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Wednesday, September 29, 2004
Sam Rosenbloom and Succah.com
From the OU website:
Succah Website Owner Flouts Beth Din; Denies Wife a Get.
OU Strongly Recommends Not Buying from Site
The owner of the website described below, www.succah.com (note: with this exact spelling only!), is in violation of Jewish law, in that he has not given his wife a get, a Jewish divorce decree. He has failed to comply with an order issued by the Baltimore Beit Din (Jewish court). Until he gives his wife a get, she is not permitted to remarry under Jewish law.
Sam Rosenbloom has a seruv issued against him by the Baltimore Beit Din. A copy of the seruv can be viewed at http://www.getora.com/seiruvim.htm.
Mr. Rosenbloom owns and operates an on-line succah business at www.succah.com (note: with this exact spelling only!). We strongly recommend that no Jewish person buy from his website, that no synagogue grant him an aliyah or other religious honor or benefit, and that no Jewish family invite Mr. Rosenbloom into their home or otherwise provide him with Yom Tov or Shabbat hospitality.
If you have a question regarding this announcement, please contact your local Orthodox rabbi for the appropriate guidance. If you do not have an Orthodox rabbi available, you may email info@ou.org for the name of an Orthodox rabbi in your area.
OU Restaurants with Sukkos in New York
From the OU (thanks to the insider who sent it to me):
http://www.ou.org/kosher/sukkah.htm
Soaked Myrtles
I have heard some people talking about a crazy new humrah of not keeping hadassim and aravos in water because that will make them kavush - soaked/cooked. Let us go through the issue so that we can see that this is neither crazy nor new.
I. Kavush
There is a dispute in the Gemara whether kavush is ke-mevushal, i.e. whether soaking something in a liquid is similar to cooking it. The classic example is placing a cucumber in pickling juice with a meat flavor. The cucumber is left in that liquid for a time and eventually thoroughly absorbs the pickling juice without the use of any flame or heat. It would seem quite counter-intuitive to claim that since the cucumber-pickle was never cooked in that meaty liquid it remains pareve (non-meat) and may be eaten with a dairy meal. Clearly, it has absorbed the meat flavor.
Similarly, if one were to take the pot or barrel in which the pickling was done and clean it thoroughly, and then put water in it and let it sit for a long time, the water will develop the taste of the pickling. The pot had absorbed the taste of the liquid and, to a lesser extent, the cucumber and that remained in its walls.
The near-unanimous conclusion of medieval halakhists is that kavush is ke-mevushal. However, the question is to what extent.
According to Rashi, soaking is cooking only if the liquid used is sharp. Thus, if a piece of cheese and a piece of meat are placed in water and left there for a week, according to Rashi one can take each one out, rinse it off, and eat it. The meat is not considered to have absorbed cheese flavor, nor vice versa. According to most others, even water can create a situation of kavush, and that is how the Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh De'ah 105:1) rules.
There are three views of the time period required for soaking to be an effective form of cooking: three days (i.e. 72 hours), one day (24 hours), the time necessary for that food to be cooked on a flame. The Shulhan Arukh (loc. cit.) splits the ruling on this and concludes that for sharp liquids the soaking time is the equivalent time for cooking on a flame but for non-sharp liquids (such as water) the soaking time is 24 hours.
What all that tells us is that hadassim left in water for 24 straight hours (without any interruption) are considered to have absorbed taste from the water and from whatever was absorbed in the container in which it is being held. The next question, though, is whether that makes any difference.
II. Hadassim and Aravos
The Beis Yosef (Orah Hayim 645) writes that hadassim and aravos that are kevushim are invalid for use on Sukkos. This would mean that, as above, hadassim and aravos that are kept in water for a 24 hour period - and this is a particular problem on Shabbos of Sukkos - may no longer be used. However, the source for this claim is very questionable. The Piskei Teshuvos (649:1) quotes the Pis'hei Teshuvah (Yoreh De'ah 87:19) and Bikkurei Ya'akov (647:19) who dispute this ruling, the latter suggesting that it is a typo. Similarly, the Darkhei Teshuvah (105:16) writes that the practice is not to follow this ruling, as does his son in Minhas Elazar (2:69). However, the Hasam Sofer (Responsa, 2:81) and his son the Kesav Sofer (Responsa, 122) support the ruling of the Beis Yosef. (See Piskei Teshuvos for all this.)
In other words, there are major authorities on both sides of this old debate. However, based on my reading of the Shakh (Yoreh De'ah 105:1), if only the bottom of the hadassim and aravos are in the water and the majority not, then that part which is not in the water is not considered to be kavush.
Furthermore, this only applies to actually soaking in water. But keeping the plants in wet paper towels does not involve this issue (Peri Megadim, Yoreh De'ah 105:MZ 1).
Tuesday, September 28, 2004
Citation of Non-Orthodox Scholars II
We have already seen how the responsum of R. Amram Gaon brought this matter, and its source in Avodah Zarah (35b), to the attention of Sephardic scholars. Ashkenazic (Franco-German) scholars, however, evidently never saw this responsum of R. Amram Gaon. However, while they did not utilize the passage in Avodah Zarah for this purpose (perhaps because tractate Avodah Zarah was not widely studied in Germany, at least among early rishonim), there is evidence that this concept was not foreign to them. Thus, Rashi in Gittin (15a sv. tikberem imam) states that Bnei Rokhel would not be quoted in the Beis Midrash because they were wicked. Similarly, Tosafos (Sotah 12a sv. aherim) quote a source (perhaps the Geonic work Toledos Tanna'im Ve-Amora'im 2:3) that the Tanna R. Meir would quote teachings from his wayward master Elisha ben Avuyah in the name of Aherim rather than in his teacher's name. All this indicates that the Ashkenazim intuited the concept of not quoting Torah from an impure source by name.
Similarly, the Sefer Hasidim writes: "We do not quote by name a good Torah explanation from someone who subsequently became an apostate "(938) and "A man who heard a good explanation or answer from an idolater, apostate or enticer to sin should not repeat it in his name" (977).
The Radbaz does not discuss the matter and, as an heir of the Spanish tradition (albeit in Egypt), he was certainly aware of the Ramban and his circle's discussion. In one responsum (vol. 4 no. 187), the Radbaz states in passing that one may not quote by name someone who has the halakhic status of a heretic.
Here ends our discussion of the matter from a pre-modern perspective. From the Ramban through the Ran, the matter revolves around the Aivu passage. According to some, one may not quote by name from a scholar who does not act according to his station while according to others, one may only not quote by name from a scholar who violates a prohibition, even of rabbinic origin. On the Ashkenazic side, there is a recognition that it is improper to quote by name someone wicked. This seems to be the position of the Radbaz as well, although it is not totally clear. All seem to agree, however, that one may quote the teachings of wicked scholars if one does not mention their names (although, presumably, one should not take credit for the teachings but should say "I heard it explained" or something similar).
(B"n, to be continued)
Stories about the Hafetz Hayim
R. Nosson Kamenetsky, in his classic Making of a Godol (p. xx), quotes Rebbitzen Feigel Zaks, the Hafetz Hayim's youngest daughter, as saying: "Eighty percent of what they tell about [my father] is not true." R. Kamenetsky adds: "I cannot help but assume that in order to bring out bluntly the idea that not everything told about R' Yisrael-Meir Kagan, author of Chafetz Chaim, is true, his daughter exaggerated the percentage of untruths."
The Day the Rabbis Marched
There is an online exhibit about the 1943 march of Orthodox rabbis on Washington.
(I believe that is R. Eliezer Silver in the front-center of this picture.)
Citation of Non-Orthodox Scholars
Academics frequently cite non-Orthodox and Gentile scholars in their analyses. On some occasions, traditional rabbis might find cause to quote a non-Orthodox scholar or even an Orthodox scholar who, unfortunately, fails to meet the ethical and practical standards normally expected of a rabbinic scholar. May they do this? Is there anything wrong with quoting a Conservative professor on a Torah matter? Does the forum of citation make a difference?
There is a rabbinic prohibition against eating a Gentile's home-baked bread. The exact details and historical observance of this prohibition are extremely complex (cf. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 112; ). The Gemara in Avodah Zarah (35b) relates that Aivu was known to eat bread baked by a gentile outside of the town's borders. Because of that, R. Nahman bar Yitzhak told people: "Do not quote from (or: speak with) Aivu because he eats the bread of Gentiles."
There are two versions of this text. In one ("mineih"), R. Nahman bar Yitzhak is telling people not to quote Aivu. In the other ("ba-ha-deih"), R. Nahman bay Yitzhak is telling people not to speak with him. Both texts are well attested among rishonim. However, "mineih" seems to have been accepted as the more correct version.
R. Nahman bar Yitzhak's statement, assuming the "mineih" version, is that one may not quote Aivu because he was doing something wrong. The implication is that it is wrong to quote someone who acts improperly. This conclusion was stated explicitly by R. Amram Gaon in a responsum. He wrote (Halakhos Pesukos min ha-Geonim, NY: 1959, no. 26): "We do not whip [i.e. punish] one who eats the bread of Gentiles but, rather, rebuke him. And it is forbidden to quote something from him in the Beis Midrash (study hall)."
This responsum of R. Amram Gaon seems to have been lost to history for a number of centuries. It is not quoted in any pre-moden Ashkenazic source and even early Sephardic texts do not hint to it. It seems to have been found by R. Avraham Ha-Yarhi in his travels throughout Europe, and his record of this responsum in his Sefer Ha-Manhig brought it to the attention of commentators and legal scholars. Subsequent to the Sefer Ha-Manhig, the next mention of the responsum is in Ramban's commentary to Avodah Zarah. He quotes approvingly this responsum from "the Geonim." There is a significant detail in his citation of this responsum that we will analyze shortly.
After the Ramban's citation of this responsum, we find it appearing in Sephardic texts, notably (and unsurprisingly) within Ramban's school. Thus, we find the Rashba and the Ritva discussing this prohibition. In the comments to Rashba's Toras Ha-Bayis (3:7, p. 184), we find the Rashba and the Re'ah having a heated discussion about the Aivu incident, one that the Re'ah continued in his commentary to Avodah Zarah. The debate is significant in that the parties discussed, among other things, whether or not Aivu violated a rabbinic prohibition. According to the Rashba, and the Ritva follows this view, Aivu violated a rabbinic prohibition and was, therefore, punished by not having his view quoted. This is referred to as a "midah ke-neged midah" - a punishment directly related to his transgression. He did not value the words (i.e. the prohibition) of the Sages so he is not considered a sage, whose words would be valued. According to the Re'ah, however, (and the Ramban seems to share this view) Aivu did not violate any prohibition but simply did not meet the high standards expected of a rabbinic scholar (note the implication that a scholar should be more stringent than the average Jew; b"n more on that in a future post). It is not a punishment meted out to sinners, but merely the natural consequences of someone who does not meet the standards of admission into rabbinic discourse.
The upshot of this disagreement is that according to the Rashba and Ritva, a scholar who is not fully observant should not be quoted "in the Beis Midrash." According to the Ramban and Re'ah, even a scholar who is fully observant but does not meet the extra standards expected of a scholar may not be quoted. Torah discourse is for scholars, and only those who act like one may take part.
Once the debate began, we can only expect that it was noted and continued by contemporary scholars. The Meiri briefly mentions the issue and the Ran, in his commentary to the Rif, raises it and quotes the responsum of R. Amram Gaon.
However, this lively debate seems to have been entirely lost on Ashkenazic scholars. There is no indication that this passage was taken as a directive not to quote non-observant scholars. In fact, even though the passage regarding Aivu is quoted in the midst of discussions of the laws of Gentile bread, there is no mention of the implication regarding whom one may quote and whom one may not. Indeed, this is despite the raising of this precise topic in Sefer Hasidim (more on that later) from a different angle. For some reason, this passage in Avodah Zarah was left unplumbed in this respect. I had originally thought that it might be due to the prominence of the textual variant that prohibits speaking with Aivu, but not necessarily quoting him. However, a search through early Ashkenazic rishonim found both variants in almost equal frequency.
Subsequent to the Ran, the connection between the Aivu passage and the citation of non-mainstream scholars seems to have been severed. I could not find any mention of the responsum of R. Amram Gaon or the implication of the Aivu passage until the 19th century battle against Reform. For some reason that I cannot explain, halakhists (e.g. Tur, Beis Yosef, Bah) failed entirely to quote the Ramban, Rashba, etc. on this issue.
(B"n, to be continued)
Monday, September 27, 2004
Gdashd
Here is an explanation by Dr. Richard A. Cohen of why he hyphenates God's name into "G-d." I am including two paragraphs of his explanation, although the first is only for fun. I will be very impressed by anyone who can understand that first paragraph in only one reading.
The only other academic book I can remember seeing use "G-d" is Louis Feldman's Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World.
Richard A. Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: 1994), p. xv:
With the term "G-d," capital "G" intact, "centered" on a dash which is not a sign, transcendence goes farther. The term harks back to a past too old, and heralds a future too distant, for the elasticity of ecstatic contemporaneity, within which contemporary thought plays. Higher than differance and being-crossed-out, the name "G-d" does not signify its signified in a straightforward or oblique correspondence, or through a coherence, whether synchronic or diachronic or both, or through a correspondence and coherence delayed, deferred, or derailed. It leaves correspondence and coherence behind, or rather beneath, drawing them upward in its train, reaching higher, disturbing, giving pause, imposing too much, tracing what is already gone andnot yet come, and as responsibility and obligation is both irreducibly present and beyond at once.In short, the dash is supposed to signify that God transcends this world. I kind of like the idea of "G/d" signifying God's being above this world.
In this word-name-signal "G-d," indicated by a dash and capital G, there is a transcendence that transcends absolutely (holiness) and at the same time, as the sense we must make of this transcending movement, there is a transcendence that transcends ethically. They are one and the same upward movement, toward that which we cannot signify or know, but what, beyond contemplation, we are compelled to do, the good. One could write the name "G-d" as "G/d," with a diagonal slash rather than a horizontal dash, indicating the upward movement of moral rectitude, the ethical asymmetry Levinas names "one-for-the-other," being-for-the-other before being-for-oneself, which is how the movement which bursts through the name "G-d" signifies for human beings -- "G-d who comes to the idea."
Sukkah Intentions
The Tur (Orah Hayim, 625; and later the Shulhan Arukh, ad loc.) introduces the laws of living in a sukkah by saying that the mitzvah is so that we remember that God had us live in sukkos in the desert after the exodus from Egypt. R. Yoel Sirkes, the Bah, asks why the Tur mentions this theological idea in his practical compendium. He answers that this idea has a practical application. The Torah tells us that we must live in a sukkah "in order that future generations may know that I made the Israelite people live in booths when I brought them out of the land of Egypt" (Lev. 23:43). Therefore, writes the Bah, when one sits in a sukkah one must consciously remember the historical origin of the sukkah in order to fulfill the commandment.
This innovation of the Bah is accepted by all major posekim, with the only debate centering around the case of someone who failed to remember this historical origin. Has this person ex post facto (be-di-avad) fulfilled the commandment or must he repeat it? Many (e.g. Bah, Bikkurei Ya'akov, Derekh Pekudekha) hold that he has not fulfilled the commandment while others (e.g. Peri Megadim, Mishnah Berurah) hold that he has and need not repeat the mitzvah act.
What leaves me dumbfounded is not the details of this matter but its methodology. Without any mention in the Talmud or medieval literature, this innovation was accepted unanimously. The Bah essentially created his own exegesis of a biblical verse in order to create an obligation (granted, in order to solve a textual problem in the Tur).
I am not the first to notice this anomaly. R. Moshe Shternbuch (Mo'adim U-Zemanim, vol. 1 no. 85) also expressed surprise at this innovation... and therefore concluded that this can only be an ab initio (lekhatehilah) obligation but not ex post facto.
I simply fail to understand how this methodology of post-talmudic biblical hermeneutics can be used. However, since the posekim have unanimously accepted this innovation, no one has the right to ignore it and I certainly defer to their authority and expertise.
Friday, September 24, 2004
RCA on the Current Situation in Israel
The RCA released a statement yesterday endorsing the recent statement of the Chief Rabbinate regarding the current situation in Israel. Here is the summary:
The leadership of the Rabbinical Council of America, is in full agreement with these sentiments. It too does not endorse or favor any particular argument or political position in the current debate, given the many and diverse views in these matters held by the membership at large of the organization. But it does call upon its members, and the community at large, whether in Israel or around the world, to engage in and foster respectful and reasonable debate and discussion of the undoubtedly important issues involved.
In Search of Leaders II
R. Jeffrey Woolf weighs in on the issues raised by R. Reuven Spolter and takes a thoughtful middle position.
Thursday, September 23, 2004
On Teshuvah
A letter in the current issue of The Jewish Week:
Rabbi Michael Strassfeld’s philosophy of embracing "a pluralistic society that allows for many versions of God’s truth" ("Teshuvah Through Change," Sept. 3), including versions that involve the worshiping of idols, might be called many things, but Judaism is certainly not one of them.
And although Jewish religious tradition is clear about the innate holiness of all human beings, it is equally clear about the fact that the Jewish people are a people (gasp!) chosen and charged to remain in many ways apart from other nations.
Rabbi Strassfeld dismisses Jews who insist on adhering to those aspects of Jewish faith as "fundamentalists," and offers "change" as his translation of "teshuvah." What teshuvah really means, though, as any "fundamentalist" day school child could readily inform him, is "return." And as used, particularly in this season, it refers to Jews’ need to re-embrace the fullness of the Jewish tradition.
Rabbi Avi Shafran
Director of Public Affairs
Agudath Israel of America
New York, N.Y.
Yom Kippur on Shabbos
In a few days it will be Yom Kippur and Shabbos on the same day, a special combination of holiness. This unique blending of the holiest days of Judaism provides an opportunity for... murder. What?
The Gemara in Pesahim (49b) quotes R. Eliezer as saying that one may stab an ignoramus (am ha'aretz) on Yom Kippur that falls out on Shabbos. So, ignorami, watch out this weekend!
When R. Hayim Volozhiner was collecting funds to start his groundbreaking yeshiva in Volozhin, people asked him why there was any need for a yeshiva when students can study the Talmud on their own in local synagogues. R. Hayim cited the above passage as to why students need an experienced teacher. If one just read the text, one would actually think that it is permissible to kill ignorami. However, a teacher will be able to tell you that this is a mistaken understanding of the Gemara.
Rav Sherira Gaon and the Rif explain this statement to be referring to someone attempting to rape a woman (or man). He may be killed in order to stop his attack. Why an ignoramus and why specifically on Yom Kippur that falls out on Shabbos? Shouldn't any attempted rapist on any day of the year be stopped at all costs?
Based on the Meiri and the Sefas Emes (and who says I don't quote Hasidic works?), I would suggest that we are speaking of someone who has not yet attacked but is talking and acting like he is going to attack. Normally, one may not kill someone who is only threatening because frequently threats are merely empty words. However, an ignoramus who is willing to make such threats on Yom Kippur that falls out on Shabbos is clearly someone who has crossed all lines and poses a very serious threat.
(See also here.)
Wednesday, September 22, 2004
Aleppo Codex Online
The Aleppo Codex is being put online. This site does not load too well with dial-up, though.
The Maichater Iluy
A recent article in the Commentator by R. Nosson Kamenetsky about R. Shlomo Polachek, aka The Maichater Iluy, brings to the fore an interesting phenomenon. R. Polachek was among the, if not the, top students of the illustrious R. Hayim Soloveitchik. Yet, this student, much like R. Soloveitchik's famous grandson, seemed to affiliate with Mizrachi and teach in a school that combined Torah with secular studies.
From R. Kamenetsky's article:
[R. Polachek] was invited in 1905 to head the Zionist Lida Yeshiva by its founder, Rabbi Yitzchok-Yaakov Reines, rabbi of Lida, initiator of the Mizrachi movement.[The yeshiva in Lida is described here:
In 1883 [R. Reines] went to Lida where he served as Rabbi and Av Bet Din and by 1905 his established reputation gave him the ability to set up without opposition the yeshiva that he wanted under the name of Torah and Madah ('Torah and Science').]And, of course, R. Polachek eventually accepted a position under R. Dr. Dov Revel at RIETS.
While it is clear that R. Soloveitchik remained opposed to both Mizrachi and the study of secular subjects (see Making of a Godol, p. 1269), it is certainly interesting that two such devoted students of his tradition should make this break with his views.
Tuesday, September 21, 2004
Mehitzah
For Rosh Hashanah, I left my relatively homogeneous neighborhood and spent the long holiday in a more religiously diverse place. This was brought home to me on the first night of Rosh Hashanah after services, when everyone in the synagogue was standing by the doors trying to decide whether to run home in the downpour or try to wait out the rain. I was shocked to see a young woman, in her late teens or early 20s, in a totally sleeveless blouse. For whatever reason, she had dressed in an entirely inappropriate manner for synagogue. So why do I care?
This episode demonstrates the necessity of a mehitzah - a barrier between men's and women's sections in the synagogue. And not just any mehitzah, such as one with glass above waist level, but one that cannot be seen through. Regardless of one's views of the architecture of the ancient Temple and how it relates to contemporary synagogues, there is a more practical need for a mehitzah.
A man may not pray, recite a blessing or say the Shema while seeing a woman immodestly dressed (Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 75:1, 5). This is considered to be a biblical requirement. While the Shulhan Arukh allows a man to do so if he closes his eyes, later authorities almost unanimously reject this and require a man to leave the room or to (discreetly) turn his back on the immodestly dressed woman (Bah, Magen Avraham, Taz, Gra, Mishnah Berurah, Arukh Ha-Shulhan, etc.). In other words, had there been no mehitzah in this synagogue, none of the men would have been allowed to pray because this woman was under-dressed!
Therefore, regardless of whether contemporary synagogues must mimic the Temple in Jerusalem, a synagogue must have a non-transparent barrier between the men and the women or have the women situated behind all the men so that the men cannot see them. Again, this is a biblical requirement. The only other option is to have a clothing police to decide whether women are dressed appropriately, which is not a very pleasant proposal.
Thankfully, the synagogue I attended had a sufficient mehitzah so that this under-dressed woman did not prevent all of the men from praying. She was not turned away from the synagogue but was welcomed and, hopefully, she will progress in her religious development so that next year she will come to synagogue dressed sufficiently modestly.
I recall once attending a synagogue that had glass above approximately waist-level. Additionally, the seats were arranged in such a fashion that the men and women were all diagonally facing a central location, so that I ended up sitting almost face-to-face with a woman on the other side of the mehitzah who, shall we say, was not dressed like a typical Beis Ya'akov student. I switched my seat so that it would not be obvious that I was turning my back to this woman and never stepped foot in that synagogue again.
Monday, September 20, 2004
Random Thoughts
1. Wouldn't you know it, someone pulled a "birshus ba'alas ha-bayis" at my parents' house over the holiday. This guy was sitting in my row on Rosh Hashanah so I know that he got to shul 2 hours late, during the Torah reading.
2. There is an article in Jewish Action by a divorced woman about the indignities and insensitivities she and her children have suffered in the Jewish community. The thought of this socially awkward man upon reading the essay was that nothing I say or do will ever be sufficiently sensitive so I am better off avoiding divorced families. I assume that this was not the desired outcome, but sensitivity is a two-way street.
3. Take note transliterators: The words are bitul and batel. Please act accordingly.
Media Mention
Hats off to Menachem Butler for mentioning this post in an editorial in the current issue of The Commentator.
Although, for the record, I think there is another blogger named Simcha Goldstein. I just go by the name Simcha.
The Chosen People
The current issue of Jewish Action has a symposium on the touchy subject of Jews being the chosen people. Without taking away from the other writers, I would like to focus on the excellent article written by R. Mosheh Lichtenstein. The main reason this article appeals to me is that it echoes ideas I have been saying for a number of years, down to some basic comparisons, but adds a little more analysis to make it even better. Not only do I feel vindicated, I found his formulation to be better and more eloquent than mine. Here are some choice quotes:
It is our expectation that non-Jews recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu, worship Him and obey the dictates that relate to them..., and it is our obligation to treat them with respect, dignity and honor for their rank in the universe as creatures created in the Divine image and subordinates them to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. What we cannot grant them is the status of having Am Yisrael's intimate relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu...
Therefore, it is evident from this analysis that there are absolutely no grounds for discriminating against non-Jews as human beings, but there is legitimacy to deny their participation in our special relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Our obligation towards them should be analogous to our obligations towards a stranger who must be treated with respect and fairness but need not receive the special treatment that we reserve for family...
Practically, this means that anything in herent to the human condition that is not a function of our special relationship applies to non-Jews and should be recognized as such. Therefore, denying non-Jews the legitimacy of their humanity (for example, the need to grieve, laugh, play, work, worship, et cetera) is a racist position and is counter to the Torah's values... However, values and mitzvot that are a function of the unique Jewish fraternity need not be extended to non-Jews. Thus, the halachot that the Torah imposed upon us as a supra-moral obligation to assist fellow Jews as members of a common brother hood (for example, ribbit, charging interest for a loan; hashavat aveidah, returning lost items; et cetera) do not apply to non-Jews, while the prohibtions that are rooted in their rights as human beings (for example, theft, murder, et cetera) relate to them as well.
Sunday, September 19, 2004
Or'hos Tzadikim
Or'hos Tzadikim is an anonymous religio-ethical book that has had a tremendous and lasting impact on Judaism. The question we will address here is when and where the book was written.
R. Eliyahu de Vidas, in his 1575 work Reishis Hokhmah (sha'ar ahavah, ch. 6), quotes the Or'hos Tzadikim so we can set that year (or, taking into account the time for publications to spread, approximately 20 years earlier) as the latest possible date. However, there is much internal evidence as to the time and place of its writing.
Sources
Or'hos Tzadikim draws heavily on earlier sources, often quoting them verbatim and, on one occasion, even leaving in the name of the original author when he identifies himself. This gives us the ability to determine a minimum date of authorship. The book quotes frequently from Rambam (d. 1204), R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol's Tikkun Midos Ha-Nefesh (ca. 1055), Rabbenu Yonah's (ca. 1180-1263) Sha'arei Teshuvah, R. Bahya Ibn Pakuda's Hovos Ha-Levavos (ca. 1161), R. Moshe of Coucy's Semag (mid-1200s), R. Yehuda He-Hasid's (ca. 1150-1217) Sefer Hasidim and other works. All of this places the writing of Or'hos Tzadikim at least into the late 13th century. So far, we have narrowed down the authorship to a three century time period from late 13th century to mid 16th century.
Internal Evidence
However, there is one section of Or'hos Tzadikim in which the author gives us valuable information about his time and background. In the Sha'ar Ha-Torah, the author traces the development of the Torah until his time. It is quite telling that the author focuses largely on the French schools of learning. After the Rambam, the author lists the Semag and a few German halakhic works, and then proceeds to laud the French tosafists. He describes the process of development of the tosafist literature, beginning with Rashi and continuing with Rabbenu Tam and the Ri. Then came the tragic expulsion of Jews from France (1306) at which point, according to the author, creativity in learning seemed to come to an end. The author then continues at length about how "nowadays" people are not on as high a level of learning as those from before the expulsion.
What is explicit is that the book was written after the expulsion from France in 1306. Furthermore, the author seems to be at least a generation or two removed from the expulsion, so that he can talk about how scholars "today" differ from pre-expulsion scholars. He must have had to wait until the pre-expulsion scholars died out. [While there were actually three expulsions from France - 1306, 1322 and 1394, with permission to return granted periodically in between, the centers of learning never returned after the first expulsion so it seems likely that the author was referring to that event.]
That the author does not mention any German work from after the early 13th century and focuses largely on the French tosafists, it seems clear that he was living an a French community, either in France itself or among exiles.
Conclusion
What we can state with certainty is that the author lived in or after the early 14th century and, despite being influenced by the German hasidim, was largely influenced by the French tosafists. We can suggest that the author lived in the late 14th century in France or among French exiles, but not in Germany.
On the other hand, I have not taken the time to see what the scholars say. If anyone is aware of an article on the subject, please share the conclusions.
Wednesday, September 15, 2004
5765
I wish all of my friends/readers a year of growth and success. Le-shanah tovah tikasevu ve-sehasemu!
The following topics are what you might find discussed on Hirhurim in the upcoming year:
- Women rabbis
- The citation of non-Orthodox sources
- The eternity of the Torah
- Highlights of new books
Tuesday, September 14, 2004
Torah Stream
R. Yosef Viener has a new website to sell his tapes, CDs and videos. It is not too often that Agudah rabbis put up (or have someone put up for them) their own websites, and this is worth noting as R. Viener is a rising star in the Agudah world.
I know him personally and, even though we do not agree on many issues, I highly recommend his shi'urim for anyone looking to be educated by an entertaining speaker.
Monday, September 13, 2004
Consciencious Objection
There is a blog that looks very Jewish - even frum - but is, in fact, run by a Karaite who is disseminating his heretical views in the appearance of a disenfranchised, anti-establishment Modern Orthodox Jew. He is a self-proclaimed Am Ha'aretz (ignoramus, in late rabbinic terminology). It pains me when other Jewish blogs link to this heresy. Remember that R. Saadia Gaon, the Rambam, Ibn Ezra and many others spent years of their lives countering this deviant sect. It behooves us not to add to this Karaite's readership or to give him any credibility.
I will not link to this blog but if you are unsure as to which I am referring, e-mail me.
In Search of Leaders
In a recent issue of Jewish Action, R. Reuven Spolter wrote about the "brain drain" in the Modern Orthodox world in which many of the most talented and promising leaders are moving to Israel, leaving America with a dearth of leaders for the next generation. The current issue (Fall 2004) has a number of letters on the subject.
One writer writes that "[t]o be so concerned that the future of Modern Orthodoxy in America is in jeopardy because an incredibly small number of idealistic, young rabbis and congregants are making aliyah is to deny everything that we have yearned and prayed for over the last 2,000 years." Another writes that R. Spolter is "advocating a new brand of Modern Orthodoxy where adherents are serious about halachah... but not so serious about their commitment to Israel and to mitzvat yishuv Ha'aretz." And the letters go on.
What these writers entirely fail to recognize is that there are millions of Jews in America with little or no connection to Torah. If every observant Jew were to move to Israel today, these millions of Jews would be lost forever. If 99% of frum Jews moved to Israel, with 1% remaining behind to influence the non-observant, and that 1% is the correct 1% with the requisite skills and talents for the job, the benefit to Torah and Yiddishkeit would be immeasurable. Instead, what is happening is the exact opposite. Many of the people with the skills to revitalize American Jewry (including some of those letter writers) are moving to Israel and the rest of us (myself included), who lack those skills, are not moving. The results are disastrous, as R. Spolter showed in his article.
R. Hershel Schachter likes to tell the story of how one time R. Avraham Shapira, at the time Chief Ashkenazic Rabbi of Israel, came to speak at YU and had a private conversation with R. Schachter in which he tried to convince R. Schachter to move to Israel. After R. Schachter finished listing his many responsibilities, R. Shapira told him that he was obligated to stay in America rather than abandon his flock. R. Schachter wrote in his article on Yishuv Eretz Yisrael:
For individual Jews there may be extenuating circumstances... in which it becomes clear that their place in not in Israel. Based on this rationale, it has been suggested [31] that the greatest scholars and leaders of the diaspora may be permitted, or even oblgiated, to remain in Chutz LaAretz. Since their sphere of influence is in Galut, and it is there that they will ahve the most beneficial effect in disseminating Torah, we cannot say that there place must be in Israel.R. Yisrael Kagan, the Hafetz Hayim, told one of his sons-in-law that the time had come for the latter to take administrative reponsibility for the yeshiva in Radin. The latter objected, saying that he could not give up his time for learning Torah. The Hafetz Hayim responded that we are obligated to love G-d with all our hearts, all our souls, and all "me'odekha." The Sages tell us that me'odekha refers to our money, that we are obligated to sacrifice our money for G-d's commandments. The Hafetz Hayim said that me'odekha really refers to whatever is most important to us. To many people, that is money. But to others, it is their time for learning. We are obligated to sacrifice that which is most important to us - in this case, one's time for learning Torah - in order to do what is needed of us. The Hafetz Hayim's son-in-law gave up the most important thing to him for the sake of G-d. Others, to whom, perhaps, living in the land of Israel is the most important thing, might be challenged to give that up for the sake of the greater good.
[31] This was told to me by the Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi Avrohom Shapiro
Saturday, September 11, 2004
Avodah Zarah Wigs VIII
My wife has been hearing for a while rumors of rabbis permitting all wigs and has been bugging me to ask my halakhic authority. I finally did and he said that there is no problem with the wigs.
Friday, September 10, 2004
Raising Children
From this week's Newsweek:
[Newsweek:] What happens to kids — developmentally, emotionally — who have everything they want?Words to remember.
[Prof. Mary] Pipher: They're set up to be narcissistic, spoiled, not inclined to work hard, and with impulse-control problems.
Voluntary Obligations
Can a woman, who is not obligated in certain ritual acts, perform those acts on behalf of someone who is obligated (i.e. a man)? This question shook the intellectual world of the Conservative movement twenty years ago when the debate over women's ordination was raging.
I. The Theory of Self-Imposed Obligation
Prof.* Joel Roth ("On the Ordination of Women as Rabbis" in The Ordination of Women as Rabbis: Studies and Responsa, Simon Greenberg ed.) championed the novel idea of women imposing on themselves obligation of all mitzvos, thereby rendering themselves as equally obligated as men and, therefore, able to perform such mitzvah acts on behalf of men. The theory depends on the concept of neder. A person may accept upon himself an obligation as a vow and is thereby biblically required to fulfill that obligation. Thus, if a woman takes a vow to fulfill all of the time-bound mitzvos in which men of an equivalent status are obligated, she is then just as obligated in those mitzvos as men. As support for this concept, Prof. Roth points out that the literature generally discusses an "eino mehuyav ba-davar," someone who is not obligated in a matter, and not an "eino metzuveh ba-davar," someone who is not commanded in a matter. Since a woman who vows to fulfill a particular mitzvah is obligated in it, even if not commanded, she is considered a mehuyeves ba-davar.
Note that this solution only works for a woman who takes such a vow of obligation. Other women, however, do not reach this level of obligation and, therefore, cannot perform such mitzvah acts on behalf of men.
Before we proceed to point out problems with this theory, let me just state that this article by Prof. Roth is of unusual quality when compared to halakhic articles by many of his colleagues. Such articles are usually filled with strong bibliographic breadth but Prof. Roth displays additionally a sincere search for truth. He notes the weaknesses of his own theory and attempts to resolve the knotty problems that arise. I did not detect any triumphalism or scholarly sleight of hand in this article. However, I do think that some of his fundamental theories are weak, not to mention disagreeing with him on some basic principles of halakhic methodology.
II. Problems with the Theory
Prof. Roth's mentor, Prof.* David Weiss Halivni, objected strongly to his student's innovation in an unpublished paper titled "On Ordination of Women." (Note that Prof. Halivni eventually resigned from the Conservative movement and the teaching staff of its flagship seminary over this matter.) To begin with, this theory has already been raised and denied by no less an authority than R. Yosef Te'omim in his classic Peri Megadim commentary to Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim, 489 MZ 4).
Furthermore, as Prof. Roth duly noted, his theory seems elegant and simple at first but raises difficult problems. For example, a woman who vows to fulfill a mitzvah has, according to Prof. Roth, a biblical obligation to do so. Therefore, when a woman vows to fulfill a rabbinic mitzvah, she has a biblical obligation while her male counterparts have a rabbinic obligation. That seems quite odd. Additionally, medieval authorities agree that someone with a rabbinic obligation cannot perform a mitzvah on behalf of someone with a biblical obligation. Yet, why should a self-imposed obligation allow one to perform a mitzvah on behalf of someone biblically obligated while a rabbinically-imposed obligation does not? Also, let us imagine that we are living in the talmudic era when there was still a central religious authority with the power to enact rabbinic ordinances. A woman could choose to obligate herself in a mitzvah and, thereby, enable herself to perform that act on behalf of others who are biblically obligated. If, subsequent to that time, the central rabbinic authority should decide to obligate women in that mitzvah on a rabbinic level, this woman would suddenly lose her ability to perform the act on behalf of those biblically obligated. The imposition of the obligation would, parodoxically, reduce her ability.
All of these logical problems bring Prof. Roth's theory into serious question. However, he was aware of those problems and in his lengthy note 79 attempted to address them. In my opinion, he failed in his attempt and could not successfully resolve these logical problems. (Hopefully, more on this in a subsequent post.)
Prof. Halivni raised another problem. A vow can be annulled. A woman who vows to keep all time-bound mitzvos can subsequently have that vow annulled and relieve herself of those obligations. This, perhaps, is key in understanding why a vow does not raise a woman to the level of a biblically-imposed obligation on these mitzvos. An other-imposed obligation can never be annulled while a self-imposed obligation can.
III. A Revised Theory
Prof. Halivni offers a further suggestion - which, to my understanding, he has since rescinded - that I had, at first, misunderstood. Here are his words:
Unless women en masse are observing time bound commandments, so that if some leave, others will join their ranks; unless it becomes a minhag, a custom, of some duration, no serious change in their religious status can be contemplated... That may take a generation or so. Less than that, no permanency can be secured. Whereas after a generation, if the daughters of these truly pioneering women will want to change and drop the observance, we will tell them what R. Johanan told (in B. T. Pesahim 50b) to b'nei Bishan: kevar kib'lu avoseikhem aleikhem she-ne'emar: Shema beni mussar avikha ve-al titosh toras imekha. Your mothers have already taken it upon themselves, as it is said: Hear my son the instructions of thy father and forsake not the teaching of thy mother (Prov. 1:8).My initial understanding of this suggestion was that if a woman were to accept on herself as a binding custom to fulfill all relevant time-bound mitzvos, then it would be binding on her daughters like other customs. This surprised me because it is incorrect. The stringencies a parent adopts are not binding on his or her children. So ruled R. Yair Hayim Bacharach (Havos Yair 126) and R. Hizkiyah de Silva (Peri Hadash, Orah Hayim 496) without any (to my knowledge) dissenting opinions. That a woman accepts on herself the obligations of time-bound mitzvos does not obligate her daugthers in those mitzvos.
However, it seems to me that Prof. Halivni's suggestion was that women obligate themselves in time-bound mitzvos to create a communal custom. If and when it reaches that point, then the custom will be binding on all members of that community and such a vow-custom may not be annulled by individuals. However, even this does not entirely solve the dilemma because communal customs may also be annulled (on this, see Prof. Roth's book The Halakhic Process: A Systemic Analysis, p. 220). Additionally, if women are obligated by custom to fulfill certain commandments, this obligation is no longer self-imposed but other-imposed, with a much lesser status of other-imposed than men. Thus, if rabbinically other-imposed obligants cannot perform acts on behalf of biblically other-imposed obligants, certainly those with an other-imposed obligation due to custom cannot. This seems like something to which even Prof. Roth would agree.
(B"n to be continued)
* I use the term Prof., which is accurate, not as a slight but as a sign of respect while still refraining from conferring the title rabbi on self-professed non-Orthodox scholars.
Thursday, September 09, 2004
Anniversary of 9-11
In the Jewish calendar, today is the anniversary (yahrtzeit) of 9-11. It is hard to believe that it was three years ago that the whole terrifying tragedy took place. One of the mourners told me this morning that he still receives e-mails and letters every month from people who were inspired by the acts of his brother, an Orthodox Jew who stayed behind in 1 WTC to help his (Christian) paraplegic colleague. Both were killed when the building collapsed, but the memory of their deeds lives on. May the memory of all the deceased be a blessing for us, and may the Lord prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again.
Wednesday, September 08, 2004
Torah Trivia II
It is well-known that the Frankel edition of the Mishneh Torah used political considerations in determining what to exclude from its index of sources. That is why Modern Orthodox and Lubavitch sources are not cited. However, I found one place in which a work of R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik is quoted. In the "sefer ha-mafte'ah" to Hilkhos Melakhim 5:5, it refers to R. Moshe Soloveitchik as cited in Be-Sod Ha-Yahid Ve-Ha-Yahad, p. 392 (a work by his son, R. Yosef Dov).
Tuesday, September 07, 2004
Belief
R. Chaim (Howie) Jachter, in an essay titled Strengthening Our Belief in Hashem and His Beautiful Torah offers the following arguments for why he is "completely convinced of the truth of Hashem and His Holy Torah." He offers the following six arguments:
1. Rav Elchanan Wasserman – The Argument from Design
2. Ramban and Kuzari – Mesorah
3. The Argument from Jewish History – The Aruch Hashulchan
4. Rav Soloveitchik – The Argument from Halacha
5. Rambam on Ahavat Hashem
6. Rav Yoel Bin Nun on Megillat Esther
His conclusion is:
Bertrand Russell (a British philosopher and mathematician who was a foremost proponent of atheism in the early twentieth century) once was asked what he will respond if after he dies he meets God and He will judge him for his lack of belief. Russell responded that he would ask God, why did You not provide sufficient evidence of Your existence. Hashem might respond, why didn’t you exercise your common sense and look beyond the secular surface of the world, and see the overwhelming evidence of My existence and of My Holy Torah.
Saturday, September 04, 2004
Permission from the Woman of the House
Every once in a while, I hear someone start off bentching with the usual form of asking permission to lead and include the "ba'alas ha-bayis" - the woman of the house - in the request. When I was younger, I only heard it from egalitarian Conservatives. Later, I started hearing it from renegade Modern Orthodox Jews, the kind who (in my limited experience) were rarely particularly pious or learned but always had an opinion on Jewish matters. Let us review the matter and see whether such a statement makes sense.
The practice of starting a zimmun (communal "bentching" with at least three participants) is not well documented. The Siddur Ezor Eliyahu states that it was rarely an Ashkenazic practice and was largely adopted from Sephardic practice. However, it seems to me that the Roke'ah (335) mentions the practice, as do the later Tosefos Yom Tov (Divrei Hamudos, Berakhos 7:47), Vilna Gaon (Ma'aseh Rav, 85) and Kitzur Shulhan Arukh (45:6). The practice is codified regarding asking permission before reciting the ha-motzi blessing on bread (Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 167:14 in Rema's gloss) but, surprisingly, not regarding bentching (op. cit., 192:1).
The question, though, is why such a practice is done. Do we ask permission as a mere sign of respect or is it a literal request for permission from those who have a prior right to lead the blessing? If the former, then there seems room to show respect to the woman of the house as well. If the latter, however, the practice seems meaningless because the woman of the house may not lead the blessing so there is no need to request her permission.
The Magen Avraham (167:33) quotes the Lehem Hamudos (i.e. the Divrei Hamudos cited above) that the custom is to ask permission from any kohen that is present. Why? Because there is an obligation to sanctify the kohen by allowing him to go first and to lead the bentching. Not necessarily to respect him any more than another, but to give him priority. Therefore, the kohen should really be leading the blessing and one must ask permission to lead in his place. Similarly, the Mishnah Berurah (167:75) states that even a great person or the homeowner should ask permission from the others as a sign of modesty, as if the others should really be the ones leading the blessing. What emerges is that the reason for asking permission is that it is a literal request for permission to lead the blessing before someone who technically has predecence in leading it. It is not merely a token ceremonial recitation to show respect.
R. Daniel Z. Feldman (Binah Ba-Sefarim, vol. 3 po. 57-58) cites a number of recent authorities influenced by kabbalah and hassidus that imply that the recitation is a display of respect rather than a literal request for permission. In this vein, they sanction requesting permission from the Sabbath Queen etc. (although not without opposition; cf. Kaf Ha-Hayim 192:2).
Therefore, according to the standard understanding that the "birshus" is a literal request for permission from those who have prior right to leading the bentching, there is no room to ask permission from the woman of the house who, despite deserving ample respect and gratitude, does not factor into this matter. Those who add the woman into the request are demonstrating that they do not take its function seriously. However, there seems to be a recent trend among kabbalists to remove the primary function of this request and turn it into a ceremonial recitation. But don't get me started on the ceremonialization and mysticization of simple halakhic acts.
Friday, September 03, 2004
Hurricane Halakhah
The OU has guidelines, written by R. Kenneth Brander on consultation with R. Hershel Schachter, on how to act on Shabbos during a hurricane.
Rule #1 should be: As the Hayei Adam famously wrote, know these halakhos in advance because when the time comes you will not have an opportunity to learn them.
(with thanks to The Town Crier)
Thursday, September 02, 2004
Halakhah and Aggadah
R. Aharon Kahn in The Commentator, Dec. 22 1993, p. 15 col. c:
Often the Rav would say in the name of his grandfather that aggadah was also halacha, the halacha of how a Jew should think.
Kevod Ha-Tzibbur
The Gemara (Megillah 23a) states that a woman may not be called to the Torah because of kevod ha-tzibbur. R. Yosef Qafih* (commentary to Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Tefillah ch. 12 n. 49) offers an interesting explanation - that I have not seen previously cited - of the enigmatic phrase "kevod ha-tzibbur." He suggests that since Torah reading requires a minyan of ten men, it is disrespectful to those who are needed for this minyan to call to the Torah someone who is not needed.
* Note that spellings of his name in English vary widely. I am using the spelling on the English title page of his collected writings.
Wednesday, September 01, 2004
Genocide II
(continued from here)
A statement from the RCA:
A Statement of Moral Principle, and a Call to Action by the Rabbinical Council of America Regarding the Impending Genocide of more than 1,000,000 Black Moslem Sudanese at the Hands of their Arab Oppressors in Darfur, Sudan(Thanks to The Town Crier and House of Hock)
- August 29, 2004 -
The Rabbinical Council of America, the largest group of Orthodox rabbis in the world, has today issued a statement of utmost moral concern, and a call to action, to put an end to the unfolding genocide that threatens the lives of more than a million Africans in the Darfur region of the Sudan, perpetrated by government-backed militias...
Peshat Study of the Torah
May a biblical commentator offer an interpretation of a biblical passage that contradicts an interpretation of the Sages? Is this sacrilege or merely creative Torah study?
R. Hayim Friedlander, the late mashgi'ah of the Ponevezher Yeshivah, addresses this in his Sifsei Hayim - Pirkei Emunah u-Vehirah, vol. 2 pp. 257-272. R. Friedlander brings numerous examples from classical commentators, such as Ramban and the Vilna Gaon, where these great scholars disputed the interpretation of the Sages. For example, the Tosefta (Sotah 10:9) and Midrash Rabbah (BR 89:11) state that the famine in Egypt ended five (of the projected seven) years early when Jacob entered the land. Ramban (Gen. 47:18) writes "al derekh ha-peshat" that the famine lasted for seven full years.
Similarly, the Mekhilta (cited by Rashi, Ex. 21:6) states that a slave's ear may be pierced only on a door and not on a doorpost. The Vilna Gaon (Aderes Eliyahu, ad loc.) writes that the simple meaning of the verse includes the option of piercing a slave's ear on a doorpost.
R. Friedlander explains that there are many ways to read the biblical text and each path teaches us a lesson. "We see the importance of trying to understand the peshat (simple meaning of the text), even when it contradicts practical halakhah or does not match the historical reality as relayed to us by the Sages. Every peshat in the Torah teaches us something in hanhagah (practice) or hashkafah (philosophy), even if we do not always understand the lesson." (R. Friedlander, op. cit., p. 272)
