, he is a descendant (nin ve-nekhed) of the Vilna Gaon, he feels obligated to pursue a line of reasoning that is consistent with this great sage's approach. He suggests that the prohibition is not like Shabbos, in which every act of forbidden work is an additional sin, but rather that once one performs labor before havdalah each additional act does not add to the violation. Therefore, since non-observant Jews have certainly already performed work after Shabbos but before havdalah, asking them to do more is not adding to their violation and is permissible.


Thursday, October 21, 2004

Tzadik Ba La-Ir

1:32 PM Gil Student

I was speaking yesterday with a renowkned talmid hakham about the Hasidization of Flatbush. In my opinion, it is more an issue of changing neighborhoods than of religious influence.

As further evidence, I just saw signs that the Vizhnitzer Rebbe will be spending this Shabbos in Flatbush. Yes, Flatbush and not Boro Park. And not just any rebbe but one of the most influential in the world.

The Tish is scheduled for 9:15 pm at Toras Emes (Ave. N & E. 19th). I may or may not be there. I'll be the guy in the dark suit and black hat.


Baseball

1:30 PM Gil Student

Let me be clear that I have zero interest in sports. Even among the various sports, I find baseball to be one of the least interesting.

However, Soloveitchik trivia is a different story. According to Dr. Jeffrey Woolf, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik was a Red Sox fan.


Spitting on Priests

9:42 AM Gil Student

Don't do it

1. It need not be said that a refined human being does not spit at inanimate objects or at animals, and certainly not at people created in the image of God. Spitting is not the sign of a ba'al mussar.

2. Darkhei Shalom. We feed their poor, visit their sick, violate Shabbos to heal their sick. Of course we don't spit on them!

See, the Jew-haters have already picked up on this story.


Shemini Atzeres

9:24 AM Gil Student

A little late, but... The author of the Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 668:1) and the Rama disagree on how to refer to the holiday of Shemini Atzeres in the prayers and kiddush. According to the Shulhan Arukh, one should say "Yom Shemini Hag Ha-Atzeres" and according to the Rama, "Yom Shemini Atzeras Ha-Hag." The custom of the Gra (Ma'aseh Rav, 228) is to follow the Shulhan Arukh on this.

R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky (Emes Le-Ya'akov on Shulhan Arukh, ad loc., OH 299:10) ties this in with two other disagreements between the Shulhan Arukh and the Rama, through which one can see that the Gra is also consistent.

The Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh De'ah 328:1) rules that on removing the hallah portion from dough one should recite the blessing "le-hafrish terumah" while the Rama rules that one should say "le-hafrish hallah." The Gra (ad loc. 1) explains that, according to the Shulhan Arukh, one blessings are generally recited in Biblical Hebrew and in that language, as the Mishnaic hallah is called terumah. The Rama, on the other hand, holds that blessings should use Mishnaic/Rabbinic Hebrew rather than Biblical Hebrew. The Gra agrees with the Shulhan Arukh that Biblical Hebrew is to be preferred.

That same reasoning, suggest R. Kamenetsky, is the basis of the disagreement regarding Shemini Atzeres. In the Bible, the holiday is only called "Yom Shemini" while in rabbinic terminology it became called Shemini Atzeres. Therefore, the Shulhan Arukh and the Gra re consistent in using Biblical Hebrew, and the Rama in using Rabbinic Hebrew.

The Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 299:10) rules that one should say "ha-mavdil bein ha-kodesh u-vein ha-hol" while the Rama rules that one should say "ha-mavdil bein kodesh la-hol." The Shulhan Arukh seems to be preferring the Biblical phraseology (Vayikra 10:10) and the Rama the Rabbinic language. (R. Kamenetsky explains exactly which grammatical principles are at play here, but I doubt many people are interested.)


Wednesday, October 20, 2004

Learning vs. Knowing

10:15 AM Gil Student

I. Introduction

I remember a number of years ago that R. Norman Lamm spoke at the RIETS hag ha-semikhah (ordination celebration) and urged the newly ordained rabbis to pursue careers in the pulpit. There was, he explained, a desperate need for qualified pulpit rabbis yet, despite this, he sees most new rabbis pursuing careers in education or communal organizations, leaving pulpits empty and congregants in need. Therefore, he encouraged his students to consider noble careers in the pulpit.

This speech was reported in a particular newspaper as R. Lamm discouraging rabbis from becoming educators, implicitly denigrating the importance of Jewish education. This was nothing short of a gross distortion of R. Lamm's sensible and praiseworthy speech.

I do not wish to make the same mistake. So let me start out by saying that, in the book Wisdom From All My Teachers: Challenges and Initiatives in Contemporary Torah Education (ATID, Urim: 2003), R. Lamm has an essay titled "Knowing vs. Learning: Which Takes Precedence?" in which he emphasizes the importance of the learning process rather than the accumulation of knowledge. I will briefly take the opposite side, pointing out the importance of accumulating knowledge, without implying that R. Lamm does not consider it important. He was writing for educators and, therefore, stressed that learning in itself is important. I only want to correct a possible misimpression some might acquire from reading that essay. Learning is important in itself. But acquiring a breadth of knowledge is also important.

II. Knowing the Oral Torah

Probably the most famous and important section of R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi's classic Shulhan Arukh Ha-Rav is the section on studying Torah. In chapter two of that section, he discusses the student who cannot remember everything that he learns, i.e. most people. They should focus on learning practical halakhah so they can function as observant Jews. Once they have mastered the halakhah that they need on a daily basis, they should set aside time to study other subjects as well. Which subjects? Based on kabbalah, R. Shneur Zalman writes (2:10) that in a person's lifetime he should learn at least once the entire Oral Torah - Mishnah, Tosefta, Gemara and Midrash Tanna'im & Amora'im. That is a big job and requires tremendous dedication.

III. Knowing All Of Halakhah

R. Yisrael Salanter (Or Yisrael, no. 27) divides the mitzvah of learning Torah into two parts: the learning process and the knowledge of Torah. For the former, one can spend all one's life on one page of Gemara. However, for the latter, one must master - actually remember - all of halakhah. About the former, it is written "ve-hagisa bo yomam va-lailah - you shall meditate on it day and night" (Yehoshua 1:8) and about the latter, it is written "ve-shinantam le-vanecha" about which the Gemara in Kiddushin (30a) comments "veshinantem - that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth and if someone asks you a question you do not hesitate but answer immediately." There is an actual obligation to master all of halakhah and have it at one's fingertips. (This is not done, according to R. Yisrael Salanter, by merely learning Shulhan Arukh. In order to know halakhah, one must learn it from the most basic sources and up.)

Of course, not everyone can accomplish this. About such people - certainly the majority - it is said: "It is not incumbent upon you to finish the task. Yet, you are not free to desist from it." (Avos 2:21).

IV. Mastering Torah First

In a different explanation than R. Yisrael Salanter's, but still relevant, is Radak's explanation to Yehoshua 1:8. After bringing the explanations of Hazal, Radak suggests a different one. One is obligated to spend day and night studying Torah until one fully masters it. After that, however, one is no longer obligated to spend day and night studying Torah and may dedicate some time to learning "Greek wisdom." Clearly, according to Radak's explanation one is obligated to master all of Torah.

My point: One must cover ground, learn practical halakhah and review, review, review. Of course, easier said than done.

(Note: Yeshivas have other considerations, such as teaching students the necessary learning skills and imbuing in them a love for Torah and a respect for its scholars.)


UPDATE: R. Lamm's speech that served as the basis for this article can be found here.


Tuesday, October 19, 2004

R. Shlomo Aviner: Soldiers, Do Not Disobey Orders

11:18 AM Gil Student

R. Shlomo Aviner ruled:
Former Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapira instructs his students who are soldiers not to fulfill orders to uproot Jews from their homes... Rabbi Shlomo Aviner of Beit El, another leading rabbi of the same sector, recently delivered the opposite ruling...

Refusing of orders by an Israeli soldier is a matter of national Pikuach Nefesh...

If today we refuse orders, tomorrow others will refuse to protect our homes and institutions!...

No soldier or group of soldiers can prevent the evacuation by refusing orders. They will simply be put in jail and someone else will do the evil deed. It is the State that is committing the sin, not the individuals. Those individuals who refuse will be left with the mortal sin of "weakening the hands of the military" without the benefit of having accomplished any Mitzva.
UPDATE:

From Wed. Oct. 20th Ha'aretz (thanks to Shmarya):
Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, the rabbi of Beit El and head of the Ateret Cohanim Yeshiva, yesterday said he continues to vehemently oppose military refusal and soldiers should not refuse orders to evacuate settlements.


Sanhedrin in Tiberias II

10:58 AM Gil Student

"In our time, after the establishment of the State of Israel, the question of renewing the Sanhedrin was raised by R. Yehudah L. Fishman-Maimon and the view of the giants of Torah in Israel and the exile is - for whatever reason - not to reintroduce semikhah [the original ordination required for a Sanhedrin]."
- R. Menahem M. Kasher, Torah Shelemah, vol. 15 p. 200

"It is clear in the Rambam - 'And all the laws return to as they were earlier' [Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Melakhim 11:1] - that he rescinded his words from his commentary on the Mishnah and is of the view that Mashiah must come before the Sanhedrin [is renewed]."
- R. Menahem M. Kasher, Ha-Tekufah Ha-Gedolah, vol. 1 p. 378


Sanhedrin in Tiberias

9:20 AM Gil Student

[Background: There is a current attempt to reestablish the Sanhedrin, the great court that carries many legislative and judicial powers in the Jewish religion.]

"I remember how [R. Joseph B Soloveitchik] concluded his eulogy for his uncle the Gri"z [R. Yitzhak Soloveitchik, the "Brisker Rav"] and said (in his very dramatic style of presentation) that we are living in an era of much ziyuf ha-Torah ["falsification of the Torah"], both external [of the religious community] and internal."
- R. Hershel Schachter, Nefesh Ha-Rav, p. 33.

"I heard that [R. Joseph B Soloveitchik] mentioned at that point how his uncle did not participate in controversy and demonstrations when there was an attempt to open mixed[-gender] swimming pools in Jerusalem that include violations of Shabbos, because those are specific sins. Only when they wanted to erect a Sanhedrin in the Heikhal Shlomo building -- on this he loudly protested in order to end the matter, because he saw in it a much greater matter; namely, ziyuf ha-Torah."
- R. Hershel Schachter, Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon, p. 23 n. 4


Monday, October 18, 2004

Hebrew Incunabula

5:44 PM Gil Student


Hats on Shabbos

9:28 AM Gil Student

I have seen and heard a number of times the question asked - always with an actual or implied malicious grin - whether one is allowed to wear a fedora hat on Shabbos. The issue is as follows:

The Gemara in Eruvin (102b) relates:
Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi said: "[Wearing] a felt hat [on Shabbos] is permissible." But is it not taught that it is prohibited? This is not difficult. This [teaching] is when it has a tefah and this [teaching] is when it does not have a tefah. If so, wearing a tallis on one's head that extends a tefah should be prohibited. This is not difficult. One is when it is tightly fastened [on one's head] and one is when it is not tightly fastened.
Rashi explains that the Gemara initially suggested that wearing a hat on Shabbos is potentially problematic because the brim creates a tent that protects one's face. By putting on the hat, one is creating a tent [in a rabbinically prohibited fashion]. However, the conclusion of the Gemara is that this is not creating a tend and the real reason for prohibiting the wearing of a hat on Shabbos is that it might be blown off and one would pick it up and carry it on Shabbos. Rabbenu Hananel, quoted by Tosafos, explains the Gemara as concluding that hats do create a tent. However, only when a hat is fastened tightly to one's head and the brim is very stiff does it look like a tent and is therefore prohibited.

The Shulhan Arukh (301:40) rules like Rabbenu Hananel that wearing a hat with a brim wider than a tefah (about 4 inches) is prohibited because it is a tent. However, in the next paragraph, the Shulhan Arukh adds Rashi's explanation as a "some say," implying that one should also be strict for Rashi's view and not wear a hat that is intended as shade unless it is tightly fastened to one's head, because the hat might be blown off.

Based on this, it seems fairly clear that one may not wear a fedora on Shabbos if the hat's brim is wider than a tefah. Does this seem to indicate that the entire "black hat" world is violating Shabbos every single week? Did, for example, the late Lubavitcher Rebbe violate Shabbos every week? Or R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik?

Before anyone asks this question, it might be appropriate for him to look in the commentaries on the Shulhan Arukh. Were he to do this, he would see that the question was raised some seven centuries ago and ably settled then. The Magen Avraham quotes authorities who rule that the only problem is if the brim is hard (unlike most Borsalinos, for example) and, even then, if the brim is tilted downwards then there is no problem. The Taz also points out that the problem only arises if the hat is worn in order to be a tent, i.e. to shade one's face. If not, then there is no problem at all.

These positions have been upheld by all the subsequent commentaries to Shulhan Arukh, continuing to recent times. See, for example, the Arukh Ha-Shulhan and the Mishnah Berurah. Notably, the Shulhan Arukh Ha-Rav, written by the first Lubavitcher Rebbe, also follows these rulings.

R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, in his Tzitz Eliezer (10:23), writes at length to answer this question and also points out that if such a large portion of the observant world, including great halakhists and talmudic scholars, follow a practice, then one should assume that it has solid basis and is not a violation of a prohibition.


Friday, October 15, 2004

Another RIETS Item

1:38 PM Gil Student

Got this in an e-mail:
Yeshiva University is pleased to announce its newest and most exciting community learning initiative - KOLLEL YOM RISHON!

Come and experience the Torah of Yeshiva every Sunday morning in YU's Main Beit Midrash! Every week features a short seder followed by 2 shiurim from YU roshei yeshiva. The Kollel Yom Rishon Program is open to men of all ages, backgrounds and learning levels.

The Kollel Yom Rishon program will begin on Sunday, October 17 in YU's Zysman Hall Main Beit Midrash located at 2540 Amsterdam Avenue (between 186th - 187th). Davening at YU's Main Beit Midrash begins at 7:45 AM and at 8:10 AM in Morgenstern Hall (2525 Amsterdam Avenue). A light breakfast be served after davening (approximately 8:30) outside the Main Beit Midrash. The learning seder will begin promptly at 9 am, shiurim will begin at 9:40 am and the program will conclude at 11 am. Please feel free to come for part or all of the program. Free parking will also be available in Parking Lot E, located on Amsterdam Avenue opposite 183rd Street.

For more information, please email beitmidrash@yu.edu or 212.960.5265.

Sunday, October 17th will feature shiurim from Rav Hershel Schacter and Rav Meir Goldwicht. Topics TBA.

There is no need to register for the program - please just come and enjoy!
Finally, someone realized that the way to get alumni donations is to 1) maintain a connection with alumni so that they will be more receptive to solicitations and 2) become a presence in the Orthodox community so that the general community will feel a connection to the school. Kudos to the new regime for this.


RIETS in the News II

1:30 PM Gil Student

Now it's official:
Oct 15, 2004 -- Yeshiva University President Richard M. Joel today announced the appointment of Rabbi Kenneth Brander of Boca Raton, FL, as the inaugural dean of the Center for the Jewish Future, effective July 1, 2005.

The Yeshiva University Center for the Jewish Future (CJF) will serve as the nucleus and central focus of YU’s educational and human-capital efforts to impact the Jewish future. The CJF will work with the university’s colleges, schools, and affiliates to shape programs--within and without the institution--that will train Jewish lay and professional leadership, develop initiatives and strengthen existing ones, create interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary synergies, as well as deliver services to its students and the broader Jewish communities...


Ask the OU Online

11:15 AM Gil Student

The OU now has an online form through which you can ask questions that will be directed to the appropriate rabbis on the OU's staff. The webpage also includes a phone number, fax number and e-mail address. Knock yourselves out.


Torah Time

10:55 AM Gil Student

Does a full day start at the beginning of the night and continue until the next evening, or does it begin in the morning and continue until the end of the night? Any observant Jew (and his employer) knows that, according to the Torah, a day begins with the night. That is why Shabbos - and all days - begin at sundown/nightfall.

However, it is not clear that this was always the case. The question has been raised how the patriarchs could be described as following the entire Torah, including observing the laws of Shabbos, if a gentile is not allowed to fully observe Shabbos. (Whether the patriarchs literally observed all of the commandments is irrelevant. How can they be described as doing so, when it is prohibited?) R. Pinchas Horowitz, the famous author of the Hafla'ah and other works, explains in his Panim Yafos that for all those to whom the Torah was not given, the day begins in the morning and continues with the night. After all, as R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky (Emes Le-Ya'akov, Bereishis 8:22) adds, Adam was created during the day and started counting his days beginning with the daytime. So, the natural day begins with the daytime and continues through the night. However, when the Torah was given, it defined a day as beginning with the nighttime.

Thus, to the patriarchs, whom had not received the Torah, Shabbos began Saturday morning and concluded Saturday night. Thus, they could observe the Jewish Shabbos which, according to the Torah, begins on Friday night while still not keeping the pre-Torah Shabbos, which concludes at the end of Saturday night. As long as they performed "work" on Saturday night, they were within their rights. (Note that R. Akiva Eiger disagrees with R. Horowitz. See R. J. David Bleich's article in Tradition 25:3, pp. 54-55. I'm pretty sure that this was reprinted in Contemporary Halakhic Problems vol. 4.)

So, according to these authorities, there are two types of days - natural days and Torah days. Natural days begin with the morning while Torah days begin with the night. Until the Torah was given, the whole world observed natural days. After the Torah was given, the Jews oberved Torah days.

A hint to this is found in the verse "Day and night shall not cease" (Bereishis 8:22) which lists day before night.

However, the Pardes Yosef (ad loc.) quotes others who raise the following question: In the Creation narrative, the Torah consistently uses the phrase "va-yehi erev va-yehi boker - and it was evening and it was morning." Clearly, night came before day from the time of Creation, and not just from the giving of the Torah.

I think there are 3 possible answers to this:
1. The Creation was done with the Torah in mind and was referring to Torah-days (Pardes Yosef).
2. Adam was not aware of this verse. No one was until the Torah was given, which was when the transition took place (R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky).
3. Even though there are talmudic passages that understand this as meaning that night comes first, it is possible that those are only asmakhtos and the peshat of the verse really means the exact opposite. As the Rashbam explains, erev means the time right before night which is actually day. Thus, consistent with the natural days, daytime comes before nighttime.

According to all of these explanations, there was a transition from natural time to Torah time with the giving of the Torah. As we shall see at a future time, there is another example of this.


Local and Israeli Poor

10:47 AM Gil Student

R. Daniel Z. Feldman pointed out that a recent post contains an error. It claims that charity to the poor in Israel takes precedence over charity to local poor. That is actually an issue that is hotly debated.

Here is what he graciously sent me:
In the view of many major authorities, the aniyei irkha take precedence over the poor of Israel, when there is a question between the two. (See Bach 251, s.v. aniyei, who considers this "obvious", and Shach, 251:6. See also Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 251:1, who cites the Maharash Chiyun as viewing the Bach's "obvious" point as "possible"). The Chatam Sofer (Responsa Vol 6 [Likkutei Teshuvot], 27) explains this position consistent with that stated above, that aniyei irkha is premised on the significance granted to proximity, a factor not affected by the importance of the land of Israel. The Sefat Emet (Chiddushim to Yoreh Deah) observes that the Tur omits any reference to the prioritizing of the poor of Israel, perhaps assuming the concept was relevant only in the time of the Temple. He further states that the Shulchan Aruch, who does acknowledge the priority, was doing so only in reference to money that was going elsewhere in any event; aniyei irkha, though, would retain their priority.

However, some disagreed, positing that the priority of aniyei irkha was assuming residence in Israel, and since supporting those in Israel is simultaneously charity and a fulfillment of settling the land, this duality gives an edge to the poor of that land. (see P’at HaShulchan, Hilkhot Eretz Yisrael 2:22 in Beit Yisrael, 29). The Chida (Resp. Yosef Ometz, 19) agrees, emphasizing the dire conditions prevalent in the land of Israel in his day as tilting the equation. R. Zevulun Charlop has suggested another factor that may, in modern times divert emphasis away from aniyei irkha in favor of aniyei Eretz Yisrael. The increasing development of the "global village", has, through technological advances, both diluted the significance of those in immediate geographic proximity while enhancing the connection of faraway donors to those living in Israel. R. Shmuel Wosner (Resp. Shevet haLevi V,135:2) rules that aniyei irkha maintain their preference, in that the importance of aniyei irkha is enough to overcome even the combining of charity with other values. (See similarly R. Shraga Feivel Schnelbag, Resp. Shraga HaMeir IV, 64:3. See also R. Betzalel Stern, Resp. B'Tzel HaChokhmah IV, 162, who cites many opinions on both sides of the debate).


Thursday, October 14, 2004

Election '04

3:20 PM Gil Student

I saw the debate between Kerry and Bush last night, the only debate that was not on Yom Tov. I concluded two things:

1. Kerry really does look like a horse.
2. Both candidates have good points and major flaws.

I hate it when people try to tell me that the Torah requires me to vote one way or another. The world is too complex for simple statements like that. If I seriously believe that Kerry will do a better job in Iraq, thereby saving hundreds if not thousands of lives, shouldn't that take precedence over his stance on abortion? Or maybe not. Maybe Bush's stance on Israel will end up saving more Jewish lives than Kerry's stance (does he have one?). And whose economic plan is better, which will have a huge impact on poverty not to mention my and my childrens' economic well-being? Call me a post-modernist, but I firmly believe that there is no one right answer to the question of for whom a Torah-observant individual must vote.

Here is an excerpt from a letter that will appear in the next issue of The Torah U-Madda Journal (printed with permission):
[E]ven with a revealed religion, we still have significant moral ambiguities. When we transfer this to the political arena, the complexities multiply even more. I remember the debates in YU when Bill Clinton was running against George Bush Sr. Some were arguing that Clinton was better for Israel so we must vote for him (yes, that was the argument) while one rosh yeshivah announced to his shiur that religious Jews must vote for Bush because his economic policies were more sound and aniyyei irekha come first (which is incorrect, because aniyyei Erez Yisrael come first; but that is beside the point). I also remember discussing these issues with one rosh yeshivah for whom I have the highest regard. We conversed about whether a vote for Clinton was a vote in favor of abortion, and he dismissed the entire discussion. The issues are so complex, and there are so many of them, that no simple formula will suffice.


RIETS in the News

1:44 PM Gil Student

The Town Crier found this in the Boca Raton News:
Rabbi Brander has accepted the vice president position of Yeshiva University in New York City.
Not big news for anyone even remotely in the loop, but still no official word from YU. I guess this means goodbye.


Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Kosher Slurpees

9:15 PM Gil Student

Everything you've ever wanted to know about the kosher status of Slurpees, via the cRc (Chicago Rabbinical Council).

I don't think I have ever in my life had a Slurpee. But I hear they are good.


Car Mezuzah

1:33 PM Gil Student

There is a relatively new religious object being sold today called a "Car Mezuzah." Very simply, it is a mezuzah that is specially designed to be placed in a car. Of course, the obligation to hang a mezuzah is only in a house. However, the question remains whether there is any sort of mitzvah fulfillment, or even protection from danger, by hanging a mezuzah in a car.

The Mishnah (Kelim 17:16) refers to a walking stick that has a compartment for a mezuzah. The Tosefos Yom Tov explains that "In the time of the Mishnah, there were people who would carry a mezuzah with them and thought that it is a mitzvah and a protection for them." About such people, the Mishnah is clear that there is an element of trickery involved in this walking stick, perhaps because such a person would trick others into believing that he was divinely protected by the mezuzah when, in fact, he was not because the mezuzah was not in a house.

On this explanation of the Tosefos Yom Tov, the Hiddushei Anshei Shem writes: "If there were such people, they were stupid." Rather, he explains, it is referring to the practice mentioned in Menahos (32b) of carrying a mezuzah on a stick to place on inn rooms which, technically, are not obligated in mezuzah because they are temporary residencies. The portable mezuzahs served as "a remembrance of the mitzvah" and nothing else.

It is hard to see how a Car Mezuzah serves as a remembrance of the mitzvah because cars are never obligated in mezuzahs. It seems much more comparable to the case of a portable mezuzah which, it seems clear, serves no purpose at all.

R. Moshe Feinstein, however, disagrees. In a responsum (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah vol. 2 no. 141) addresses a mezuzah on a necklace. Is this degrading to the mezuzah or, to the contrary, is it a meaningful practice? For starters, he proves from the above Tosefos Yom Tov that there is certainly no prohibition in carrying a mezuzah around. Even if it is stupid as per the Hiddushei Anshei Shem, with which R. Feinstein takes issue, it is certainly not prohibited. The same would seem to apply to a Car Mezuzah. R. Feinstein is not entirely clear whether there is a divine protection for those who use such a mezuzah, but the impression I get is that he believes that there is.

REVISED:

On the other hand, R. Shmuel Wosner (Responsa Shevet Ha-Levi, vol. 9 no. 221) accepts the position of the Hiddushei Anshei Shem and states that when there is no mitzvah there is no protection and, therefore, when there is not even a "remembrance of the mitzvah" there is no point in using a mezuzah at all. Thus, according to him, there is no benefit at all from a Car Mezuzah.


Looking For

9:40 AM Gil Student

If anyone maintains contact with R. Dr. David Sykes, who taught Bible in YU in the late 80s and early 90s, please e-mail me. I would like someone to relay a message to him on my behalf.

Thank you.


Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Humrah Society III

9:32 AM Gil Student

Not all modern humros (stringencies) are the same. Yes, there are people out there who look for every possible stringency. There are people out there who try to fulfill every halakhic view rather than merely following one. But some humros reflect a very different phenomenon and it is important to recognize that distinction.

We live in a world of burgeoning technology in which we have tools that were unheard of decades ago. When I was growing up, home computers were rare (although we had one). Who would have thought that computers could be programmed to accurately check Torah scrolls? But now they can. What do we do with that? What do we do with the information that the overwhelming majority of Torah scrolls are missing at least one crucial letter, thereby rendering them unfit for use? Do we ignore this information?

Some, whom I call "anti-progressive halakhists," don't like change and want to ignore this information. If Torah scrolls that were not checked by computers were good enough for my parents and grandparents then they are good enough for me. When "progressive halakhists," those who want to use all of the tools and information available, incorporate these into normative behavior they are labeled as mahmirim (strict ones) when, in my mind, they are doing the only reasonable thing. We now know, through modern technology, that the vast majority of Torah scrolls are unfit for use. Do we ignore this information out of some mystical/nostalgic confidence that our parents could not have done anything wrong or do we utilize all of the information that we have? I see no option but the latter. We now have tools that were previously unavailable and to ignore them is to be anti-progressive.

This is distinct from the checking with microscopes in vegetables for bugs or measuring the squareness of tefillin with ultra-precise tools, because in those cases we were never commanded to be that exact. But when it comes to using computers to avoid human error, the more tools the better. (See Responsa Shevet Ha-Levi, vol. 7 no. 2 on this; and vol. 8 no. 10 for the logical results of this conclusion regarding Torah scrolls.)

The same goes for the copepods in the water. If there is a real infestation problem, and all the scientific evidence indicates that there is, then we have to rule based on the information that we currently have. We cannot simply say that such-and-such rabbi drank it so it must be OK when it is clear that he did not have all of the information that we now have. There might be other reasons to be lenient, but those reasons must fully take into account all of the information that we now have.

I was trying to think of examples in which we use modern technology for leniencies. One is the ending of Shabbos. We can now calculate the exact time that Shabbos ends (each according to his view) and utilize atomic clocks to know the correct time within a second. Atomic clock technology is now so cheap that I have a fairly inexpensive watch that is set twice a day via radio waves to an atomic clock in Colorado. I know exactly when Shabbos is over. Of course, I can add on a few minutes to extend Shabbos, but I do not have to look outside at the sky like people had to do in olden times (or like we used to do in summer camp). That inevitably leads to a later end for Shabbos. (Please add more examples in the comments section.)

My point: Not every humrah is the same. Some are crazy; some are the result of being indecisive; and some are due to new technologies and information. It is a mistake to label "progressive halakhists" as mahmirim simply because they arrive at a different conclusion than was previously held. They have new information and technologies that informed their decision.


Monday, October 11, 2004

New York Water VI

3:29 PM Gil Student

I just listened to a 45-minute lecture by R. Mordechai Willig on this subject from a month ago (Sep. 9 '04). He draws no conclusions but makes it clear that this is a very serious question which he is not ready to answer. He also mentions that R. J. David Bleich is lenient.

If anyone knows whether R. Willig has reached a conclusion, please let me know either in the comments or via e-mail. Thank you.


Lomdus Reconsidered

10:04 AM Gil Student

The topic of lomdus - talmudic analytics - has received a good deal of attention in recent years. I know of three articles on the subject, although I am sure that there are more and, as usual, the discussion has vastly surpassed the written record.

Marc Shapiro wrote an article titled "The Brisker Method Reconsidered" (Tradition, 31:3 Spring 1997). In it, he noted the propensity of R. Hayim ("Brisker") Soloveitchik to explain disagreements rather than merely bring proofs to one side or the other. He also noted the Brisker emphasis on Maimonides' Mishneh Torah and the questionable attribution of complex analytical theories to Maimonides, occasionally in contradiction to Maimonides' explicit statements in responsa.

R. Moshe Lichtenstein wrote a critique of Brisker lomdus titled "'What' Hath Brisk Wrought: The Brisker Derekh Revisited" (The Torah U-Madda Journal, no. 9 2000). R. Lichtenstein brings a number of examples to demonstrate the sole concern of Briskers with the "what" of a question, contenting themselves with explaining the technical mechanics of halakhah while ignoring more fundamental questions of why the halakhah is such. He then proceeds to suggest directions in which Brisker lomdus can develop in order to include the concerns of the "why." R. Lichtenstein then notes the extensive Brisker emphasis on Maimonides and suggests returning to the Gemara and focusing on its text and debates.

R. Doniel Schreiber wrote a chapter titled "The Brisker Derekh Today: Are We Pursuing the 'Path' Envisioned by Reb Hayyim?" in the book Wisdom From All My Teachers. In addition to describing the Brisker approach, R. Schreiber offers several critiques of the method, many of them regarding implementation and teaching rather than of fundamental issues. I will skip many of those. R. Schreiber contends that the emphasis of brilliant innovations in theory tends to neglect the crucial area of character development. Similarly, the study of Torah can be turned into merely an intellectual exercise rather than a divine command. Furthermore, it can lead to a denigration of less theoretical study - such as beki'us (less analytical study to acquire breadth rather than depth) and practical halakhah. It can also lead to the neglect of works of great scholars who do not fit into the Brisker mold.

These are all interesting studies. However, they all seem to suffer from the same flaw, in that they focus solely on the "pure" Brisker approach and neglect the important developments of many of R. Hayim Soloveitchik's students. It seems like these authors were writing about "lomdus, as taught by my teachers in the schools I attended." Even Marc Shapiro, whose article was a review essay of a study of the Brisker methodology, neglected the approaches of R. Hayim's students that are discussed in the very book he was reviewing. This tunnel vision prevented these authors from seeing that many of their critiques had already been noticed and that methodologies have been developed to avoid these pitfalls. Thus, one would have expected a discussion of Telzer lomdus that addresses the "why" of halakhah or the Hafetz Hayim approach (from the yeshiva in Queens, not in Radin) that incorporates mussar directly into the struggle with texts. Additionally, the very free lomdus of Slabodka-Hevron-Lakewood, in which individual scholars develop their own unique approaches, might have already found solutions to all of these critiques.

It is true that the influence of "The Rav" (R. Hayim's grandson) in America and "The Brisker Rav" (R. Hayim's son) in Israel has made the "pure" Brisker approach very prevalent. However, lomdus is not limited to this methodology and those who find problems in the Brisker derekh would do well to investigate alternatives propounded in yeshivas outside of their direct experience.


Saturday, October 09, 2004

Lashon Ha-Ra about "Outsiders"

10:49 PM Gil Student

R. Binyamin Yehoshua Zilber (Responsa Az Nidberu, vol. 14 nos. 60,69) discusses whether one is prohibited from speaking lashon ha-ra (negative gossip) about gentiles and non-religious Jews. From a technical legal perspective, the prohibition only relates to those who "perform the acts of one's nation," i.e. observant Jews. However, R. Zilber (a haredi halakhist from Israel) writes that one may still not speak lashon ha-ra about such people because it can cause negative feelings and creates negative character traits within a person.


Wednesday, October 06, 2004

Death in Life

3:33 PM Gil Student

Franz Rosenzweig begins his The Star of Redemption by stating that death is an overshadowing concept that is so present in our consciousness that, paradoxically, death is part of life. This always struck me as very dated. Sure, during World War I, with war and disease on all sides and people dropping like flies, people were constantly scared of dying. But in today's world (at least in US), who thinks of dying? Between hygiene, medicine and the general comforts of life, death is not by any means an overshadowing concept.

R. Mayer Twersky suggests that it should be. That, he explains, is why the Torah ends with death - Moshe's death.
The Torah is underscoring a fundamental, indispensable perspective on life. We must live our lives with a keen awareness of our mortality. This perspective ought to be sobering and energizing, not depressing or paralyzing. Armed with this perspective, we are able to establish and maintain correct priorities. Since olam ha-zeh is simply a gateway to olam ha-ba ("olam ha-zeh resembles a corridor before olam ha-ba. Prepare yourself in the corridor so you can enter the banquet hall" Avos 4:17), it is the ultimate folly to pursue physical pleasures and material possessions. "Fear not when a man grows rich, when he increases the splendor of his house. For upon his death he will not take anything, his splendor will not descend after him" (Tehilim 49:17-8). By dint of nature and nurture, we always plan for the future. We prudently establish pension plans, invest in IRA's, etc. But the ultimate and eternal future is olam ha-ba. Are we equally prudent in prioritizing and planning for that future? We can only hope to answer the question affirmatively if we maintain a perspective of mortality.


Citation of Non-Orthodox Scholars III

1:25 PM Gil Student

The first modern discussion I found of this subject was by R. Shlomo Kluger (d. 1869) in a responsum regarding the permissibility of utilizing the German translation of the Torah by Moses Mendelssohn and its accompanying Bi'ur commentary (Responsa Ha-alef Lekha Shlomo, Yoreh De'ah 257). R. Kluger cites R. Yehezkel Landaud who states that the matter depends on each time and place. In the time of Aivu, it was necessary to punish his relatively minor transgression in order to prevent a weakening of the general religious fabric of the community. So, too, in R. Kluger's time, he claimed, it was necessary to avoid certain intellectual pursuits as well as Mendelssohn's German translation of the Torah because it threatened the religious community. To extrapolate a bit more, it would be wrong to cite heretical sources to those who might be tempted to study those sources further and question their own religious beliefs. But to those whom those sources pose no temptation, there is no problem with quoting them.

R. Hizkiyahu de Medini wrote/compiled a daunting encyclopedia of Jewish law titled Sedei Hemed. It is a classic work, even if it is only used by those who have mastered its idiosyncratic format. He corresponded with rabbis throughout the world, and frequently published their correspondence in his encyclopedia. One of these rabbis was R. Yosef Zechariah Stern, who wrote a letter do R. de Medini in which he quoted Moses Mendelssohn. To his surprise, this letter was published in Sedei Hemed, which led to his receiving many letters reprimanding him from citing such an impure source. In his defense, he composed a long letter which R. de Medini published in the addenda to Sedei Hemed (Sedei Hemed, Pe'as Ha-Sadeh, vol. 1 ma'arekhes ha-aleph no. 64). In this letter, R. Stern offers a broad defense of the study of heretical sources as well as their citation, frequently jumping from one topic to another. R. Stern argues that one is only prohibited from learning directly from a heretic but that one is permitted to learn from his writings (I believe the Maharal preceded him with this, but I cannot find the reference right now) because one is better to able to weigh a person's words objectively and not be swayed by his charisma or personal persuasiveness when the words are in writing. He also quotes the Divrei Yirmiyahu who rules similarly. The implication of all this, which he does not state explicitly, is that one may quote heretical sources in writing but not in speech.

[On the usage of Mendelssohn's translation and its accompanying Bi'ur, see most recently Aaron M. Schreiber, "The Hatam Sofer's Nuanced Attitude Towards Secular Learning, Maskilim, and Reformers" in The Torah U-Madda Journal, vol. 11 (2002-2003) pp. 140-140, 163-167).]

In the same era, R. Hayim Sofer, a student but not relative of R. Moshe Sofer (the Hasam Sofer), was asked whether one may quote a Torah insight that one happened to hear from or in the name of a heretic (Mahaneh Hayim, 3:11). He responded that at first he thought it would be permissible but because of the discussion of the Ramban, Rashba, etc. one may not quote the heretic. Rather, one should say that he heard it from or in the name of "someone" without stating the name, so as not to take credit for someone else's insight.

Much more recently, R. Moshe Stern addressed the pressing matter of whether a student may use books written by Zionists or someone associated with Yeshiva University (Responsa Be'er Moshe, 8:3). He concludes that one may not, based on the discussion of the Rashba, etc. and, additionally, because one may not learn Torah from - even from the writings of - a teacher who does not follow the proper path.

Clearly, there are different approaches among the later authorities. According to R. Yosef Zechariah Stern, one may learn and cite heretical sources in writing. According to R. Kluger, it depends on the place and time. It is unclear what R. Sofer holds about material in writing, but he rules based on the Ramban, etc. R. Moshe Stern is strict even about material in writing.

It is interesting, though, that the responsum of R. Amram Gaon that is the basis of the discussion of the Ramban etc. only refers to quoting a wayward scholar in the beis midrash. It is possible that in other places, such as in the college classroom, there would be no implicit respect given to the wayward scholar by quoting him. I do not mean to imply that the location is key but, rather, the venue. Torah study in a beis midrash is a religious exercise. Academic study is not. Perhaps the citation of wayward scholars is entirely permissible, even according to the strictest authorities, in a non-religious atmosphere.

There is more to say on this subject but since my goal here is not to offer any halakhic ruling, I will stop and simply recommend that anyone interested in this should ask their local rabbi what his position is.
Note that I had intended to put this all together as an article but never found the time to think it through and develop it sufficiently. If you want to do so, feel free but please cite this blog.


Tuesday, October 05, 2004

R. Yisrael Ta-Shema z"l

9:38 PM Gil Student

Dr. Jeffrey Woolf mourns the passing of a respected academic talmudist.


An Open Letter to the Editorial Board of Tradition

3:04 AM Gil Student

As you consider the future direction of Tradition, I ask that you consider the following thoughts I have compiled at this late hour of 3 am. Tradition was once the forefront of Orthodox Jewish thought but has since fallen into a rut. As is inevitable, times have changed and Tradition needs to adapt or fall into irrelevance. I have grown spiritually and intellectually from the pages of Tradition and treasure its legacy. Please take these suggestions/criticisms within the constructive framework in which they areintended.

1. There are more academic Jewish Studies departments today than there were when Tradition was founded. There are more academic Jewish Studies journals today than there were 40 years ago. Furthermore, there is much more acceptance of Orthodox scholars in academic Jewish Studies than in the past. So there is no need for Tradition to be an academic journal. You probably can't do it better than all the rest, so try being different instead.

2. Take risks. Be creative. Most importantly, be honest and caring. See below for some suggestions.

3. Be relevant. When an issue arises, get an article about it and print it immediately. Bump something else if need be, but don't wait until two years after the fact to address an important communal issue.

4. Be timely. Don't miss deadlines by months.

5. Don't be scared to vary size. No one is afraid of a big journal, and a small issue every once in a while won't bother anyone either.

6. R. J. David Bleich is a treasure. Too often, he is the only thing worth reading.

7. Probably the most interesting and talked-about article in the past few years was Moshe Koppel's letter. No, it wasn't academic. But that did not make it any less excellent. It is exactly what Tradition should be printing.

8. Find a distributor and get the journal into bookstores pronto. You should always be over-printing and selling in stores.

9. Cultivate young, up-and-coming authors. Get the phone numbers of these young scholars and ask them to contribute: Rabbis Assaf Bednarsh, Eitan Mayer, Jeremy Wieder, Uri Cohen. Why have I seen articles from R. Meir Soloveichik in Azure (to which he is a contributing editor!) and First Things, but not in Tradition? I'm sure that if you go to him with a good idea and apply pressure in the proper way he'll give you something great - truly great. More Yitzi Blau, please. Get an article-length excerpt from whatever he's working on. R. Mayer Twersky is full of eloquence and wisdom but has to be coaxed into writing. Please do so. An editor has to work hard, but it is not a thankless job. Not by far.

10. The Modern Orthodox world is going through a seismic shift at this moment, but I would not know it from reading Tradition. R. Feldman covered developments in feminism. Granted, in his own partisan way (which many loved and many hated), but at least he acknowledged that it exists. Why is there nothing in Tradition about the impending split in the Orthodox community? Why is there almost no social commentary at all? Are Marvin Schick and Hillel Goldberg really the only ones who can analyze and critique the Orthodox world? Get Prof. Halivni to write about his view of the developments in Orthodoxy. It might work and if it doesn't, don't print it. I've seen a draft article by a young thinker on this subject that is eminently publishable. I don't think he is even considering submitting it to Tradition.

9. YU is at a major crossroads and no one is analyzing it. It is pretty hard to understate the enormity of current developments. Why not have an outsider take a look at this and write his impressions?

10. Jewish-Christian relations. There is still a lot to be said on this matter, but try to get someone who has not yet said his piece. We already know what he is going to say.

10. Self-pesak, i.e. the ignoring of top posekim - good thing or bad?

11. Kiruv techniques: the good, the bad and the ugly.

12. How about some serious, critical biographical and historical essays? I recently read the Artscroll Rav Pam and was appalled, to say the least. Great inspiring stories but almost no history. Why not commission a history of Torah Vodaas? Someone should set the record straight about exactly what happened between those great scholars. Or get a former talmid of Rav Pam to write a real biography. For that matter, why not get someone to write a real biographical essay of the Rav, that includes his flaws and failures? For all the huffing and puffing the Modern Orthodox community likes to do about hagiography, I have yet to see someone seriously analyze the Rav's successes and failures. Certainly not in Tradition.

13. Does the internet exist? Does it have an impact on: the Jewish family, Jewish education, the pace of events in the Jewish community? At the very, very least, have someone write an halakhah article about internet use. Granted, I have an obvious pro-internet bias. But I reckon that the vast majority of the 50-and-under population do as well.

14. The world of Jewish education has taken enormous steps in the past few years. Take a look at some of the articles in the Lookstein journal or at its e-mail list (see the previous point on e-mail lists). Some of this, or at least an acknowledgement that it is happening, should be taking place in Tradition. Why not ask ATID to publish some of its fellows' papers in Tradition?

15. Book reviews do not have to be glowing. If they consistently are, no one will read them. Publish some critical reviews on interesting topics. For example, try getting R. Nosson Slifkin (speaking about young, up-and-coming scholars, put him on your list) to review the recently published English translation of R. Leo Levi's The Science in Torah or anything by Gerald Schroeder.

I could go on and on, and I am sure that I am not the only one who can. The main points are 2 and 3 above - take risks and be creative. Other journals, who will remain nameless, are doing that with mixed results. Don't be scared of a little failure. It's a good thing. That is how you learn what works and what does not. Otherwise, you end up doing the same thing you've been doing for years, which was a great success 30 years ago but now has gotten more than a little stale.

I wish you much success and growth. As you stand at this crossroads, look to a future that is different. A future with new voices and different ways of doing things. Change is a good thing.

UPDATE:

PS The academic study of the Talmud is being resurrected in the Orthodox community after being dormant since the purge of Revel. If Dr. Elman does not have the time or the health to write something about it for Tradition, find a student of his to do so. Additionally, a little communal introspection about what to make of this would be very valuable. Personally, I don't know what to make of it. The Revadim controversy would have been the perfect opportunity but that went by entirely unnoticed.

PPS A reader correctly pointed out in an e-mail that Tradition should also be recruiting more women writers. There is a growing group of capable women who can and should add to the community's discussion.


Monday, October 04, 2004

Solving the Agunah Problem II

1:47 PM Gil Student

Due to a request in the comments and a lengthy and very polite private e-mail, I took out my copy of the Winter 2002 issue of Tradition and reviewed the give-and-take between R. Shlomo Riskin and R. Jeremy Wieder regarding R. Riskin's long-standing proposal for marriage annulments (see here for a brief summary of R. Riskin's position). Why R. Wieder was chosen by the editorial board of Tradition to debate R. Riskin, and not someone with more experience in the area of practical dayanus, I do not know. But he performed admirably in demolishing R. Riskin's entire proposal, despite R. Riskin's opportunity to have the last word. What follows is a list of my personal objections, none of them addressing the fundamental halakhic issues involved. The reason for this is simple: In the real world, "metzi'us" - practical reality - trumps theoretical issues almost all of the time. R. Riskin's proposal is so impractical that there is no need to discuss the complex underlying halakhic issues. It is simply unfeasible.

I. Old Wine in New Flask

In the 1880s, rabbis in France proposed that the rabbinic establishment annul all marriages that end in civil divorce. This proposal was shot down by an overwhelming array of great Torah scholars. I ask, in what way R. Riskin's proposal is different? In fact, if R. Riskin finds that the plight of mamzerim - halakhically illegitimate children - is of equal concern as that of agunos, and I do not find that a stretch at all, then why should he not propose that a rabbinic court be given the ability to annul any marriage that ends in a subsequent remarriage without a religious divorce? Yet, that very proposal was suggested 120 years ago and soundly rejected. How is R. Riskin's proposal different?

II. Lack of Consensus

Any solution to the problem of agunos must - absolutely must - find broad consensus within Orthodox Judaism. Anything less than that will be disastrous. In R. Wieder's eloquent words: "The probability of the entire Haredi community agreeing to R. Riskin's solution... is somewhere between slim and none, with slim having left town." Any viable solution in today's world must have the stamp of approval of - at the very minimum - R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and R. Ovadiah Yosef. R. Riskin's does not. R. Riskin's claim that the Haredi community will eventually come around is, at best, wishful thinking.

III. Definition of Problem

More fundamentally, R. Riskin never defines who is an agunah and who is not. He can never solve the problem without defining which women deserve a get but are still not receiving one. (See here for more on this)

IV. Local Solution

R. Riskin's solution only affects women who have not yet wed. His proposal would prevent them from ever reaching the status of agunah. However, it does not address women who currently are already married. If that is the case, why not simply insist that these as-of-yet unmarried women sign an RCA pre-nuptial contract and avoid the potential problem in that way? R. Riskin's proposal, according to him, has the benefit of solving the problem for the following two situations: 1) women who do not sign the pre-nuptial agreement, 2) women whose husbands are rich enough to pay the large regular sum of money the agreement requires. If we focused our energy on having all young couples sign pre-nuptial agreements rather than trying to fight old battles, then the only unserved women would be the very rare case of agunos living in wealth. Is that worth the fight? Furthermore, as R. Wieder points out, R. Riskin's proposal is even less encompassing than the pre-nuptial agreement. R. Riskin's proposal only helps women whose husbands have been ordered by a beis din to give a divorce but have refused. It does not help the majority of agunos whose husbands have been able to avoid being ordered (rather than advised) to divorce their wives or have simply refused to show up in court. Again, had R. Riskin defined an agunah then we would be able to guage how well his proposal solves the problem. It seems that he defines the problem very narrowly and, therefore, his solution will only help a small number of agunos. The pre-nuptial agreement is far more effective.

V. Solution Already Exists

In my mind, the solution to the agunah problem already exists. It is the pre-nuptial agreement. We need no longer spend our intellectual energy on trying to find a solution but must now face the much more difficult task - implementing the solution. We need to ensure that every young couple signs a pre-nuptial agreement.

VI. Negative Implications

Whenever any well-intended rabbi proposes a solution to the agunah problem, he unintentionally creates the impression that those who did not offer solutions or who oppose his solution have little concern for the suffering of agunos. The atmosphere that creates this impression is not the scholar's creation, but it is something he must bear in mind. When a rabbi proposes an unfeasible solution, the impression is created that he cares while the others do not. This is simply incorrect. The others are, perhaps, more aware of the halakhic and political realities and are not willing to offer proposals that are unworkable. By offering this proposal for the annulment of marriages, R. Riskin has unintentionally created the impression that he cares while the others, who oppose his proposal for very good reason, do not care. This is a very unfortunate and damaging false impression. It is another setback for the honor of the general rabbinate, a calling that has been steadily losing honor over the past half-century or so.


Sunday, October 03, 2004

Reflections on Returning from an Uncle Moishy Concert

2:56 PM Gil Student

1. Even though I am descended from Gerrer hasidim, being a kalter Litvak must be in my blood. Despite my best efforts, the only one of my children who wanted to go to this concert sat there the whole time without moving and without a smile on his face.

2. I make sure to only go to the concerts in Flatbush or Boro Park, and not in Crown Heights, after an experience a few years ago in which the whole audience was shouting out "Yehi adoneinu, moreinu ve-rabeinu, melekh ha-moshiah le-olam va-ed."

3. After every concert, I make a point to tell my children that we do mitzvos because God commanded us to, not in order to bring Mashiah. Whether or not it will bring Mashiah, and I'm not convinced that it is wise or correct to tell our children that it will, is irrelevant.

4. The song "Hashem is Everywhere" makes me uncomfortable. These matters are beyond my comprehension, but it seems to me that the Vilna Gaon would label the panentheism/monism inherent in this song as heresy. (See Mordekhai Willenksi, Hasidim u-Misnagdim, pp. 188, 200-201; R. Menahem Kasher, Torah Shelemah, addenda to Parashas Shemos, no. 15; Allan Nadler, The Faith of the Mithnagdim, ch. 1)


Saturday, October 02, 2004

Buying Books

10:39 PM Gil Student

Koheles 12:12 "And more than that, my son, be careful, making many books without end..."

The Targum Yerushalmi translates this verse as encouraging writing books. "...be careful to make many books without end..." This is also how R' Sa'adia Gaon explains this verse. R. Yitzhak Sorotzkin (Rinas Yitzhak, Koheles, ad loc.) connects this to the statement in Sefer Hasidim (530) that one who receives the gift of a Torah insight but does not share it with others by writing it down is guilty of stealing that insight.

However, R. Yonah Ibn Janah in his Sefer Ha-Rikmah (beginning of ch. 2) argues at length that "hizaher - be careful" is always about something that one should not do and never an exhortation to do something. Additionally, he suggest that "making" books in Biblical Hebrew never means writing books but, rather, acquiring them. Thus, the verse is a warning not to buy too many books. Ibn Ezra briefly offers the same explanation, and it seems to find an echo in midrashim as well. Perhaps it is a caution against extra-biblical books or simply a warning that too much information will overwhelm a person. (See Da'as Mikra, Koheles, p. 77 n. 14)

This explanation, though, is quite surprising. The exact opposite view is found in other areas of rabbinic thought. The Mishnah in Avos (1:4) states "Yose ben Yo'ezer of Tzereidah said: Make your house a gathering place for scholars" which R. Hayim Volozhiner (Ruah Hayim, ad loc.) explains includes creating a library of Torah books. By surrounding oneself with the works of scholars, one makes one's house a gatherin place for them.

Perhaps more importantly, the last commandment listed in the Torah is the obligation on every man to write a Torah scroll. The Rosh famously ruled that in today's age, when people do not learn directly from a Torah scroll but from books, the commandment is to acquire Torah books from which to learn. Whether that is in addition or instead of writing a Torah scroll is a separate issue. However, what is clear is that normative halakhah holds that one fulfills a biblical obligation by buying books of Torah from which to study. (See the Tur, Shulhan Arukh and commentaries to Yoreh De'ah 270)

Certainly contemporary practice, which is frequently a good guage for which of two halakhic views has been accepted, is that in this age of mass publication and widespread literacy owning Torah books is a worthy goal.


Twitter Delicious Facebook Digg Favorites More