Friday, March 30, 2007

Just Say No

From this week's The Jewish Week (link):
Just Say No

What are we thinking when we put a 14-year-old child wearing a $1,000 gown and $400 shoes into a limousine to attend a prom?

What are we thinking when put a television in a child’s bedroom? Why do we not simply put a sign up that says, “Please — do not use your imagination and do not read?” Why allow an Internet connection behind a closed door, knowing that the Internet, alongside its blessings, is a sewer of pornographic, violent, hateful and dangerous ideas and images?

What are we thinking when we send children to parties where there will be drinking, drugs, and people treating their bodies as though they were disposable? Why bring a 10-year-old to a concert where the principle virtue of the performer is that she is scantily dressed and exudes sexual allure?

Parents are the first and most important teachers of their children. So here is a word to teach: NO.

Melville wrote about Hawthorne that he knew how to say “No! In thunder.” In other words, to say “no” when others are saying “yes,” to say “no” when “yes” is the easy answer, to brave the conflict and anger and recrimination that “no” will bring.

For each of us the day comes when decency, family, integrity — maybe even sanity — depends on being able to say “no.” God help our children if we have not taught them to say it.

David Wolpe


Happy Blogaversary

It looks like I missed the third anniversary of the first posts on this blog on March 15, 2004. We've already started into the fourth year.


Exodus and Time

R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Festivals of Freedom:
Maimonides says that as we start the recital of Maggid over the second cup, we say, Bi-vehilu yatzanu mi-Mitzrayim, "We departed from Egypt in a hurry." Does it make much difference whether the Jews departed from Egypt slowly or in a hurry? Yet it is so important that Maimonides apparently made it the symbol of the great freedom of the exodus. (p. 42)

Time is of critical importance--not years or months, but seconds and split seconds. This time-awareness and appreciation is the singular gift granted to the free man, because time belongs to him: it is his time, and he can utilize it to the utmost or waste it. A free man does not want time to pass; he wants time to slow down, because to him time is a treasure. To the slave, however, time is a curse; he waits for the day to pass. The slave's time is the property of his mast. No matter how hard he may try to be productive in time, he will not reap the harvest of his work; therefore, he is insensitive to time. His sense of the movement of time, the passing of hours, days, weeks, is very dull. Life, to the slave personality, is motionless. (p. 41)

[Bi-vehilu] refers to our acquisition of time consciousness--the exodus can happen now, and may not happen later. This sense of time was the shibboleth of our ancestors when they left Egypt. The first commandment they were given in Egypt, marking the commencement of their liberation, was to mark time: "This month shall be to you the beginning of months" (Ex. 12:2). Bi-vehilu yatzanu mi-Mitzrayim--we have gained the consciousness of time, and therefore we are free. (p. 42)


Thursday, March 29, 2007

Abortion and Tay Sachs

R. Haskel Lookstein relates a discussion between him and R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik (link):
A particularly poignant exchange between us occurred after I had attended a Rabbinic Alumni convention and heard a very prominent rabbinic scholar discuss the issue of Tay-Sachs testing. That scholar advised against any kind of testing for reasons which he explained. Furthermore, he said, once a woman was pregnant there is certainly no reason to test because even if the fetus were found to have Tay-Sachs disease there is nothing that can be done about it. One may not abort. I was concerned about that approach and, as luck had it, I had been invited to have dinner that evening at the home of a member of the Rav's family at which the Rav was going to be present. He was scarcely in the door when I described to him the view that had been expressed earlier that day and I asked him what his opinion was. He said very firmly: "You can abort a Tay-Sachs fetus through the sixth month." I said nothing but he must have noticed a quizzical look on my face as if to say - which, of course, I would not - what was the basis for the p'sak? I will never forget what he told me. He said: "Chatzkel, did you ever see a Tay-Sachs baby?" I replied that I had not. He said: "We had a Tay-Sachs baby in Boston. I tell you that you can abort a Tay-Sachs fetus through the sixth month." I saw at that moment a gadol in action, deciding a difficult question of Jewish law with absolute confidence and courage, based upon his scholarship and experience.


Wednesday, March 28, 2007

Sociology and Halakhah

The application of historical and sociological techniques and assumptions to halakhah is fraught with the danger of trivializing the sanctity of the halakhic tradition. It is all too easy to get caught up in the sociological framework and to forget the seriousness with which rabbis have taken their responsibilities to the chain of tradition in which they are but one generational link.

However, that does not mean that there is no room for such studies. There are areas where "public policy" has a role in halakhic decision-making and where sociological methods are appropriate. A prime example of this is the realm of the collision of traditional and modern society. That is where "public policy" has traditionally played a large role, and both time and place have an important role in the conclusion of the rabbinic authority. However, even in this area the danger remains that the analyst may underestimate the seriousness of the halakhic decisor. What looks like a public policy desion to the untrained eye might be a simple application based on a pure and timeless study of the halakhah. That is why such studies can only be carried out by a sensitive scholar.


Such individuals exist, and R. Dr. Adam Ferziger's Exclusion and Hierarchy: Orthodoxy, Nonobservance, and the Emergence of Modern Jewish Identity is a fascinating and careful study of the issue. Not only is this analysis of major halakhists of the nineteenth century extremely thorough as an historical work, the analysis of halakhic works is unusually solid. The author is a Ben Torah, and therefore is able to understand not only the texts that he is analyzing but also the broader context of the halakhic tradition. As a student of sociology, Dr. Ferziger attempts to categorize various reactions to the changing patterns of modern life through the language of the field. As someone whose knowledge of sociology ended with the Sociology 101 CLEP exam, I found this quite original. Most fascinating, though, is the combination of this sociology with accurate Jewish history and sensitive halakhic analysis. In the hands of a lesser scholar, the results of this study might have been somewhat offensive. But in the hands of someone who truly respects the scholars and texts he studies, the results are quite original.

All three aspects of this work struck me. There was much historical insight into these scholars (such as R. Ya'akov Ettlinger and R. Azriel Hildesheimer), including German texts of which I had not previously aware. The careful analyses of various halakhic texts also yielded quite a bit of insight. And the contrasts and comparisons of reactions to modernity through the eyes of a sociologist found previously unnoticed patterns. A very rewarding read.


More Legacies

More in the series of articles about the legacies of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik:


Medication on Passover

Dr. Daniel Eisenberg on the important issue of taking medication on Passover (link). Unfortunately, too many people are overly lenient regarding their health and end up suffering due to refusal to take medication. This is an important issue and this article should be forwarded around:
...It is crucial to appreciate from the outset that a threat to life takes precedence over all of the laws of Passover (and all other biblical laws except for the prohibitions of murder, adultery/forbidden sexual relationships, and idolatry). No one should stop taking medications for serious or even potentially serious medical conditions during Passover (or any other time) without the express agreement of their doctor (and their Rabbi). Judaism does not look with favor on pious foolishness...

If a person has or may have a life-threatening illness or condition, then they clearly may utilize any food, drink, or medication that is appropriate for their condition, regardless of whether it contains chametz, provided that a convenient substitute without chametz is not easily available. Eating chametz in such a situation is not only permitted, but is mandatory because of the overriding Biblical obligation to preserve life.(4) Therefore, while it is praiseworthy for an ill person to check their medication list against one of the published kosher for Passover medication lists, this is only for their own peace of mind, so they can be assured that they are not ingesting chametz or so that they can ask their physician if any of the chametz-free medications are appropriate substitutes. But under no circumstances should Passover be used as an excuse for seriously ill or potentially seriously ill people (such as those with heart conditions, hypertension, diabetes, or infections) to stop taking prescription medications without clear directions from their doctor...

Several Rabbinic organizations have published practical guidelines to help navigate the complex variety of medicine types. One simple formulation, which is an excellent starting point for evaluating medications, is the Chicago Rabbinical Council declaration regarding the use of medicines on Passover, which divides medicines into three basic categories:
  1. All pill medication (with or without chametz) that one swallows is permitted. Vitamins and food supplements do not necessarily fall into this category (even when they are in pill form), and each person should consult with their Rabbi.

  2. Liquid and chewable medications (or pills coated with a flavored coating) that may contain chametz should only be used under the direction of a Doctor and Rabbi, who will judge the severity of the illness, the likelihood that the medicine contains chametz, and the possibility of substituting a swallowable pill. Important: Do not discontinue use of liquid, chewable or any other medicine without consulting with your Doctor and Rabbi.

  3. Liquid and chewable medications that are chametz-free but contain kitniyos, may be consumed by someone who is ill. A healthy person, who would like to consume this type of medicine to merely relieve a minor discomfort, should only do so if the product is known to be free of both chametz and kitniyos.
Read the whole article here.


Mossad HaRav Kook Catalog

Download the latest catalog of Mossad HaRav Kook (for its annual "Book Week" sale) at Lamed.


Tuesday, March 27, 2007

Kitniyos

A rabbi* in Israel recently ruled that Ashkenazim who live in Israel do not need to maintain the Ashkenazi custom of refraining from eating kitniyos (e.g. peanuts, string beans, rice) (link - PDF).

My humble opinion on this matter is that there is nothing new in this ruling. It contains two main points:

1. There are opponents to the custom of refraining from eating kitniyos. The ruling quotes the Tur (a Sephardi), the Beis Yosef (a Sephardi) and R. Yaakov Emden (an Ashkenazi who grew up in the Sephardic community where his father was the rabbi). This is nothing new. You can see it in many different popular works, such as R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin's Ha-Mo'adim Ba-Halakhah. The ruling does not quote the many, many other sources who accept the practice, such as the Maharil, Rema, Gra, Chayei Adam, Mishnah Berurah, Arukh Ha-Shulchan, etc. etc.

2. Israel is a Sephardic country and therefore Ashkenazim are obligated to accept Sephardic customs when moving to Israel. This is an important question and I believe that the position advocated has merit except for one point -- timing. If this ruling had been issued 200 years ago, I think it would be valid. However, as Ashkenazim moved to Israel and established communities, their posekim ruled that they should not abandon their customs. The most famous such ruling is in the Pe'as Ha-Shulkhan (first section), in which R. Yisrael of Shklov argues that Ashkenazim have had a long, if limited, presence in Israel and therefore the country is like a city with two courts, in which each community follows its own court.

R. Nachum Rabinovitch put it well in his Melumedei Milchamah (no. 84):
One can question whether there is room for this custom [of refraining from eating kitniyos] in the land of Israel, since the ancient communities here did not practice as such and it is accepted among the decisors that the Rambam and the author [of the Shulchan Arukh] are the decisors for the land of Israel, and they explicitly permitted rice and certainly other kitniyos. However, from the time that other communities became established here, they retained their ancestral customs that they brought with them from various coutnries, and they have already practiced that the entire community follows its own customs. Therefore , there is no custom of the land of Israel that obligates them.
By now, the Ashkenazic community has been growing for over 200 years and has maintained its customs. Now, almost 60 years after the establishment of the State of Israel, we are hearing a call for Ashkenazim to adopt Sephardic customs??? Did R. Avraham Kook eat kitniyos? Did R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach eat kitniyos? They knew everything contained in this ruling and still kept their family customs.

In my opinion, the time for such a radical proposal is long gone. There are, I believe, more important windmills to charge against.


* If you'd like to get to know the rabbi who issued this ruling, see this video in which he launches what I consider to be a sarcastic and unfair attack on R. Shlomo Aviner - link. You can also see this essay by him on Jews and Gentiles, translated into English and posted on an anti-religious website - link.


UPDATE: See this article on Arutz Sheva of contemporary rabbinic authorities who disagree with this ruling.


Monday, March 26, 2007

Praiseworthy Leaders

Rashi, Lev. 4:22 (link), quotes the Midrash and Gemara:
Fortunate is the generation whose leader is concerned to bring an atonement for his inadvertent transgression -- all the more so that he regrets his intentional transgressions.
The Maharal in Gur Aryeh explains:
The generation is praiseworthy because they did not sin but have a leader who, if he sins, regrets his mistake. We can also explain that specifically here it says that the generation is praiseworthy because from that he [the leader] regrets his mistake, it is clear that he is not embarrassed to say "I sinned" and does not say "I am great and important, how can I say 'I sinned'?"


The Reb Chaim Brisker Of Bible Scholars

R. Shalom Carmy's excellent eulogy for R. Mordechai Breuer (link):
There are great teachers whose impact is limited to their students. Greater still are those whose students initiate students of their own. The greatest teachers, however, influence not only the direct line descending from them, but an entire climate of thinking. All of us are their talmidim.

Twentieth-century Orthodox Bible study boasts two such figures. Nechama Leibowitz’s writing, teaching and broadcasting turned the exacting, microscopic study of Jewish parshanut into an exciting and popular pursuit. And Rabbi Mordechai Breuer fashioned the tools that enabled Orthodox students to confront the literary problems raised by modern biblical criticism. He entered a situation where the Orthodox approach was an apologetic one, in which the Torah was to be defended against heretical assault.

By the time he died last month, Rabbi Breuer had transformed the encounter with kefira into a positive act of Torah study. Where his influence is felt, the literary questions posed by the Bible critics are treated no different from other interesting questions endemic to Torah study: questions are a spur to chiddush and deeper understanding rather than a cause for discomfort or panic...
Continued here.


Friday, March 23, 2007

Rabbi Zev Farber, Yeshiva Chovevei Torah and the Orthodox Community

Rabbi Zev Farber, Yeshiva Chovevei Torah
and the Orthodox Community
A Brief Statement


Michael J. Broyde

A number of people have asked me about the Yated Neeman article criticizing Yeshiva Chovevei Torah generally and Rabbi Zev Farber, the director of the Atlanta Torah Mitzion Kollel. The criticism of Rabbi Farber focused on a dvar torah he wrote which can be found at http://www.yctorah.org/content/view/176/56/. (For the sake of full disclosure, I note that I am among the founders of the Atlanta Torah Mitzion Kollel, and that it learns every day in the Young Israel of Toco Hills, where I am the rabbi.)

I write this brief note to share my views.

  1. It is clear to me that Rabbi Farber's dvar torah is far from heretical and certainly does not make him a kofer. Even if one disagrees with the way he formulated the ideas he presented (and I do in a detail, as I explain below), it is a sad reflection on our Orthodox society that these disagreements are manifest in allegations of heresy. Anyone with a basic knowledge of Jewish tradition ought to know that the ideas Rabbi Farber presented were not heretical at all. Indeed, each of them has echo in the remarks of commentators from previous generations. There is no heresy in his writing.


  2. Having said that, I think that Rabbi Farber did not present his dvar torah in the proper form or format and the absence of sources within Chazal documenting his insights was an error of style. In general, claims of moral imperfection of the Avot are complex to advance and ought to be diligently supported by references to rabbinic literature and done in the course of lengthy essays on topics with long explanations of reasons and rationales This type of mistake in style and expression on his part comes from lack of experience and nothing more. Anyone who has read his defense of his comments sees that his comments are well vested in the approach of tanaim, amoraim, rishonim and achronim, in fact -- even if he did not tell us this in his initial dvar torah. I hope he has learned the lesson of providing supporting sources for the less than obvious to readers who are sometimes ignorant of the breadth and depth of Chazal's insights. Let me add something else. Anyone who knows Rabbi Farber, knows very well that he is a learned, God-fearing, young, Torah-scholar who, although he wrote this dvar torah in the wrong tone, has a wonderful future ahead of him and could go on to greatness and accomplishment.


  3. The creation of additional yeshivot which serve the Modern Orthodox community is good, both because competition creates intellectual vibrancy and because variety is important for serving many different students' needs. Thus, I view the creation of Yeshiva Chovevei Torah in a positive light, even as my own primary loyalty resides with Yeshiva University, where I was privileged to learn for fourteen years. Indeed, I have spoken at Chovevei Torah a number of times, and I arranged for a YCT musmach to direct the Atlanta Torah Mitzion Kollel (see above).


  4. Yeshiva Chovevei Torah is in its infancy and has, in my view, made a number of mistakes, which if not corrected will ultimately undermine its credibility within the Orthodox community. To me, the biggest mistake Chovevei Torah is making is the policy of never announcing that it made a mistake and letting accusations fester against it without either a rebuttal or an acknowledgement of error. Orthodox institutions (like all others) err and they sometimes engage in conduct that with hindsight was far from ideal or even just plain wrong and assur. When that happens, it is important that they note such conduct publicly, so that all can understand that what happened was not proper. Silence confuses people as to whether what occurred was ideal or less than ideal or simply wrong. YCT's policy of silence in the face accusations of impropriety by its musmachim, staff, Chairman of the Board, and others in its institution or its publicity is simply unwise and misleading about what YCT is. Because YCT is a leftward leaning yeshiva, YCT bears a special responsibility to make sure that those who speak for YCT are representing YCT accurately and when a misrepresentation of YCT occurs, it needs to actively correct it. (Let me be equally clear that YCT should not be judged because of the actions of others and YCT is not in the rebuking business -- nor is any yeshiva. However, when someone affiliated with YCT speaks in the name of YCT, it is reasonable to assume that unless YCT speaks to the contrary, that is YCT’s view.)


  5. In particular, it is important to me that YCT speak publicly and directly about five matters, so that the Modern Orthodox community can hear the authentic voice of YCT on these matters. I do not mean to imply at all that YCT’s conduct in each of these cases has been incorrect (indeed, in some of them, I am comfortable with YCT's conduct and in others, not) -- what I mean to note is that YCT is not sharing with the community its full views on these issues, and a reasonable person who simply reads what YCT itself has done or published can not determine were YCT stands on many of these issues. (For those who are unfamiliar with the details of these particular five events, see the note here.)

    1. First, it is important that YCT address the comments of its Chairman of the Board from three years ago about Yeshiva University and a number of its erudite scholars. Do those statements represent YCT or not? These comments, said publicly from the dais in the course of the YCT annual dinner, sound like the official pronouncements of YCT. Are they?


    2. Secondly, it is important that YCT address the question of the publicity YCT has itself put out with regard to one of its musmachim's work with the gay and lesbian community and its hagadah. YCT needs to tell us whether the publicity it shared with the community represents the YCT ideal as a reasonable person could conclude from the way YCT publicized this work?


    3. Third, it must address the questions related to its vision of am hanivchar and the perfection of our Creator, so as to inform our community whether the comments of a particular YCT musmach is representative of YCT, as he has indicated he is.


    4. Fourth, YCT must address question of interfaith cooperation and interfaith interactions -- was the Cardinals’ visit to YCT a manifestation of the ideal or something less.


    5. Finally, it must present a consistent vision to the community of its vision of inter-denominational interactions within Judaism. Are the non-Orthodox clergy on the faculty of YCT part of the YCT approach?

    I recognize that one of the hardest mitzvot in the Torah is to eradicate the wrong within one's own midst, and that it is very hard for anyone or any institution to speak about mistakes. Writing this note pains me, to be honest. But without such guidance by YCT as to its own philosophy, it is reasonable to assume that YCT's own conduct speaks for itself. I, for example, will not support any Yeshiva that publicly attacks my own teachers at Yeshiva University or is supportive of creating a gay and lesbian hagadah or denies the notion of am hanivchar. Others might have other criteria -- and YCT ought to share its own vision so as to clarify the reality.

    A little bit of light drives away a lot of darkness is an old rabbinic adage, and YCT has the chance to clarify its views in a public and open way. That light will drive away much darkness and ought to be done.


[1] For (A) see http://www.forward.com/articles/philanthropist-attacks-university-for-right-turn for a history of this matter. For (b) see http://www.yctorah.org/content/view/120/49/ and call up the summer 2005 newsletter, and then go to page 7. On matter (C), go to http://www.jewishaz.com/issues/story.mv?061103+torah; on (D) see http://www.yctorah.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_download/gid,101 and on (e) see http://www.yctorah.org/content/view/20/49/ for a list of the YCT faculty.


UPDATE: From R. Darren Kleinberg:
I just wanted to drop you a line to clarify something in R' Broyde's post. In it he states that YCT needs to clarify "whether the comments of a particular YCT musmach is representative of YCT, *as he has indicated he is*."

Without question, the musmach he is referring to is myself. I just want to be clear that I am *in no way an official representative of YCT* and that *I have never indicated as such*. In fact, just last week I wrote a piece for the Phoenix Jewish News in which I stated explicitly that while I am a graduate of YCT, etc - I do not speak on behalf of the yeshiva.


Le Marais - Kosher According to the OU

It seems that there has been some allegations against Le Marais but the OU has investigated and insists that it is kosher: link. So eat, drink and be merry there.

(The allegations: link)


Thursday, March 22, 2007

Salt vs. Honey: The Spiritual Taste Test

(by R. Dovid Gottlieb)

A short time after the passing of legendary film and Broadway star Hume Cronyn, family and friends gathered to memorialize his life. The most moving part of the evening occurred when the guests were surprisingly treated to a brief biographical video narrated by Cronyn himself.

Speaking over images from his long career, Mr. Cronyn described his basic love of acting. “I enjoy it. Why? Because it’s a lovely escape from the Hume Cronyn I have to live with twenty four hours a day.

This is a striking statement.

Click here to read moreIn addition to revealing a remarkable capacity for self-reflection, Cronyn’s observation candidly articulates a somewhat common human desire to hide from ones true self. While Mr. Cronyn was able to use the different roles that he played as a mask to hide behind, many of us utilize a different method: we hide behind the mask of social conformity.

It’s sad enough when this lack of individuality affects other parts of our lives, but it becomes even more tragic when this becomes a dominant motif in our religious lives.

There is an alternative model, however, which celebrates authentic self expression, and is highlighted by a fascinating contrast of halachos regarding – of all things – the Korban Minchah.

On the one hand we are told that any minchah, or meal offering, may not include leaven or honey (Vayikra 2:11). This pasuk implies that the basic ingredients of flour and oil must remain free from anything extra.

And yet, just two pesukim later we are told “ba’melach timlach,” that all menachos should be salted (2:13). In fact, the verse continues and further commands us that all sacrifices must include the addition of salt.

The question is two-fold: Why may we not add leaven or honey to the korban? And if we are commanded not to add ingredients, why must we add salt?

A number of classical meforshim offer symbolic explanations for the problem with leaven and honey, but most of these explanations don’t address the positive contribution of salt.

R. Mordechai Gifter (Pirkei Torah), on the other hand, offers a beautiful and unified explanation to both rules.

The problem with honey and leaven is that they are additives. They improve the taste or consistency of food by changing it. The external nature of the change they induce is the source of their prohibition.

Salt, on the other hand, preserves and enhances the natural flavor of food and this is the reason that we add it to korbanos.

[I am reminded of my beloved grandmother who takes well-deserved pride in her cooking. Add (a little) salt to her food? No problem. Add ketchup? Don’t even think about it!]

R. Gifter goes on to explain that these twin halachos do not merely govern what ingredients can be added to a sacrifice, but – more profoundly – serve as a model for spiritual expression and aspiration.

Symbolically, we are being taught that our service of and relationship with God shouldn’t be artificial mimicry of others, but a natural expression of our true inner selves. [For a similar idea, see the comments of the Sfas Emes, on the phrase (Vayikra 1:2) “adam ki yakriv mi’kem.”]

Obviously there is much about a halachic lifestyle which is objective and non-negotiable. No one is perfect and we all fall short at times. But this doesn’t – or at least shouldn’t – detract from our commitment to the binding nature of our obligation.

However, there is also large component of our religious life which is subjective and could fairly be described as more grey than either black or white. For example, on many issues there is a multiplicity of legitimate opinions and, as a result, some people or communities will choose to follow one opinion while others will follow an alternate approach.

And there are also many practices that aren’t mandated by strict halachah but are, nevertheless, observed by some people because they enhance their personal relationship with Ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu.

I believe that it is in these situations – the all important grey areas – where it is so crucial that we internalize the lesson of the minchah.

What is right for one person or community may not be right for another. In those areas where there is a range of legitimate opinion or which can be honestly characterized as optional (divrei reshus), we must remember that “one size does NOT fit all.”

Doing, or not doing, something primarily because “that’s what he or she is doing” is the equivalent of adding honey to the korban. Perhaps it improves the taste but – ultimately – it’s artificial. And when it comes to matters of the soul, inyanei ruchniyus, artificiality simply has no place.

Rather than honey, it’s far better to add a little salt.

Subjective or optional choices should be made with the sincere intent of actualizing our unique potential and strengthening our personal relationship with the Ribbono Shel Olam.

The challenge of life is to improve – not hide from – who we are.

Remember: When it comes to avodas Hashem, there is no single recipe and salt is always sweeter than honey.


Apdapted from a drasha given at Congregation Shomrei Emunah in Baltimore, MD on Shabbos, Parshas Vayika, 5764.


Women in the Army

Should women serve in the army? In theory, assuming that there was an army that was entirely accomodating to the religious woman's needs, would a woman be obligated to serve in the army?

Ostensibly, this would seem to be a matter of debate between the Rambam and Sefer Ha-Chinukh regarding an obligatory war, which the Rambam elsewhere defines as a war against Amalek, the seven Canaanite nations or to defend Jews. The Chinukh (603) writes that women are not obligated to remember what Amalek did to the Jewish because it is tied to fighting Amalek, which is a task for men and not women. Similarly, he writes (525) that the obligation not to fear an enemy during war is only on men, because they are the ones who do the fighting. Clearly, the Chinukh is of the view that women do not fight in wars, including the obligatory war against Amalek.

Click here to read moreHowever, the Rambam writes in Sefer Ha-Mitzvos (introduction at the end of shoresh 14) that women do not fight in optional wars. The implication seems to be that they are only exempt from optional wars but they do fight in obligatory wars.

The Minchas Chinukh (525:1, 603:3) argues on the Chinukh based on the Mishnah in Sotah (44b) states that during a time of mandatory war a bride and groom leave their chupah. If a bride leaves her chupah (wedding canopy), then surely she fights in the war.

Others, however, counter that the Gemara (Nazir 59a) states that a woman may not carry weapons because they are considered "men's clothes". Additionally, the Gemara in Kiddushin (2b) states that it is not the "way" of women to wage war. If they were obligated in fighting a war, wouldn't it be considered their "way" and shouldn't they be allowed to carry weapons? R. Shlomo Wahrman (She'eiris Yosef vol. 5 no. 38 p. 212) quotes R. Eliezer Silver as saying that whenever the Gemara explains that it is not the "way" for something to be done, it really means that it is prohibited to do so (see there). Therefore, women would be forbidden to fight in an obligatory war.

Regarding the Mishnah in Sotah, that a bride leaves her chupah, many point to the Radbaz (Hilkhos Melakhim 7:4) who explains that Mishnah in two ways: 1) Since the groom has to leave to go to war, there is therefore no chupah left. The bride's leaving the chupah is so the groom will go fight the war. 2) The bride goes off to war to prepare food and drink for her husband, but not to fight (cf. the glosses of the Rashash, ad loc.).

R. Chanokh Agus (Marcheshes vol. 1 22:6) suggests that women are not obligated to fight in war, per se, but they are obligated to settle the land of Israel. Any war that is necessary to fulfill that commandment is, therefore, also obligatory on them. But they are exempt from other wars, such as that against Amalek. However, most other authorities argue that women are exempt from all wars.

R. Yosef Kafach, in his edition of Sefer Ha-Mitzvos (p. 56 n. 54), argues that even the Rambam agrees that women are not commanded to fight in an obligatory war. He points out that in manuscripts of Rambam's commentary to the Mishnah (Kiddushin 1:7, see R. Kafach's edition of it) he writes that women are not obligated to fight the war against Amalek. Clearly, Rambam also holds that women are not commanded to fight in an obligatory war.

Therefore, many have reached the conclusion that women are not obligated to fight in any war. Cf. R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Hilkhos Medinah vol. 2 3:6; R. Shlomo Goren, Toras Ha-Moadim (1992 edition) pp. 195-198; R. Yosef Kafach, ibid.; R. Shlomo Wahrman, ibid.

One more thing needs to be said. None of the above means to imply that a woman is not allowed to defend herself when and if this is needed. If there is no one else to fight for her, then no one would require her to just sit and let herself be attacked. The only question is when there is an existing army -- whether women should be called to the army or just men. And the halakhah seems to be that -- even in an ideal religious environment -- women should not be fighting in a Jewish army.


Wednesday, March 21, 2007

The Stability and Flexibility of the Torah

R. Zvi Kanotopsky, Rays of Splendor (Brooklyn, 1956), pp. 22-23:
What of the Oral Law itself? What should be the conception of the Orthodox Jew with regard to the nature of the Oral Tradition? We hear so much in our days of the inherent flexibility of Jewish Law! The cry of flexibility and its component clamor for change has contributed no little to the existing confusion. It is a difficult problem. But a position of some clarity should be established. Now, notice the simple teachings that our Rabbis are suggesting in their intriguing remarks ואת הארץ כי נעמה זו תורה שבעל פה. He saw the land that it was pleasant. This refers to the Oral Law [Yalkut Reubeni Vayehi]. The Oral Law, the Halacha, is symbolically compared to land, to soil. Draw this analogy to its logical conclusion and you will find a beautiful and concise analysis of the nature of our Oral Tradition.

The very first characteristic which is suggested by ארץ, by land or soil, is its stability. Of all the objects in the world, of all the property a many may possess, nothing suggests the characteristic of stability as does land or soil. And this we must learn above all else as the foundation of our thinking. After all the talk of the development of Jewish Law is said and done, our Rabbis saw fit to emphasize the inherent stability of the Law. The Oral Law remains the same and retains the same stability as suggested by ארץ, by soil. The analogy is so startling. The student of the soil can at best devise means and methods of drawing the most from the soil he is studying. The basic nature of the soil remains the same. The student of Halacha can again draw from the Halacha as much as is possible, but can never change one iota of the Halacha. Regardless of our secular moral code, the laws of modesty and the segregation of the sexes at services remain unchanged. Regardless of every advance in science and medicine, the laws of מקוה remain untouched. This is stability. This is what our Rabbis meant when they compared the Oral Tradition to Land.

Surely there is development in Jewish Law. The one who tills the soil, plants the seed and cares for it, finds out that it soon produces fruit. We have new problems today, new technological problems. We have situations today which did not exist in ancient times. Here the problems have to be planted in the soil of the Halacha and the solution will be forthcoming. But something strange happens! With the solution to the problem, Halacha is clarified. In the process of abstraction of principles and application to the specific, the concepts of the Halacha themselves become clearer and more profound. This is development. This is flexibility as we recognize it, and as we accept it.

But one other point must be clearly emphasized. The one who tills the soil has a great deal of respect and love and reverence for the soil. The farmer always speaks with reverence of his land. A similar attitude must exist in Torah. In the process of development, that reverence must be expressed. It is only that individual who has lived with Torah, whose entire life is integrated with Halacha as the life of the farmer is integrated with his soil, it is only that individual who can interpret the Halacha and apply it and develop it.


Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Intermarriage and Minyan

Can a man who is intermarried be counted for a minyan? The Minchas Yitzchak (3:65) quotes the Chakham Tzvi (38) who writes that there are certain sins that are so rebellious that the community would excommunicate someone who commits them. Examples he gives are openly violating Shabbos and repeatedly sleeping with non-Jewish women. Even if, the Chakham Tzvi writes, the community has not excommunicated such a person, we cannot give public honor to someone who should be excommunicated because it gives the mistaken impression to people that these sins are acceptable. Therefore, the Chakham Tzvi concludes, we should not count them for a minyan or call them to the Torah (cf. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Talmud Torah 7:4). This means that someone who is intermarried should not be counted for a minyan.

Writing in early twentieth century Germany, the Seridei Esh (Orach Chaim 7 [new edition]) writes similarly, that since the community must excommunicate someone who intermarries in order to teach that it is unacceptable, even if for whatever reason they cannot excommunicate him they still may not call him to the Torah.

The above Minchas Yitzchak raises the issue regarding someone who violates Shabbos, that people today are not necessarily raised in tight, traditional communities and therefore do not violate Shabbos with the same intentions as in past generations -- i.e., they are tinokos she-nishbu and therefore not fully culpable for their violations. Therefore, there is reason to be lenient regarding someone who violates Shabbos. While the Minchas Yitzchak does not indicate whether he agrees with this position (which has become fairly normative), he points out that this logic does not apply to intermarriage. In 1959 Manchester, every Jew was raised knowing that intermarriage is absolutely unacceptable and, therefore, no one can claim that they were not adequately educated regarding this prohibition.

Similarly, the Seridei Esh (ibid. 11:13) writes that since not calling Shabbos violators to the Torah is an issue of public policy and communal education, it is up to the local rabbi to determine whether refusing to call someone to the Torah will teach them (and the community) a proper lesson or will serve to alienate people from the Torah. If the former, then they should not be called up. If the latter, then the rabbi is free to permit it.

The question, then, is whether in the year 2007 intermarriage has sadly become so common that we cannot say that every Jew is raised knowing that intermarriage is absolutely unacceptable. Perhaps there are people today who are tinokos she-nishbu regarding intermarriage and our failing to call them to the Torah only alienates them further. According to the above reasoning, perhaps in certain communities and outreach synagogues, where there is not an issue of appearing to condone such violations, intermarried men may be counted for a minyan and called to the Torah.

R. Hershel Schachter (Eretz Ha-Tzvi 17:4-5) quotes in the name of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, based on Eruvin 19a, that God's covenant with Avraham required four things of Jews: 1) Belief in God's unity, 2) Performing circumcision, 3) Not intermarrying, 4) Belief that God gave to Avraham and his descendants the land of Israel. R. Schachter suggests that fulfilling these four conditions is a prerequisite for being a part of the Jewish people (regardless of one's personal status as a Jew). Therefore, someone who violates any of these conditions (e.g. intermarries) is not a part of the Jewish people and, if this is taken literally, should not be called to the Torah or counted for a minyan. I'm not entirely sure if R. Schachter would extend this idea that far, although see his article "Synagogue Membership" in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society.


Sunday, March 18, 2007

Mendelssohn on Alenu

R. Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, pp. 307-309:
[There was in Prussia] a royal edict of August 28, 1703, which forbade the recital of a certain phrase, "for they bow down and prostrate themselves before what is vain and futile and pray to a god who cannot help," in the `Alenu prayer at the conclusion of each service. A Jewish convert to Christianity had testified that this particular phrase was meant as a slur against Jesus. To ensure the omission of this sentence from the prayer, the edict demanded that the text be recited aloud by the cantor and that the services be inspected by government-appointed Christian supervisors familiar with the Hebrew language...

This utterly ludicrous edict had actually been observed by the Jewish communities, so as to avoid giving any imagined offense, but the duty of supervising the services was no longer taken seriously by local authorities except in the city of Koenigsberg... Offended, [the Koenigsberg supervisor, named David Kypke,] lodged a complaint with the Royal Ministry of State on April 5, 1777, airing not only his personal "grievance" but also reporting that the `Alenu prayer was being recited in a sort of "muttering," rather than aloud...

In self-defense the community submitted a testimonial written (at its request) by [Moses] Mendelssohn a few weeks before his departure for Koenigsberg [in the summer of 1777, on a business trip]. It was entitled "Thoughts on Jewish Prayers, Especially on the `Alenu Prayer" and did not bear his signature... "The prayer `Alenu," Mendelssohn pointed out, "is one of the oldest prayers of our nation. It was originally instituted only for New Years's Day, as a solemn introduction to the homage paid to the Supreme Lawgiver and Judge of the World. Because of its important and sublime [erhabenen] content it has been adopted as the daily concluding prayer. It can be shown irrefutably, on a number of grounds, that only the heathens and their idolatrous worship are referred to in it, and not, as some enemies and slanderers of the Jewish nation falsely contend, the Christians, who like ourselves worship the King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be He; that, moreover, no kabbalistic allusions to their [the Christians'] Messiah are found in it." The last remark was directed against the allegation that the numerical value of the word va-rik ("and futile") alluded to Yeshu (Jesus).

Mendelssohn then undertook to prove that this prayer had originated in pre-Christian times and thus could contain no anti-Christian passages. Indeed, some authorities had attributed its authorship to a figure of such remote antiquity as Moses' disciple Joshua the son of Nun. Yet this much was certain, that the prayer must have existed at least at the time of the Second Temple. For had it been composed later one should find there some expression of hope in the rebuilding of the Temple and the restoration of the Jewish state. The text had remained unaltered, and the fact that Jews in Muslim lands recited it in exactly the same way as Jews recited it in Christian lands was a clear indication that no anti-Christian reference was intended...

On September 2, 1777, a strong memorandum opposing Kypke's rejoinder was submitted, and in the following year a petition addressed to the king finally achieved the termination of the undignified practice.


Friday, March 16, 2007

Thoughts on Interfaith Dialogue

R. Yitzchok Adlerstein discusses an article by R. Meir Soloveichik on interfaith dialogue: link


The Rambam on Sacrifices in the Future

R. Gidon Rothstein (link):
Giving them some apparent (I stress the word) comfort is the view of Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim, who suggests that God instituted sacrifice because the people of the time of the Exodus were not ready for a sacrifice-free world. In weaning them from it, God restricted it to one place and only certain forms.

Only by knowing a bit of Rambam can we avoid the common error of assuming that he meant to imply that sacrifice has no other importance, and would not occur in a future Temple. First, as Prof. Twersky zt”l noted (and R. Lichtenstein has quoted approvingly), that section of the Moreh is not so much devoted to giving the reason for the mitsvot, but a reason. Rambam was trying to show that mitsvot are logical, not that he had captured the absolute reason for them (as he himself stresses in the Mishneh Torah, again as Prof. Twersky zt”l demonstrated).

If so, that Rambam’s reason no longer applies in no way implies that sacrifice itself has become irrelevant. Rambam’s having spent so much of the Mishnah Commentary and the Mishneh Torah explaining and expounding the laws of sacrifice and ritual purity—laws that did not apply in his own time, and were usually left out of halachic works of his time—should be enough of a proof of his commitment to their continuing importance.


Thursday, March 15, 2007

Lace on the South Side

From R. Yitzchak Meir Goodman, And There Was Light, p. 284:
"...on the south side, lace hangings were of fine twisted linen...." (Shemos 38:9)

These "hangings" (kela'im) existed only in the Mishkan, but not in the Temple in Jerusalem. However, the puzzle is that in the chapter of Mishnah recited each morning [Eizehu Mekoman], we read of sacrifices to be eaten "inside of the hangings." But the Mishnah was written to guide us in Temple procedures.

The early commentators (Beis Yosef, Orach Chaim, chapter 50) state that this chapter of Mishnah was chosen for each morning's prayers as a rare, ideal one. In the entire chapter there is no disagreement between the rabbis. Why indeed is there such a rarity?

The Vilna Gaon states the reason. This chapter was rendered in its entirety, without a word changed, precisely as it was handed down to us by Moshe at Mt. Sinai! Therefore, the kela'im were of course part of the instruction at that time, and remained in the text of the mishnayos.

The Vilna Gaon, פנינם משלחן הגר"א, edited by Rav Dov Eliach


Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Musings on the Proper Way to Learn Chumash

Learning Chumash (the Pentateuch) is controversial of late, so allow me to offer a few thoughts. I was taught that an important goal in learning Gemara is to try to think like earlier sages. Thus, if you asks a question that one of the rishonim (medieval commentators) asked, it means you are on the right track. And if you suggest an answer that one of the rishonim offered, then you've scored a major success. So the general measure of success is how well your mind is in tune with medieval commentators. And if you offer a new explanation, the measure of its success is in whether it seems like something a rishon would say. Sure, you can find acharonim who aren't like rishonim. So if you ask a question or offer an answer like them, you're also on a good path. But if your question or answer is not something any of them would have asked, you aren't following in any established way of learning.

Does this mean that there is no room for new methodologies? Not necessarily. They just shouldn't be your main approach and you should be very hesitant when offering any new idea. You shouldn't use these approaches for anything controversial.

The same goes for learning Chumash. If your question and answer are what a rishon would ask and answer, then you're doing great. If not, well, maybe you're doing something wrong. You shouldn't be going out on any limbs that way.

So if you make a deduction that is critical of one of the Patriarchs, you have to ask yourself whether this is an explanation that a rishon would offer. If it is in the same style, then you're on solid ground. If not, then you should be extremely careful and perhaps should not say it at all. Just because rishonim criticized the Patriarchs does not mean that all criticism is fair game. You need to be taking their approach to the text and utilize similar sensitivities. If you can intuit their questions and answers on other issues then you can offer your own questions and answers in a similar vein.


Web Choices 2007

Jason Maoz, Senior Editor of The Jewish Press, lists his choices of "worthwhile" websites and blogs: link

I don't think it is in order of importance but Hirhurim is in the top ten of the list.

Thank you.


Happy Pi Day

Happy Pi Day. I'm proud to say that I still remember the first 14 digits of pi by heart from elementary school. But that's child's play compared to the guy who can recite 100,000 digits by heart.


Amalek and Military Ethics

When R. Elijah Schochet, author of the biography of the Bach, sent me a copy of his 1992 book Amalek: The Enemy Within, I flipped through it, saw a lot of references to chasidic and kabbalistic commentaries, and decided that it didn't particularly interest me. For some reason, this year before Purim I was moved to take another look at the book and was very surprised by what I found. R. Schochet takes a topical survey of the various approaches to explain the concept of Amalek. He categorizes the different approaches, cognizant of the chronology of commentators but not a slave to it, and gives brief summaries of samples from each genre and approach to demonstrate the various trends, all with his characteristic eloquence and clarity. What emerges is, on the one hand, a collection of vertlakh (short Torah insights) on Amalek and, on the other hand, a study of how different rabbinic thinkers approach the topic in their own ways. I found the book to be enlightening and enjoyable.

Here is one approach that I found interesting:
As noted earlier, many reasons are cited for Joshua's having been chosen as military leader of Israel. However, the homilist R. Zevi Hirsch of Vilna in his Maggid Mesharim suggests that the true reason for Joshua's selection was due to Moses' ethical sensitivities. Moses was concerned that the Israelites might adopt Amalekite tactics in their battle plan against Amalek! R. Zevi points out how it is common practice for warring armies to carefully study and emulate on another's military tactics and procedures:

"Behold, the Torah has described the nature of the weapons of Amalek, i.e., a lack of reverence for the Lord. More horrible than all else are the evil attributes and abominable cruelties perpetrated by man in this state of faithlessness. For, if one has no fear of any divine power, there will be no restraints upon his lusts, and he will do whatever his heart desires, for he reasons that there is neither judge nor judgment... only a reverence for the Lord can possible restrain and control one's behavior...

But, what if Israel should choose to emulate Amalek and employ his tactics? Why should we not practice deceptions, deceits... robbery, murder, all possible worldly abominations? Since they are his weapons of war, we, too, shall employ them!"


It is for this reason that Moses chose Joshua to lead the Israelites into battle, confident that Joshua would not stoop to employing Amalek's reprehensible military stratagems. The only proper weapons of Israel are "fear of the Lord" and "ethical commitments." Only by means of sincere faith and compassionate living can Israel hope to triumph.

Maggid Mesharim presents an interesting theory as to why this "ethical approach" is bound to succeed:

"When the nations of the world perceive Israel practicing righteousness, integrity, kindness and compassion toward all peoples, they will perforce assent with an "amen," and proclaim, 'There is no nation as righteous as Israel.'"


JIBs

Still early in the game but here's a plug anyway: www.jibawards.com


Tuesday, March 13, 2007

Enlisting in the Army II

Regarding this post, Menachem Butler correctly noted that I had forgotten the recent article by Dr. Judith Bleich in Tradition on this very subject (link - subscription required but note that you can now subscribe online). Dr. Bleich quotes a number of authorities who were opposed to enlistment and/or looked negatively on conscription. On the other side, she quotes a few authorities who looked positively on army service: R. David Tzvi Hoffmann (Melamed Le-ho'il, Orach Chaim 42-43), R. Samson Raphael Hirsch (Horeb, sec. 609) and R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (the "Dor Revi'i" in Tel Talpiot, no. 104). She did not quote the position of Rav Herzog that I translated in the previous post.


Monday, March 12, 2007

Enlisting in the Army

Is a Jew allowed to enlist in the army (outside of Israel)? Assuming that kosher concerns can be taken care of, there are still serious issues of Shabbos violations, among other things.

In volume 4 of Bnei Banim (link), R. Yehuda Henkin published a letter from his famous grandfather, R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, to his son (and R. Yehuda Henkin's father) on this issue. During World War II, Dr. Avraham Hillel considered enlisting in the US army and asked his father, R. YE Henkin, for advice. R. Henkin responded as follows (pp. 93-94):
In my view there is a distinction between the army rules that used to be in America and England, and the current obligations to the army. In the past, when the entire army was voluntary, and during war they would announce and call for volunteers based on their emotions and dedication to nation and land -- then everyone was certainly required to accept this responsibility. But now that there is an obligation for this work [i.e. a draft] -- I don't see why one should volunteer to go. Through this, one will only exempt someone else because there is a limit to the army...
Perhaps more to the point, R. Yitzchak Herzog writes the following in an essay published in Techumin 4/1983 (pp. 14-15):
The question is when there is no draft but the government request volunteers from the people, like in Britain at the beginning of World War I.

On this there is not only the question of placing oneself in danger to be killed, or the question of killing... but also of violating Shabbos and eating non-kosher food and chametz on Pesach. And even if we can fully arrange the matter of kosher food -- if all the Jews in the country request it, they can work with the government to make sure there is kosher food -- but it is impossible to avoid violating Shabbos and Yom Tov. However, once one is in a battle there is piku'ach nefesh and, additionally, [even before] then one is forced by the government since the volunteer from the time he enlists is under the full obligation of the army and cannot fail to violate Shabbos and Yom Tov... The question is whether one is permitted to bring oneself into a situation of such duress.

Regarding the actual law of violating Shabbos we should investiagte whether he is violating Shabbos on a biblical level, because the view of the Maharik (137) is that when gentiles threaten our lives if we do not violate Shabbos then one does not violate on a biblical level because it is a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah... However, one can also say that if all or most Jews, relying on their religion that prohibits violating Shabbos, fail to volunteer, then this will also endanger all Jews in that country, perhaps in the whole world, because they will say that Jews are not loyal to their government and are a danger to the country's existence. See Responsa Mitzpeh Aryeh from the genius of Lvov who permitted a Jewish doctor to violate Shabbos to save endangered gentiles for this reason.

In addition to that viewpoint we arrive at the dispute between the Ramban and Razah if one is allowed to place oneself in a position of duress regarding the violation of Shabbos, which the Razah permits in a mitzvah situation and based on this it is ruled that one may join a caravan into the desert and a boat, even if one knows that they will need to violate Shabbos because of piku'ach nefesh... Therefore we can say that preventing bad things from the Jews and a denigration of the Jewish name among the nations is also a mitzvah, a great mitzvah, even if we do not wring (נמצה) the matter all the way to piku'ach nefesh for the entire Jewish people. Therefore it is permissible to enlist, and once he volunteers he is under duress because of piku'ach nefesh.


Sunday, March 11, 2007

Abandoned by the Rabbis?

It is always wonderful when rabbis try to make Judaism more relevant to people's daily lives. In today's metropolitan areas, that means dealing with the workplace, where people -- particularly men but often women as well -- spend the vast majority of their waking hours. How does Judaism in general, and halakhah in particular, impact that significant aspect of people's lives?

As I was looking recently for a Pesach guide, I came across a short book I once received in the mail titled Nine to Five: A Guide to Modest Conduct for Today's Workplace. The title sounded promising and I was hoping to find a book that deals with how to maintain modest behavior in a business environment that thrives on arrogance. How do you go on an interview without immodestly praising yourself? How do you make sure to receive credit for work you've done without bragging? Unfortunately, the book is limited to male-female interaction. While it is understood that this deals with one of the strongest natural urges in a human being, there is definitely more to the workplace than avoiding improper male-female interaction.

But not only that, the book seems to claim to address the contemporary business environment but addresses situations that seem to be highly limited. This is understandable, because what opportunities do a rabbi have to experience multiple business environments? Yet how can you write a book about something of which you have limited knowledge? (My wife points out that maybe the book is specifically referring to all-frum work environments. That would be great but the introduction to the book makes it sound like it is universally applicable.)

Just consider the following excerpts make it quite clear:
It is forbidden to make small talk about matters unrelated to business. Men and women working together should not discuss politics, current events, recent tragedies or gossip, even if they do not do so regularly. Discussing these matters on a daily basis, is a violation of halachos that border on giluy arayos, which requires one to sacrifice his life rather than transgress. (p. 9)

When conversing with female employees or co-workers, one must be careful not to us the word "we," so that the man and woman are not referred to as one unit. For example, one should not say, "We must talk with the editor," or "We must purchase that software program." Rather, he should say, "The editor must be consulted," or "Please purchase that program." (pp. 10-11)

It is a custom amongst yirei shomayim not to call a woman other than one's wife or immediate family member by her first name, thus keeping a respectful distance between the two parties. Referring to a woman by her first name brings inappropriate familiarity into the relationship. Similarly, a woman should refrain from addressing a man other than her husband or immediate family member by his first name. (p. 20)
That's just a sample. If you follow these rules, you will be so awkward that you will never get a promotion and never close a deal. In a company where everyone is called by their first name and you can go into the CEO who makes 30 million dollars a year's office and call him Larry, is it really a good idea to advise people to call every woman Mrs. Grand or Ms. Crystal? I'm sure that there are a few people with the charisma to be able to handle every situation. But, speaking for myself, I would just end up being awkwardly silent and offending women, who may be my boss or simply someone whose help I will eventually need. In the workplace, you can be faced with complex political situations in which you need all of the allies you can get. Alienating half of the workforce isn't going to help you with that. Nor will it help you to get someone to take on some of your work because you have to leave early for Shabbos.

Are there nisyonos (spiritual challenges) in the workplace? Of course there are, and male-female interaction is definitely a significant (but not the only) one. We all need to have appropriate boundaries to help us deal with these nisyonos. But offering unrealistic guidelines doesn't help us; it hurts us.

When I read a book like this, I feel profoundly sad. It makes me think that the rabbis have abandoned us. There was once a time when rabbis recognized that people struggle to feed and clothe their families. They considered working to be a devar mitzvah and struggled to find leniencies to allow people to earn a living. And what do we get? Don't shake hands.* Don't make small talk. Don't compliment a woman. Etc. etc. Unrealistic advice does not help us get through our challenges. It just leaves us abandoned, trying to figure it out on our own. No wonder there are many people who fail these challenges.

Consider this passage that the book labels a "Helpful Suggestion":
It is appropriate for male and female employees [to] refrain from all conversation when they meet anywhere outside of the office. This includes not discussing even job-related matters when meeting in the hallway or elevator at work.
Thanks for the "helpful" idea. Reality: Business is discussed everywhere. In the bathroom, in the hallways, in cabs, and on the street. What do you do if a female colleague (or executive!) starts talking business to you? Or what if she starts making small talk? Or what if she doesn't and you fail to fill that awkward silence. Do you insist that your religion prohibits it? I honestly know of a case in which a woman lost a job opportunity to a less qualified man because she left what was perceived as awkward silences in a particular conversation. And this book is highly praised and comes with glowing approbations from leading rabbis.

We need you but where are you? Are we all alone in this? Maybe TorahWeb can give us insight into these issues because they seem like some of the only people making sense today.


* Regarding shaking hands, see the current issue of Hakirah, where R. Yehuda Henkin permits shaking hands, a position that most rabbis will take in private. When a friend of mine started working, he called R. Avigdor Miller and, despite this friend's hesitations that he was uncomfortable with the idea, was told by R. Miller to shake women's hands.

UPDATE: R. Yehuda Henkin published the following critique of the book in Hatzofeh Oct. 4 '02:


Saturday, March 10, 2007

Important Responsum Regarding Child Abuse

If anyone can translate this into English, please post it in the comments and I'll move it into the text of the post. Thank you.
In the year 5613 it occurred in a certain city; a rumor was heard about a certain teacher, who lives there now for 8 years, and the children who learned from him in their youth, and are currently 13 years old and more, testify that in their youth (minority) when they learned from him he defiled them with homosexual intercourse, God save us. And in the past summer when the thing became known to a God-fearing man, he cried a great and bitter outcry, and the thing came before the rabbi and head of the bet din, and they did not wish to accept testimony. And this man [the accused] accepted upon himself with swear and oath that immediately after the semester he would move from there. And behold, afterward he wished to be a teacher in Lvov. And when the rumor was heard in Lvov one respected layman sent a letter to the rabbi, head of the holy bet din, and he responded that he would seat there a beis din to investigate and inquire into the matter, and he did not find a speck of disqualification according to the Torah, and there was no clarification on the topic, and a judge has only that which his eyes see, and the aforementioned custom is under his control (?). And against the will of the layman of that place they accepted the teacher to be there, for they said that he was a good worker. And the aforementioned brazen one crowed like a bird that it was a treasonous scheme, that they are weak minded and also that he gave to the benefactor and leader 50 units of money, and they are perforce interested parties [i.e., have a conflict of interest]. And here, in [the week of] Parashas Va’era, a letter reached me with testimony signed by three respected men, and one man who recognizes the signatures, and two young men testified, one who is now 15 years old and one who is today 13 years old or more, that in their youth when they learned from him, boys of around 9 years or less, he would defile them with homosexual intercourse, for they would sleep with him in a bed in the room where he lived, and the things came with much elaboration that is disgusting to put into writing.

And this is what I responded: in truth, I already went on at length about this in a responsum, that to disqualify a person it is necessary that there be two kosher witnesses, and I brought the words of the Pri Chadash and the Ritva that to disqualify a person it requires two kosher witnesses, and that it is like capital matters. And if so, in this case, where they were minors at the time of the act and they are only believed to testify in their adulthood about what they saw in their childhood for questions of rabbinic law [not biblical], as elaborated in Choshen Mishpat siman 35, and here to disqualify a person they are certainly not believed. However, according to what the Mahari”k and the Terumas Ha-Deshen wrote, and the Rem”a set in the Shulchan Aruch, that in a situation where kosher witnesses are not necessary, even a woman and a minor child are believed. And if so, in this matter, where it is definitely impossible for there to be adult men, and it is impossible for there to be testimony in the matter, for without a doubt this man even if he is wicked and corrupt, but his acts are in secret and he only amuses himself with young children, and he is like one who (mislahleha be-zikim?) and says “I am only playing.” If so, it is obvious that they are believed to testify, and are we also [not - GS] coming to disqualify him from testimony and oaths but only say that perhaps he did this. And they already said in Niddah (61), this bad talk [i.e. lashon ha-ra], even though to accept it is not required, to be concerned however is required. And in Moed Kattan (18) they said that this bad talk -- in any event some bit of it is true. And if so, however, woe unto us that in our days such a thing arose, that a man like this would be a teacher of young children of the study house, the breath of whose mouth is pure, and there is a concern that the breath of his unclean mouth will defile them. And therefore, in my opinion it is appropriate to remove the crown of education from his head, and they should worry for their lives until he fully repents with afflictions as appropriate, and then he will return to accept the status of a full community member and it will be for him atonement for his sins. And as long as he does not admit his sins repentance is inapplicable, as the Tevu'os Shor wrote in siman 2.
And I went on at length about this in a responsum to Dravitch…

And here, regarding what was written above from this bad talk, even though to accept it is not required, to be concerned however is required, I found afterward in the Mahari”k shoresh 188, that he wrote that this is specifically to save them that it is permitted to desist [based on the lashon ha-ra], but not to punish them with any punishment, and to embarrass them is prohibited based on bad talk. However, this is specific to the case there, where there was only bad talk. But here there was a testimony, even if there are no kosher witnesses it is worth more than (mere) bad talk, and it is obvious that one should desist from giving him students. So it seems IMHO.

And behold, on the holy Shabbos of Parashat Toledos of that year, two letters reached me speaking and advocating on behalf of the same man. And this is what I responded to them both at once: …


שו"ת שואל ומשיב מהדורה א ח"א סימן קפה

בשנת תרי"ג אירע בעיר אחד נשמע קול על מלמד אחד שמתגורר שם זה שמנה שנים והילדים אשר למדו אצלו בקטנותם וכעת הם בני י"ג שנה ויותר הם מעידים שבקטנותם כאשר למדו אצלו טימא אותם במשכב זכור ר"ל ובקיץ העבר כשנודע הדבר לאיש ירא אלקים צעק צעקה גדולה ומרה ובא הדבר לפני הרב האב"ד והנה לא רצו לקבל גבי"ע =גביית עדות= וזה האיש קבל על עצמו באלה ובשבועה שתיכף אחר הזמן יסע משם והנה אח"כ רצה להיות מלמד בלבוב וכאשר נשמע הקול בלבוב שלח בעה"ב אחד נכבד מכתב להרב אבד"ק והוא השיב כי ישב עם ב"ד לחקור ולדרוש הדבר ולא מצא שמץ פסול עפ"י ד"ת ולא הי' שום בירור על הענין ואין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות והמנהג הנ"ל תחת ידו הוא וע"כ הבעה"ב דשם החזיקו המלמד שיהיו שם כי אמרו שהוא אומן והחצוף הנ"ל צווח ככרוכיא שהוא קשר בוגדים שהם קלי הדעת ומה גם שנתן להפו"מ חמשים רייניש כסף על רעקריטרינג וע"כ המה נוגעים בדבר. והנה בפ' וארא הגיעני מכתב עם גב"ע מחותם בחתימת שלשה אנשים נכבדים והעיד אלי איש אחד שמכיר בטב"ע החתימות והעידו שני בחורים האחד הוא כעת בן ט"ו שנה והאחד הוא כהיום בן י"ג שנה ויותר שבילדותם בהיותם לומדים אצלו כבני ט' שנה או פחות היה מטמא אותם במשכב זכור כי היו שוכבים אצלו במטה בחדר אשר דר שם והדברים באו ברוב ענין אשר הוא מגונה להעלות על הספר וזאת אשר השבתי באמת כבר הארכתי בזה בתשובה דלפסול האדם צריך שיהיו שני עדים כשרים והבאתי דברי הפר"ח והריטב"א דלפסול אדם צריך שני עדים כשרים והיא כד"נ וא"כ כאן שהיו קטנים בעת שהיה המעשה ואינם נאמנים להעיד בגדלם מה שראו בקוטנם כמבואר /בחו"מ/ סימן ל"ה רק במילי דרבנן וכאן לפסול את האדם ודאי לא נאמנים אמנם לפמ"ש המהרי"ק והתה"ד וקבעו הרמ"א בש"ע שבמקום שא"צ להיות עדים כשרים נאמנים אפילו אשה וקטן וא"כ בדבר זה שבודאי א"א להיות גדולים וא"א שתהיו עדות בדבר דבלי ספק האיש הלז אף אם הוא רשע ופריץ אבל במסתר מעשהו ורק בילדים קטנים משחק וכמתלהלה בזיקים ואומר הלא משחק אני א"כ פשיטא דנאמנים להעיד ומה גם דאטו אנו רוצים לפסלו לעדות ולשבועה רק דאמרי' דשמא עשה זאת וכבר אמרו בנדה דף ס"א האי לישנא בישא אף דלקבולי לא בעי למיחש מיהא מבעיא ובמ"ק דף י"ח אמרו דהאי לישנא בישא עכ"פ מקצתו אמת וא"כ איפוא אוי לנו שבימינו עלתה כך שיהיה איש כזה מלמד תינוקות של בית רבן אשר הבל פיהם טהור ויש לחוש שהבל פיו הטמא יטמא אותם וע"כ על דעתי שמהראוי להסיר כתר המלמדות מעל ראשו ויחושו לנפשם עד אשר ישוב בתשובה שלימה ובסגופים כראוי ואז ישוב לקבל ד"ח =דברי חבירות= ויהיה לו לכפרה על חטאיו וכ"ז שאינו מתודה על חטאיו לא שייך תשובה כמ"ש התב"ש בסמ"ב והארכתי בזה בתשובה לדראהביטש בדבר השו"ב אשר שם והוגד לי בשם אחד גדול הגאון הצדיק וחסיד מו"ה דוד זצ"ל בעהמ"ח אהבת דוד ויהונתן שפירש בדרך מוסר מ"ש בש"ע המטיל מים מן הצופים ולפנים לא ישב ופניו כלפי הקדש ואמר שקאי על מי שמטיל קרי ואמר שזה מן הצופים ולפנים דעינא וליבא תרין סרסורי דעבירה לזה אמר לא ישב שאינו מועיל תשובה ופניו כלפי הקדש ודפח"ח.

והנה במ"ש למעלה מהך דלישנא בישא אע"ג דלקבולי לא בעי למיחש מיהא מבעיא מצאתי אח"כ במהרי"ק שורש קפ"ח שכתב דדוקא להציל אותם הוא דמותר להמנע אבל לא לענוש אותם שום עונש ולבייש אותם אסור ע"י לישנא בישא אמנם זה דוקא שם שלא היה רק לישנא בישא לבד אבל כאן היה גב"ע אף דאין כאן עדים כשרים עדיף מלישנא בישא ופשיטא דיש למנוע מלתת לו תלמידים כנלפע"ד.

והנה בש"ק פ' תולדות בשנה ההיא הגיעני שני מכתבים המדברים ומליצים טוב על האיש הלז. וזה אשר השבתי לשניהם ביחד מ"ש הרב להתנצל על מה לא קיבל עדות וכתב בתחלה עפ"י דברי מוהר"ם מינץ בתשובה סי' ע"ה שאין לגבות עדות להוציא לעז הנה תשובתו בצידו וכמ"ש בעצמו דשאני כאן דהוא לאפרושי מאסורא ואני מוסיף שכן מבואר גם לענין עדות א' דקי"ל דטוביה חטא וזיגוד מנגד ומבואר בש"ע חו"מ סימן כ"ח דאם הוא לאפרושי מאסורא שרי ומ"ש מעלתו דגוף דברי העדים אינם כלום דהם קטנים כ"כ בזה בתשובתי וע"כ לא הבינותי גם מ"ש מעלתו דהם עדות מיוחדת ולפסול אדם בעי שיהיה עדות אחת דהוה כד"נ =כדיני נפשות= לא הבינותי דאני אמרתי עדיף מיני' דאפילו עדות מיוחדת ליכא ודמי להאי ציידא והנה עתה אשיב כסדר מ"ש על דברתי דלאפרושי מאיסורא ל"צ לגבות בפני בע"ד ומ"ש מעלתו די"ל דבאיסורין כיון דל"צ הגדה בב"ד כמ"ש הגאון בעל נתה"מ בסי' ל"ח ובסי' כ"ח באורך ה"ה דא"צ לקבל בפני בע"ד דדוקא על הב"ד הזהירה תורה לקבל בפני בע"ד הנה גוף סברתו אינו מתקבל כי גם דברי הגאון במחכ"ת לא נהירין כלל ויפה השיב עליו במשובב דרשו משם ואינו רוצה להתווכח עם הגאון מפני עשה דכבוד תורה והנה מ"ש לחלק דדוקא אם אנו באים לפסול האדם מחזקת כשרותו בזה צריכין לקבל בפני בע"ד אבל כאן אין אנו באים רק להרחיקו שלא ילמוד עם תלמידים עד שישוב אין אנו באין לפסול אותו וע"ז כתב מעלתו שלא הבין כלל שיחתי דבכ"מ שאנו פוסלין אדם אינו רק עד שישוב בתשובה ואפ"ה אי אפשר לפסלם ואני אומר דיפה כתב שלא הבין שיחתי דכוונתי בפשיטות דדוקא היכא שאנו מוציאים אותו מחזקת כשרותו בזה אמרינן דסתם כל אדם בחזקת כשרות וא"א לפסלו שלא בפניו ובפרט לקפח פרנסתו אבל כאן אטו נפסל בשביל זה מחזקת כשרותו רק שאנו אומרים שמלמד תינוקות צריך להיות ירא וחרד לדבר ד' יותר משאר בני אדם וכאן אנו רואין דהוא קל ע"כ צריכין אנו להרחיקו שישוב בתשובה שלימה א"כ ע"ז ל"ש שום קבלת עדות שלא בפני בע"ד וכל שנשמע עליו קול כזה כדאי בזיון וקצף שיהיו מלמד שם עד שישוב בתשובה שלימה ומ"ש דכבר נפסלו כיון שקבל עדות שלא בפני בע"ד הנה רואה אנכי שבשביל זה לא רצו לקבל העדות תחלה שאם יקבלו אחרים בודאי לא ירצה לבא לפניהם וא"צ לבא לפניהם וגם מתיראים לקבל עדות וא"כ אף שיקבלו עדות שוב יפסלו אבל לא הועילו בתקנתם דלא קי"ל דעביד איניש לאחזוקי דיבוריה כמ"ש הקצה"ח סי' כ"ח ס"ק ז' וסימן ל"ג ס"ק ב' והקצה"ח האריך בראיות ברורות וכן נכון לדינא כמ"ש בתשובה לק"ק פרעמישלאן ומ"ש על מ"ש בשם מהרי"ק והש"ע סימן ל"ה דנהגו לקבל אף עדות קטן כל דא"א שיהיה שם עדים כשרים וע"ז כתב דבמהרי"ק מבואר שצריך להיות התובע טוען ברי תמהני דשם שייך טענת בריא ומהטעם שכתב מהרי"ק דאל"כ לא שבקת חיי אבל כאן מה ריעותא יש במה שאינם טוענים ברי ואטו היו צריכין לדעת ואנן על זה העדות סומכין ומ"ש דל"ש אין אדם מע"ר =משים עצמו רשע= דרצונו לעשות תשובה וע"ז כתב מעלתו דזה שייך דוקא לגבי עצמו אבל לא לענין לפסול האדם עי"ז מאד תמהני דאטו פוסלין ע"י עדותם דהא באמת עדות קטנים היו אבל העדות לפסול הוא מצד התקנה ומ"ש דשייך פ"ד לא יפה כוון דכאן כשאנו מפלגין דבורא שלא רבע לזה שוב אין כאן שום עדות דבאמת הוא קטן רק דאמרינן מ"מ היו שם ומפני התקנה מקבלים אבל שיעיד שרבע ע"ז לא מהמנינן ליה וז"ב.


Friday, March 09, 2007

Radiating True Splendor

(Guest post by R. Dovid Gottlieb)

In describing Moshe’s descent from the mountain with the second set of luchos, the Torah famously informs us that Moshe was unaware that “keren ohr panav” – his face radiated light (34:29).

The Rabbis in the Midrash (Shemos Rabbah #47) are puzzled by the origin of what they refer to as these “karnei hod” – rays of splendor. When Moshe went up to receive the Torah he did not possess this light; so the question is: where did it come from?

While a number of answers are suggested – each one fascinating – I want to focus on the final answer given in the Midrash.

Click here to read more
Ad she’haya kasav be’kulmus” – While writing (the Torah) with a quill, “nishtayer kimah” – some ink was left over, “ve’he’eviro al rosho – and he passed it over his head, “u’mimenu na’aseh karnei ha-hod” – and from that the rays of splendor were created for him. Moshe’s radiance was the result of the left-over ink from the quill with which he wrote the Torah.

This is a remarkable Midrash and a vivid metaphor, but the question is, what does it mean?

A number of meforshim explain the deeper meaning of this Midrash by first asking a question on the literal meaning of the Midrash. How is it possible that there was extra ink in the quill? Didn’t God know exactly how much ink was needed? Is it possible that God miscalculated?

The Ohr ha-Chayim and the great Chassidic sage, the Rebbe Reb Heschel, both explain that the quill possessed exactly the right amount of ink necessary to complete the Torah as God had intended it be written. But, as it happened, Moshe prevailed upon God, and convinced Him that the Torah been written slightly different than planned.

The extra ink in the quill was the result of Moshe writing the word “anav” without the letter ‘yud’ in the pasuk which proclaims “ve’ha-ish Moshe anav me’od mikol ha-adam asher al pe’nei ha-adamah” – and the man Moshe was exceedingly humble, more than any man on the face of the earth (Bamidbar 12:13).

Moshe, in his humility, could not bring himself to write the word in its complete form and therefore left out the letter ‘yud.’ It was the ink that should have been used for that 'yud' which was the source of the rays of glory that shone from Moshe's face.

In other words, according to the Ohr Ha-Chayim and the Rebbe Reb Heschel, the extra ink symbolized Moshe’s humility and it was this character trait which caused his face to radiate a special glow.

This should serve as a powerful reminder of the importance of the middah of anavah. Because the truth is that for many of us, the opposite character trait, arrogance, or ga’avah, is a perennial problem.
And this isn’t only true the brilliant, rich, or famous. The reality is that many of us are arrogant even when we know that there is no rational basis for our arrogance.

One of the great Mussar Masters used to enjoy telling the following fable: “When I get to Heaven,” he said, “they’ll ask me, why didn’t you learn more Torah? And I’ll tell them that I am slow-witted. Then they’ll ask me, why didn’t you do more kindness for others? And I’ll tell them that I am physically weak. Then they’ll ask me, why didn’t you give more to charity? And I’ll tell them that I didn’t have enough money. But then they’ll ask me: if you were so stupid, weak, and poor, why were you so arrogant? And for that I won’t have an answer.” (Climbing Jacob’s Ladder, pp. 90-91)

And perhaps the most common obstacle to following Moshe’s example is simply a misunderstanding of the true meaning of humility.

Far too many people have a notion similar to something I recently came across in a Church sermon. “The supreme height of spiritual loveliness,” the saying went, “is to be lovely and not to know it.”

I think that this is the conventional understanding of humility: we must deny our own talents and accomplishments. Any awareness of our own “loveliness” is in and of itself a mark of arrogance.

“What, me smart? No way!” “What, me funny? Ahh C’mon!”

This may be the Christian conception of humility but from the Jewish perspective it is a profound error.

It is inconceivable that anavah come at the expense of emes; we don’t barter honesty for humility. We are called upon to strive for truth in all areas of our life and this includes being honest with ourselves. Furthermore, to deny God’s gifts smacks of ingratitude.

In fact, humility is the awareness that the ultimate source of one’s abilities and talents is God and that those gifts have been given to us to be used for a constructive purpose.
We have all been blessed in countless ways. Humility doesn’t obligate us to deny these blessings. On the contrary, humility requires us to acknowledge that these blessings come from God and to use them accordingly.

If we have been given more talents than our neighbor or if we have attained greater success than our friends, that doesn’t make us better than other people, it just makes us more blessed.

Similarly, when the Torah says that Moshe was the most humble of men, it doesn’t mean that he was oblivious to his own talents or accomplishments. It means that Moshe was constantly aware that all of his talents and accomplishments were the result of the Ribbono Shel Olam’s munificent kindness.

This was the awareness that Moshe possessed; this was the awareness that resulted in his karnei hod; and this is the awareness that is required of all of us.

(Adapted from a drasha delivered at Congregation Shomrei Emunah in Baltimore, MD. )


Some Torah Links

The OU has a new website for Pesach: http://www.OUPassover.org

The RCA has published the first online issue of its 50-year old Torah journal HaDarom. It includes a few articles by R. Chaim Jachter and an article by R. Eliezer Ben Porat about issues of halakhah and the internet, the largest section being about internet commerce on Shabbos and holidays (he permits it): http://www.rabbis.org/hadarom.cfm

More Commentator articles about the legacies of Rav Soloveitchik:


In Defense of YCT II

A response by R. Zev Farber, a YCT alumnus: http://indefenseofyct.blogspot.com/

Again, not posted on this blog because I have no connection to YCT and do not support the institution. If you are going to leave a comment, please keep it to the issues and not the people.

See also this letter to Yated that I posted in the comments: link


Thursday, March 08, 2007

Losing Faith: How Scholarship Affects Scholars

Very interesting set of interviews at Biblical Archeological Review (link). Hershel Shanks, the editor, interviewed four scholars about how scholarship impacted their faith: two lost faith and two did not. Among the four is (Orthodox Jew) Prof. Lawrence Schiffman:
[T]he more I’ve done in scholarship, the more it has strengthened my faith, even though it has refined it in certain ways. There’s a non-literalist tradition that I’m coming from. And for this reason a lot of these issues aren’t challenges to my faith.
Sounds like ban-worthy views, if you know what I mean.


(hat tip)


Waging War on Shabbos

The book of Maccabees (1:2:31-41) tells the story of how the Hasmoneans originally refused to wage war on Shabbos and were slaughtered. After that, Matisyahu ruled that they must fight back on Shabbos. This account is repeated by Josephus (Antiquities 12:276). Prof. Louis Feldman (Jew & Gentile in the Ancient World, pp. 160-161) lists other ancient attestations to this refusal to fight on Shabbos, such as Strabo (16:2:40:763) and Dio Cassius (37:16). The question is why they refused. Isn't it piku'ach nefesh?

R. Shlomo Goren (Meshiv Milchamah 1:2) addresses this question. He suggests that the Greeks knew how important Shabbos was to Jews and wished to force them to fight on that day. Thus, there was a shmad-gezerah specifically to fight on Shabbos and, therefore, the Hasmonean beis din ruled that it is yehareg ve-al ya'avor -- when gentiles try to force us to violate a law we must choose martyrdom over violating it. In this case, they tried to force us to fight on Shabbos and the Hasmoneans chose martyrdom over violating Shabbos.

If that's the case, then why did the beis din subsequently rule that they may fight back? When the Greeks continued this strategy and it became a threat to the
continuity of the Jewish people, the Hasmonean beis din ruled that the continuity of the Jewish people overrides the law of yehareg ve-al ya'avor and they may not choose martyrdom.


Wednesday, March 07, 2007

Forgotten Traditions

The Rambam, in his introduction to the Mishnah (link), writes that there were never debates in the Talmud regarding oral traditions from Sinai, that one part forgot or was mistaken about and the other correct. This has led many to conclude that the Rambam is of the view that oral traditions could not be forgotten and no one could make a mistake regarding them, at least in the Talmudic era. This is a very difficult claim to accept.

R. Tzvi Hirsch Chajes (Toras Nevi'im, Ma'amar Torah She-Be-Al Peh in Kol Sifrei Maharatz Chajes, vol. 1 pp. 114-115) explains that the Rambam intended something different. He meant that if there was a debate between two talmudic scholars and one claimed that his view was based on an oral tradition, then the other would immediately capitulate. Therefore, there were no debates based on forgetting an oral tradition because if one side claimed that he had a tradition for his position, the debate would end. But absent a debate, traditions can be forgotten. While this might seem like a farfetched interpretation, a careful reading of the Rambam's words can fit nicely with this understanding. This is also the approach of R. Yitzchak Sheilat (Hakdamos Ha-Rambam La-Mishnah, p. 90).

R. Ya'akov (Gerald J.) Blidstein (Samkhus U-Meri Be-Hilkhas Ha-Rambam, pp. 47-48 n. 3) argues against this interpretation. He points out that the Rambam also says that there were no debates based on a mistake in a tradition. If someone mistakenly thought that his position was based on an oral tradition from Sinai, would he concede when his opponent said that he had an oral tradition for his position? Presumably not. To the opposite, he would stand firm in his position because he thinks he has an oral tradition supporting it.

This argument of R. Blidstein has already been addressed by R. Zvi Lampel (The Dynamic of Dispute, ch. 7). R. Lampel suggests that the Rambam meant that if a scholar thinks that his position is supported by an oral tradition but is confronted with someone claiming a tradition to the contrary, he will humbly investigate the possibility that he might be mistaken. In this very passage, the Rambam emphasizes the moral qualities of the Sages. Thus, he is suggesting that the search for truth and humility of the Sages prevented them from falling into debates based on forgetting or mistaking a tradition. Once the issue of a tradition is raised, Sages will investigate and consider whether that tradition is legitimate and, if so, they will concede.


Monday, March 05, 2007

The Clothing Make The Man

R. Berel Wein on last week's parashah (link):
Thus, to a great extent, clothing made the person. As such, I feel that it is quite understandable that Jews always placed a great stress upon what clothing they wore and how they dressed. Naturally, the type and style of “Jewish clothing” varied in different ages and locations. The Jews of Persia and Iraq did not wear Polish fur trimmed hats nor did Polish Jews wear head scarves or turbans. The Jews of Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth century wore triangular cockaded hats and the Lithuanian rabbis of the nineteenth century wore gentlemanly tall silk top hats. But the common denominator to all of this is that, from the time of Moshe onwards, Jews attempted to dress distinctively, albeit always within the confines and influences of the surrounding general population.

“Jewish clothing” was always meant to be modest, neat and clean. It was to be an “honor and glory” to the wearer and the Jewish society. The Talmud speaks very strongly against Torah scholars who are somehow slovenly in the appearance of their clothing...

Clothing was never looked at as being a purely inanimate object. After all, the first clothing for humans was fashioned for Adam and Chava by G-d Himself, so to speak. Ill treatment of clothing was deemed to be a punishable offense. King David, in his old age was not warmed by his clothing any longer. The Rabbis attributed this to the fact that he mistreated the clothing of King Saul earlier in his life.

I think all of the above helps explain the importance that clothing, the type of individual “uniforms” that Jews in the world and here in Israel, play in our communal and personal life. Each of us and the groups that we belong to attempt to wear clothing that will be an “honor and glory” to us individually and to the group collectively. We should therefore not only treat clothing with respect but we should respect as well the wearers of those different types of clothing that conform to our traditions of modesty and Jewish pride.


Sunday, March 04, 2007

Stalin and Purim

According to the story I've heard, Joseph Stalin (may his name be blotted) died on Purim day 1953 (5713). From what I can see, that is not precise but has a kernel of truth.

Stalin died on March 5, 1953 from what seems to have been a plot to poison him (link). However, Purim in that year was on March 1, 1953 (link, link). Which, for those who can do the math, means that he did not die on Purim. However, on March 1 he collapsed and eventually died four days later. So there is some truth to his being defeated on Purim.


Saturday, March 03, 2007

U-V'nei Yisrael Yotzim Be-Yad Rema

There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim. There is no mitzvah to get drunk on Purim.


Twitter Delicious Facebook Digg Favorites More