Ayin Ha-Ra

I saw in a syndicated column over the past two weeks a daring attempt to offer "The Real Meaning of Ayin Hora." Finally, someone will explain this enigmatic concept to the confused public. In the first installment, the author offers the following explanation for ayin ha-ra:

The Rishonim tell us that if someone has a talent or an advantage over the average person and he flaunts it, people become upset and envious of him. Hashem sees this flaunting, and does not want this person to upset the natural flow of things, so He takes away that person's advantage. And if that gift is ingrained within the person, Hashem, chas v'shalo-m, takes the person away.

Unfortunately, the author fails to share with us his sources other than that they are Rishonim. But ayin ha-ra seems to come from flaunting one's talents or possessions. This is not a punishment for the flaunting, but a need to remove this potential for discontent from disrupting the pre-ordained flow of events. For some unexplained reason, flaunting is not covered by free will and therefore must be removed, even if it means killing the flaunter. I find this hard to accept (this explanation, not that there is such a concept of ayin ha-ra).

The author utilizes the concept of ayin ha-ra to explain many customs, such as not calling a father and son to the Torah consecutively and breaking a glass at a wedding. While these customs have other, primary reasons, the author assures us that ayin ha-ra is also an explanation (for the latter custom, he quotes the Sema as his source; does anyone know where that Sema is?). In fact, no less than one of the ten commandments - the prohibition of lo sahamod (do not covet) - is predicated on the issue of ayin ha-ra.

But wait! Does that mean that one should not speak to a crowd or be honored by a charitable organization? No, the author assures us. Because "when a person is doing a mitzvah he does not have to worry about Ayin Hora." Except, evidently, when that mitzvah is getting married or being called to the Torah.

And, of course, members of the tribe of Yosef need not worry about flaunting because, even if they do so, they are exempt from ayin ha-ra. Evidently, they do not disturb the "natural flow of things" as much as members of other tribes.

This two-part series explaining "The Real Meaning of Ayin Hara" has, I believe, only perpetuated the confusion it was trying to dispel. Additionally, the irony that the articles are set next to a picture of the author very piously wearing a tallis and tefillin was not lost on this reader. An honest, or even just coherent, attempt to tackle this difficult topic would be much more appreciated. The public needs to be educated towards intelligent and, dare I say it - rational, thought and not placated with meaningless citations that only serve to confuse when not adequately explained.

Read the rest of this entry »

Homosexuality in Halakhah VI

R. Josh Yuter posted a good review of Steve Greenberg's book Wrestling with God and Men.

Read the rest of this entry »

R. Soloveitchik's Impact on American Orthodoxy

Nicht, at the House of Hock, questions what role great people really played in the growth of American Orthodoxy in the twentieth century. In the comments section, Nicht further questions the role that R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik played in that growth.

I quote here from R. Emanuel Feldman's tribute to R. Soloveitchik in Tradition (1996:4):

[H]istorians will have to note a more subtle truth: that it was the unique approach and background of a rosh yeshiva like Rav Soloveitchik that provided the intellectual framework that was uniquely suited to present classical Judaism to twentieth century men and women. More than any other religious leader, he was able to demonstrate to a wide audience the intellectual rigor and discipline of halakha as well as the profound world-view inherent in the minutiae of the daily halakhic regimen -- a world-view which addresses itself not only to the mind but also to the troubled heart and soul of the lonely modern man.

This demonstration of the universality of Torah, presented with such clarity and passion, also contributed immeasurably to the morale of an Orthodox community which, in mid-century, was being buffeted on all sides and was beset with self-doubt and dispiriting retreats on many fronts.

In particular did he have a major impact on the American-trained Orthodox rabbinate. Not all of them studied under him at Yeshivat Rabbeinu Yitzhak Elhanan/Yeshiva University, but they all benefited directly from the spiritual support and inspiration which his teaching provided at a critical juncture in American Jewish history. The undersigned, not a student at Yeshiva University, can directly attest to this. Not only did Rav Soloveitchik help keep at bay those debilitating forces of modernity that threatened to overwhelm and drown the fledgling Orthodox; he was also a major architect of the bridge upon which many marginal Jews were able to return to the tradition.

Read the rest of this entry »

American Jewish History in Yeshiva College

Menachem Butler is running a contest for those who can answer the following question:

Why should a course in American Jewish History be offered to undergraduates at Yeshiva College?

The following was my answer, which won me a G-mail account. To be fair, it was inspired by an excellent speech I heard earlier this month by Richard Joel.

YC graduates have been and will continue to be the men who shape the American Jewish community. They are the rabbis, administrators, politicians, lobbyists, opinion makers and lay leaders who define the direction of Jewish society. How can they do that without the tools to fully understand the background and nuances of the different segments and institutions of American Jewry? How can they continue a legacy that they do not fully understand? And how can they learn from the mistakes of history without ever studying it?

Read the rest of this entry »

R. Dovid Lifschitz zt"l

Mochassid reminds us that today is the yahrtzeit of R. Dovid Lifschitz zt"l. More than his years of strength, I remember his last year and how his health deteriorated. You can tell the dignity of a man by how he acts when he is left without his full faculties. Reb Dovid was a man flowing with dignity and love of Torah, to his very last day. Even when he was clearly confused by his surroundings, his actions and motions bespoke a certain nobility that is the hallmark of a mussar personality. It was a tremendous privilege to be able to witness such a great man. Yehi zikhro barukh.

Read the rest of this entry »

Religious Hatred

I was quite surprised when I saw the letters from R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg published by Dr. Marc Shapiro in The Torah U-Mada Journal. In particular, his letter (p. 118) stating that "More than Christianity hates Judaism, Judaism hates Christianity" seems bizarrely divorced from reality. My bafflement was relieved somewhat when I saw that R. Nosson Kamenetsky was also taken aback by the statement and attempted to offer his own amateur analysis about the psychological state that could have led to such a statement (Making of a Godol, pp. 818-820). I will not repeat the entire analysis but will simply write that we must make allowances for the traumatization of a Holocaust survivor.

Read the rest of this entry »

Shabbos Attire

(For my comrade-in-blog Mochassid)

The prophet Yishayahu tells us (58:13): "ve-khibadto - and you shall honor [Shabbos]." The Gemara (Shabbos 113a) applies this oblgiation to the clothes one wears: "Your clothing for Shabbos should not be like your clothing for weekdays." Note that the Gemara does not say that you should change your clothes for Shabbos but that your clothes for Shabbos should be different from those for weekdays. The Ben Yehoyada (ad loc.) explains that one might have thought that it is sufficient to have different clothes for Shabbos. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that this is not enough but rather one must wear clothes that are sufficiently special that onlookers will recognize that the garments are for Shabbos.

This halakhah is recorded in Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayim 262:2-3). The Magen Avraham (2) writes in the name of the Arizal that it is best not to wear any weekday garments on Shabbos, and this is brought down in the Mishnah Berurah (5) and the Arukh Ha-Shulhan (3). The question arises regarding a mourner during shivah: Should he wear Shabbos clothes or not? The Rema writes in Yoreh De'ah (399:3) not to but the Magen Avraham (loc. cit.) quotes the Arizal as saying to wear them. The Mahatzis Ha-Shekel explains the Arizal's intent being that one should wear only on Shabbos garment and the rest weekday clothing. However, the Vilna Gaon (Ma'aseh Rav, no. 193) holds that a mourner must wear his regular Shabbos garments (as did the Radbaz in his responsa, vol. 2 no. 693). The Birkei Yosef (YD 400) rules similarly.

This same dispute applies to Shabbos Hazon. According to the Rema (Orah Hayim 554:1), one should wear weekday clothes on that Shabbos like a mourner. However, the Vilna Gaon opposes this custom and it has largely fallen out of practice (cf. Arukh Ha-Shulhan, ad loc. 11; Piskei Teshuvos, ad loc. 4; Mo'adim U-Zemanim 5:343, 7:256).

The P'ri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 262:2) has a surprising leniency regarding this oblgiation. He writes: "In one's home one may [dress] as he pleases but not in public." In other words, you can change into weekday clothes at home but when you leave your house you shuold make sure to wear Shabbos clothes. I quote this not because it is normative - I have not seen it cited by any subsequent authority - but to show that even the most lenient posek would disapprove of the practice of many contempary Orthodox Jews. However, the Hayei Adam* writes that even when all alone in a room one should wear Shabbos clothes. The later posekim seem to be unanimous that one should remain in Shabbos clothes until after havdalah (Mishnah Berurah 262:5; Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayim 262:3), with the exception of the Kaf Ha-Hayim (262:28) who maintains that one should nto change clothing until after melaveh malkah (and so, surprisingly, rules the Shemiras Shabbos Ke-Hilkhasah, vol. 2 42:51).

---

* I could not find it in that book but I found it in a smaller work of his titled Zikhru Toras Moshe 1:3.

Read the rest of this entry »

Just In Time For Summer 2004

Today, 4 days into the summer of 2004, I received my copy of the Summer 2003 issue of Tradition. Gentlemen, you can do better than this. (I'm referring to timing, not quality.)

Some very good letters. One from R. Gidon Rothstein pointing out that feminist innovators cannot just argue in favor of each new practice but must also take into account the larger trend and to where women's roles are moving. And the last letter... Well, we all knew it. But finally someone had the guts to say it.

UPDATE (for Menachem):

Table of Contents

Ma Adam Va-teda-ehu: Halakhic Criteria for defining Human Beings by John D. Loike and Moshe D. Tendlet

Uterine Transplantation and the Case of the Mistaken Question by Edward Reichman

Halakhic Parameters for Removing Patients from a Ventilator by Zev Schostak

Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature - Genetic Engineering by J. David Bleich

From the Pages of Tradition - The Day Vilna Died, by Yosef Friedlander (translated) by Shnayer Z. Leiman

Communications: Rabbis, Rebbetzins and Halakhic Advisors; Mitzvot in the Polar Regions; Kohanim and Flights Leaving Israel; Paralysis in Contemporary Halakha?

Read the rest of this entry »

Habad Messianism IV

R. Dr. David Berger, once again, sets the record straight on Habad Messianism. Would that we all had his wisdom and courage.

Read the rest of this entry »

Rabbinic Disrespect

The Gemara in Gittin (7a) tells the story of Mar Ukva's troubles with Geniva. Geniva was a talmid hakham, as we shall see soon, who would insult and curse Mar Ukva, the av beis din in his locale, and this behavior caused Mar Ukva great pain. Mar Ukva was so troubled by this conduct that he asked R' Elazar whether he was permitted to turn Geniva over to the gentile authorities (it is unclear for what offense, perhaps for undermining communal authority). R' Elazar told him that he may not but should, instead, make sure to enter the beis midrash before Geniva and leave after him (i.e. learn Torah for more hours). In other words, Geniva was someone who was seriously learning in the beis midrash but was still greatly lacking in proper interpersonal behavior. Mar Ukva followed this advice and Geniva was soon thereafter taken by the gentile authorities and sentenced for execution.

This story was just intended as background. The Gemara later in Gittin (62a) relates that Rav Hisda and Rav Huna were sitting and they saw Geniva walking by. One asked the other whether they should stand for this Torah scholar and the other replied that they should not because Geniva was a "palga'ah" - a divisive person, someone who disagreed with hakhamim. Interestingly, Geniva approached them and, despite their lack of respect towards him, greated them with a great show of respect.

Some lessons from this story:

1. Even in the times of the Gemara, a talmid hakham could have bad midos.

2. Sinas hinam was not a post-talmudic development (although that should be obvious because it was a cause of the destruction of the Second Temple), nor was the baseless undermining of communal authority by respected members of the society.

3. One need not show respect to a vicious talmid hakham. On this last point, the Meiri is careful to state that a talmid hakham (like Rav Hisda and Rav Huna) need not show respect to a vicious talmid hakham. The implication is that normal people like I am must show respect to such a person. If Rav Elazar Shach or someone similar shows disrespect to a talmid hakham whom he considers to be destructive, we may not follow his lead on this. (Granted, the exact parameters of who may do what remain only vaguely defined.)

Read the rest of this entry »

YU Torah

RIETS has put together a new website with a nicely organized selection of audio shi'urim and a few written texts. Kudos to those involved!

(Thanks to Steven I. for pointing out this site)

Read the rest of this entry »

New York Water III

To clarify on R. Hershel Schachter's pesak:

In my haste, I left out some very important points.

1. The creatures in the water are dead. However, if, when alive, they were identifiable as creatures by their movement then, even when dead, they are still prohibited.

2. R. Shachter "heard" that the majority of specks in Boro Park and Flatbush water are these creatures and are, therefore, forbidden to be drunk.

3. R. Schachter ends with a "however". The water would be permitted if we are willing to rule based on the following innovative approach: Just like with a Torah scroll, we are not obligated to check each letter with our eyes right up to the parchment but, rather, from the distance of about a foot, perhaps with these creatures also, we should only rule based on observation from a distance. Since we would only have known that these are living creatures because of looking more closely than we are obligated, perhaps they are permitted anyway. R. Schachter leaves this with a "ve-ayen", because it is difficult to suggest that the Tanna'im and Amora'im did not drink similar water.

Read the rest of this entry »

New York Water II

My source tells me that R. Hershel Schachter has reversed his opinion regarding water in New York. I have a copy of his in-house letter on the subject but have been instructed not to post it verbatim. What R. Schachter says is that if you can see a speck in water and the speck is moving (i.e. from that movement you can tell that it is a bug) then that is sufficient to render it visible to the eye as a bug. As proof, R. Schachter cites Rashi, Eruvin 28a sv. tzir'ah:

sheretz is from the language of shoretz (crawls) - something that moves on the ground but is not visible due to its small size, except through its crawling and stirring

This would effectively prohibit unfiltered water. My source tells me that R. Yisrael Belsky is still ruling leniently on the water issue. But make sure to ask your local rabbi.

Read the rest of this entry »

Coeducation

R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook in R. Shlomo Aviner, Gan Na'ul, pp. 32-33:

Mixed swimming is the most severe example of intermingling between the sexes but coeducation also has no connection to normal Judaism. In normal, healthy, kosher Judaism, who knew of such a thing? Boys learned in a heder and girls alone in a school. When we came to Israel, there were economic difficulties on the Moshavs which led to people becoming used to mixed schools. But coeducation as a matter of principle - there was never such a thing. Mixing boys and girls is not a simple matter. It is against human nature and the halakhos of tzeni'us.

Read the rest of this entry »

Habad Messianism III

A Hebrew booklet titled Kuntres Bikores HaGeuloh, analysing Habad messianic claims through the Lubavitcher Rebbe's writings, is available online.

Read the rest of this entry »

Waiting for Mashiah

I wrote in a comment, regarding Mashiah: "but still believe that he can come at any time"

In my haste I implied that one must belief that Mashiah can come at any time. R. Henkin e-mailed me that this is incorrect, as he explained in his book. Here is a translation of a letter of his that is posted online:

In the matter of waiting for the redemption, I wrote in Bnei Banim vol. 3 ma'amar 3 and in the name of my great grandfather zt"l that the obligation is to anticipate every day that Mashiah will come and not necessarily that he will come on each day. It seems that the world has trouble with this. Many prefer their current situation and place and their anticipation of Mashiah is only a recitation of words. But others want him to come so much that they believe he has already come.

In the above quoted chapter in Bnei Banim, R. Henkin cites a number of talmudic passages that render a required belief that Mashiah can come every day difficult. For example, the Gemara in Eruvin 43b states that Mashiah will not come on Shabbat or holidays. Elsewhere, Tannaim argue whether the redemption will be in Nissan or Tishrei. Clearly, they were of the view that Mashiah cannot come on any day. Rather, one each day the anticipated that he will come sometime.

The Lubavitcher Rebbe (Likutei Sihos, vol. 23 p. 394) originally understood the wording of the Ani Ma'amin - "ahakeh lo be-khol yom she-yavo" - as meaning that the waiting has to be every day, as R. Henkin holds. However, the Lubavitcher Rebbe eventually rejected this explanation because, if that was the intent, the Ani Ma'amin should have read "be-khol yom ahakeh lo she-yavo. Therefore, he concludes that this must be referring to Mashiah ben Yosef, who can come on any day, rather than The Mashiah (ben David) who is limited from coming on certain days.

(Compare the Hebrew version with the English translation:

As has been explained, this does not mean that every day we should wait for Mashiach's ultimate coming, but that every day, we should wait expectantly for Mashiach to come on that very day.

From the footnote to that text, it is clear that it is intended to be a tranlsation of what I summarized above. But instead it turns it inside out. You would not think that Hasidim who revere their rebbe so much would distort his words.)

Read the rest of this entry »

Cheating II

My old friend, R. Uri Cohen, was kind enough to send me his translation of a similar responsum from R. Shlomo Aviner (Iturei Kohanim no. 49, Nissan 1989, pp. 19-20):

QUESTION: I heard it's permitted to cheat, since it isn't genevat da'at (deception), as the teachers know that cheating goes on, and also it would be "a decree that the community can't live up to [and which therefore isn't binding]." In our institution, there's a hidden competition among the students to be accepted into a program (?), for which math, English, and Talmud are the main subjects, and the students are accepted based on their relative ranking of grades. Since there's mass cheating in all the subjects, I'm asking if I may cheat, since it's likely that I'll be harmed.

ANSWER: G-d forbid that it be permitted to cheat on tests and the like.

It's genevat da'at (Rambam, Deot 2:6), which is a prohibition in the Torah according to most halakhah-decisors (Smag, negative #155), which is included in the prohibition of "Don't steal"; this is because "mind-stealing" is called stealing, as it says [when Lavan accused Ya'akov], "You stole my mind" (Genesis 31:26), and "Avshalom stole the mind of the people of Israel" (Shmuel II 15:6).

Furthermore, it's possible that one is also violating "Stay far from a matter of lying," which is a much broader prohibition than "Don't lie," and also includes indirect lying, various strategies, and even indirectly causing a misunderstanding by one's silence -- as we see from all the examples in the Talmud (Shevuot 30-31).

In addition, even without any verse, it's clear that this is a lack of integrity. For a person to study Torah, he must first have integrity -- an ethical character trait that's elementary and general (i.e., not just Jewish -- U.C.) -- and only on its foundation can one build all the holiness of Torah.

The claim that "teachers know students cheat" does not permit it, just as the knowledge of the police that there are thieves does not permit theft. In fact, it's the opposite -- the police force uses this knowledge to prevent theft. So too with a teacher's knowledge, it doesn't mean approval, but rather the opposite -- he tries to prevent [the cheating], and isn't happy with it. The proof is that if he discovers a student cheating, he'll punish him.

Similarly, the claim that [the prohibition of cheating] is "not a decree the community can live up to" doesn't apply, because this isn't a new decree, but an old decree of the Creator who commanded us to have integrity. Thank G-d, many students do not cheat -- especially girls.

As for the concern that you'll be harmed if you don't cheat, this is not [grounds for] permission. Many times people of integrity get harmed, but "It's better for me to be called a fool all my life than to become evil in front of G-d even for a moment" (Mishnah, Eduyot 5:6). Other people's stealing does not permit you to steal. In the end the truth will win, and people of truth will be the leaders of the world.

Read the rest of this entry »

Cheating

Along the lines of bizarre questions, R. Shmuel Wosner (Shevet Ha-Levi, vol. 10 no. 163) was asked the following question by the principal of a seminary in Israel. The principal had instituted punishments for students caught cheating and parents had objected to this, labelling it wickedness (rish'us). Obviously searching for a higher authority to defend his stance, the principal asked R. Wosner whether students are allowed to cheat in school. For those who will read no further, know that he answered a resoundng "No!" His answer:

I will say briefly that I am surprised that there is any doubt on this matter. How is it possible to think that this may be done, expecially in an educational framework? It is a simple matter of halakhah that this constitutes misleading (geneivas da'as) and involves the prohibition of "you shall not lie" and the commandment to distance oneself from lying (cf. Shevu'os 31). This also includes a certain level of, and a habituation towards, trickery. About this the prophet said, "They trained their tongues to lie..." (Jer. 9:4). Cf. Sukkah 46b; Yevamos 63a how far these matters extend in education.

This also leads to stumbling in the future through the concealment of truth in the (fake) marks if these students require a job or continuing education. Those accepting these students will consider them to be experts when they are not. This causes distinct financial damage to those employers and to others.

Above all else is the damage to these students' character through the habituation away from truth. This is among the great stumbling-blocks of this generation. But the truth is beloved above all...

The real surprise is that this responsum, like all the rest printed in the volume, contains the address and title of the correspondent, including the name of the school of which he is the principal.

Read the rest of this entry »

Habad Messianism II

In honor of the Rebbe's upcoming tenth yahrtzeit, the entire book Can the Rebbe be Moshiach? has been posted for download. Like all e-books, it does not feel the same on the screen or in an unbound printout.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Haredization of American Orthodoxy IV

R. Shlomo Riskin adds his voice to the discussion. However, his only real point on the Haredization of Orthodoxy is that he considers the move to stronger halakhic observance to be not a Haredization but a renewal and re-invigoration of Modern Orthodoxy. (He also throws in a shtukh to Haredi women who wear wigs.)

He then goes on to define Modern Orthodoxy: Torah ve- (or Torah u-). In other words, accepting something in addition to Torah, whether it be science, military service, work of the land, etc.

But the three essays failed to mention the real essence of modern Orthodoxy as well as its most significant challenge in our generation and in every other: its mission to embrace and sanctify – rather than automatically reject – those aspects of contemporary society which can not only be made compatible with Judaism but which can enhance it.

That is actually a pretty good definition. Although what would he do with Hassidus? Do not they accept Torah ve-Hassidus? Or do they simply expand Torah to include it? But then don't the Modern Orthodox expand their definition of Torah? And what about Mussar adherents?

Read the rest of this entry »

The Camel, The Hare, And The Hyrax III

R. Nosson Slifkin, author of The Camel, The Hare, And The Hyrax, has posted online an interesting correspondence between him and R. Zushe Blech on the thorny subject of R. Slifkin's book, the signs of kosher animals.

(While we're on the subject, the website also has a nice letter from a reader about how the book "given [him] new found inspiration in [his] relatively new Torah-Observant way of life.")

Read the rest of this entry »

Administrative Notice: Retraction

In an earlier post, I had stated that R. Yehuda Henkin is "associated with Feminist Orthodoxy". R. Henkin has informed me that this is an entirely incorrect description. Additionally, he has no connection to Edah, JOFA or Chovevei Torah. Nor does R. Henkin endorse the le-khat'hilah establishment of women's prayer groups.

I apologize for the misinformation and hope that R. Henkin and readers accept this correction.

(Please do not post comments to this post that can be construed as lashon ha-ra.)

Read the rest of this entry »

David and Bassheva II

I

In the comments section, anon raised the point that David clearly violated the prohibition of lo sasur aharei... eineikhem by watching Bassheva bathe. However, it could be that he unintentionally saw her. A bigger question, though, is that according to the Rambam a man is biblically prohibited from sleeping with a woman who is not his wife with improper intentions (le-shem zenus). Even if Bassheva was not married to Uriah, she was not David's wife! Unless we suggest that the relations was intended as a form of marriage (kiddushin) which is now rabbinically prohibited but may not have been at that time. Or we can suggest that David's intentions were actually proper because he saw that the heir to the throne would be from Bassheva so his only intent was to conceive a righteous child. Neither suggestions are particularly compelling.

II

I saw that the Maharal, in Be'er Ha-Golah, ch. 5 (pp. 101b-102a), has a slightly different understanding of this episode. According to the Maharal, David had full intention to sin with Bassheva but God ordered events to happen so that David would not sin. God made sure that Bassheva would not be married at that time so David would not be commiting adultery.

III

Dopey asked how the Bible can record an event that portrays David in a worse light than the historical truth. Is that not slander (hotza'as shem ra)? Even if to teach a lesson, certainly I would not be allowed to publish a similar story about a contemporary rabbi, exaggerating his role to look as if he was an adulterer.

There are two ways to respond to this: the simple way and the complex overly-concerned-with-halakhic-minutia way. The simple way is that if God tells a prophet to write the story this way then that's what the prophet is going to do. Evidently, the omniscient and eternally just God determined that this is the most fitting and beneficial way to record the story.

The complex way is as follows: Even if this is a prohibited form of slander, there are times when the law is set aside by divine mandate. This is called a hora'as sha'ah - a temporary ruling. If a bona fide prophet (and there are rules to determine who is a real prophet - hey, that would make a good topic!) tells you that God has commanded you to temporary violate a prohibition, then you must do so. However, the violation must only be temporary and, according to some rishonim, must be for the sake of strengthening commitment to Torah (le-migdar mil'sa). Does this apply to the writing of a slanderously misleading story that has remained in writing for thousands of years? (Let me just be clear that I am working with the assumptions of the question without addressing whether one call this story, or anything in Tanakh, slanderous.)

It doesn't matter. The Gemara in Hullin 5a talks about how Eliyahu ate animals that were slaughtered by King Ahav. How could he do that?, the Gemara asks. Ahav was an idolater so his slaughtering is invalid. The Gemara answers that Eliyahu was told by God that he can eat it. But this was not le-migdar mil'sa, so how was this a valid hora'as sha'ah?

R. Tzvi Hirsch Chajes answers in his Toras Nevi'im, hora'as sha'ah ch. 4 that there are two ways in which a divine commandment to violate a law can be transmitted. If a prophet is telling people to violate a law, then the above conditions must be fulfilled. However, if God is directly telling a prophet what to do then he does it. We leave it to God to worry about whether the conditions need to be fulfilled. A general word of advice is that if God communicates directly with you (and you have no mental problems) then you should take His word seriously. After all, He created and runs the world.

The same goes for a prophet writing a biblical book. If God tells the prophet that the story must be written this way, who in their right mind would not write it that way?

Read the rest of this entry »

Useless Torah Trivia

Who would have expected R. Yosef Kafah, the modern Yemenite scholar with very strong Maimonidean beliefs, to quote approvingly a typical Hungarian scholar? Yet he does so and, to the best of my knowledge, only once. In his Collected Writings, vol. 3 p. 1427, R. Kafah cites approvingly an halakhic ruling of the Hungarian-American scholar R. Moshe Stern, the Debreczyner Rav.

As a bonus, I'll include a link to an English translation of R. Kafah's introduction to his translation of Mishneh Torah.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Year of the Redemption

R. Shmuel Wosner is a leading posek in Bnei Brak who has published 10 volumes of responsa, titled "Shevet ha-Levi." I do not know why, but he will not only answer bizarre questions but will publish them along with his answers (although he never answered my letter about the status of Habad messianists).

R. Wosner (vol. 10 no. 1) was asked in 5759 (1999) by a rabbi who prepares annual calendars whether he should label the upcoming year, 5760 (2000), as the year of the redemption. His reasoning was that the kabbalistic work Galya Raza implies that 5760 will be the year in which the messianic redemption will take place. Thus, this rabbi asked in his simple piety, should he publish this news in his calendar?

R. Wosner did not respond as I would have - "No, you idiot!" - but instead gave a gentler answer:

My honored friend, we have no business in the hidden, and the coming of the righteous messiah is covered and hidden, not to be addressed in public. Rambam, the leading teacher of the generations, wrote (Hilkhos Melakhim 12:2*): "No one should ever occupy himself with the legendary themes or spend much time on midrashic statements on this and like subjects. He should not deem them of prime importance, since they lead neither to the fear of God not to the love of Him. Nor should one calculate the end. Said the rabbis: 'Blasted be those who reckon out the end.' One should wait (for his coming) and accept in principle this article of faith."

Even though many great and righteous scholars of the generations may have let slip from their holy mouths or pens hints about the time of the messiah's coming, that was out of the abundance of faith and hope for the revelation of G-d. However, it is know that throughout the ages - and particularly in 1948 - this has led to failing and weakening religiosity. Why should we endanger ourselves and please the masses with something that requires modesty. In the end, if Heaven forbid we do not merit the redmption many will leave the faith out of disappointment...

What is important is the strengthening of our Jewish brethren, believers descended from the faithful, in the principle of the messianic redemption of Israel through the will of our Father in heaven. We wait each day for it to come - today if we listen to His voice. But in that which is hidden from you do not investigate.

As a post-script to this responsum, I'll point out to those who were not keeping track that, sadly, the messianic redemption did not occur in 5760 (2000).

---

* Hershman translation of the Rambam from the Yale Judaica Series.

Read the rest of this entry »

David and Bassheva

The Gemara in Shabbos 56a relates the following:

R. Shmuel bar Nahmeni said in the name of R. Yonasan: Whoever says that David sinned is nothing but mistaken, as it says "And David behaved wisely in all his ways, and the Lord was with him..." (1 Shmuel 18:14). Is it possible that a sin came to his hands and the Divine Presence was with him? If so, how do I explain "Why have you despised the commandment of the Lord, to do evil..." (2 Shmuel 12:9)? He wished to do [sin] but did not.

What emerges clearly from this passage is that one who claims that David sinned regarding Bassheva and Uriah (the context of the latter verse) is mistaken. Not a heretic, mind you, but mistaken. However, claiming that one's personal view is correct and the Talmud not does have distinct shades of heresy. Who would dare to contradict an explicit passage of the Talmud?

With this passage in hand, it is possible to dismiss the entire story of David's sin as an intentional exaggeration by the biblical author. David wanted to sin but did not, and for someone on his level that is sufficient to deserve the punishments he received. (The apparent contradiction with Kiddushin 39b regarding mahashavah ra'ah could possibly be explained by distinguishing between thinking about sinning, which is not punished, and attempting to sin, which is. Or, perhaps, the passage in Kiddushin only applies to average people while exceptional people like David are judged on a higher standard.)

However, the sensitive reader of Tanakh cannot help but notice the distinct midah ke-neged midah in the punishments of David that correspond very clearly to the sins of adultery and murder - his child from Bassheva dies, his daughter is raped, his son becomes a rapist and another son rebels against and tries to kill him. The correspondence is even pointed out by the classical commentators in the Mikra'os Gedolos. Particularly difficult is the death of the young child. If he was the offspring of an illicit encounter between David and Bassheva then it is understandable why an appropriate punishment is the death of the fruits of that sin (aside from the obvious question about punishing an innocent child). But if the child was not from an adulterous relationship but from the time period after David legally married Bassheva, the correspondence to the (non-)sin is much weaker if existent at all.

There are other passages in the Talmud that directly address this story in a much different manner. The Gemara in Avodah Zarah 4b-5a:

R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon bar Yohai: David was not the kind of man to do that act... as it is says "My heart is slain within me" (Tehillim 119:22)... Why, then, did [he] act thus? In order to teach that if an individual sins [and hesitates about the effect of repentance] he can be referred to the individual [David]... This accords with the following saying of R. Shmuel bar Nahmeni in the name of R. Yonasan: What is the meaning of the verse "The saying of David the son of Yishai, and the saying of the man raised on high" (2 Shmuel 23:1)? The saying of David the son of Yishai, the man who elevated the yoke of repentance.

There are a few things to note here. First, it is clear that David sinned, although his intention is somewhat justified in that he did so in order to teach about teshuvah. However, he sinned. Second, a saying from R. Shmuel bar Nahmeni in the name of R. Yonasan is quoted, this time implying that David sinned and repented. Yet, in Shabbos above the same pair is quoted as saying that David definitely did not sin.

And then there is the following in Yoma 22b:

Rav said: ...David [sinned] with two and they did not count against him... What are they? Uriah and counting [the nation's population]. But what about the incident with Bassheva? There, he was punished for it, as it says "And he shall restore fourfold for the lamb" (2 Shmuel 12:6) - [his four punishments were:] the child, Amnon, Tamar and Avshalom...

The clear statement here is that David sinned with Bassheva and was punished for it. It seems that there is a more nuanced view emerging from the Talmud than one would have thought by just looking at the passage in Shabbos. There is more than one way to reconcile these seemingly conflicting passages and we will present two.

1. There is a disagreement among the sages whether David sinned or not. According to the passage in Shabbos, David tried to sin but did not. According to the passages in Avodah Zarah and Yoma, he did sin. There is no contradiction between the views of R. Shmuel bar Nahmeni in the name of R. Yonasan because in Avodah Zarah they are only quoted as saying that David taught the importance of teshuvah. This was utilized as part of an approach that understood the biblical text as saying that David sinned, but we are not forced to conclude that R. Shmuel bar Nahmeni and R. Yonasan would have agreed to that. He could have taught about teshuvah in other ways.

2. Everyone agrees that David did not sin. He only tried to sin but did not. However, for someone on his high level this was so egregious a transgression that he was punished extremely harshly for it, as if he had actually sinned. Thus, his punishments correspond to what he had tried to do rather than what he actually did. His repentance was appropriate because he had put in a good deal of thought and effort into sinning, even though his plan did not succeed, and that time and energy spent on sin was terribly damaging to his soul. He needed repentance, and taught us much through his own process of change.

I find the latter explanation to be more compelling from the perspective of talmudic interpretation. However, I do not deny others the option of preferring the former explanation and explaining that David did, in fact, sin, so long as they leave open the possibility of the other talmudic view and do not denigrate it.

In this respect, R. Carmy has a great take on the David and Bassheva episode from the previously mentioned article in Hamevaser:

The Gemara suggests that David didn't commit adultery because Uriah had given Batsheva a conditional get, and that Uriah's inferred disloyalty made his life forfeit and therefore exculpated David from the guilt of his death. Abarbanel questions this, and the text of Tanakh seems to support him. After all, David was punished for taking Batsheva and for killing Uriah. According to Abarbanel, then, and according to the simple phrasing of Tanakh, David was an adulterer; according to Hazal he was not.

Which view is historically correct? If the Gemara is conveying the authentic tradition of Torah she-b’al Peh, then it is literally true, and you have to explain why the pasuk gives a different impression. If Abarbanel is right, then the Gemara, regarding David as a righteous person, is offering the most respectful, least damaging version of the story.

It is not my primary interest to decide between these options. My business is to explore the implications of the sources. Why indeed does the Navi imply that David was an adulterer and a murderer, why is he so severely punished for his behavior, if, as Hazal teach, he was halakhically impregnable? The answer is very simple. Legal invulnerability does not exclude moral guilt. In the face of God's condemnation, David's ability to justify himself on narrow halakhic grounds counts for very little. We, who have so much experience with legalistic politicians and other amoral personages, should understand why Hazal's defense of David does not override peshuto shel mikra.

That Tanakh presents David as sinning, even though according to the sages he did not, teaches important lessons about morality and misuses of halakhic legalities.

Read the rest of this entry »

Understanding the Patriarchs II

(The first post on this subject is here.)

I found, online, an article mentioned in one of the comments recently: Imitate the Ramban, Not the Professors: An interview with Shalom Carmy from Hamevaser, vol. 38 no. 1

One reason that people shrink the larger than life personalities of Tanakh to pop-psychology size is that they are accustomed to treat themselves the same way. What characterizes pop-psychology? Casual deterministic assumptions, clichéd depictions of emotion, a philosophy that cannot grasp the dramatic, absolute, momentous solemnity of the moral-religious life. This is not the way I think of myself; it is not the way I think of you. It is not the way one should think about any human being created uniquely in the image of God. Once people see nothing wrong in entertaining secular conceptions of themselves, once they take for moral and psychological insight the tired idiom of the therapeutic, it's no wonder that they are tone-deaf to the grandeur of the Avot and Immahot.

There is much to discuss in this brief paragraph. First, people automatically see themselves in others. A crude person will always see the worst in others; a devious person will always assume that others are crooked; a good person will always see the positive in others. It is just human nature. We are most familiar with our own outlooks and automatically transpose them onto others and read them into their actions.

Furthermore, those whose occupation is dealing with the emotionally disturbed will see hints of emotional disturbance in many places. That is what is on their mind for a good part of the day, so it is only natural that when they see what might be symptoms their minds move toward a tentative diagnosis. Similarly, those whose minds are busy with Torah and mitzvos all day, whose lives shun sin and immorality, will automatically read the Torah with a bias towards finding a religiously positive image.

Additionally, those who fail to comprehend the complexity of human experience and, instead, diagnose everyone and everything with simple formulae - if only David had possessed greater self-esteem... - lose not only the truth of Torah but also the ability to learn about the human and religious experience from Tanakh.

Read the rest of this entry »

Herem of Rabbenu Gershom

On a biblical level, a man is allowed to marry more than one woman. While it has never been a common Jewish practice, at least not in biblical or talmudic times nor in Ashkenazic countries, it was technically permitted. Tradition has it that around the year 1000 CE, Rabbenu Gershom (Me'or ha-Golah) promulgated a ban or a decree prohibiting, among other things, polygamy. Also included in that ban is a prohibition against divorcing a woman without her consent, reading someone else's mail and a number of other acts.

However, I have seen and heard it claimed that the Herem of Rabbenu Gershom was only intended to last for one thousand years. Since that time has past, the prohibitions no longer apply. This argument is incorrect for a number of reasons that we will discuss.

I. Time of the Herem

If there was a single time in which the decree took place, and we will discuss whether that is historically true, we do not know when it was. Rabbenu Gershom passed away in either the year 1028 or 1040. The first record we have of a decree is from the year 1056. Therefore, there is no way to be certain that the thousand years has already passed. It could be that the decree was in the last year of Rabbenu Gershom's life and the thousandth anniversary of the decree will be in either 2028 or 2040.

II. Incorrect Calculation

Regardless, the tradition that certainly inspired this claim is that of the Rashba, made famous by the Maharik, that Rabbenu Gershom's decree only applied until the end of the millennium in which he was living, i.e. until the year 1240. If that is true, then there is nothing new in our situation. It is the same situation as that which faced the Maharam, the Rosh, the Rema, the Hasam Sofer, etc. We will soon see how they dealt with this issue.

III. Who Made the Herem?

There is an historical question as to whether Rabbenu Gershom actually made a Herem. It seems quite unusual that he would arrogate to himself the position of authority over not only Germany but also all of Northern France. And even if he did, it would be entirely out of character for the French rabbis to unquestioningly accept the authority of a German rabbi, no matter how great he may have been. There is also the point that we have very different reports of which prohibitions were included in the Herem. Avraham Grossman, in his seminal work Hakhmei Ashkenaz Ha-Rishonim, throughly covers all of the scholarly theories on this issue until the time of his writing. As he describes it, theories range from the decrees actually preceding Rabbenu Gershom and he only giving his added approval, to his leading a gathering of united communities in agreeing to these decrees (possibly in stages), to some being from his time and others being of later origin, etc. Grossman gives substantial evidence that the decrees were from Rabbenu Gershom's time or before (that he renewed) and that shortly afterwards even leading French rabbis were agreeing with the decrees. But none of this matters.

The real question is what gave Rabbenu Gershom the ability to bind everyone in his region beyond to his decrees. After all, he did not have a Sanhedrin with which to religiously bind others with his interpretations. The answer is given much later by the Rosh in one of his responsa (43:8):

There was a scholar in our land and his name was Rabbenu Gershom. He lived during the time of the Ge'onim and instituted good decrees in the matter of divorce. His decrees are established as if they were given from Sinai because [the people] accepted them upon themselves and transmitted them generation after generation.

The force of Rabbenu Gershom's (or whomever's) decrees is not the personality behind them but their acceptance by the community. Because all "Ashkenazim" accepted these decrees in surprising unison, that itself is the reason that they are binding.

Therefore, returning to our original question, the Rosh was writing after the year 1240 but still claimed that the decrees were binding because people accepted them! The same can be said for a number of scholars. Therefore, the decrees must still be in force. It could, however, be suggested that the decrees are no longer in force as decrees but only as custom.

This issue is discussed at length in the commentaries to the Tur, Even Ha-Ezer, 1. The Beis Yosef (in a responsum - Responsa Beis Yosef, dinei kesuvos no. 14) claims that the scholars who stated after 1240 that the decrees were still in effect were only doing so because they were unaware of the condition that they only lasted until the year 1240. Therefore, the Shulhan Arukh (Even Ha-Ezer 1:10) states that the decrees are no longer in effect. The Rema, however, states that the custom is to still adhere to the decrees. The Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo, Yevamos 6:41; Responsa Maharshal, no. 14), another contemporary of the Beis Yosef and the Rema, argues forcefully that the decrees are still in effect.

The aharonim wrote about this issue at length and all followed either the Rema or the Maharshal, as would be expected of Ashkenazic scholars, that the decrees are still in effect. See the Pis-hei Teshuvah, Even Ha-Ezer 1:19.

IV. Conclusion

In summary, the prohibitions that are traditionally subsumed under the category of Herem of Rabbenu Gershom are still in effect. There is no time limit to the prohibitions, regardless of whether Rabbenu Gershom inserted one while issuing the decrees (or even made any actual decrees in the traditional sense).

Bibliography:
Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei Ashkenaz Ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem: 1981 ,2001), pp. 132-149
Encyclopedia Talmudis, vol. 17 cols. 384-386

Read the rest of this entry »

Ingredients of Rabbinic Leadership

TorahWeb once again produces a relevant and significant statement by a respected scholar from the ranks of Yeshiva University-RIETS roshei yeshivah. This week, R. Dr. Michael Rosensweig discusses the elements that make a successful rabbinic leader:

The need for breadth of vision in halachic leadership obviously extends to single rabbinic authorities striving to emulate the model of Moshe and the zekenim to the best of their ability. At the same time, the prospects of achieving that vision is daunting and the ability to apply it is significantly more challenging. Halachic leadership demands more than a careful reading of texts and a discerning eye toward application. Many halachic issues defy easy classification and assessment. In the complex world which we inhabit this is particularly true, as we struggle to incorporate and integrate the halachic ramifications of technological innovation and thorny social and ethical conundrums. Moreover, much of halachic-decision making revolves around broader halachic value and policy issues that require both vision and clarity. Halachists are obligated to be roeh et ha-nolad, to assess the likely long-term impact of their decisions. Their responsibility is a dual one: to the matter at hand and its immediate constituency, as well as to future generations. These considerations are sometimes misconstrued and inaccurately portrayed as either peripheral or political. In fact, these factors have always been an integral component of halachic leadership and in many respects their proper integration into the halachic process distinguishes the truly great poskim.

In other words, there is more to pesak than "just" analyzing texts. One must also apply halakhah properly, which involves assessing potential reactions in the present and the future.

R. Rosensweig raises other issues, such as the definition of semikhah and upon whom may such honor and responsibility be conferred, but I defer that discussion for a later date. In his last paragraph, he makes the important point that a true leader must be infused with the proper values and, if not, is a dangerous figure.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Haredization of American Orthodoxy III

A reader was kind enough to direct me to an earlier article by Chaim Waxman on this subject. I have not yet had the chance to read it but feel free to post your comments about it.

Read the rest of this entry »

Approaches to Midrash Halakhah

This post is in response to a question that Ezra Butler posted to his blog about "three schools of thought, each believing diametrically opposite beliefs about the root of rabbinic law. is it divine like the gaonim, man-learned like maimonidies, or man-chosen like nachmanidies."

I. Introduction

In a 1994 lecture a Harvard Law School, Prof. Moshe Halbertal of Hebrew University presented three very different views of the development of halakhah. On the one hand, there is the Geonic view that the entire Torah was given to Moshe and transmitted through the generations. Halakhic hermeneutics and their accompanying disagreements were only attempts to retrieve elements of the original Oral Torah that were lost due to insufficient transmission. The Maimonidean view is that hermeneutics and disagreements were not elements of retrieval. Rather, they were creations of new laws whose clarification became necessary due to various historical reasons and whose methodologies were limited and somewhate defined. These new halakhot accumulated over time and form a significant part of the Oral Torah we know. According to the school of Nahmanides, every possible legal view was given to Moshe at (or from) Sinai and the Torah leaves it up to the sages of each generation to decide which view constitutes the current norm. Thus, there are three very different views - each with support from strong authorities - about the significance of disputes, hermeneutics and the origin of large portions of the Oral Torah. How, asks Ezra Butler, should this be taught to students?

Before we reach Mr. Butler's question, we first have to show that Prof. Halbertal is not entirely correct. As is common in academic literature, Halbertal has overstated the differences and minimized the similarities of these views to create a much starker disagreement than really exists.

II. Geonim

I have no disagreements with how Prof. Halbertal described the view of the Geonim.

III. Maimonides

Maimonides' view of the development of the Oral Torah is, unsurprisingly, complex. As Prof. Halbertal describes, R. Yair Hayim Bakhrakh (Havat Yair, no. 192) devastatingly critiques many aspects of Maimonides' view. However, Prof. Halbertal takes R. Bakhrakh's critique as the final word on the subject. As R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes (Torat Nevi'im) has shown, Maimonides can be defended from most of R. Bakhrakh's attacks. Indeed, the vast literature that seems to contradict Maimonides' thesis should serve an immediate "red flag." Is it really possible that the great Maimonides missed all those very explicit passages? On one issue in particular, R. Chajes shows that R. Bakhrakh misunderstood Maimonides and, therefore, critiqued a view that Maimonides never held. Maimonides wrote that there was never a disagreement on a matter over which there was a tradition but it was forgotten. R. Bakhrakh takes this to mean that, according to Maimonides, the sages never forgot a tradition, quite an amazing and indefensible claim. R. Chajes explains that Maimonides was referring to a dispute in which one party forgot the tradition but the other remembered. This is because once the other party stated that he had a tradition on the matter the first party would accept that tradition and abandon his hermeneutical attempt to recreate the tradition (this reads well in the context of Maimonides' statement).

What emerges from this important correction is that, according to Maimonides, legal hermeneutics serves two purposes: to retrieve lost traditions and to accumulate new laws. Thus, while Prof. Halbertal posits that the Geonim and Maimonides had diametrically opposed views on the development of halakhah, our udnerstanding is that Maimonides held a modified Geonic view. His modification is certainly significan, but it is not radically different from the Geonic view.

IV. Nahmanides' School

Prof. Halbertal was being quite original in his deducing from various works a third approach. However, in doing so, he neglected the original context of these statements. All of those quoted are writing of cases in which there is debate. Revelation is not, according to these scholars, "open-ended." When there is a debate, then and only then we say that the different views originated from Sinai. When a law is forgotten then scholars must try to recreate the original law - to retrieve it - using traditional methodologies. The innovation of this school is that even if a scholar fails to retrieve the law as it was practiced earlier, before it was forgotten, he has still retrieved a view that was sanctioned at Sinai.

In reality, Nahmanides' school (or, the scholars cited by Prof. Halbertal) agrees with the retrieval model of hermeneutics but gives sanctity to minority views and, significantly, provides a mechanism to account for error and even change.

V. Summary

To summarize the views, all agree with the Geonim that hermeneutics is a process for retrieving lost portions of the ancient Oral Torah. Maimonides adds a new element for creating new laws and interpretations when necessary, which is a substantial divergence from the Geonic approach. Nahmanides' school accounts for issues such as disagreements and errors with which the Geonim might have agreed but never fully addressed. There are differences between the views but they are not as wide or as fundamental as Prof. Halbertal made them seem.

How should we teach these views to students? My general approach is to choose one view and stick with it consistently, all the time explaining that there are other views that will be covered at a later date. After time, perhaps in 11th or 12th grade, expose students to these other views

Read the rest of this entry »

Letter To A Philosophical Dropout From Orthodoxy II

R. Shalom Carmy was contacted by a former student who confessed that he lost his belief long ago and has become a confirmed Orthoprax Jew. Can Rabbi Carmy help him recover his faith? R. Carmy corresponded with this student and one of his letters has been published by Atid as a pamhplet, titled "Forgive Us, Father-in-Law, For We Know Not What To Think: Letter To A Philosophical Dropout From Orthodoxy."

The letter has four sections, each of which requires study before being fully understood. At first, I did not grasp the connection between the sections and even questioned many points as being counter-productive. But like all of R. Carmy's writings, the effort expended in trying to understand eventually paid off in dividends.

The first section directly addresses the former student's assertion that reason is his only standard for evaluating Judaism. If he cannot find a rational basis for believing then he will not. R. Carmy embarks on what I can only call a Post-Modern attack on this embrace of reason alone as the arbiter of truth. Do not intuition and emotion play important roles in our understanding of the world? Is the policeman's hunch not utilized on a daily basis in judging events? As R. Carmy eloquently argues, reason is only part of an intelligent being's arsenal of comprehension tools. (I might say that R. Carmy was playing Captain Kirk to the student's Mr. Spock.)

The next section flows directly from this critique of pure reason. Why does this student still desire to observe mitzvot if he no longer believes? Does he, perhaps, see truth through his non-rational faculties?

In the third section, R. Carmy dissects the classic Pascal's Wager argument for observing religious law "just in case." R. Carmy, drawing on a vast philosophical literature, demolishes this argument and even suggests that Pascal never proposed it as it is used today. How can this student adopt an observant lifestyle based on this terribly flawed proposal? Is it that his emotional intelligence has grasped something that his rational faculties have yet to accept?

The final section is very important. Do not, R. Carmy tells his student, mistakenly think that Orthodox scholars lack your knowledge or capacity to reason. They do not think less than you but more than you. They utilize a broader range of cognitive strategies - experience, emotion, intuition, etc. - and have based their decisions on these. Observe these talmidei hakhamim and how they live their lives. Observe the general Jewish population and look at their lives. Perhaps you will learn much more about people, life and the universe.

Read the rest of this entry »

Judaism in Culture: Much Ado About Nothing

There has already been quite a bit of buzz about Dr. Alan Brill's article in the recently released issue of The Edah Journal, titled "Judaism in Culture: Beyond the Bifurcation of Torah and Madda." Frankly, I don't see the big deal. He writes as if this were his manifesto but it seems to me to be one of the most confused and confusing articles I have read in a long time. It is certainly true to its sociological basis: Like most sociology, it is 1/3 obvious observations, 1/3 terminology games and 1/3 nonsense.

The main take-away of value that I got from this article is that Modern Orthodoxy has to come to grips with the Post-Modern academic world. From where I am sitting, Post-Modernism can be not only consistent but helpful to traditional Judaism. But that brings us to the topic of our next post, discussing a coherent contribution to Torah and scholarship.

Read the rest of this entry »