New York Water V

The following is a statement I received from the OU. Keep in mind that this is not a pesak but a statement that until the OU reaches a final decision it will accommodate those who wish to be strict.

This is also certainly not meant as a pesak for individuals. As it ends, and this cannot be emphasized enough, "As in all such cases, individuals should consult with their local Orthodox Rabbi for guidance."

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Tiny crustaceans called copepods have been found in New York City tap water. The species we are finding primarily is Diacyclops thomasi, along with some Mesocyclops edax and Skistodiaptomus pygmaeus. These tiny crustaceans are ubiquitous in ponds, lakes, and reservoirs. New York City, because of the high quality of its water, is not required by the EPA to mechanically filter its water. Their appearance in tap water as small white specks may represent a significant kashrus issue.

It is important to note that in some cases, water containing aquatic micro-fauna is permitted for consumption by Halacha. This is determined by several factors, including:

· Whether or not the organisms came into existence in water contained by vessels, cisterns, wells or still-water enclosures, and other factors (See Talmud Bavli: Chullin 67a, and Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh De’ah: 84:1,2 with commentaries);
· The visibility of the organism to the unaided eye;
· The frequency in which the organisms appear in the water from the tap.

Some Poskim (rabbinic decisors) believe that one of the above considerations might apply in our case, and rule, therefore, leniently. Many others feel that the prevalence, nature of the water source, and size of the copepods do not allow for a lenient decision. Since this is an issue of a potential Issur d'oraisa (prohibition on a biblical level), we are issuing the following, interim, guidelines to OU certified restaurants and caterers.

· Tap water in New York City (i.e., the boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx and Staten Island) should be filtered before use in drinking, cooking and baking;
· Products already manufactured may be used, even if made with unfiltered water;
· The water supply of dishwashers does not require filtering. Similarly, dishes may be washed by hand in unfiltered water if the dishes are subsequently towel dried, or left to drip-dry without "puddles" of water in them;
· Water should not be filtered on Shabbat or Yom Tov because of the prohibition of borer (selection). Rather, filtering should be done before Shabbat and the water should be stored for Shabbat use. One may, however, filter water for non-food purposes on Shabbat and Yom Tov.
· Bottled water is permitted for use.

We have found filters rated at 50 microns to be sufficient. Most commercial filters are finer (10-15 microns) and will filter out the copepods. Filters must be maintained or they lose their effectiveness.

The OU continues to evaluate the issues. As new information emerges we will make it available to the public. As in all such cases, individuals should consult with their local Orthodox Rabbi for guidance.

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The Adoption of Heterodox Practices

The following is the first installment from an article I have written. I submitted it for publication last year but it got rejected by a grumpy editor who wanted changes. I made those revisions but decided to just blog it instead of resubmitting it for publication. After I finish posting all of the pieces, I'll find somewhere on the web to post the entire article.

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The traditionalist Jewish community does not live in isolation. Even among those who seclude themselves and restrict their interaction with "outsiders," there is still a necessary reaction to the practices of others. Perhaps the most famous example was the removal of the ten commandments from the daily liturgy so as not to unintentionally support the heresies of those who claimed that only these laws are binding.[1] Similarly, the addition of the blessing against "informers" was certainly a response against sectarians.[2] More recently, the Vilna Gaon’s abolition of the custom to decorate synagogues with trees on Shavuot reflects a reaction to Gentile religious practice.[3] These few examples, and there are many more, demonstrate an awareness of external developments and a need to adjust normative practice to accurately reflect old distinctions in a new reality. Additionally, any proposed innovation must be weighed within the inverse of this scale. We must carefully consider not only its internal implications but also its repercussions outside of our proverbial ghetto walls.

The primary consideration is certainly the biblical prohibition against following the ways of the Gentiles. This is a highly nuanced commandment that is widely discussed in the halakhic literature.[4] Another issue that reflects the impact of external practice on internal developments and also the potential effect of internal custom on external parties is the less famous, although certainly worthy of consideration, prohibition against imitating heretics and thereby encouraging them in their deviant ways. Out of a sensitive concern for their fates and a desire to not even slightly worsen their position vis a vis traditional Judaism, we must carefully ensure not to strengthen any of their misperceptions.

Confirming Sectarians

The Mishnah in Hullin (41a-b) records:

One may not slaughter at all into a pit. Yet, one may dig a pit in one’s own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, one should not do so lest one confirm the sectarians (minim)[5] in their ways.[6]

The Mishnah here is somewhat unclear. It first states that one may not slaughter and have the blood fall into a pit. This is either because sectarians used this method in order to collect blood for their idolatrous sacrifices[7] or because they collected blood in this way to eat in their pagan services.[8] According to both opinions, this otherwise permissible method of slaughtering is prohibited because of idolatrous sectarian practice; because what is done outside of our community affects what may be done within it.

However, the Mishnah continues to permit the practice in one’s house but not in the street, which seems to directly contradict the immediately preceding prohibition. In the Gemara (41b), Rava authoritatively explains the Mishnah’s language as meaning that slaughtering directly into a pit is forbidden everywhere but slaughtering into a ditch that allows the blood to drip into a nearby pit is permitted in one’s house but not in the street. A baraita is brought to confirm Rava’s distinction and this baraita attaches to the prohibition against slaughtering in this way the verse "You shall not walk in their ways" (Lev. 18:3), the source for the prohibition against following Gentile practices.

The simple way to understand this passage is that these are all examples of idolatrous practices that we may not follow, consistent with the prohibition against “walk[ing] in their ways.” However, Rashi explains differently. As indicated above in our translation of the Mishnah, Rashi writes that slaughtering into a ditch that leads to a pit is prohibited because it will confirm the sectarians in their ways (yahazik yedeihem be-hukoteihem). According to him, the prohibition involved in this matter is not one of following prohibited idolatrous practices[9] but of imitating sectarian practice. Rashi explains that one may not slaughter into a pit, "even in [one’s] home because it looks like a sectarian practice."[10] Even when the prohibition against following Gentile or idolatrous practice no longer applies, we are still prohibited from appearing to follow sectarian practice so as not to strengthen their resolve and confirm their position.

Rambam has a different way of understanding this issue. In explaining the prohibition against slaughtering into a pit he writes, "because this is the practice of idolaters." This is Rambam's explanatory addition to the Mishnaic passage. Rather than maintaining the Mishnah's explanation of "lest he confirm the sectarians in their ways," Rambam offered his own explanation that seems to invoke the baraita's citation of "You shall not walk in their ways" (Lev. 18:3). This was in regard to slaughtering directly into a pit. However, in describing the prohibition against slaughtering into a ditch that drips into a pit, Rambam reverts to the Mishnah's "lest he confirm the sectarians in their ways." [12] Evidently, according to Rambam sectarians only slaughter directly into pits and, therefore, only this is considered to be a prohibited idolatrous practice. However, while slaughtering into a ditch that leads to a pit is not technically an idolatrous practice, it is a practice that conforms to sectarian rules and, therefore, gives the appearance of trying to follow sectarian regulations. This alone, appearing to intentionally obey sectarian rules, is prohibited because it strengthens their resolve.[13] When they see another person coming closer to their practices it legitimates them and reinforces their position.

This can be further seen from the exception to the general rule that the day following a holiday - is'ru hag - has a special status that includes a prohibition against eulogizing and fasting. The Mishnah in Hagigah (2:4) states that when Shavuot falls out on Shabbat, the next day, Sunday, is not given any unusual practices. The reason for this exception is that Second Commonwealth sectarians always observed Shavuot on the Sunday following the traditional Shavuot. Because observing a semi-festive day on the Sunday following Shavuot might be seen as partial agreement with sectarians, it is not practiced even though it would otherwise be required.[14] We must not strengthen the position of sectarians even to the point of omitting a rabbinically ordained observance.

The source for this prohibition is, presumably, the Mishnah and Gemara in Gittin (61a, 62a) that one may not encourage sinners in their incorrect ways. Even a mere verbal greeting that could be understood as encouragement is rabbinically forbidden.[15] It stands to reason that active encouragement, including imitation, would also be prohibited, as discussed above.[16]

From all the above, and particularly Rashi's explicit statement in Hullin, we see a prohibition against observing sectarian practice if it will strengthen the public stature of sectarianism. The application of this prohibition to modern heterodox movements seems self-evident. While the sectarianism referred to in the Mishnah was idolatrous, there is no indication that idolatry per se is a necessary requirement for falling under this prohibition. It is well established among historians that the term sectarian (min) refers to a broad category of deviants[17] and, as R. Samson Raphael Hirsch expertly demonstrated in his open debate with R. Seligman Baer Bamburger regarding Austritt, within the Maimonidean framework the term certainly applies to heterodox movements.[18] If so, and, as we shall see, numerous halakhic authorities have affirmed this, there is a prohibition against embracing heterodox practices when and if such adoption confirms the heterodox in their ways. What remains to be determined is what can be considered sufficient confirmation to be prohibited.

(to be continued be"H)

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[1] Berakhot 12a
[2] Berakhot 28b-29a. Cf. Lawrence H. Schiffman, Who Was A Jew? (Hoboken, NJ: 1985), p. 53 ff.
[3] R. Avraham Danzig, Hayei Adam, 131:13. Whether the Vilna Gaon abolished only the custom about trees or also about flowers, see R. Yosef Levy, Minhag Yisrael Torah, vol. 2 p. 364.
[4] Cf. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 178 and commentators; Encyclopedia Talmudit, vol. 13 sv. hukot ha-goyim.
[5] The Vilna Shas reads "Sadducees" but older versions have "Sectarians." See Dikdukei Soferim, ad loc. n. 7.
[6] So Soncino, n. 6 translates according to Rashi.
[7] Rashi, ad loc.
[8] Rashba, Torat Ha-Bayit, 1:3 p. 17a. Cf. Rashbam, Ramban, Rabbeinu Bahya on Leviticus 19:26; Seforno on Leviticus 17:7; R’ Yonatan Eybeschutz, Pleiti, 12:1.
[9] Perhaps because there is a rational reason to slaughter into a pit, namely cleanliness. However, this raises the issue of whether a rational idolatrous practice may be followed. See further the responsa of R. David Tzvi Hoffman (below note 22), R. Marcus Horovitz (note 23) and R. Yechiel Ya’akov Weinberg (note 30) where this is discussed.
[10] 41b sv. kol ikar
[11] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shehitah 2:5
[12] ibid. 6
[13] Note that according to Rambam we only presume of being a sectarian someone who publicly slaughters directly into a pit. This is further evidence that Rambam’s view is that slaughtering into a pit was sectarian practice while slaughtering into a ditch that leads to a pit was only reminiscent of sectarian practice. Cf. Radbaz, ad loc.; Pri Hadash, Yoreh Deah 12:4.
[14] Cf. Tiferet Yisrael, ad loc. no. 31; Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger, ad loc. no. 8. This seems to be a proof countering R. Daniel Sperber’s claim in The Edah Journal, 3:2 Elul 5763 p. 11 n. 26 that "the concern about appearing to emulate non-Orthodox movements does not arise as long as there are normative halakhic sources that may be relied on." As we have seen, even something that was permissible in a different time, as reflected by normative halachic sources from that period, can be forbidden in a later situation. This is a prohibition that greatly depends on time and place.
[15] Cf. Nedarim 22a. It is certainly noteworthy that "the ways of peace" override this prohibition, implying that there must be a genuine halakhic need to set aside this consideration.
[16] R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, "Tefillat Nashim Befarhesyah" in Tehumin, 5758 p. 122 cites Avnei Nezer, Hoshen Mishpat no. 149 that such encouragement of antinomians or heretics is biblically prohibited.
[17] Cf. Lawrence Schiffman, ibid. p. 54
[18] R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, Collected Writings, vol. 6 pp. 277-287

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The World That Was

The Jewish Press has a review of an excellent new book by Sha'ar Press, The World That Was: America 1900-1945: Transmitting the Torah Legacy to America by Rabbi A. Leib Schneinabum. The review lauds this attempt to present history accurately, without modernist revision to make the past look like the current.

I read one chapter of the book and agree that it is excellent, although it has the typical Artscroll coffee-table layout that makes it look much less serious than it really is.

The best line from the review:

"The Chazon Ish wrote that one who does not learn history is doomed to repeat the failures of his people."

So that's where George Santayana got it from!

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Forbidden Mixtures

Following up on a discussion in the comments section about whether one can merely look at the ingredients of an item and determine whether it is kosher, I present the following sources. This is not intended as a well-researched or thorough post. I just pulled some stuff together after dinner.

Regarding whether something that one cannot taste is permissible to eat, there is a three-way disagreement among rishonim about whether something is forbidden if one cannot taste it but it is more than 1/60th of a mixture. The Rema rules strictly like Rashi, the Ramban, the Rashba and the Ran. On this, see Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Yoreh De'ah 98:21-22, 25.

R. Akiva Eiger (Glosses to Yoreh De'ah 99:5) quotes a responsum of the Rivash to the effect that someone manufacturing a foodstuff who dilutes a forbidden ingredient is diluting it on behalf of all of his customers and the mixture is therefore forbidden to anyone who buys it. This is, however, hotly disputed. The Darkhei Teshuvah (99:67, 108:20) quotes a host of posekim agreeing with R. Akiva Eiger and a host disagreeing with him. The rabbi who taught me Yoreh De'ah agreed with R. Akiva Eiger.

The upshot of these two positions is that if a manufacturer mixes a forbidden ingredient into food to the point that one cannot taste it, the mixture is forbidden to all.

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R. Yitzhak (Prof. Isadore) Twersky z"l

A post at the House of Hock led me to a website with a collection of writings from R. Yitzhak (Prof. Isadore) Twersky z"l. Given his ground-breaking academic accomplishments and his life-long dedication to honest and uncompromising Torah, I thought it worthwhile to blog a link to this website.

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OU Kosher

The OU has launched a new kashrus website.

(Thanks to the husband and wife blogging team of Avraham and Dani Bronstein.)

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Tisha B'Av Resources

Tisha B'Av is not a day for in-depth study but light reading of appropriate material is allowed. These three websites have such resources. Please add to this list of Orthodox resources in the comments section.

OU
Aish
Ohr Somayach
Torah.org
Torat Emet

Artscroll Gemara (Gittin 55b-56a in English)
Artscroll Kinnos for the Holocaust

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Genocide

Lest we frumme Yidden be accused of lack of concern, let me voice my opposition to genocide anywhere against anyone. I frankly do not know enough about what is going on in Darfur to render an informed opinion nor do I have any ability to help, but my heart goes out to anyone who is innocently murdered or even just displaced. The world has been too slow to react in the past (even the very recent past), and it is to its great shame. I can go off into a political discussion, but let me just say that my vote this November will be for a president who rose to stop a perpetrator of mass murder and systematic subjugation of an entire people.

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Laws of Charity III

Ch. 250

1. How much do we give a poor person? As much as he has lost. If he is hungry, we feed him. If he needs clothes, we clothe him. If he lacks furniture, we buy it for him. Even if he used to have, when he was rich, a horse to ride and a servant to run before him, we provide them to him. And so to each person according to his needs. Some to whom it is appropriate to give bread, we give bread. Dough, we give dough. A bed, we give a bed. Hot bread, we give it to him hot. Cold, cold. To feed him directly in to his mouth, we feed him. If he wishes to marry, we rent a home for him and furnish it, and then pay for his wedding.

Rema: This only applies to a person responsible for communal charity but an individual is not obligated to give a poor person what he has lost. Rather, he must notify the public of this man's need. If the public cannot afford to provide for this poor person only then is the individual obligated to give for all of this man's needs.

2. A poor woman who is ready to marry should be given no less than 50 zuz (Shakh: or whatever amount is appropriate for that time and place) and if more charity money is available then she should receive according to her societal standing.

3. A poor person who collects door-to-door receives only a small amount from the communal charity funds. (Shakh: This also applies to anyone who comes collecting from an individual. One need not give him a large amount.)

4. A traveling poor man receives no less than a specific amount. If he is sleeping over then he is given a pillow and a place to sleep and oil. If he stays for Shabbos, he is given food for three meals, oil, fish and vegetables. If one knows him than one gives him according to his societal standing.

5. If there are many poor people in a town and the rich people say that the poor should collect door-to-door while the average say that the community should support them - each community member according to his means (i.e the rich paying more), the ruling is with the average.

Rema: Because the main obligation to give charity is according to one's wealth. In some places, charity is given as gifts and in some place, as a communal tax. One who gives according to his material blessing is more worthy of future blessing.

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Martyrdom

In the days before Tisha be-Av, something from R' Nathan Lopes Cardozo to ponder about those Jews in history who were strong enough in faith to choose martyrdom over apostasy:

The late British philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin at the end of his famous essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” tries to convince us that one needs “to realize the relative validity of one’s convictions and yet stand for them unflinchingly”. We must however agree with Michael Sandel’s bitter critique when he states: “If one’s convictions are only relatively valid, why stand for them unflinchingly?” Indeed this kind of liberalism, with all its beauty, keeps the “Li” outside our life and turns us into outsiders looking into our lives like a blind man looks to colors.

Albert Camus once stated: “There is only one serious philosophical problem and that is suicide” The great Jewish thinker Abraham Joshua Heshel differed. It is not suicide but martyrdom, he said, which is our only real problem: Is there anything worth dying for?

This is indeed the ultimate question for Jews today. Only when Jews will realize again that their Jewishness is worth dying for they will be able to actually live it.

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Hessed Alert

Shmarya makes us aware of a man in need of a kidney donor, with information on how to help.

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Women Rabbis

R. Hershel Schachter on women reading the kesubah at a wedding, being called to the Torah and being ordained as rabbis.

I, once again, tip my hat to TorahWeb for providing excellent material for public education.

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The Camel, The Hare, And The Hyrax IV

It seems this book has made an impression. One prominent outreach group has, after reading this book, decided to stop using the "proof" for the divine origin of the Torah that the Torah lists every animal with only one kosher sign. Here is a letter from the group:

Dear R' Nosson,

I wanted to let you know that after reading your book, I've informed the Arachim staff not to use the argument of the camel, hare & hyrax in our seminars or lectures. I think that you've done a very important work, and we should be very careful with the facts that we offer.
After all, EMET (the Ultimate Truth) is the Divine signature (or better: fingerprint) of G-D!

Zvi Inbal
Arachim

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Laws of Charity II

Ch. 249

1: One who can afford to should give as much as the poor require. One who cannot afford to do so should ideally give 20% of his assets or, for an average person, 10%. Anything less than 10% is stingy.
 
Rema: One should not give away more than 20% of one's assets so as not to become needing of others. But that is only during one's life. At one's time of death, one may give away to charity as much as one wants. One should not use ma'aser money for other mitzvos. It should only be used to support the poor. (Shakh writes that one may use it for other mitzvos)

2: One who gives less than one third of a shekel a year to charity does not fulfill the commandment to give charity.

3: One must give charity with a happy countenance, show sympathy to the poor recipient and speak comfortingly to him. One who gives charity nastily loses one's merit.

4: If a poor person asks for charity and one has nothing to give, one should not be mean to him but should apologetically and sympathetically explain the situation.

Rema: One is prohibited from turning away a requestor empty-handed.

5: If one encourages other to give charity, the encourager has greater reward.

6: There are 8 levels of charity: The highest (8) is supporting a poor Jew and giving him gift, loan, partnership or occupation in which he will be able to support himself.

7: Below this (7) is to give anonymously without knowing the identity of the recipient. Similar to this is placing money in a charity box. However, one should not place money in a charity box unless one knows that the person in charge of the box is reliable and trustworthy.

8: Below this (6) is to know the identity of the recipient but to give anonymously

9: Below this (5) is for the recipient to know the donor's identity but not vice versa.

10: Below this (4) is to give to a poor person before he asks.

11: Below this (3) is to give a proper amount after he asks.

12: Below this (2) is to give an improper amount after he asks.

13: Below this (1) is to give begrudgingly.

Rema: One should not take pride in having given to charity. If one does, one not only loses reward but is punished. However, if one donates an object to charity one may ask to have one's name written on it as a memorial of him.

14: It is good to give one perutah to charity before each prayer.

15: Charity distributors should use charity money to marry of poor orphans.

16: Some say that donating to a synagogue is better than donating to charity, and that giving money to educate poor children in Torah or to the sick is better than donating to a synagogue.

Rema: The practice of pledging money during Yizkor is ancient and helps their souls.

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Shabbos

Until I saw this passage, it had never occured to me that the Shabbos of Creation was not only the day on which God rested. It was the day on which nature started to take its course.
 
From R. Walter Wurzburger, God is Proof Enough, p. 113:
 

The regularity and order governing the realm of nature tend to obscure the Divine source of all existence. It is for this reason that precisely on the Sabbath, the day when, according to the Biblical account, the universe began to function in accordance with the laws of nature, it is incumbent upon us to acknowledge God as the Owner and Master of the universe.
 
By abstaining from productive activities on the day on which the Creator "stopped" His work of creation, we affirm that what appears to the secular mind as purely natural processes are in actuality manifestations of the Divine. Thus, the Sabbath reveals what nature conceals.

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Laws of Charity

"Tziyon be-mishpat tipadeh, ve-shaveha bi-tzedakah" - "Zion will be redeemed through justice, and its returnees through charity" (Isaiah 1:27; cf. Metzudas David, ad loc.; Shabbos 139a)

In the spirit of the nine days, I present a slightly abridged translation of the laws of charity in Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah

Ch. 247

1: It is a positive commandment to give charity according to one's ability. This commandment is repeated a number of time in the Torah and there is an additional prohibition against refusing to give charity. One has to be very scrupulous about this commandment because refusing to give in a timely manner could lead to the death of someone poor.

2: No one becomes poor or otherwise damaged from giving to charity.

3: God has pity on those who pity the poor. Rema: One should remember that one is always requesting sustenance from God and, therefore, just as he want God to answer his requests he should answer the requests of the poor. One should also remember that charity is a cycle and that one who gives may end up receiving similar beneficence in the end, either himself or one of his descendants.

4: Charity tears divine decrees of punishment. Rema: It also brings wealth. One is not normally allowed to test God but in this matter, one may challenge Him. However, some say that one may challenge God only regarding giving ma'aser but not other charity. (R. Ya'akov Emden and the Shelah write that one may only challenge in regard to ma'aser of produce and not ma'aser of money. - Pis'hei Teshuvah)

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ch. 248

1: Every person, even someone supported by charity, is obligated to give charity. (A poor person is only obligated to give if he will have sufficient funds to survive - Shakh) The religious courts can force one to give charity and even remove funds from one's estate for charity. (There is a dispute whether the court can remove funds for charity from an estate without the owner's presence - Shakh and subsequent commentators)

2: One may take a collateral for a charity fund, even on the eve of Shabbos.

3: A court does not assign charity requirements to orphans living off their father's estate. (Many disputes over the exceptions.)

4: The charity agent may only accept small donations from children or married women because the father/husband must authorize such donations. (If it is clear that the father/husband approves of such a donation, then one may accept it - Pis'hei Teshuvah) ("Nowadays", when women normally buy and sell items and have permission and control of a portion of household finances, one may accept donations from wives - Gilyon Maharsha)

5: If a woman hires a tutor for her children and her husband does not protest, then the transaction is valid. If he objects, then the transaction is null.

6: An adult son who eats at his father's table and a servant who eats at his master's table may give a piece of food to a poor person or to his friend's son, because such is common practice.

7: A desparate person who pledges more charity than he can afford or who pledges begrudgingly, all so he is not embarrassed for not giving, the charity agent may not collect on that pledge.
 
8: One who wishes to achieve merit for himself should overcome his inclination towards stinginess and give generously. Anything that is for the sake of Heaven will be good. If he builds a synagogue, it should be nicer than his home. If he feeds the poor, he should give of the best food on his table. Etc.

(b"n, to be continued)

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Judaism and Vegetarianism

One day, about a year ago, I was learning on the Subway and a fellow, who was on his way out the door and whom I had never before spoken with, handed me a synopsis of an halakhic article he had written and recommended that I read it. I read it, and when I got to work I downloaded the entire article and read it carefully. The article argues that vegetarianism is an halakhic mandate. Since this is not only incorrect, it is a distortion of halakhic methodology, I wrote a response and e-mailed it to him. You can find the article here. My response follows (his words are in italics before each response).

Although the Garden of Eden was strictly vegetarian and the Messianic era will reinstate a similar vegetarian paradise

However, as Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 11:1, the sacrificial order - including animal sacrifices - will be reinstated at that time. As these sacrifices are eaten, it is clear that vegetarianism will not be reinstated. On Rav Kook’s view of this, which is frequently misstated, see http://www.ottmall.com/mj_ht_arch/v39/mj_v39i49.html#COZ for a translation of a relevant letter of his.

As the Rabbis of the Talmud noted, any obligation to consume meat was extinguished after the destruction of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem. No person whose sensibilities are offended by an animal-based diet has an obligation to consume meat; and the commandment to rejoice on the Sabbath can be fulfilled by vegetarians.

First, Maimonides rules in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yom Tov 6:18 that one is obligated to eat meat on holidays. While this is disputed by most other authorities, many are strict and fulfill this obligation even according to Maimonides. This is as much of a praiseworthy lifnim mi-shurat ha-din as what is advocated in this paper.

The obligation on the Sabbath is to eat food that you enjoy. While vegetarians who do not enjoy consuming meat may certainly refrain from doing so, those who enjoy meat over vegetarian options are obligated to eat meat. That is how they enjoy the Sabbath, which is a biblical mandate.

The third assumption is that modern agricultural practices comply with the letter of the law, including ts'sar ba'alei chayim. This is doubtful in the vast majority of cases.

It has yet to be demonstrated that, even if the author is absolutely correct that modern agricultural practices are blatant violations of tsa'ar ba'alei hayim, the resulting food becomes prohibited. There are some prohibitions whose violation causes the resultant to be prohibited from consumption - assur ba-hana'ah. However, most prohibitions are not of that severity and there is no evidence, to my knowledge, that implies that food produced through prohibited acts of tsa'ar ba'alei hayim are not allowed to be eaten.

The fourth assumption is that Jewish ethics requires no more than compliance with religious codes. To the contrary, there is an obligation of "lifnim meshurat hadin" i.e., to exceed the letter of the law. As Rabbi Yochanan lamented: "Jerusalem was destroyed because the residents limited their decisions to the letter of the law of the Torah . . . ."

This is, indeed, an important statement and one that deserves profound thought. However, in addition to pointing out that Jewish ethics, and frequently law, requires following the spirit in addition to the letter of the law (see this letter in the Elul 5763 issue of The Edah Journal), since this is not an inherently obligatory issue there are many public policy matters that need to factor into the equation. Is this a top priority or are there other pressing issues that require more immediate attention? Will the inevitable denial of certain pleasures make Orthodox Judaism appear even more ascetic and unpleasant than it already appears, in this hedonistic age? Will this deter non-observant Jews from becoming more observant or even encourage observant Jews to leave the fold? Is this plan of action realistic or will it add to the distance between ideal Jewish observance and the reality in observant homes? Will this make rabbis appear even more distant from the laity than they already are? Etc. Etc. These are serious questions that need to be answered before any plan of action is taken.

While codes of Jewish law have not, to date, specifically addressed consumption of factory farm animals and their byproducts, the ancient Biblical laws are instructive.

As above, I see no instruction at all from Biblical or Rabbinic laws. Just like a forbidden hybrid mixture of fruit species is forbidden to make but, once made, is permitted to be eaten, food produced through unfortunate acts of tsa'ar ba'alei hayim are also permitted.

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Innovation in Halakhah

An unauthorized translation of an excerpt from R. Hershel Schachter's article on Women's Prayer Groups:

It is very clear that halakhah is not frozen. Due to all the many changes in circumstances, halakhah has been forced to respond appropriately. The questions of 1984 are not the same as the questions of 1974 and, therefore, in many cases the answers will be different.

However, above and beyond this, just like there have been advances in science, so too there have been advances in halakhah. The midrash in Bereshit Rabbah (49:2) states, "There is no day in which G-d does not innovate a halakhah in the heavenly court." Similarly, Yalkut Shimoni (Shoftim, 49) explains the verse "G d chooses new..." (Judges 5:8) as referring to the battles of Torah, that G-d desires Torah novellae. As R. Hayim Volozhiner wrote*, "There is no measuring the great wondrousness and heavenly impact of true man-made Torah novellae."

However, Tosafot in Pesahim (50b sv. ve-kam) note a contradiction between two talmudic passages. The Gemara in Pesahim states that one should learn Torah even without the proper motivation, because from doing so one will eventually arrive at the proper motivation. In contrast, the Gemara in Berakhot (17a) states that he who studies Torah with the wrong motivation would have been better off never having been born. The Netziv** resolves this contradiction by explaining that learning extant Torah without issuing a ruling or innovating an interpretation is certainly permissible, even a mitzvah, regardless of motivation. After all, he is learning the true Torah. However, Torah pilpul, i.e. creating new interpretations, requires the proper motivation and, if done with the wrong intentions, is spiritually poisonous because the practitioner biases his judgement towards his personal desires.

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* Nefesh Ha-Hayim 4:12
** Meshiv Davar 1:46

Listen to a similar theme in this lecture.

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Ethiopian (Jews?) II

R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yabi'a Omer, vol. 8 Even Ha-Ezer no. 11 sec. 2

I will not fear [to comment on] what I saw from R. Yitzhak Isaav Halevy Herzog zt"l... who wrote to question the Jewishness of the Falashas... I was very surprised to see that he disputed the words of great scholars who determined with certainty, without question, that they are from the tribe of Dan. [He questioned] based on the words of researchers who question the Jewishness [of the Ethiopians]. Who should be set aside for whom?

R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah 4:41

There is no reason to be concerned that we are teaching Torah to doubtful Jews... since because they might be Jewish, and there is a reason for this [teaching them], it seems that the prohibition does not apply... However, be careful not to state a false halakhah which in itself is prohibited. Do not tell them that we consider them definite Jews (she-al tagidu she-anu ken mahashivim osam ki-yehudim vada'im). Rather, tell them that we are unsure of their Jewishness but we are prepared to educate them in the Torah of God and His commandments.

Until they convert, do not consider them in practice to be definite Jews, even regarding counting them for a minyan or calling them to the Torah. Do not embarass them but do not flatter them. However, out of stricture they are still obligated to observe the commandments, since they might be Jewish.

(le-havdil bein... - regarding the source)
Ha'aretz, Sunday, April 4, 1999

...He also reiterated that the Ethiopians are not being singled out, since Chabad policy applies to anyone whose Jewishness is in question...

Rabbi Yeruslavski, the leader of Chabad in Kiryat Malachi, says that the policy of not accepting Ethiopian children is an internal matter and has nothing to do with racism. "We have principles. We also did not accept children from the [former Soviet Union] if there is any doubt to their Jewishness," the Chabad rabbi said.

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Ethiopian (Jews?)

Around twenty years ago, with tremendous famine ravaging Africa, the plight of the Beta Israel came before the world Jewish community. These Ethiopians claim to be Jews who had lived there for thousands of years, since the destruction of the First Temple. The question came before the world Jewish community in the 1980s whether to accept the Beta Israel as Jews and, not necessarily linked to the first question, whether to attempt to save them from persecution by securing their immigration to Israel. This is beside the need to save Ethiopians in general from famine.

Before we even begin, it needs to be said that the color of someone's skin is irrelevant to his status of being Jewish or not. There are unquestionably (and unfortunately) some Jews who are racist, but that bigotry has no place in an halakhic discussion.

I. The Ancient Question

This was not the first time an Ethiopian Jewish community came into question. In the ninth century, a traveler named Eldad of Dan emerged and created a big stir in the Jewish world. He claimed to be a member of an isolated Jewish community in Ethiopia that traces its lineage back to the tribe of Dan. Importantly, R. Tzemah Gaon wrote a responsum in which he seemed to accept this Eldad's claim. Centuries later, we find the Radbaz mentioning an isolated Jewish community in Ethiopia. There were large wars going on between the Muslim, Christian and Jewish populations in Ethiopia. On more than one occasion, "Jews" were captured and sold into slavery. The question arose as to whether these Ethiopian "Jews" were really Jews and must, therefore, be treated like Jewish slaves (eved ivri) or even set free (pidyon shevuyim). The Radbaz (Responsa, vol. 2 no. 219, vol. 7[(Divrei David] nos. 5, 9) ruled that they were Jews from the tribe of Dan and that, even though they acted like Karaites, it is not their fault because they are tinokos she-nishbu.

Is this sufficient to attribute full Jewish lineage to the community in Ethiopia claimin to be Jewish? There are a number of historical problems. First, the geographical description given by Eldad, that R. Tzemah Gaon had no ability to verify, does not match that of Ethiopia. Second, the historical communities claimed lineage back to the tribe of Dan. The current community claims lineage to Solomon. Third, there is significant evidence of intermarriage. Even a careful reading of the Radbaz's responsum indicated this, but there is other historical evidence to this as well. Fourth, even a student of the Radbaz, R. Ya'akov Kastro (Erekh Lehem, Yoreh Deah 267:14), indicates that there was a doubt at that time whether this community was really Jewish and this doubt was used for both halakhic leniencies and stringencies.

Further complicating this issue is that the Beta Israel do not issue divorces with a get, as we would require. Therefore, as the Radbaz pointed out, it is possible that women became married, divorced improperly and had illegitimate children with a future husband. This leads to a question a mamzerus, something we take very seriously.

II. Modern Responses

The messianic furvor of the nineteenth century did not lose sight of the Ethiopian communities. Luminaries such as R. Yisrael of Shklov, author of Pe'as Ha-Shulhan, and dignitaries such as R. Nathan Adler, Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, attempted to establish contact with the Ethiopian community. R. Azriel Hildesheimer accepted the Ethiopians as Jews, based on an article by a R. Guggenheimer in Jeshurun in which he claims that they are descended from converts. Nevertheless, despite the doubts that R. Hildesheimer and R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook had about the origin of this community, they signed public proclamations about the importance of saving the Ethiopian community from Christian missionaries. R. Yitzhak Isaac Herzog wrote that if they are converts, most likely their conversions were not valid. However, we must try to bring them under "The Wings of Heaven" and convert them properly.

Despite all this uncertainty, R. Ovadiah Yosef (Yabi'a Omer, vol. 8 Even Ha-Ezer no. 11) ruled that the Beta Israel are full-fledged Jews from the tribe of Dan without any question of mamzerus. He did this quite simply, and with his typical assuredness, by simply denying the admissibility of any historical evidence, even from "frum" historians of the nineteenth century. Eliminating all of the doubts with such a broad stroke, R. Yosef simply relied on the Radbaz's ruling.

Most other contemporary posekim were unwilling to take such drastic steps. R. Eliezer Waldenberg, R. Moshe Feinstein, R. Elazar Shach, R. Shalom Yosef Elyashiv, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R. Yitzhak Weiss and the Bada"tz of the Edah Ha-Haredis all ruled that the Beta Israel require full conversions before being considered Jews (cited in Tzitz Eliezer, 17:48).

R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah 4:41) writes that there is no problem of mamzerus among them. However, the Bada"tz of the Edah Ha-Haredis and R. Yitzhak Weiss ruled that there is, as did R. Moshe Shternbuch.

The Israeli Chief Rabbinate ruled that the Beta Israel require conversion before being considered full Jews (but, curiously, do not require hatafas dam beris).

III. Practical Issues

The question arose in the early 1980s whether the world Jewish community should attempt to save the Beta Israel community. R. Moshe Feinstein wrote that we should, on condition that these people convert when they arrive in Israel. Otherwise, evidently, having questionable Jews mix into the Jewish community was too disastrous a result. R. Ovadiah Yosef, who fully accepted the Beta Israel as Jews, enthusiastically supported their rescue. R. J. David Bleich offered two cogent reasons that should move us to attempt to work on behalf of saving the Beta Israel: 1) Because gentiles considered them Jews and if they gain the impression that the world Jewish community will defend local Jews, other Jews will affected and 2) people will think that this decision is based solely on racial considerations. R. Menahem Schneerson, the late Lubavitcher Rebbe, evidently removed himself from this issue and took no stance on this controversy (I mention this because there is one blogger who is fixated on this point).

To my knowledge, the Beta Israel who arrived in the land of Israel did not convert. Someone please correct me if I am wrong. Furthermore, it is unclear whether all those who converted ever intended to become fully observant of traditional Judaism, which raises questions about their conversions (only of those who are non-observant of traditional rabbinic Judaism).

Another issue is whether Jewish schools may accept Beta Israel who did not convert. Because they are questionably Jewish, there are serious halakhic and social problems with this. R. Moshe Feinstein ruled that we should allow them into schools, despite the clear problems associated with such a move, because this would (hopefully) prevent the assimilation of possible Jews. However, others - such as R. Menahem Schneerson - ruled strictly on this matter based on the prohibition against teaching Torah to gentiles and the problem of socializing Jewish children and doubtfully Jewish children (i.e. marriage issues).

(Much of the material here was gleaned from an article by R. J. David Bleich in Or Ha-Mzrah that was printed in his Bi-Nesivos Ha-Halakhah. I am not sure which volume, but my photocopy is from pages 221-241.)

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The Name of G-d

REVISED ONE MORE TIME:
Nisht, at the House of Hock, noted that The Forward has started hyphenating God's name (into G-d). Nisht claimed that there is no halakhic basis for this practice, to which I countered that it is a matter of dispute. I was challenged to present a source, which I failed to do.

The Shakh (Yoreh De'ah, 276:11) writes that there is no prohibition against erasing God's name in any language other than in Hebrew. The Havos Ya'ir (109; 106 in old editions) disagrees and rules that one may not erase God's name that was written in any language provided that it was written with Hebrew letters in Ashuris script (the script used in Torah scrolls). However, he adds, even if it is written in other scripts, we must still treat it with respect and may not denigrate it (e.g. by throwing it in the garbage). R. Akiva Eiger, in his notes to Yoreh De'ah 276, cites the Rashbatz who holds that God's name in languages other than Hebrew has the status of a kinui (nickname) and may, therefore, be erased. The Minhas Hinukh (437:5) follows the Shakh that only God's name in Hebrew has sanctity but argues that this is true regardless of the script used to write it. The Darkhei Teshuvah quotes the Hokhmas Adam (64:7) as being strict on this issue but I do not have it handy to look it up (yes, I'm embarrassed to wrote that I have neither a Hayei Adam nor a Hokhmas Adam UPDATE: See Hokhmas Adam 89:9).

The following is what the Arukh Ha-Shulhan (Hoshen Mishpat 27:3) has to say on the matter:

Many gedolim have protested against the practice of writing God's name, whether in Hebrew, a mundane language or any language, in mundane letters between friends because the letters are eventually placed in the garbage and the names within them come to denigration. Poverty descended upon the world due to this terrible sin. Our ancestors established a holiday when people stopped writing God's name in vain on contracts, due to the concern that when the contracts were fulfilled they would be thrown in the garbage (Rosh Hashanah 18b). It is known that women and ignorami frequently violate this prohibition. Therefore, everyone should be careful not to use letters for any degrading purpose... Rather, it is proper to burn mundane letters. However, if one knows that there is written on it a name of God one is prohibited from burning them and must, instead, cut out the names and respectfully place them in genizah. Upon one who follows this will descend the blessing of good, amen and amen.

This would explain why people tend to be strict on this matter. It is, clearly, another manifestation of the Ashkenazic tendency to have great reverence for God's name. I support this reverence, but find some of the strictures so remote that I cannot follow them (like writing the name Yehudah with an aleph rather than a hei* or writing Hay' instead of Hayah**). (I have long desired to write a paper tracing this trend throughout Ashkenazic history. But it is low on my long list of things-to-do. I'm currently working on two papers simultaneously, with another ready in my head but not yet put to paper.)

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* Yehudah is normally spelled as YHVDH. If you forget the D then it is God's name. Therefore, to avoid that possibility, the name is sometimes spelled YHVDA.
** Hayah is spelled HYH. The last two letters are a name of God so some leave off the last H to avoid spelling God's name even as part of another's name.

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R. Jacob Joseph

As noted by Menachem Butler and HebrewBooks.org, today is the yahrtzeit of the first and only chief rabbi of New York, R. Jacob Joseph.

R. Nosson Kamenetsky (Making of a Godol, p. 399 n. s) notes that according to R. Joseph's monument, Joseph was his middle name and not his last name. However, R. Dov Katz in his Tenu'as Ha-Mussar (vol. 2 pp. 368-384) assumes that Joseph was his last name.

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Shabbos Violator

The Gemara in Eruvin (69a) tells of a man who would walk in public areas on Shabbos, clearly wearing an item that is considered a burden. In other words, he would consistently publicly carry on Shabbos. However, whenever he saw R. Yehudah Nesi'ah, he would cover the item. Because of this, the Gemara concludes that he is not considered a mumar, the status normally reserved for public violators of the Sabbath. R. Avraham Hayim Schorr, in his Toras Hayim (ad loc.), suggests that one can infer from this passage that any person who publicly violates Shabbos but has at least one person before whom, out of respect (or embarrassment), he refrains from such violation, then this person does not have the status of a public violator of Shabbos. This ruling, if accepted, has tremendous implications. As stated above, a public violator of Shabbos (absent other considerations) has the status of a mumar le-khol ha-Torah and is treated, in regard to many laws, as a gentile. However, if such a non-observant person refrains from Shabbos violation when in the presence of a respected rabbi or a beloved relatived then the status of mumar does not apply.

I saw in the footnotes to the book Shulhan Shlomo (on Orah Hayim, 512), that someone asked R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach whether he may invite his non-observant son for a Yom Tov meal. Since one is not allowed to cook on a holiday for someone who does not observe Shabbos, may one invite one's non-observant child? R. Auerbach responded that since the son will not violate Shabbos in front of the parent, the man lacks the status of mumar and one may cook for him on Yom Tov.

(As always, consult your rabbi before applying this.)

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Tikkun Olam

Gerald Blidstein, "Tikkun Olam" in David Shatz ed., Tikkun Olam: Social Responsibility in Jewish Thought, p. 57:

Since the Jew is able - as individual and perhaps as community - to participate in the processes that govern democratic societies as a whole, his silence and inaction reflect an acquiescence in the evils and abuses to which other human beings are subject. This raises the issue of hillul ha-Shem in an overall sense, as we project an image of apathy to suffering. No less acute, though, is the fact that this image is true to reality, that our passivity in the face of societal challenges means that we do condone evil and that we do not really care about our fellow human beings. What happens to the divine image within us if we remain unmoved by indecency, if we are not outraged by wrong?

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Honesty

R' Yisroel Belsky's answers to questions about honesty. We need more of this type of teaching.

Other classes of that nature at Torah.org:
Business Halacha
Business Ethics

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Haredization of American Orthodoxy V

R. Jonathan Rosenblum belatedly joins the discussion. His contribution is that the Haredi emphasis on kiruv is also a large element in the Haredization of Orthodoxy. New recruits tend to join the Haredi camp. This is certainly true in Israel, but is it true in America?

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Water Filters on Shabbos

Can a water filter be used on Shabbos? One of the 39 forbidden labors of Shabbos is borer - separating - and a water filter separates the water from dirt particles and bugs (which is precisely the whole reason for using it). Can one separate water from offensive particles?

This is not a new question. People have been using water filters for a long time, particularly on Passover. The Kaf Ha-Hayim (319:120) records that the practice in Jerusalem was to use a crude water filter to keep out the bugs. If such great scholars - as many of the residents of Jerusalem at that time were - would do such a thing, then it is evidently permissible. Similarly, Kinyan Torah (2:66) writes that the practice in Hungary was to use a water filter. The question is why this is permissible.

The Hazon Ish (Hilkhos Shabbos, no. 53) adresses this issue. If there is only a preference for filtered water but not a requirement, then the water is really drinkable both before and after filtering. Therefore, the filter is not really serving the function of changing the water because the water was perfectly good before the filtering. The Hazon Ish also recommends allowing a little filtered water to flow into the sink, and not only into a cup, to show that one has no specific desire for filtered water and is willing to waste it a little.

R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Weiss (Minhas Yitzhak 7:23), who was for many years a rabbinic judge in Manchester, England, dealt with exactly this issue (in a 1976 responsum). There were small bugs in the water system and many were using filters to keep out the bugs. R. Weiss relates that there are three situations:

1. When most people do not necessarily desire filtering, in which case filtering is entirely permissible.
2. When most people would want filtering, in which case filtering is permissible only in a different manner (with a shinui).
3. When everyone would need filtering, in which case it is entirely prohibited. Although, some would say that even in this case it is permissible with a shinui.

The Hayei Adam (16:8, Nishmas Adam) discusses the case of water that people would, in theory, drink except is prohibited to be drunk. This is exactly our case (if one accepts that the water is prohibited). The majority of New Yorkers are not observant Jews and do not think twice about drinking unfiltered water. The Hayei Adam brings proofs back and forth but leaves the question unanswered.

R. Weiss suggests that since once the filter is attached to the sink, the normal (and only) way to get water is through the filter, getting water in that way is considered using one's hand. Therefore, taking water with one's hand to use shortly is a permissible form of separation. However, he adds that one should follow the Hazon Ish's suggestion of allowing a little water to go to waste. He also writes that one who puts some sort of shinui on the filter for Shabbos is praiseworthy.

The rabbinic authorities in the Breuers community were evidently not convinced by this argument, if we accept the notice I received as authentic. So ask you rabbi for guidance on this issue.

See also: Az Nidberu 8:8; Shemiras Shabbos Ke-Hilkhasah 3:56 and n. 163; Ketzos Ha-Shulhan 125:37

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The Passion

Prof. Louis Feldman's critique of Mel Gibson's The Passion.

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Teaching Up

From a summary of a 1955 speech of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik to RIETS Rabbinic Alumni:

The Rav described the new intellectual stature of the young American Jewish layman and their search for depth. Only the rabbi who is a lamdan can satisfy this. Only such a rabbi can sufficiently portray the depth of Jewish learning for an intellectually thirsty community. We must not underestimate our audience. We must teach them substance; not "about" Torah, but Torah itself. Is we teach Chumash and rashi, it must challenge the students with deep insights behind the words. And must undertake to find a common language with such laymen, so as to properly communicate the depth of Torah...

The Rav called upon the Rabbinic Alumni as well as the Rabbinical Council to develop a deeper religious literature. He felt that in this way we will earn the respect of the American Jewish religious intelligentsia which continues to grow steadily. There are academics, intellectual Jews, in every Jewish family, and if we gain their respect we will have the respect of at least another ten people. If we lose their respect, we lose the others. There is no land anywhere that respects intellectual greatness as does America. Jews in America have unlimited admiration for intellectual attainment. It should be a project of Yeshiva to establish a research center for Jewish thought. Let the American Jewish intelligentsia know that we have a high intellectual stature, and they will respect us because of it.

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Under-Appreciated Books

There are many books that are under-appreciated. A set that I love are R. Aryeh Kaplan's The Handbook of Jewish Thought (2 volumes). The author can be accused of being overly eclectic and of reading non-kabbalistic texts within a kabbalistic framework. Nevertheless, the organization, clarity and, most of all, the vast wealth of sources contained in the footnotes make this series irreplaceable. This is not a handbook of Jewish thought but an encyclopedia, if you are willing to look up the references in the footnotes.

UPDATE: I found that three chapters (absent the footnotes) from this series have been posted online at the Aish HaTorah website.

The Rules of Halacha
The Pre-Messianic Era
Respecting God in Speech

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Facing the Kohanim

One the first Yom Tov after I was married, in my in-laws' shul, I noticed someone standing with his back to the kohanim. As we all know, we are not supposed to look at the kohanim during dukhening, so we either look down or cover our faces with a tallis. Therefore, I was and still remain only aware of what the few people near me do during dukhening. I had never before seen someone turn his back to the kohanim and it struck me as being blatantly incorrect - against an explicit Rashi. The Gemara in Sotah 38a is as follows:

"So shall you bless" (Numbers 6:23) - face to face. You might say: Is it face to face or face to the back of the neck? We are taught, "say to them" - as one speaks to a friend.

During dukhening, the kohanim must stand face to face. As we all know, the kohanim start out facing the synagogue's ark and then turn around to face the crowd. Rashi (ad loc., sv. o eino...) explains that one might have thought that the congregation need not face the kohanim and that only the kohanim must face the congregation, whether the congregation's faces or backs, but the Gemara deduces from a verse that the congregation must also face the kohanim. Clearly, anyone who turns his back to the kohanim for whatever reason, even the praiseworthy reason of avoiding looking at their hands during the dukhening, is disregarding his obligation to face the kohanim.

On that first Yom Tov I saw this practice, I mentioned it to my new wife who surprisedly told me that all the women in her synagogue turn their backs to the kohanim. I told her to continue doing that if everyone else was, since she should not publicly deviate from the community's practice even if it is mistaken (not that she asked me what to do). But after some consideration I thought I could justify the practice.

The Sefer Haredim (4:18), in his list of biblical commandments, writes that Jews who stand quietly and listen to the dukhening also have a part of the mitzvah. The Hafla'ah (Kesuvos 24b) deduces that, according to the Haredim, not only the kohanim but all of the Jews are obligated in the mitzvah of birkas kohanim. However, the Minhas Hinukh (378:4 in the Mekhon Yerushalayim edition) cites the Ritva (Sukkah 31b) who explicitly states that the obligation is only on kohanim.

Perhaps, an obligation to face the kohanim can only apply if the congregants are obligated in this mitzvah. If, as the Ritva maintains, the congregants are not obligated in this commandment, then they cannot be required to do anything regarding this mitzvah. How can they be, if they are not obligated to take part in it? Therefore, perhaps Rashi shares the view of the Haredim that the congregants are obligated in this mitzvah and, therefore, requires them to turn to face the kohanim. Others, who might share the view of the Ritva that the congregants are not obligated in this mitzvah, would not require them to face the kohanim.

According to the Ritva and others, the Gemara in Sotah can be read as requiring the kohanim to face the congregants rather than the ark, and not requiring anything of the congregants. This is how the Poras Yosef (printed in the back of the Vilna Shas) understand the passage, and the Meiri seems to as well.

Thus, the practice of a congregant turning his (or her) back to the kohanim may be problematic according to only Rashi and the Haredim. But according to the Ritva and Meiri it would not be a problem.

However, this entire analysis faces difficulties when we consider the Devar Avraham's convincing argument (vol. 1 no. 31) that the Haredim never intended that the congregants are obligated to hear dukhening. Rather, he wrote that they fulfill a non-obligatory commandment (mitzvah kiyumis) if they hear the dukhening. However, what we can say is that according to Rashi and the Haredim, if the congregants wish to fulfill the commandment then they must face the kohanim. According to the Ritva and Meiri, there is nothing for the congregants to fulfill and, therefore, there is no need for them to face the kohanim.

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The Devar Avraham further attempts to prove that the obligation of being "face to face" during dukhening is only a rabbinic obligation, with the verse serving merely as an asmakhta. If that is the case, the above arguments can be discarded. Everyone would agree that there is no biblical obligation for the congregants to face the kohanim. The only question is whether the Sages applied an obligation to them. The Sages could very well have affixed a rabbinic obligation on the congregants to face the kohanim and enable the kohanim to fulfill their commandment, even if the congregants are not biblically obligated in the mitzvah at all.

If we accept this conclusion of the Devar Avraham, we are left with what seems to be two different views in the rishonim. According to Rashi, the congregants must face the kohanim. According to the Meiri, they need not. The source of the disagreement could merely be due to differing texts (see the Poras Yosef).

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Blog of Note

It seems that Marvin Schick has a blog with his weekly columns.

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New York Water IV

I received this via e-mail from a source that claims it came from R. Zechariah Gelley of the Breuers community:

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE RABBINATE

As you most probably have heard, a Sha’aloh has recently been raised about the water in New York City. Initial reports indicated that this problem did not affect water in Manhattan. However, recent information indicates that water in Manhattan shares the same problem as the water in Brooklyn. At this time there still remain gaps in the information available – information that could affect the Heter or Issur of the water.

In the meantime, the Rabbinate is recommending that all drinking water (including ice cubes, tea, coffee, etc.) and cooking water be filtered either through the use of a water filter that can be attached to the faucet or some other device, or by using bottled water that has been filtered.

Before Shabbos one should prepare a sufficient amount of filtered water for use on Shabbos.

Water for rinsing or washing food or dishes need not be filtered. Also water for rinsing one's mouth need not be filtered.

As more information becomes available, this recommendation might change.


10 Tamuz 5764
June 29, ‘04

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