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Monday, August 30, 2004
Limits of Orthodox Theology IV
New review of Shapiro's book in the current issue of Modern Judaism, titled "Crossroads: Where Theology Meets Halacha-A Review Essay."
Table of Contents
Full Text (Subscription only)
(It looks like some of the endnotes were garbled by the editor but a little detective work will get you the exact reference.)
Letters on Monkey Business IV
Link to original
(Corresponding statement by women)
The following was drafted by Rabbi Michael Taubes of Teaneck, New Jersey as a proposed letter to the editor of The Jewish Week in the days following the July 29 article regarding Rabbi Hershel Schachter, shlit"a. Rabbi Taubes had initially hoped to send it in the name of the Rabbinical Council of Bergen County, of which he is the immediate past president, but the varied summer schedules of the RCBC members and the fact that the RCBC does not generally meet during the summer made it impossible to reach the membership in a timely fashion. The letter was therefore not sent to the newspaper.
As people return from their summer vacations and Rabbi Schachter, shlit"a resumes his regular shiurim in RIETS and various communities (including Teaneck, New Jersey) it was felt that it would be appropriate to release the statement at this time.
As rabbis and students who have studied under and/or benefitted from the encompassing, patient and concerned Halachic guidance of Rabbi Hershel Schachter, shlit"a, we were appalled and dismayed by the article in the July 29 edition of The Jewish Week about our revered teacher and Rebbe. This article took out of context a passing remark made by Rabbi Schachter and seized upon it as an excuse to publicly disparage and besmirch the reputation of this highly respected Torah leader. While the author of the article and the other sources cited in the piece may have been unaware of the fact that designating an activity which has no Halachic standing as something that "a monkey could do" simply reflects a fairly common rabbinic expression rooted in the Talmud itself (having nothing, by the way, to do with women), no truly objective person, and certainly nobody who has had the chance to meet and converse with Rabbi Schachter, could possibly think that this sensitive and caring Talmid Chacham would ever intend to belittle women by comparing them in any way to monkeys, as the report suggests. The very allegation would be laughable were it not so outrageous and inappropriate.
This is not, however, the forum to debate the relative merits of Rabbi Schachter's statement or whether it deserved, with all that is going on in the world today, a full story, complete with a picture (though outdated) and in-depth analysis and commentary (though in large part anonymous). It would seem to us, though, that a newspaper with the word "Jewish" in its masthead ought to try and champion, among other things, the concept of kevod haRav, respect for a rabbi, especially one who is so widely acknowledged as a Torah authority by many of its readers who themselves or whose own local rabbis consult him regularly on matters ranging from Kashruth to business law to life and death medical decisions.
Given the fact that the Talmud likens one who mocks a Torah scholar to a heretic, The Jewish Week would do well to instead help its readership understand how accepted and true representatives of Torah values should be treated, even where there may be areas of disagreement. We are sure that Rabbi Schachter would graciously accept an apology for this gratuitous defamation of his character.
Sincerely,
Rabbi Michael Taubes
Contemporary Jewish Music II
In my previous post, I distinguished between songs that inspire and songs that entertain. Astute readers questioned, in the comments section, whether either of these two types of songs are permissible today, living in a state of mourning for the Temple.
I. The Prohibition
The Gemara in Gittin (7a) states that making music is prohibited, both instrumentally and vocally. Rashi and Tosafos (ad loc.) explain that this is referring to making music in a pub (beis ha-mishta'os). However, Tosafos add that it is proper to be strict for the view expressed in the Yerushalmi that making music is also prohibited outside of a pub in the case of someone who wakes up and goes to sleep with music, who enjoys it overmuch (she-mis'aneg be-yoser). Even though there are other views that are stricter, the Rema (Orah Hayim 560:3) rules according to Tosafos' view that making music - and listening to it - outside of a pub is permissible to those who do not enjoy it overmuch, i.e. those who wake up and go to sleep with music like kings. (Note that all agree that for the sake of a mitzvah, such as at a wedding, music is not only permitted but a religious imperative.)
Based on this, it is fairly clear that, according to the Rema, there is nothing wrong with casually listening to music, as long as it is outside of the context of drinking alcohol in a group. Other posekim disagree with the Rema's lenient ruling, but as the Tzitz Eliezer (15:33) emphasizes, contemporary practice is clearly - and permissibly - in accordance with the Rema's view.
II. Exceptions
R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin (Ha-Mo'adim Ba-Halakhah, p. 441) points out that in recent history, particularly since the advent of the Hasidic movement, song has become much more of an integral part of Jewish life. He offers what is certainly a common explanation - the inspiration derived from such song is in itself a mitzvah. In other words, without such inspiring music it is quite possible that, in our orphaned generations, the Jewish religious experience would deteriorate and become much less common. Enhancing religious life is sufficient reason to invoke the mitzvah exception.
R. Shlomo Zalman Braun (She'arim Metzuyanim Ba-Halakhah, Sotah 48a) suggests that listening to music is also permissible if done in order to relieve depression or anxiety, to relax from one's troubles. The Piskei Teshuvos (560:11) lists the following posekim who rule similarly: Shu"t Maharshag 2:125; Helkas Ya'akov 1:62; Shevet Ha-Levi 6:69, 8:127; Mishneh Halakhos 6:106; Le-Horos Nassan 4:46.
There are posekim, such as R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Orah Hayim 1:166), who rule very strictly on this issue but the minhag clearly does not follow their rulings.
III. Blaspheming the Bible
There is, yet, an additional consideration. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (101a) states that one may not sing verses from the biblical book Shir Ha-Shirim as a song because one is turning holy words into a song. The Ra'avyah extends this to all biblical verses. However, my impression (and I believe I heard this in the name of R. Yoshe Ber Soloveitchik) is that most posekim reject this extension and apply this statement only to Shir Ha-Shirim. It is very easy to take that particular book out of context and use it as a love song. This is obscene and sacrilegious (and I have seen it done, but that is another story). On this, see R. Reuven Margoliyot's Margoliyos Ha-Yam on Sanhedrin 101a.
IV. Conclusion
We have already seen that many posekim permit songs that inspire, and contemporary practice is certainly to allow them. What about songs that entertain? It depends on how they are used. If they are overused, i.e. one enjoys them too much and listens to them constantly, then that practice is prohibited unless one is doing so to relax and relieve one's troubles. If one is not relaxing but is still only an occasional listener, then according to the Rema such practice is permissible. Are there stricter views? Yes, but the minhag does not seem to follow them.
Friday, August 27, 2004
Contemporary Jewish Music
Some of the best and nicest Jewish bloggers are the Jewish Music bloggers. Ever since I started following blogs I have seen the JM-bloggers railing against certain musicians who appear to be ruining Jewish music. As a consumer rather than a producer of Jewish music, allow me to respectfully voice a different opinion.
I took one semester of Music in college and, in between Vietnam stories, learned a little about how music works and got to appreciate great music. I can no longer remember anything from that class. I listen to music for two reasons - to inspire me and to entertain me. Inspiring music is of the Carlebach or Regesh variety (maybe even hazzanus) - frequently slow, the tune fits the words, everything comes together and uplifts the soul. Entertaining music is anything that entertains me. Many years ago, it would have been Billy Joel or the Police. Nowadays, it is only Jewish music but really anything that sounds good and does not have filthy or stupid lyrics. If the tune does not fit the lyrics, I don't care. I just want a decent song in my head to relax me. I'd pull out an old Billy Joel tape except his songs are almost all about peritzus or narrishkeit. I listen to this kind of music when I'm driving tired or am simply trying to relax after an exhausting week. I don't care if the melody is simple or anything like that. I would not even notice if the song is slightly off-key.
In the movie Mr. Holland's Opus (which I may have seen or may have just heard about - this is not a confessional blog), there is a scene in which the high school music teacher plays the song Louie Louie to a young student (who later becomes governor). He asks her why the very simple song is so popular. His answer: Because it's fun.
Music that is fun and relaxing - and does not have filthy or idiotic lyrics - is OK in my book. Cultural biases about what kind of music is entirely unacceptable (as a child of the 70s and 80s, I find disco beats and electric guitar solos to be offensively "goyish," particularly at weddings) are just a way of old people like me being old-fuddy-duddies and complaining about kids today and their loud music.
Maimonides Heritage Center
Sorry for the slow pace of posting this week. I've been busy.
This place looks like it will be interesting when it gets off the ground.
Wednesday, August 25, 2004
The Value of Archaeology
In an otherwise uninteresting article, Newsweek has the following line:
The value of archeology is not in validating scripture, but in providing a historical and intellectual context, and the occasional flash of illumination on crucial details.Well said!
Tuesday, August 24, 2004
Religious Calendar for the Holidays
Ezras Torah has long been famous for its calendars that explain the religious practices of the year, particularly the details of the synagogue service. Most (Ashkenazic) Orthodox synagogues in America use the Ezras Torah calendar when questions arise.
The following is a link to the Ezras Torah calendar for the upcoming month of Tishrei. I encourage readers to donate to this deserving organization in exchange for using the calendar.
When I first started working, I discussed with my rebbe where to give my ma'aser (tither) money and he immediately suggested Ezras Torah.
Monday, August 23, 2004
New Blog
Dr. Jeffrey Woolf of Bar Ilan has started a new blog.
Here are two articles of his that are available online: I & II
And here are Google results on him: I & II
Sunday, August 22, 2004
Feeding the Non-Observant
The Gemara (Hullin 107b) writes that a person may not give bread to a servant (shamash) unless he knows for sure that the servant has washed his hands. The Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah on Berakhos (42a in the Rif) add that one may similarly not give food to someone whom one suspects might not recite a blessing before eating. The concern, clearly, is of causing another to sin. A religious individual may not abet a religious crime.
The Beis Yosef (Orah Hayim 169) takes this to be an absolute prohibition, even unviolable in the face of a charitable need. One may not give food to a beggar whom one suspects will not recite a blessing before eating. However, the Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah explicitly permit charity to override this matter, and the Bah and Rema concur with this leniency.
At first glance, the Beis Yosef's position seems to be the most tenable. One may not abet a crime even in the case of performing a mitzvah. Lifnei iveir, assisting the commission of a religious offense, is a biblical prohibition. Even if lifnei iveir does not apply, e.g. if the beggar can get food elsewhere and therefore the "crime" can be committed without the assistance of this individual, there is still a rabbinic prohibition called "mesaye'a li-dvar aveirah" that prohibits assisting the commission of a sin in any way. Why should this case be different? We will return to this issue later.
This matter is of significant contemporary concern because we live in a world in which the majority of Jews are not observant and do not recite blessings before eating. May an observant Jew serve food to his non-observant friends, family, colleagues or even strangers? The posekim have unanimously permitted this, but their rationales vary.
R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Orah Hayim vol. 5 no. 13) rules that one should ask the person to recite a blessing but, if he refuses, to serve him food anyway so as not to have him think that religious Jews lack basic manners. However, one should ask again, in future cases, that the person recite a blessing before eating.
R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minhas Shlomo, vol. 1 no. 35) writes that if asking someone to recite a blessing will so offend him that he will start to hate observant Jews, it is better not to ask him to do so.
R. Shmuel Wosner (Shevet Ha-Levi, vol. 4 no. 17) writes that this is only a rabbinic prohibition and may be set aside so as not to antagonize a non-observant Jew, particularly if he might otherwise eat non-kosher food.
R. Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvos Ve-Hanhagos, vol. 1 no. 483) takes the long view and states that kiruv, bringing a fellow Jew closer to Torah, in the long run creates less violations than otherwise so it is a good thing to offer a non-observant Jew food even if he will not recite a blessing before eating. He further states (ibid., vol. 2 no. 138) that an employer who gives food to his non-observant employees should also explain which blessings to recite and set out yarmulkas for the employees, in case they are willing to try.
R. Shammai Gross (Shevet Ha-Kehasi, vol. 4 no. 329) writes that the prohibition is only when one knows for certain that the person will not recite a blessing. With a non-observant Jew, it is a mitzvah to invite him for a meal and to serve him food. At worst, the giver can recite a blessing out loud so as to be exempt everyone within earshot. As we shall see, R. Gross' claim, that the prohibition is only in the case of someone who will definitely not recite a blessing, is not at all clear.
R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky (Emes Le-Ya'akov on Orah Hayim 169 n. 197) is quoted as saying that it is more important to feed someone kosher food, and thereby prevent him from eating forbidden food, that to be concerned about him not reciting a blessing. However, he adds that there is no need to be concerned that he might come to hate religious Jews because if we explain properly he should understand our concern.
R. Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 22 no. 3) argues that there is no issue of lifnei iveir in this case because people can always find food elsewhere. The only issue is of mesaye'a, and R. Waldenberg dismisses this concern based on the ruling of the Shakh (Yoreh Deah 151:6) that mesaye'a does not apply to someone who regularly violates this prohibition (cf. Dagul Me-Revavah, ad loc.). Therefore, there is absolutely no prohibition against giving food to someone who never recites a blessing on the food. The only concern is with someone who sometimes recites a blessing and sometimes does not. To him, there is a prohibition against giving the food because he might not recite a blessing.
Furthermore, R. Waldenberg points out that the original language of the Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah seems to be more of a praiseworthy behavior - midas hassidus - than a prohibition. [I am now starting my own analysis. R Waldenberg never developed this point.] If that is the case, the Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah must have been referring to a case of someone who never recites a blessing - because otherwise there is a prohibition against offering him food - and stating that there is no actual prohibition but it is praiseworthy to refrain from offering food to someone who is so irreligious as to not recite a blessing. If so, the non-observant today are significantly different from the non-observant in Rabbenu Yonah's day, and it is quite plausible to suggest that even the praiseworthiness no longer applies to refraining from offering food to someone who will definitely not recite a blessing.
Thursday, August 19, 2004
Rabbinic Laws and the Perfection of the Torah
R. Hillel Goldberg, in his column in the Intermountain Jewish News explores the implications of rabbinic ordinances. He first starts by defending the concept of the perfection of the Torah:
Why should we not add to or subtract from (i.e., change) the Torah? Because, if G-d is perfect, then the "entire word" of G-d is perfect. It needs no improvement and is not subject to improvement.Classic medieval scholastics. Thankfully, he does not revert to the circular argument that the Torah is perfect because it says in Tehillim (19:18) that it is.
If the Torah is imperfect, then its author, G-d, is imperfect; or, G-d is not the author of the Torah. Neither possibility is compelling. If G-d is imperfect, what is the value of G-d? Why bother? An imperfect G-d is just another form of an idol.
If G-d is not the author of the Torah, what is the value of the Torah?
One could argue that, even imperfect, the Torah is a great repository of wisdom; but if so, the same can be said for Shakespeare and the scriptures of many religions. If imperfect, the Torah has no unique claim on us.
But, if the Torah is perfect, of what use are rabbinic ordinances? Do they not imply that the Torah is imperfect and therefore needed to be fixed?
The real issue raised by the perfection of the Torah is not that G-d or the Torah is imperfect (G-d forbid, I might circularly say), but this: If the Torah is perfect and cannot be improved upon, on what basis do we sanction "fences," "rabbinic laws" and "stringencies" (chumrot), not found in the Torah?...
The first example, milk and meat, is an illustration of a "fence." A fence is not an addition to the Torah; it is designed to keep one distant from a prohibition...
A fence is intuitive. If am a drug addict in recovery, I will do more than not use drugs, I will not own them. If I am on the verge of bankruptcy due to excessive credit card use, I will not just cut down on the credit card, I will often leave it at home, or will not own one altogether. If I need to study for finals but am addicted to television, I will not just turn off the TV. I will study in a room without a TV.
The Torah keeps us away from prohibitions with "fences," restrictions that do not render the Torah imperfect; their point is not philosophical. Their point is psychological: how to help the human being control himself.
The second example, Purim, illustrates the power of ancient rabbinic legislation. Purim, at its base, is not an observance of the Torah, but the commemoration of a great event. Its basis is not G-d's revelation (the Torah), but G-d's intervention in history, however cloaked.
At a certain point in history, rabbis had the power to legislate for the entire Jewish people. Now, rabbis, if they are scholars and pietists of international repute, retain the power of legislation, though less extensively. Why that is so, is a separate topic. The philosophical point remains the same: Legislation to commemorate an event does not add to or subtract from the Torah. Moses did not observe Purim; Moses' understanding of the Torah was nonetheless perfect.
The third example, extra pools for a mikveh, illustrates the role of technology in the Torah. A mikveh with one pool of rainwater is a perfect reflection of the Torah law. One pool, however, quickly gets dirty. It cannot simply be emptied on the hope that it will rain that night. It doesn't rain every night but a mikveh needs to be used every night. A community with a dirty mikveh cannot simply wait until it rains for its dirty water to be replaced. The issue here is technological: How may dirty mikveh water be replaced, given the Torah law that mikveh water must be "at the hands of Heaven" (flowing to a mikveh without human intervention)?
This technological challenge is not easy. Different authorities have devised different solutions. All require an additional pool of rainwater. The configuration of some of these pools reflects the opinion of the majority of the authorities. Typically, Jewish law follows the majority, but if the minority opinion is articulated by a renowned authority, many will try to follow it, too. This might require two extra mikveh pools, not one.
This is an example of a stringency. It does not add to the Torah; it reflects a different view of how to resolve a technological challenge.
Fences, rabbinic legislation and stringencies do not add to the Torah. To add to the Torah would be to keep the Sabbath two days a week, and to subtract from the Torah would be to keep the Sabbath once every other week. However, not to sleep on Shabbos -- a rare level of piety -- is not to add to the Torah. It is to maximize the gift of Shabbos, consciously to take advantage of every moment of its holiness.
Wednesday, August 18, 2004
Letters on Monkey Business III
There are more letters in The Jewish Week. Here are excerpts from two excellent ones:
Very Distressing
It was with great sadness that I read the article by Gary Rosenblatt headlined "Rabbinically Incorrect" (July 30) just two days after Tisha b'Av, a day commemorating the destruction of our Holy Temple because of sinas chinam ("improper hatred"). The belittling comments made by some people quoted by Mr. Rosenblatt are unfortunately part of the reason we remain in golus (exile).
Rabbi Herschel Schachter is unquestionably one of the great tzaddikim of our day, a holy rav who has taught me personally not only the sweetness of Torah and the Torah's attitude toward women, but also proper behavior and derech eretz (the right way to act) toward women, and life in general.
Once while driving Rabbi Schachter home after a shiur, I asked him why he does not respond to people who criticize him. His answer, in a nutshell, was one should be stringent on the biblical command to "Love thy neighbor as thyself." He refused to answer harsh, inappropriate critics (outside of providing halachic responses to questions they raised) because it would serve no purpose other than furthering strife...
Rabbi Dr. Aaron Glatt Woodmere, N.Y.
Utmost Deference
Your recent article "Rabbinically Incorrect" (July 30) falls short from both the standards of professional journalism and Jewish ethics.
Professional journalistic standards dictate that an article present a complete picture rather than innuendo based on statements taken out of context. Can one honestly say that a shiur that speaks of the bina yetera, the extra dose of wisdom given to women, is an affront to them? Can one truly suggest that a shiur that creates a typology of women as identified closely with God’s characteristic of kel mistater, the Hidden God, as offensive?
To quote one line out of the technical context in which it was stated - to emphasize the fact that the reading of the ketubah is not a religious act - is very unfair and unprofessional...
A public apology and request for forgiveness is due Rav Schachter by the editor of The Jewish Week.
Rabbi Kenneth Auman New York, N.Y.
The Small Sanctuary
The Talmud (Megillah 29a) expounds on the prophetic verse "I shall become to them a small sanctuary in the countries where they shall come" (Ezekiel 11:16) - that in the times of exile the synagogue is the equivalent of the Temple. Synagogues are not merely a post-exilic invention to facilitate communal prayer but, rather, are part of an historical continuum beginning with the Tabernacle built in the Desert, continuing with the two Temples in Jerusalem, and culminating with the third, messianic Temple. This equation bears clear and documented halakhic ramifications.
The Tosefta (Megillah 3:14) rules that a synagogue’s doors must be opposite its ark as was done in the Tabernacle. This architectural law, based solely on the equation of a synagogue with the Desert era sanctuary, is cited by halakhic authorities throughout the ages. This is certainly an indication that the synagogue’s designation as a "small sanctuary" is an halakhic mandate, particularly in regard to its architecture.
Similarly, the Mishnah (Megillah 3:3, 28a) states that a synagogue that is in ruins and unusable retains its sanctity because the Torah relates God’s statement, "I will make your sanctuaries desolate" (Leviticus 26:31); even in destruction they are still called sanctuaries. Thus, the status of synagogues as small sanctuaries has halakhic ramifications in terms of holiness, as documented in a Tannaitic halakhic passage. The medieval commentators expand on this as follows below.
The precise sanctity of a synagogue is explained by Nahmanides as being the same sanctity of any other item used for a mitzvah, such as a sukkah or shofar. This is a holiness that exists while the mitzvah is being performed. However, at times when a synagogue is neither in use nor set aside for a mitzvah it retains no sanctity. Rabbenu Nissim of Gerona (Ran on Rif, Megillah 8a) disputes this understanding at length and instead explains that synagogues are imbued with a holiness while certain key prayers are being recited and, for other times, the Sages decreed that a rabbinic sanctity be instilled into synagogues. R. Eliezer of Metz (Yere'im, 324), however, is of the view that synagogues always have a biblical sanctity similar to that of the Temple in Jerusalem and, therefore, the biblical obligation to fear the Temple (Leviticus 19:30) applies equally to synagogues. This is echoed by R. Moshe of Coucy (Semag, aseh 164) and R. Yitzhak of Corbille (Semak, 6). Significantly, commentators have deduced from Maimonides' words that he is of the same view. Certainly, according to R. Eliezer of Metz et al., the synagogue is halakhically and biblically a small sanctuary. Even according to Rabbenu Nissim the equation of synagogues and the Temple stands, albeit alternating between a biblical and a rabbinic level. Only according to Nahmanides is the equation left on the aggadic level.
The Gemara (Megillah 28a-b) quotes the Tosefta (Megillah 2:11) that frivolity is prohibited in a synagogue. Many see the root of this prohibition as the holiness due to its status as a "small sanctuary." Just like we are obligated to fear the holy Temple, we are similarly required to act respectfully inside its exilic counterpart.
R. Mordekhai ben Hillel (Megillah, ch. 3 no. 827) writes that the biblical prohibition against tearing down parts of the Temple also applies to a synagogue because it is a "small sanctuary." This is agreed to by many of the scholars mentioned above and is brought down as practical halakhah by R. Moshe Isserles in his authoritative glosses to Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 152:1).
In an important responsum (no. 161), R. Yosef Colon (fifteenth century) contends that the Sages consistently equated synagogues with the Temple. In addition to the passage of "small sanctuary" and the Mishnah regarding a desolate synagogue, R. Colon cites Shabbos 11a where the law is stated that the synagogue must be the tallest building in a town. As a prooftext for this rule the Talmud quotes a verse in Ezra (9:9) regarding the building of the Temple – "To raise the house of our Lord." Evidently, the Talmud considers verses about the Temple to be valid indicators about the proper architecture of the synagogue. R. Colon further cites the Mordekhai who extends this equation to the holiness of the Temple, as we saw above, and then extends the concept himself to equate donations to a synagogue with donations to the Temple.
Clearly, the idea of the synagogue having the status of the Temple is more than a mere homiletic device and has extensive halakhic applications. In the lands of exile our sole refuge of holiness from the mundane world is the synagogue, the sanctuary that accompanies us in our wanderings. All agree that the respect due to such a holy place demands that frivolity be prohibited in the synagogue much as it was in the Temple.
It is also noteworthy that the classical peshat commentaries to Ezekiel – Rashi, R. David Kimhi, R. Yosef Kara, Metzudat David, R. Yitzhak Abrabanel – all explain the phrase "I shall become to them a small sanctuary" (Ezekiel 11:16) as referring to synagogues in exile.
Monday, August 16, 2004
The Eagle or the Vulture
Steven I. Weiss is always requesting that bloggers post the content of their rabbi's speeches. His new blog is now more inclusive and asks us to blog our "spiritual leaders." Well, here goes.
My rabbi spoke about the identity of the nesher, one of the forbidden birds listed in this week's Torah portion (Devarim 14:12). The nesher has been traditionall identified as an eagle. However, this contradicts the statement in the Mishnah that the nesher has none of the kosher signs listed in the Mishnah. The eagle has one. Over 800 years ago, Rabbeinu Tam stated that the nesher is not the eagle. Prof. Yehuda Felix of Bar Ilan University has suggested that the nesher is a griffon vulture rather than an eagle. However, my rabbi pointed out that this is problematic because the griffon vulture also has one kosher sign. Therefore, my rabbi left the identification of the nesher unresolved.
After services I showed my rabbi that his view was agreed to by R. Pinchas Presworsky in his book Birds of the Torah, which is in my synagogue's library. I also checked at home and saw that R. Nosson Slifkin reached the same conclusion in his Nature's Song. However, I saw today that R. Slifkin has changed his mind and now concurs with Prof. Felix's conclusion that the nesher is the griffon vulture.
The Path to Humility
From R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik:
The awareness of defeat, the path to humility, has five steps. The first is the feeling of dependence. A ben-Torah must realize he is dependent on the advice, guidance, and instruction of someone who has come a few inches closer to the summit of the mountain. The more one knows, the greater the perplexity; the closer one is to one's Creator, the clearer the awareness of one's inadequacy and failure. Someone else will know more than I. Sometimes it will be a great scholar, sometimes even a small child or a pupil...Such a Litvak. It's refreshing!
The second step is intellectual circumspection and caution. A talmid chacham is careful in the rendering of halakha. Only ignorant and arrogant people think that all questions are answerable. The humble talmid chacham does not proclaim high-sounding theories, sweeping statements about ethics and philosophy. The humble person will not boast that Judaism is commodious enough to embrace any theory, any trend in modern culture. A new idea, a new problem, must be treated with circumspection, carefully, and with trepidation.
The third step is ethical modesty. There is not only intellectual dependence, but moral inadequacy as well. Moral complacency, so repugnant in a proper framework of kedusha, is all too prevalent in the Orthodox community, both in the diaspora and in Israel. A talmid chacham is very wary of such "pious" people, who condemn and judge mortal man from a position of assumed moral supremacy. Here too, the endowment with kedusha must be accompanied by a sense of inadequacy and modesty, a readiness to admit errors and understand the view of others, rather than one of self-satisfaction.
The fourth step is called "tzimtzum." The humble man must know how to recoil, to retreat; he must know the art of self-contraction, even when not required by the letter of the law. The is true first of all in the physiological sphere - the Rambam describes in Hilkhot De'ot (ch. 5) the necessity for a wise man to control his appetite, to forego many common pleasures, even though they are not strictly forbidden... It applies to his emotions as well - when he succeeds, the talmid chacham praises God, but does not boast or brag to others. The more one succeeds in the realm of kedusha, the less the outside world will know of it...
The fifth and final step is "chesed", generosity. We are interdependent. The same way I expect and depend on others to help me, I must extend help to others. I must open myself up to embrace the other...
Sunday, August 15, 2004
The Bible Unearthed
Choice excerpts from Kenneth A. Kitchen's review of Israel Finkelstein's and Neil Asher Silberman's The Bible Unearthed in Kitchen's On the Reliability of the Old Testament:
"[A] careful critical perusal of this work - which certainly has much to say about both archaeology and the biblical writings - reveals that we are dealing very largely with a work of imaginative fiction, not a serious or reliable account of this subject." (p. 464)
"The whole correlation of the archaeological record for the eleventh to early eighth centuries is based upon Finkelstein's arbitrary, idiosyncratic, and isolated attempt to lower the dates..." (ibid.)
"F. & S. have gone mad on 'Deuteronomism.'" (ibid.)
"On the patriarchal and exodus periods our two friends are utterly out of their depth, hopelessly misinformed, and totally misleading." (p. 465)
"Their treatment of the exodus is among the most factually ignorant and misleading that this writer has ever read." (p. 466)
"[O]ur pair are clueless here." (ibid.)
"Then, in Transjordan, we are treated to the usual sociological poppycock..." (p. 467)
"The mishmash on Joshua and Judges is an idle repetition of all the usual nineteenth-century poppycock..." (p. 468)
UPDATE: Relevant article in this past week's Forward.
The Dispersion and Language
The Generation of Dispersion (Dor Ha-Haflagah) is the traditional term to refer to the people who built (or attempted to build) the Tower of Babel (Bereshis 11). The Torah states that the "entire land was safah ehas u-devarim ahadim" which seems to imply that everyone in the world spoke one language and that, as a consequence of the failed attempt, God decreed that people henceforth speak many languages. A possible historical problem with this story is that we seem to be able to document the existence of other languages at that time (recall that Avraham lived shortly afterward). The following alternate explanations of the episode were offered before any such historical evidence was known, and is therefore free from the charge of apologetics.
The first thing to notice is that in the previous chapter, there are already references to multiple languages. Regarding both the descendants of Ham and Shem, the Torah says that each family had its own language (Bereshis 10:21,31).
I
R. Ya'akov Tzvi Mecklenburg (Ha-Kesav Ve-Ha-Kabbalah, Bereshis 11:1) quotes a Ralash (anyone know who this is?) who suggests that the entire story is only about the people in the region of Yoktan, which was discussed immediately prior to this episode. See his commentary for how he, typically, expresses great care for the precise wording of the passage. This, of course, alleviates the entire problem because the single language was only in one region. Other regions had different languages, as implied in the previous chapter.
II
The Talmud Yerushalmi (Megillah 1:9) records two opinions regarding the above generation. One is that the people spoke seventy languages and the other is that they spoke the Holy Language (i.e. Hebrew). However, the first view is extremely difficult to understand. The verse specifically states that they spoke one language - "safah ehas" - so how could this talmudic sage say that they spoke many languages? The standard commentaries on the side of the Yerushalmi, Korban Ha-Edah and P'nei Moshe, explain that the people spoke different languages but everyone understood each other's languages so it was as if they all spoke one language. This, too, would solve the above problem.
III
R. Barukh Ha-Levi Epstein, in his Torah Temimah (Bereshis 11:1), offers another explanation to this view in the Yerushalmi that anticipated the views of many contemporary academic biblical scholars. R. Epstein suggests that the people of that time each spoke their own tribal language but, additionally, spoke a universal language that was common to all. Everyone spoke Hebrew, but everyone also spoke their own local language. This is very similar to the way English and Spanish are treated today in many parts of the world.
Friday, August 13, 2004
Literary Biblical Criticism
Kenneth A. Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 2003), pp. 492-493
With the evolutionary [of religion] ladder gone, what happens to the biblical literature? Where do J, E, D, P, now belong, if the old order is only a chimera? Or, in fact, do they belong at all?UPDATE: In the comments section, Kochav gave a link to this article by David Hazony about biblical archaeology.
Here we will be concise, open, and fairly staccato. First, the basic fact is that there is no objective, independent evidence for any of these four compositions (or for any variant of them) anywhere outside the pages of our existing Hebrew Bible... They exist only in the minds of their modern creators... This very simple fact needs to be stressed. Our resourceful biblicists are not sitting on some secret store of papyri or parchments that contain any such works. The Dead Sea Scrolls show no sign of them whatever... Modern guesswork, as we all know, is often extraordinarily and breathtakingly clever and ingenious - one can only reverently take one's hat off to it all, in respectful amazement, sometimes. But... it does not constitute fact, and cannot substitute for it... The standards of proof among biblical scholars fall massively and woefully short of the high standards that professional Orientalists and archaeologists are long accustomed to, and have a right to demand. Some MSS, please!...
Second, time and time again the modes of analysis (and their criteria, variant vocabulary, "styles," etc.) have been demonsrated to be defective. And not just by "conservatives" either. Suffice it to refer to the very careful and conscientious study by (e.g.) the late R. N. Whybray (no conservative), The Making of the Pentateuch. On the internal data, it is a damning indictment of these methods. He offers a largely unitary Pentateuch, but of a relatively late date...
Third, people sometimes talk glibly about the "literary strata" in the biblical writings, as if they weer somewhat parallel to the strata in an archaeological mound. Yes, it sounds very appropriate, but which way do your strata run? In an archaeological site, the successive strata (by and large) lie in succession roughly horizontally, one above the other... But the "strata" supposed in J, E, D, or P, H are of an entirely different kind. Here, to distinguish passages of J, E, P (say) in Genesis, vertical cuts have been made, all the way through the book... No archaeologist worth his salt would dream of accepting as "strata" a set of vertical sections cut separately, over a mound.
Wednesday, August 11, 2004
Blessing on the Purchase of a House
The Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 223:3 quotes the law that one must recite the blessing of praise "she-heheyanu" upon purchasing a house. However, the question has been debated whether this applies to a house that is purchased with a loan. The concern is that the burden of repaying the loan diminishes the new homeowner's joy in his purchase.
R. Hayim Falaji (Lev Hayim 3:52) rules that the diminished joy of borrowing renders the purchase insufficient to require (or allow) recitation of the blessing. More recently, R. Moshe Stern (Be'er Moshe 5:68) concurs, and points out that, according to Tosafos (Sukkah 46a), this blessing is not recited at a circumcision because the pain to the baby diminishes the joy of the occasion.
R. Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 12:19) emphatically disagrees. According to R. Waldenberg, the blessing is not recited on joy but upon the receipt of benefit. Therefore, since any anxiety over repaying a loan does not detract from the benefit of the new house, the blessing should still be recited.
R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv is quoted as ruling that someone to whom missing payments on the loan is a significant possibility should not recite the blessing because, to him, the mortgage represents significant stress and anxiety. To more regular house-buyers, though, the mortgage is not as big a stress and therefore does not remove the ability to recite "she-heheyanu."
R. J. David Bleich (Tradition 35:1 Spring 2001 pp. 80-81) takes issue with R. Elyashiv's ruling, pointing out that the Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 224:4) rules that a person should recite "she-heheyanu" upon finding a lost object even if there is a significant possibility that the monarch will seize the property. Seizure by the government, argues R. Bleich, should be no different than seizure by creditors.
(On all this, see R. Bleich's article cited above.)
Tuesday, August 10, 2004
Eating Kiddush Leftovers and Other Common Acts of Theft
My shul rents out a room in a building that also has a hall. It is not uncommon for a celebration to be held in the hall on Shabbos and much of the leftover goodies (cake, cookies, etc.) to be left sitting there. When we come to shul for minhah services, there are some children and adults who feel free to take from the leftovers. In my mind, that is theft and I have told my children unequivocally not to eat such food. Here is a general rule: If it doesn't belong to you then don't touch it.
I saw that R. Yisroel Belsky agrees with me on this matter.
[UPDATE: A comment has convinced me that the following is incorrect. Rather, if you are ready to buy something and the seller will make a profit from the sale, you can use the item (i.e. eat the food) prior to actually buying it. See Mahaneh Ephraim, Hilkhos Gezeilah 4; R. Akiva Eiger, Glosses to Hoshen Mishpat 359:2 on Shakh no. 4.]
Another issue - eating food that you are about to buy but have not yet bought. For example, if you pick up a danish in a bakery and are standing on line to pay. The danish is not yours! If you eat it, you have stolen from the bakery. I make sure to get explicit permission in a pizzeria to eat before paying (if there is no one currently at the cash register and I plan on paying when I am done eating) and, on more than one occasion, have had to deal with kvetching children in a supermarket who want to eat something we have picked up. The kvetching may be annoying but the educational opportunity is priceless.
Monday, August 09, 2004
Letters on Monkey Business II
OF MONKEYS AND MEN
Rabbi Avi Shafran
New York this week resembled the Planet of the Apes.
First, reports of a respected rabbinic figure's use of a monkey metaphor caused an uproar in some circles. And then a disabled man's macaque nipped a little boy in a supermarket, eliciting howls not only from the victim but from an animal rights group as well.
Rabbi Hershel Schachter is a renowned scholar and decisor of Jewish religious law who holds major positions at Yeshiva University's Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary. During a lecture addressing whether the reading at a Jewish wedding ceremony of the marriage document known as a ketubah may be performed by a woman, it seems Rabbi Schachter innocently invoked what turned out to be an incendiary traditional expression.
Distinguishing between a ritual act that requires an actual actor and one that does not, he observed that it would seem that the ketubah could certainly be read by a woman because there is no actual requirement for its reading in the first place; it could just as well be read, as he put it, "by a monkey." (Later, in an apparent concession to monkeys' inability to vocalize, he changed the metaphor to a parrot.) Halachic literature uses precisely that example - "the mere act of a monkey" - to refer to religious acts that are not actual requirements but rather simply need, in whatever way, to happen.
Nonetheless, umbrage ensued in some corners. The editor of the New York Jewish Week characterized the rabbi's remark as "seem[ing] to compare women to animals," and quoted an unnamed "Modern Orthodox rabbi" as calling it "vulgar and embarrassing."
In retrospect, Rabbi Schachter might well have avoided controversy by using a "tape recorder" or "computer" as his example of a non-human actor that could nevertheless effect the reading of a ketubah. But he opted instead with the colloquialism, and so is suffering (or, at least, is assailed) for his cultural incorrectness.
The other monkey business in the local news also evoked ire; this, from a spokesperson for PETA, the organization that supports granting to animals rights that society currently offers only to human beings. PETA's spokesperson was indignant over the fact that the man in the wheelchair dared bring his monkey into a public place. This, despite the fact that the trained animal assistant helps the disabled man manage everyday tasks and is by all accounts legal, healthy and well cared-for, and that the bitten boy, according to the monkey owner, provoked the attack.
Not to make a mountain out of a monkey, but it's hard to shake the suspicion that something else underlay PETA's pique. The group, after all, is well known for things like its "Holocaust on Your Plate" exhibit, which likens factory animal farming to the systematic annihilation of six million Jews. Might PETA's objection to the man with the monkey be strongly informed by a larger irritation, over the fact that animals are employed (PETA would likely say "enslaved") to do the bidding of men in the first place?
The irritation is illustrative; it is born of a certain fundamental approach to life, one that regards all living things, men, moles and manatees alike, as equals, with equal claim to everything around them.
That may be an enticingly egalitarian view, but it is profoundly diametrical to Judaism's. While the Torah considers men and women to be the custodians of their world, and forbids wasteful destruction and the unnecessary infliction of pain on animals, it also makes clear that there is a distinct dichotomy of species: the human, and the rest. And that the role of the rest is to serve the needs of the human, whose role in turn is to serve, each in his or her own way, the Divine.
Which brings us back to the first monkey, the rabbi's. One wonders how much of the anger at his words derived not from the simian simile alone but from the fact that the scholar went on to conclude that a woman should in fact not read the ketubah at a wedding; that, while the roles Jewish law assigns to women are as important as men's, they may not be as public.
If those who protested the rabbi's words were in fact more upset with his conclusion - if their paramount concern was some feminist coup, not a sincere desire to discern the position of Jewish religious law - then the two monkey tales may have more in common than their primate protagonists.
Because they then both speak to the very same question: are we humans just here, or are we charged with a special mandate, including, at times, specialized roles?
Are we, in other words, mere parts of a biosphere, or, as Rabbi Schachter clearly believes, sublime servants of God?
(AM ECHAD RESOURCES)
The Adoption of Heterodox Practices IV
Women's Issues
One of the burning issues of today is the role of women in Jewish ritual, whether and how much it should change. Reform adopted completely egalitarian practice long ago; Conservative decades ago. Currently, the only heterodox Jews who do not accept – in theory if not in practice – complete egalitarianism in the synagogue ritual are the non-denominational who fall between Conservative and Orthodox. Should the Orthodox take a step towards egalitarianism, this might be perceived as a sign that just like the Conservative followed the Reform to egalitarian practice so, too, the Orthodox will follow. Perhaps, even if the Orthodox have no intention of ever going that far, the adoption of a practice that might give such an indication would be prohibited as confirming the sectarians in their ways.
Already, two prominent posekim – the influential Rosh Yeshiva and Rosh Kollel at Yeshiva University, R. Hershel Schachter, and R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, one of the few Israeli scholars to achieve wide acceptance among many different segments of Orthodox Jewry – have ruled that the creation of prayer groups solely for women in which they participate fully, much like men do in regular synagogue services albeit with specific differences, is too reminiscent of the heterodox practice of allowing women to participate fully in the synagogue. Even though there are differences between these women's prayer groups and heterodox services, these posekim have weighed the issues and determined that these groups still give a sufficient confirmation to the heterodox and are, therefore, prohibited.[37] Certainly, the confirmation to the heterodox is greater with women's prayer groups than, for example, with the planting of flowers on graves that R. Weinberg prohibited. While in that case the Orthodox and heterodox practices were identical and here the practices are somewhat dissimilar, lack of equivalency is only significant if it removes the confirmation to the heterodox which, in our case, it arguably does not.
Other posekim, however, evidently disagree with this evaluation. Those who permit women's prayer groups, such as former Chief Rabbi of Israel R. Shlomo Goren[38] and the respected scholar and philosopher R. Eliezer Berkovits[39], certainly deny that the prohibition applies to this case, while those who forbid such groups but do not raise this consideration may implicitly disagree or may simply have been satisfied with their arguments and found no need to discuss this particular issue.[40] It is not clear at all, though, that any of these posekim are of the view that there is no prohibition against imitating sectarians. At most, one can infer that they deny its applicability to this particular issue, perhaps due to the dissimilarity between heterodox services and women's prayer groups.
A more recent case is the proposal to call women to the Torah in a regular synagogue service.[41] No major posek has sanctioned this practice while R. Yitzhak Yosef and R. Yehuda Henkin have opposed it in writing.[42] Setting aside the many primary halakhic issues involved, there still exists the real concern that adopting such a practice is not only an imitation of heterodox practice but is also the sending of an unmistakable message that the Reform and Conservative were correct in adopting complete egalitarian practice and the Orthodox will be shortly following their example. Indeed, not only halakhah but our heartfelt concern for our heterodox brethren demands that we consider the repercussions our actions have on their perceptions of Torah. Nevertheless, this author freely admits to a lack of sufficient qualifications to render judgment on such a complex and delicate matter. While it would come as no surprise if posekim consider the calling of women to the Torah a prohibited sectarian practice, we still await their evaluations of this aspect of the issue.
Innovation in religious ritual is a very delicate matter. Judaism's conservative nature has protected it from the passing fads and the more lingering deviations. However, while halakhah preaches moderation in making changes it does not close the door to all new practices. Yet, these innovations must not be taken on without due consideration of all the many implications, whether halakhic or meta-halakhic, internal to our communities or external. We must overcome the intoxication of innovation and look beyond our local concerns to evaluate how our actions will impact the entire Jewish community. We must consider not only the potential benefits and detriments our actions have on our own community, but also the wide ranging effects they have on the entire spectrum of Jewish society. Our deep concern for our fellow Jews demands no less.
[37] R. Hershel (Tzvi) Schachter, Tze'i Lakh Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon, p. 34; R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, "Tefillat Nashim Be-Farhesyah" in Tehumin, 5758 pp. 120-122. R. Yitzhak Yosef raises the issue in regard to reading the Torah in a women's prayer group in Yalkut Yosef, vol. 2 143:4.
[38] Cited in R. Aryeh and R. Dov Frimer, "Women's Prayer Services – Theory and Practice: Part I, Theory" in Tradition, 32:2 Winter 1998, n. 5.
[39] R. Eliezer Berkovits, Jewish Women in Time and Torah.
[40] For a comprehensive review of attitudes towards women's prayer groups, see Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer’s article "Women's Prayer Services" (above note 38). While one may be able to take issue with some of the authors' analysis, one can only praise their extensive bibliograhical research. See also R. Mayer Twersky, "Halakhic Values and Halakhic Decisions: Rav Soloveitchik's Pesak Regarding Women's Prayer Groups" in Tradition, 32:3 Spring 1998; R. Moshe Meiselman, "The Rav, Feminism and Public Policy: An Insider's Overview" in Tradition, 33:1 Fall 1998; the extensive discussion at www.hirhurim.blogspot.com.
[41] Cf. R. Mendel Shapiro, "Qeri'at ha-Torah by Women: A Halakhic Analysis" in The Edah Journal, 1:2 Sivan 5761.
[42] R. Yitzhak (ben R. Ovadiah) Yosef, Yalkut Yosef, vol. 2 135:41; R. Yehuda Henkin, Bnei Banim, vol. 2 no. 11; idem., "Qeri'at ha-Torah by Women: Where We Stand Today" in The Edah Journal, 1:2 Sivan 5761. Cf. R. Moshe Meiselman, Jewish Woman in Jewish Law, pp. 141-144; R. Ahron Soloveichik, Od Yisrael Yosef B'ni Hai, p. 100. R. Daniel Sperber, professor of Talmud in Bar Ilan and author of the well-received Minhagei Yisrael, has written in support of this practice in "Congregational Dignity and Human Dignity: Women and Public Torah Reading" in The Edah Journal, 3:2 Elul 5763.
Friday, August 06, 2004
Barber Shop Trimming
There are different kinds of trimmers that barbers use. Most are intended to cut hair at certain lengths and have guards to ensure that appropriate lengths of hair are left intact. But there is also a trimmer that touches directly on the skin and is used to even out the edges and remove neck hair. My longstanding practice at the barber shop is to politely ask the barber to only use that trimmer behind my ear, i.e. on the back of my head and neck. That way, it will not remove my peyos. I never asked a she'eilah on this because it seems pretty clear cut. But every time I ask a barber to do it he seems surprised. Is this not common practice? Why not?
Thursday, August 05, 2004
Letters on Monkey Business
The Jewish Week published a letter from R. Reuven Spolter in defense of R. Hershel Schachter. I was forwarded his unedited letter with permission to post it. I have other letters but am still awaiting permission to publicize them.
To the editor,
When Editor in Chief Gary Rosenblatt published his expose on Rabbi Baruch Lanner, he made it clear that he did so under the careful guidance of halachic authority. I'd like to know which posek he asked permission from to print the hatchet job lambasting Rav Hershel Schachter in print. Sure, you can write anything under the guise of "Some in the community are wondering..." but that doesn't make it any more appropriate to criticize a rav you disagree with in print. In the context of any halachic discussion, when one is trying to make a point about a halachic idea, it's very common to take that example to the extreme to demonstrate its halachic validity. If Mr. Rosenblatt didn't get that point, he should have asked someone before writing about it. And if he did, he made absolutely no effort to explain where Rav Schachter was coming from and why he would speak that way. If Mr. Rosenblatt wants to write an op-ed piece about his disagreements with Rav Schachter, that would be insulting and inappropriate, but within his rights as an editor. But using an "article" to report "insensitivity" to further his own agenda is not only improper; it tramples the principles of journalism he so staunchly defends.
People wonder why the Orthodox world keeps moving to the right. To me the answer seems painfully obvious. Rav Schachter's hasn't moved at all. From a hashkafic point of view, he's right where he's been his entire life. Yet, in their frustration, people like Mr. Rosenblatt and Mrs. Greenberg have resorted to trying to push leaders like Rav Schachter - people who they dislike - aside in their efforts to claim the vaunted role of spokesmen for Modern Orthodoxy.
If Modern Orthodoxy can only promote its ideology by denigrating those with whom it disagrees, then it becomes easy to understand why people choose not to be Modern Orthodox.
Rabbi Reuven Spolter
Young Israel of Oak Park
Outreach vs. Inreach
Dr. Marvin Schick makes an amazing and alarming statement this week:
It appears, in fact, that defections from our religious life now exceed the number of returnees. Such statistics are inevitably fragile, but they are supported by the observations of key outreach leaders.His point: We need to focus more on day schools and yeshivas rather than outreach. He makes a very good argument.
Mazal Tov
I wish a hearty mazal tov to R. Baruch Simon and Ms. Mellanie Keller on their engagement. May their current joy remain constant throughout their lives.
Wednesday, August 04, 2004
The Adoption of Heterodox Practices III
Counter-Examples
Despite this long list of precedents, there have been many cases in history in which the prohibition against imitating sectarians was not invoked despite its seeming appropriateness. For example, the Reform movement championed the synagogue sermon in the vernacular, rather than Yiddish, and the style of rabbinic speaking that has been termed the “edifying sermon.” While many rabbis of that time denounced these innovations, other traditional rabbis not only voiced no opposition to these practices but even adopted them.[33] Why were they not concerned with the issue of strengthening the heterodox?
Similarly, in the early twentieth century, the Young Israel movement intentionally adopted certain otherwise permissible heterodox practices in an attempt to make the Orthodox synagogue more attractive to young American Jews.[34] Did all this imply a different reading of the sources that denies a prohibition against imitating sectarians?
One could suggest that there is, in fact, no actual ban on imitating sectarians. Rather than being a rabbinic prohibition in itself, it is the reason that the Sages had in instituting other, specific prohibitions. Thus, the Sages prohibited slaughtering into a ditch that leads to a pit because doing so would strengthen the position of sectarians and that, the Sages felt, was a sufficiently negative consequence to warrant a specific prohibition. However, not everything that may strengthen the position of sectarians is automatically prohibited. While an action that will encourage the heterodox must be looked at disfavorably, there is no prohibition that will render it impermissible and, therefore, the posek has more leeway in deciding whether or not this action should be allowed.
An alternate and far more convincing suggestion is that the prohibition is not against imitating sectarians but against encouraging them. Adoption of a heterodox practice that will confirm them in their ways is prohibited. However, if the adoption of said practice will actually weaken the heterodox position then it is permitted. Anything that will strengthen the sectarian position, whether it is imitation, words of encouragement or implicit legitimation, is prohibited. But if the very same actions will weaken the stature of sectarianism then they are permissible if not praiseworthy.[35]
This analysis, however, generates an extremely subjective prohibition. Yet, such is sometimes the way of Torah. It is the role of the posek to carefully weigh the possible outcomes and decide whether an action will encourage the heterodox, and is therefore prohibited, or will weaken their standing, and is therefore permitted. This is no small feat. It is almost a certainty that posekim will disagree about the ultimate outcome generated by various practices and, therefore, their permissibility. Yet, such is also the way of Torah.
However, the reader is cautioned that because the definition of which heterodox practices are prohibited is ambiguous, or perhaps subjective, only a sensitive and experienced posek can make a definitive ruling on the subject. This ambiguity is not license for the inexperienced to choose the most comfortable option but is, rather, the exact opposite; precisely because of this lack of clear definitions only great and experienced scholars have the prerequisite ability to rule on such matters. That sociology plays a role in the final determination of the halakhah does not mean that anyone with a modicum of sociological insight may issue an halakhic ruling. It is, at its core, an issue that requires a keen sensitivity to halakhic values and priorities, an appreciation whose fullest embodiment is only found in the greatest of scholars. The determination of whether a practice is a subtle legitimation of sectarians, one that is sufficiently strong to be prohibited, can only be left to those few who are qualified.
This is not a situation in which an authority offers an opinion which the layperson may accept or reject. Rather, it is similar to a woman’s cloth stained with an ambiguous color. If a rabbi decides after careful consideration that the stain is red, he is not recommending that based on his judgment the woman should, if she chooses to, consider herself a nidah. He is ruling that she is a nidah with all the implications, including the punishment of karet, that it entails.
Contemporary Applications
What we can conclude from the above survey is that normative halakhah prohibits the adoption of distinctively heterodox practices that might give the impression of a step towards accepting sectarian ideology. However, practices that are significantly different, such as an educational Bat Mitzvah outside of the synagogue, are permitted. This consideration is certainly relevant today. One would be hard pressed to differentiate between the status of Orthodoxy in America today and its position in pre-war Germany, at least in a way that is sufficiently significant to change the application of this halakhah. Furthermore, the Conservative movement has unquestionably moved well beyond any acceptable ideological or practical border so that it, too, is certainly classified as sectarian along with Reform. This essay should not be mistaken with a call to revive inter-denominational bickering. Rather, it is a call to consider the strengthened position Orthodoxy has gained and to responsibly respond to it.
It is to those who are our closest that we must be most sensitive of subtly legitimating and, thereby, further closing their doors to Orthodoxy. This author can attest from personal and second-hand involvement in the Conservative movement, and the written record certainly provides much testimony as well, that there are many who will grasp at any hints, even those based on gross misinterpretations and far-fetched comparisons, that "the Pharisaic sages have permitted the matter" and that the Orthodox are on their way to acknowledging what the heterodox have long accepted. Furthermore, there are many who defy denominational labels and wait for hints of Orthodox direction to determine their own place; if the Orthodox appear to be moving towards accepting it, whatever the relevant “it” may be, then these fence straddlers feel justified in utilizing the Conservative sponsored facilities for “it”. With the shift towards the left in the Conservative movement, this “Conservadox” group of issue-watchers has grown significantly. The need to avoid legitimating Conservative practices is a concern not only for the future of our Conservative brethren who desire legitimation but also of those on the fringes who carefully watch the winds of change.
(to be continued be"H)
[33]In nineteenth century Germany, recognizing the timing is key to understanding a shift in attitude. An earlier authority, from before Reform had defined itself and its practices, had to contend primarily with the prohibition against imitating Gentile practice. Later German, and Hungarians in general, were facing Reform (or Neolog) more than Christianity and were limited by the prohibition against imitating sectarians. Thus, the wearing of canonicals or usage of a choir in Germany were initially issues of adopting Gentile rather than Reform practices. (I am indebted to R. Seth Mandel for sharing with me this insight.)
[34] R. A. Leib Schneinabaum, The World That Was: America 1900-1945, p. 19 ff.
[35] A relatively recent example of this attitude is R’ Ahron Soloveichik’s approach to women reciting kaddish in the synagogue. Since, he claimed, allowing women to do so would weaken the heterodox we must permit it. See R’ Ahron Soloveichik, Od Yisrael Yosef B'ni Hai, p. 100. Other posekim, however, disagreed with this evaluation of the impact on society.
Tuesday, August 03, 2004
Prophecy in Exile
The Rambam is of the view that prophecy is a level of human perfection that any person can, in theory, attain by rising to a high moral and intellectual level. When a person reaches this lofty level, he will attain a prophetic connection to God. However, God retains the right to sever that connection if He sees fit. This general understanding is reflected in many of the Rambam's writings, from his Shemonah Perakim to his Mishneh Torah to his Moreh Nevukhim. (There is, however, a different understanding of Rambam's view - that God must bestow prophecy on a deserving individual rather than actively remove it from those otherwise deserving. See Lehem Mishneh, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 7:1.)
Thus, for example, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 11a) states that Hillel and Shmuel Ha-Katan were worthy of attaining prophecy but that their generations did not deserve having among them a prophet. These individuals had reached the status of prophecy but God withheld it because of their neighbors.
The Rambam explains why there is no longer, during the long exile, any prophecy:
The same circumstance, prevalence of sadness and dulness, was undoubtedly the direct cause of the interruption of prophecy during the exile... This is a real fact, and the cause is evident; the pre-requisites [of prophecy] have been lost. In the Messianic period - may it soon commence - prophecy will therefore again be in our midst, as has been promised by God. (Moreh Nevukhim II:36)
In other words, the travails of exile prevent individuals from attaining the necessary level for prophecy. This explains why the Rambam did not mention in Mishneh Torah that prophecy cannot take place outside of the land of Israel, even though it seems to be an undisputed statement of Hazal. According to the Rambam, this is not a rule of prophecy but a reality of exile. Exile prevents a person from acquiring the prerequisites of prophecy. However, I was bothered for a long time why the Rambam needed this roundabout approach.
I recently discovered that R. Yitzhak Arama took the general approach of the Rambam to prophecy but addressed this particular issue differently. According to R. Arama (Akedas Yitzhak, Balak ch. 82), God intentionally removes prophecy from those in exile. One can ask why God does this, and there are many possible answers. Perhaps it is to emphasize the special character of the land of Israel. Or perhaps it is part of God's plan for a degeneration of divine revelation until messianic times. But, regardless, it seems to me that this is a more palatable mechanical explanation of why there is no prophecy in exile.
Monday, August 02, 2004
Sick To My Stomach
DIGRESSION:
The entire "Rav Schachter Scandal" has made me sick to my stomach. It is times like these that remind me why I no longer live in the Modern Orthodox community. For a community that claims not to believe in the infallibility of gedolim to crucify one of their own greatest minds for using a turn of phrase that could be misinterpreted is simply sickening. His biggest sin, if you can call it that, is unfortunate phrasing about something that should be obvious to all. But the innuendo, the immediate negative reaction, the lack of basic respect for not only a fellow human being but a talmid hakham... disgust me. The calls for his resignation or firing are just childish. Such an act would be Modern Orthodoxy shooting itself in the foot (once again).
It is wrong of me to tar the entire Modern Orthodox community for this because it is only the vocal few who are doing the distorting, while most of the others are simply gullible and overly judgmental (I know, pot calling kettle black).
But let's be real here. Rav Schachter does not believe that women are animals. His essay does not even imply it, except by a forced and unsympathetic reading. Let's stop the (politically motivated) madness already.
Ribbono shel olam, it is not even a week after Tisha B'Av!
(This whole issue reminds of a Washington DC politician who had to resign after publicly using the word "niggardly". I hope we have not sunk so low as to allow our immediate impressions to override truth and our obligation to be dan le-khaf zekhus.)
Sunday, August 01, 2004
The Adoption of Heterodox Practices II
(continued from here)
Modern Applications
The first modern halakhist that this author was able to find who applied this passage in practice was the great authority R. Moshe Sofer, the famed Hatam Sofer. Perhaps surprisingly, his utilization of this prohibition was not in the form of a polemic but as part of a responsum to a traditional rabbi who had requested guidance in planning the doors and outer hallway of a new synagogue. The doors to the actual sanctuary must be in the west[19] but, the respondent asked, is there any rule about the doors leading from the outside into the hall? After thoroughly analyzing this obscure topic, R. Sofer added that since Reform synagogues are built with the outer doors in the west, it is forbidden for a traditional synagogue to do likewise and, thereby, imitate the Reform.[20]
However, since R. Sofer is known as having taken an extremely strong stand against Reform some discount his rulings on related issues. While this author shudders at the thought of dismissing this venerable authority, since others have less hesitance to do so this essay will focus on authorities generally considered more tolerant of others who are different and of innovative ideas.
R. David Tzvi Hoffman
The introduction of the organ into the synagogue was one of the earliest Reform innovations in the second decade of the nineteenth century and was roundly denounced in the 1819 collection of responsa from the leading rabbis of Europe titled Eileh Divrei ha-Berit. However, even clear directives from such luminaries as R. Akiva Eiger and R. Moshe Sofer would not deter the budding Reform movement. They had received the permissive rulings they desired, responsa from relatively unknown rabbis that had been previously published in the 1818 book Nogah ha-Tzedek, and no amount of scholarship or rabbinic presssure would deter them.[21]
In 1897, long after Reform had come to dominate German Judaism and Orthodoxy, through the tremendous efforts of R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, R. Azriel Hildesheimer and others, had reasserted itself as a viable minority, the question was presented to R. David Tzvi Hoffman whether an Orthodox synagogue may use an organ during the week. In a monumental responsum, the man who later became the foremost halakhic authority in Western Europe neatly summarized the existing literature on the subject and then formulated his own extensive reasoning as to why an organ is prohibited in the synagogue even during the week.[22] He received approval for his work from R. Azriel Hildesheimer and all but one of the rabbinic authorities he consulted.[23] In addition to the prohibition against walking in Gentile ways, which he thoroughly analyzed from all positions, R. Hoffman also cited the prohibition against imitation, and thereby encouragement, of sectarians. Since the Reform movement certainly qualifies as sectarian, we may not adopt any of their practices which might confirm them in their ways. Once we take a small step towards Reform the public might think that, despite our protests to the contrary, this is only the first of many steps. This is not merely the concern of a dominant majority worried about the potential growth of a small deviant group for, as we have seen, this prohibition was invoked by R. Hoffman long after Reform had become dominant and a healthy Orthodox opposition had become established.
Rav Kook
In the summer of 1935, the issue of an organ in the synagogue was brought before the world-renowned Chief Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Kook. Evidently, a Sephardic rabbi in Israel had permitted the use of an organ, claiming that all of the previous rulings issued only apply to Ashkenazim. The matter was taken to Rav Kook who, without citing R. Hoffman's recently published responsum which he may not have seen, arrived at the same conclusion that even if an organ were not a prohibited Gentile practice it would still be forbidden as a sectarian practice.[24]
Rav Kook further cited this prohibition in 1938 regarding cremation. In addition to the obligations to respect and bury a deceased person, about which he wrote at length, Rav Kook further noted that since Reform had accepted cremation as an option it is forbidden to accept or even assist with this sectarian practice.[25] If we are not allowed to encourage their practices through imitation, he argued, certainly the Orthodox "Hevra Kadisha" may not facilitate the Reform practice of cremation.
There is no question that in attempting to understand Rav Kook's approach to the heterodox we must take much more into account – his love for all Jews and, more generally, all people, his attitude towards the unlearned and non-religious, his approach to pluralism and on cooperation with those with whom he disagreed, his eschatological views, and more. This certainly applies also to R. Hoffman and all the other authorities cited here. However, our focus in this essay is a narrow halakhic issue that will admittedly give us an incomplete picture but one that is still necessary.
Rav Herzog
A few years after Rav Kook's response, in late 1945, his successor as Chief Rabbi of Israel, R. Yitzhak Isaac Herzog, utilized this prohibition in response to a timely question. Less than two years before the United Nations approved a Jewish state in Israel, Rav Herzog was asked whether an Ashkenazi may adopt a Sephardic, or more likely Modern, pronunciation of Hebrew for praying. While the respondent, R. Levi Rabinowitz, lived in Johannesburg, South Africa, this was certainly a relevant question in the burgeoning community of ingathered exiles in Israel. Responding to R. Rabinowitz's specific situation in Johannesburg, Rav Herzog wrote that since Reform in that location had grown and was utilizing Sephardic pronunciation of Hebrew, it was forbidden for R. Rabinowitz to change his pronunciation because it would appear to be an imitation of Reform practice which, as we have seen, is prohibited.[26] This was not a "public policy" decision that it would be best not to change pronunciations. Rather, it was an outright prohibition based on the above issue and the realities of Johannesburg at the time.
R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg
R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg, the famed Lithuanian genius who grew to become the leader of pre-war German Jewry, cites this prohibition in three separate responsa. In one responsum[27] he responded to the question of whether an organ may be used in a ceremony to inaugurate a new Jewish cemetery. Citing both the prohibition against adopting Gentile practices and that against imitating sectarian, R. Weinberg clearly distinguished between the two and argued that both applied in that situation. Explicitly affirming R. Hoffman's approach, R. Weinberg wrote:
If we allow the use of musical instruments at the inauguration of a cemetery, the unlearned and unlettered will say, "The Pharisaic sages have permitted the matter." It is therefore incumbent upon us to preserve our ancestors' actions and not to deviate from their customs by even a hair's breadth.[28]In a responsum[29] from 1936, R. Weinberg addressed the issue of planting flowers on a grave. After considering all the possible objections, R. Weinberg concluded that this would be permissible except that, since Reform had previously adopted the practice, for the Orthodox to then adopt it would be a prohibited acceptance of a sectarian observance. Since we may not encourage them or lend credence to their practices, we must carefully avoid any innovations they may have initiated, even those that otherwise conform to halakhah.
In a third and oft-quoted responsum,[30] R. Weinberg answered an inquiry about whether the celebration of a Bat Mitzvah is permitted. His main concern was that it might be considered a variation of the Christian confirmation ceremony, an issue he exhaustively analyzed and put to rest. However, a matter that he did not and could not dismiss was that the Bat Mitzvah ceremony was a heterodox innovation and, as such, may not be adopted. Imitating a heterodox practice, even if unintentionally, "has within it the strengthening of the destroyers because they were the first to initiate the new practice of celebrating the Bat Mitzvah." This, R. Weinberg rules, is a sufficient reason to prohibit the Bat Mitzvah celebration. The only way for such a practice to be permitted is to sufficiently differentiate it from the heterodox celebration. Basing himself on the view of Tosafot,[31] R. Weinberg argued that if it is obvious to onlookers that the ceremony is for a different reason than a corresponding heterodox ceremony would be for then it is permissible. The heterodox Bat Mitzvah is a dry synagogue ritual followed by a party for its own sake; the Orthodox Bat Mitzvah that R. Weinberg permitted is a celebration, specifically outside of the synagogue, of family joy and, more importantly, a time of educational strengthening of the religious development of a budding woman. As R. Weinberg quickly noted, those who do not utilize the opportunity properly and wish merely to have a party like those in the heterodox community have no halakhic permission to do so.[32]
(to be continued be"H)
[19] Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 150:5
[20] Responsa Hatam Sofer, vol. 1 no. 27
[21] Cf. Michael A. Meyer, Response to Modernity, pp. 57-61; Judith Bleich, "Rabbinic Responses to Non-observance in the Modern Era" in Jewish Tradition and the Non-traditional Jew, ed. Jacob Schacter, pp. 40-53.
[22] Melamed le-Ho'il, vol. 1 no. 16
[23] R. Marcus Horovitz, the only rabbi to dissent, agreed with R. Hoffman's conclusion and his analysis of the prohibition against imitating sectarians. He only disagreed regarding the prohibition of following the ways of the Gentiles. See his entire letter to R. Hoffman in Responsa Mateh Levi, vol. 2 no. 6. This position of R. Horovitz's regarding following the ways of the Gentiles was later quoted and disagreed with by R. Hayim Ozer Grodzenski in Ahiezer, vol. 4 (Jerusalem: 1992) no. 38.
[24] Orah Mishpat, Orah Hayim no. 36
[25] Da'at Kohen, Yoreh Deah no. 197
[26] Pesakim u-Ketavim, vol. 1 no. 14. Cf. ibid. no. 1.
[27] Seridei Esh, vol. 2 no. 80
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., vol. 3 no. 111. Cf. R. David Tzvi Hoffman, Melamed le-Ho'il, vol. 2 no. 109
[30] Seridei Esh, vol. 3 no. 93
[31] Hullin 41a sv uvashuk
[32] The omission of this entire issue of imitating sectarians from the responsa of R. Moshe Feinstein on this subject does not indicate disagreement over the prohibition. R. Moshe Feinstein gave brief responses to the question with little halakhic background. As R. Weinberg himself claimed, he and R. Feinstein wholly agreed and the only difference between them was that R. Weinberg discussed at length the underlying halakhic issues. See his letter to Ha-Pardes, Tammuz 5726 p. 37.
