Habad Messianism

I think by now we are all familiar with the particular form of Habad messianism that holds the deceased Lubavitcher Rebbe, R. Menahem Mendel Schneerson, to be the messiah. There are some who believe that he is already the messiah and wait for his resurrection, some who even believe that he never died, some who believe that he will definitely be the messiah when he is resurrected and some who believe that he probably or might be the messiah after his resurrection. Some, from what I understand a minority, believe that their Rebbe can no longer become the messiah. These beliefs have been documented and addressed in two books: The Rebbe, the Messiah and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference is a history of and commentary on the subject and Can the Rebbe be Moshiach? is an analysis of the textual and theological issues involved.

This post is not intended to deal with the nonsense of Habad messianism but with the halakhic repercussions of such mistaken beliefs. Has a Habad messianist - a Meshihist - overly deviated from the traditional Jewish messianic belief to the extent that he is considered a heretic, with all of the halakhic implications of such a title?

There are two responsa on the subject that have been conveniently posted online, one even with an English translation. R. Aharon Feldman, dean of the prestigious Ner Israel Rabbincal College (Yeshivas Ner Yisrael) in Baltimore responded as follows (Hebrew, English):

[T]he meshichistim are not to be considered non-believers (“apikorsim”) and they remain within the category of “your nation,” their testimony and shechita are valid and it is permitted to include them in a minyan. However, great danger surrounds their belief, for it digs beneath the very foundation of the Jewish belief in moshiach!...

Now even if it is true that the meshichistim are not considered non-believers, it is still forbidden to support them or publicize their opinions for it is forbidden to support falsehood. All the more so in this case where there exists the danger that their belief might spread to the general Jewish community and thus the Torah itself could be erased from Israel, chas v’sholom.

Therefore, one who finds himself among Lubavitchers who observe customs aimed at strengthening their faith (for instance, those who chant “yechi adonainu hamelech hamoshiach” at the end of davening), is required to leave, or, if possible, to offer rebuke.

Furthermore, in my opinion it is clear that even though the meshichistim are not considered “non-believers,” nevertheless, they are presumably (“b’chezkas”) people who lack Torah understanding and it is impossible to rely on their conclusions in Torah matters - even issues that do not relate to Moshiach.

Habad messianists are not heretics but they maintain a foolishly and dangerously mistaken view, which renders their judgement suspect and requires us to avoid legitimating their belief. A similar, but less strident, approach is taken by R. Yehuda Henkin (as a free advertisement, I'll point out that this is only one of many interesting responsa that is scheduled for publication this summer in volume 4 of R. Henkin's Bnei Banim):

What many of his Hassidim believe, that R. Menahem Mendel Schneerson is the king messiah, is false and nonsense. However, I do not know of any denial or heresy in [this belief] for they await the messiah. What do we care if in their mistaken view he already was, died and will return? In the end, they are waiting for the messiah to come.

I spoke with R. Hershel Schachter and R. Mordechai Willig on this subject. R. Willig said that R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv has ruled that Habad messianists are heretics while R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg has ruled that they are not. R. Willig said that he believes we have to follow R. Goldberg on this issue.

R. Schachter began by saying, "I think Dr. Berger went too far..." He agreed with what the others mentioned above have said, that Habad messianists are not heretics. However, he also said that we should all be uncomfortable about the recitation of "Long live our master, our teacher, the king messiah forever and ever" that is done in many Habad synagogues and should leave such a synagogue during a recitation of this mistaken formula.

I have intentionally remained silent about the issue of confusion between God and the Lubavitcher Rebbe. However, both R. Aharon Feldman and R. Yehuda Henkin address this in their responsa (above).

Other perspectives on this issue, that were given before R. Schneerson passed away but after the messianic fervor in Habad had grown, can be found in stories about R. Yitzhak Hutner and R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky. About the former, Hillel Goldberg has written in his Between Berlin and Slabodka, pp. 187-188 (reference taken from here):

Rabbi Hutner's opposition to Lubavitch came to expression with colorful asperity. For example (interview with Saul [pseudonym], January, 1985, Jerusalem):

'I was a student at Mesivta Rabbi Chaim Berlin for only half a year, and had not spoken to Rabbi Hutner in about twenty years. I phoned him in New York, saying only 'hello,' to which he responded, "Hello, Saul, how are you?" He knew my voice! He had this habit of making appointments at strange times, so we met at 2:10 p.m., Sunday afternoon. I told him that I had come to New York to pick up my children from summer camp-a Lubavitch camp. Whereupon he suddenly turned his whole body around in his chair, his back facing me, and just sat there in blazing anger, glaring into space for what seemed like an eternity. He must have been silent for two minutes. I was dumbfounded. Then he said, "Saul, you come to see me once in twenty years, and all you can tell me is that you send your children to a Lubavitch camp? There aren't enough other camps?" He told me that my children would return home saying that the Lubavitcher Rebbe was the Messiah, that Lubavitch would ruin my children.' (emphasis added)

This attitude of R. Hutner has been confirmed to me by other students of his. He was very concerned over the "cult of personality" that R.Schneerson had built and, in particular, the messianic element of that community.

The following report about R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky comes from the controversial biography of him by his son, R. Nosson Kamenetsky, Making of a Godol (if anyone cares, I read this passage before the controversy erupted). In the forward, while discussing his father's attitude to the unpublished chapters regarding the Vilna Gaon's opposition to Hassidus in R. Betzalel Landau's Ha-Gaon he-Hassid mi-Vilna, R. Kamenetsky writes as follows (pp. xxvii-xxviii):

R' Landau pleaded with my father, "How can I publicize the Gaon's prohibition on intermarriage with hasidim and possibly cause families to break up?" My father agreed that the five chapters he had prepared be left unpublished but not destroyed, saying, "Have them prepared for publication but desist from [publishing them] until such time as may come when events will necessitate their publication." He explained in veiled terms, "They must be ready in case a certain someone [yener] should do an ugly thing [a mi'usse zakh]." He was referring to messianic fantasies simmering in a hasidic circle - in Israel, the adherents of that group had fomented a political feud along hasidic-misnagdic lines - and my father felt that the eventual publication of these chapters would help the general hasidic public shake off the messianics should their fantasy get out of hand. As it turned out, my father's concerns were well founded: a large segment of that hasidic cult did declare its leader to be the Messiah. (The perverse possibility that a decade after his meeting with R' Bezalel, many of the sect's members would formulate the phantasm that its dead rebbe would make a "second coming" - this is what they believe and are propagating in our day - likely never even entered the realm of our protagonist's normal, healthy imagination...)

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Humrah Society

We are all familiar with the trend towards crazy humros and how some people are going out of control. However, they seem to me to be the extreme and do not represent the norm. I am not implying that the Orthodox community as a whole has not moved towards increased observance and stringency. Rather, I question whether this is a move towards humrah or towards the only halakhah that can be (textually) justified. Is it that people are looking for new ways to be strict (I know, some definitely are) or that they are doing their best to align all of their actions with halakhah? I think the latter. Some are misguided; some, particularly youngsters, are immature. But most "normal" people I know have a certain degree of yiras Hashem and do not want to do something that they and their rabbi cannot justify halakhically.

I found Dr. Haym Soloveitchik saying something similar in a response to a rebuttal of his article "Rupture and Reconstruction." This response is titled "Clarifications and Reply" and was printed in The Torah u-Madda Journal vol. 7.

Like most of my contemporaries and elders, I was baffled by the spread of humrot (stringencies in religious performance). Upon reflection I realized that many of the so called humrot were, in fact, quite reasonable, indeed, could often make good claim to being the only correct ruling in the case at hand. Frequently, a new practice was being labled a "humra", not because it was the more stringent of two valid views, but simply because it made stricter demands than what had been habitually required. More often than not, "humra" meant simply "more than what one had been accustomed to." (p. 137)

Much later in his article:

What is clear, to me at least, is that we are dealing with a generational difference. A new generation has emerged which finds the past ways of its parents and grandparents too unthinking, too ignorant, and yes, if truth be told, simply too lax and accomodative. This is not a pleasant prospect for the older generation to contemplate, especially as the young are only too unaware how much this "lax" observance had cost their parents in a different day, and how high the price they regularly paid for their "minimal" Orthodoxy. It is only natural then that explanations as religious one-upsmanship, "humra of the month club," ideological brainwashing and "Magyarization of Yiddishkeit" abound and beckon soothingly. Such interpretations, to my thinking, offer consolation rather than understanding. (p. 145)

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Music on Yom Ha-Atzma'ut II

There is an excerpt posted online from a book by R. Shmuel Katz, author of the more popular Kedoshim Tihyu, about the first seventy years of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel. The passage excerpted is regarding Yom ha-Atzma'ut and the official attitude of the Chief Rabbinate.

R. Katz records that, at first, the Chief Rabbinate declared that Yom ha-Atzma'ut has the status of Lag ba-Omer and, therefore, shaving, weddings, etc. are permitted on the holiday. This was declared on 11 Nissan, 5709 (April 12, 1949) in an announcement in the newspaper Ha-Tzofeh.

However, there was a subsequent meeting during the intermediary days of Pesah that year, on 18 Nissan, 5709 (April 19, 1949), in which it was decided that inter alia the regular sefirah prohibitions should be maintained and the issue should be re-examined when Jerusalem is fully in Israeli possession. This retraction was also published in Ha-Tzofeh.

Unfortunately, the excerpt does not continue to the period after the Six Day War so I cannot report of any changes in the Chief Rabbinate's ruling. There is, however, posted online a ruling by Chief Rabbis Isser Yehuda Unterman and Yitzhak Nissim that one should not observe the sefirah mourning on Yom Yerushalayim, 28 Iyar. However, that ruling explicitly takes into account that many have the custom not to observe the mourning restrictions after Lag ba-Omer anyway.

In the synagogue calendar published by Mekhon Shlomo and arranged by R. Yehuda Eisenberg it says in the entry for Yom ha-Atzma'ut that Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim permits shaving on that day.

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Women's Prayer Groups - R. Avi Weiss' Position

Introduction

R. Avi Weiss is a very successful pulpit rabbi and Jewish activist. He has founded the organization Amcha that tries to stand up for the Jewish people in a number of venues. His efforts on behalf of the Jewish people and individual Jews in unfortunate situations demonstrate a caring heart and an effective organizational skill.

However, in the area of talmudic scholarship he has shown that he is not an expert and, indeed, has made many mistakes and published sub-standard works. I am not writing this without reason. R. Weiss has tried to publish talmudic/halakhic scholarship to justify some of his feminist innovations and, by forcing himself into the arena of such scholarship, has portrayed himself as the scholar that he is not. It must be said that his works should not be taken by the public to be serious scholarship.

The most obvious example is his article in The Torah u-Madda Journal about women reading megillah for men. His article was so flawed that I cannot understand why the editor agreed to publish it. However, as a redeeming act, the editor published a rebuttal article that ably demonstrated the many flaws in R. Weiss' article. That R. Weiss would nevertheless publish that article as an appendix to the second edition of his book, Women at Prayer, is not only astonishing but raises many questions that I prefer not to pursue.

In this post, I shall address chapter eight of his book, Women at Prayer, and point out some of the errors that exist on almost every page of that chapter. The chapter is largely devoted to rebutting R. Hershel Schachter's essay on the subject of Women's Prayer Groups. As should be clear from my comments thus far, I believe that R. Avi Weiss is well over his head in trying to refute so great a scholar as R. Hershel Schachter.

Before I begin addressing R. Weiss' arguments, I would like to point out that R. Weiss makes a most unfortunate choice in terminology. He repeatedly, throughout his book and in his article, refers to women's "right" to read the megillah or lead the services, thus implying that women have a de facto entitlement to these roles and that anyone who rules strictly on these matters is denying women these rights. This kind of biased and leading terminology has no place in a serious Torah discussion.

I. Incomplete Fulfillment of Prayer

R. Avi Weiss begins by quoting both R. Hershel Schachter and R. J. David Bleich who argue that since prayer with a minyan is always preferable to private prayer, WPGs are misguided.

R. Weiss offers two responses. First, all-female prayer groups are the norm in girls' schools rather than the administrators organizing a minyan for the female students every day. Therefore, it is clear that the administrators disagree with Rabbis Schachter and Bleich.

Of course, this argument is entirely incorrect. No school administrator would claim that they choose not to have a daily minyan in their school. Rather, the logistics of arranging it are too complicated for them to bother. If they had a choice between holding services with a minyan and without, they would certainly choose the minyan. In fact, Stern College for Women regularly has a minyan on Shabbos and I've been told by friends who have been in charge of that minyan that ensuring regular attendance of ten men is quite a logistical challenge.

Comparing settling for all-female, non-minyan prayer to actively choosing to forgo a minyan and pray in an all-female setting is simply mistaken.

R. Weiss also argues that some women have more kavanah, intent, in their prayer in a WPG. Therefore, for them prayer in a WPG is preferable to prayer in a minyan.

However, he (1) fails to prove this claim that it is preferable and (2) neglects that R. J. David Bleich explicitly addressed this case and came to the opposite conclusion.

R. Weiss embarks on a lengthy discussion of the different forms of kavanah in prayer, something that I will not bother to critique because it is not really relevant. I applaud him for delving into the meaning of kavanah in prayer but regret that he did not make it entirely clear that increased kavanah in the Torah and haftarah reading, or in the holding of the Torah, or even in the "repetition" of the Amidah do not override the benefits of praying with a minyan according to any opinion at all.

II. The Appeal to Contemporary Torah Scholars

In this section, R. Weiss argues that scholars are being dishonest when they claim that such luminaries as R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik and R. Moshe Feinstein opposed WPGs. R. Weiss is both correct and incorrect on this subject, but his level of fault is so egregious that this section is almost painful to read. Keep in mind that R. Weiss is arguing in favor of WPGs.

For example, R. Weiss quotes R. Schachter as stating that R. Soloveitchik and R. Feinstein opposed WPGs. R. Weiss then writes (p. 106):

But these two Torah scholars had ample opportunity to publicly condemn such groups, and they very carefully held back from any issur (prohibition and always held open the real possibility of these groups functioning within the halakhic community.

First, note that R. Weiss claims that both R. Soloveitchik and R. Feinstein believe that there was a "real possibility" that WPGs can be permitted. As we shall see, R. Weiss himself will demonstrate that this is incorrect. Second, R. Weiss is arguing that since R. Soloveitchik and R. Feinstein issued careful statements about WPGs and did not scream "Assur, assur assur!" they must have held that such groups are permissible. Again, R. Weiss will himself demonstrate - and state explicitly - that this is simply not true. He actually subsequently proves that R. Schachter is correct, but leaves this criticism of R. Schachter intact.

R. Weiss writes (p. 107): "In the early 1970s, Rav Soloveitchik indicated to some rabbis that under certain guidelines, women's tefillah groups are permitted." The source for this statement, R. Weiss tells us, is R. Shlomo Riskin. As the Rabbis Frimer demonstrated at length (in their article that was published after the first edition of R. Weiss' book but before the second, revised edition), this is an inaccurate portrayal of the dealings between R. Soloveitchik and R. Riskin. See the quote in an earlier post on this subject.

R. Weiss' conclusion is that R. Soloveitchik opposed WPGs for reasons other than "halakhic grounds," or reasons that R. Weiss understands as being non-halakhic. In plain English, R. Soloveitchik opposed WPGs precisely as R. Hershel Schachter claimed.

Interestingly, R. Weiss shares with us in footnote 39 (p. 112) the following exchange between him and R. Soloveitchik:

For this writer, the distinction between public policy and a binding halakhic opinion became clear in a related discussion I had with Rav Soloveitchik concerning the carrying of the Sefer Torah by women through the ezrat nashim (women's section). In conversation with the Rav I asked whether he felt this was prohibited. I remember the Rav's response with great clarity: "Don't do it." I then asked: "But Rebbe, are you saying it is assur?" The Rav Answered: "I didn't say it's assur. It's mutar (permissible), but I want to protect you."

Here again, the Rav's "don't do it" was not a halakhic pesak, but an expression of concern - a concern which in this case, the Rav felt, would protect me - but a suggestion which was certainly not halakhically binding, and one which I have respectfully chosen not to follow.

Let me get this straight. He asked his mentor, one of the most profound talmudists and thinkers of the twentieth century, whether a course of action is advisable and this respected teacher responded, "Don't do it." But since he did not say that it is absolutely assur, R. Weiss decided to ignore him. Respectfully ignore, though. It is always important when dealing with matters of far-reaching communal importance to ignore your rabbe'im respectfully.

R. Weiss then reproduces two unpublished responsa from R. Moshe Feinstein about WPGs. R. Feinstein states that in order for a WPG to be allowed, the participants must be righteous and motivated entirely for the sake of Heaven. R. Feinstein further clarified that "the possibility of a group of women or for that matter men existing in any one community which will fulfill the lengthy philosophical criteria mentioned in his printed teshuvah is extremely remote. Therefore, realistically speaking he doesn't recommend or actually condone the establishment of women's prayer groups."

Ahah! R. Weiss immediately notes that R. Feinstein does not actually condemn Women's Prayer Groups. He only does not "recommend" or "condone" them. Ring the bell, we have a celebrity endorsement! You see, R. Feinstein leaves open the "extremely remote" possibility that nashim tzidkaniyos can be found - and evidently have been found in Riverdale, Teaneck and elsewhere - for a permissible WPG.

R. Weiss is correct that both R. Soloveitchik and R. Feinstein clearly disagree with many of R. Schachter's arguments. But R. Schachter never claimed anything to the contrary! He only stated that these two scholars opposed WPGs, a claim that R. Weiss has proven to be correct.

R. Weiss then makes a startling, even humorous deduction (p. 111).

Also in a shiur (Torah session) given at Stern College, Yeshiva University (Spring 1986), Rabbi Avraham Shapiro, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, was asked about women's prayer groups. He responded that he personally did not condone the services, as he saw little value in them. When I asked him aftewards whether his statement constituted a halakhic pesak, i.e., whether in fact, women's tefillah groups were halakhically assur (prohibited), he responded in clear terms: "I did not say that these prayer groups are assur."

Rabbi Shapiro affirmed this position in a letter he recently wrote. He concludes that a "woman's minyan where devarim she-bi-kedushah (are recited) is contrary to halakhah and minhag." The implication is clear. A woman's tefillah group where devarim she-bi-kedushah are not said is not halakhically prohibited.

Unbelievable! R. Weiss seems to have difficulty distinguishing between improper and permissible. If something is improper but not technically prohibited, he sees carte blanche permission to go ahead with it. R. Weiss lists leading scholar after leading scholar who oppose Women's Prayer Groups and he concludes that since they did not use the word assur then there is nothing wrong with such a practice. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is more to halakhah then simply assur and mutar (see, for example, R. Mayer Twersky's eloquent essay on halakhic values).

III. Imitations of Non-Jewish Practices

R. Weiss quotes R. Schachter's invoking of the prohibition against imitating Gentile practices and suggests that, perhaps, we can take the good from Feminism and reject the bad. I do not believe that R. Schachter would disagree with this claim. However, he was referring to a very specific aspect of Feminism that has increased promiscuity and loosened the bonds of authority. Would anyone suggest that R. Schachter is against "equal pay for equal work" simply because Feminists advocated equality in wages?

R. Weiss' claim (p. 113) that "[t]he reality is that participants in women's tefillah groups are primarily motivated by increased Torah learning and not by the feminist movement" is not only entirely speculative, but contradicts the very public example of the initiators and advocates of WPGs.

R. Weiss claims (pp. 113-114) to have found a contradiction, perhaps even a reversal, in R. Schachter's writings. In his first article on the subject, R. Schachter wrote that the main motivating factor in establishing WPGs was to innovate, gain publicity, etc. and that among the founders were students and graduates of JTS. In a later article, R. Schachter wrote that some women who participate in WPGs are educated and well-intentioned. I fail to see the contradiction - the gotcha! that R. Weiss was looking for. Yes, the early leaders and initiators of WPGs were Conservative (or Conservative-leaning) and had many unpraiseworthy intentions. But that does not mean that everyone involved with WPGs lack the proper sincere motivations.

R. Weiss (p. 114) then conclusively ends the discussion of the issue of imitating Gentile practices by quoting R. Yehuda Henkin, whose approach we discussed in an earlier post.

IV. More on Non-Jewish Practices

R. Weiss (pp. 114-115) quotes R. Schachter's relaying of R. Soloveitchik's position that there is a specific prohibition against imitating Gentile practices in the synagogue. As R. Schachter transmits, R. Soloveitchik saw as the source for this prohibition Nahmanides' commentary to Devarim 12:30. In his extensive erudition, R. Weiss claims that R. Soloveitchik entirely misunderstood Nahmanides' commentary and, indeed, any such application to contemporary circumstances "borders on the absurd." I think that it need not be said that there is a slight possibility that R. Weiss, rather than R. Soloveitchik, is missing something here.

V. Motivation

R. Weiss (p. 116) quotes R. Schachter as prohibiting WPGs because they were introduced by "insincere, even rebellious, women." R. Weiss' response is that it doesn't matter because the participants in WPGs are sincere. In other words, he rejects without argument R. Schachter's claim, based on halakhic sources, that a new custom must be innovated with entirely proper motivations (see here section VI).

VI. Approbation of Noted Scholars

Here is another Twilight Zone moment. R. Schachter argues that new customs must have the approbation of noted scholars. R. Weiss (pp. 116-117) responds that "it is not at all clear that women's tefillah groups lack this approval." Remember? Rabbis Soloveitchik, Feinstein and Shapiro only opposed WPGs but did not declare them to be "assur." That, in R. Weiss' expert opinion, is approval.

VII. New Practice

R. Weiss raises (pp. 117-118) the issue of lo ra'inu eino ra'ayah and then quotes R. Eliezer Berkovits' resolution of this problem. We already addressed that in an earlier post.

VIII. Location: Home or Synagogue?

R. Weiss (pp. 118-122) spends a good deal of time stressing the importance of praying in a synagogue and does not realize that, to some degree, he is arguing against WPGs. As many, including R. Yehuda Henkin, have noted, WPGs are a deviation from traditional synagogue customs and may not be held there. Clearly, R. Weiss disagrees. But if we accept what actual posekim rule on the matter and then look back at R. Weiss' many sources indicating the importance of praying in a synagogue, we are left with a solid argument for praying in synagogue with a minyan rather than elsewhere with a WPG.


Tam ve-nishlam, shevah la-Kel borei olam

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Sephardic Attitudes to Women's Prayer Groups

Jacob Katz asked: "Has Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, or any of the other sefardic halakhists of our time, written anything about Women's Prayer Groups?"

I found the following prohibiting sources in Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer's article Women's Prayer Services - Theory and Practice:

R. Shalom Messas, Resp. Shemesh uMagen, II, sec. 28; R. Mordechai Eliyahu in an unpublished responsum, dated 19 Kislev 5750 (Dec. 17, 1989).

I thought that R. Yitzhak Yosef addressed this issue in his Yalkut Yosef, perhaps in volume 2, but I did not find reference to it in the Frimer article or in my brief notes on the subject (but he does prohibit calling women to the Torah, a la R. Mendel Shapiro, in ch. 135 par. 41).

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Music on Yom Ha-Atzma'ut

I have heard R. Hershel Schachter say many times that R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik was opposed to suspending any of the mourning observances of sefirah for the celebration of Yom ha-Atzma'ut, Israeli Independence Day. So, when a group at Yeshiva University would arrange to celebrate Yom ha-Atzma'ut and would invite R. Schachter to speak, he would gladly speak but would not stay for the inevitable live music.

However, the logic for suspending the mourning customs is not difficult for me to understand. If one were to be personally saved from danger and designate a day during sefirah as a private Purim, I doubt that anyone would object to the suspension of mourning for that joyous day. Those who feel that Yom ha-Atzma'ut is the equivalent of, or even greater than, a personal Purim celebrate it as such.

The revision of the Ma'ariv service of Yom ha-Atzma'ut, though, is something that I do not understand.


UPDATE: To be clear, this post was generated by a request from MoChassid on his blog and in the comments section to this blog.

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Guilt by Association

The Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 3:2 writes, "A scholar is prohibited from sitting down to a court case until he knows with whom he is sitting lest he sit with men who are unfit and becomes part of a rebellious group rather than a court." While this halakhah only technically applies to a religious court, it is important advice for life. Be careful with whom you affiliate because you may unwittingly advance your colleagues' causes and become perceived by the public as associated with those colleagues.

And now, a story. Over ten years ago, R. Hershel Schachter was being driven to one of his weekly lectures in Queens (I think, or maybe Brooklyn) and, on the highway, the small group was car-jacked. Yes, the car was stolen at gunpoint and they were left stranded on the highway. Over the Shabbos of that week was scheduled an NCSY event at which R. Schachter was scheduled to speak. R. Schachter apologetically backed out of his speaking engagement for that Shabbos, implying that his wife was still shaken up by the car-jacking. A friend of mine, now a pulpit rabbi and a kashrus professional, was invited to eat Shabbos dinner at the Schachter home that week and heard a very different story.

Also invited to speak at the NCSY event was a prominent Modern Orthodox rabbi and speaker whose speeches and published writings had been straddling the line of Orthodoxy, perhaps crossing it on occasion. When R. Mordechai Willig, who spoke at the NCSY event, discovered in advance that this rabbi would also be speaking, he asked R. Schachter whether he should back out of his speaking obligation. Presumably, he did not want to be associated with this rabbi. R. Schachter told R. Willig that he was not obligated to back out of his speaking obligation. However, since R. Schachter had another excuse he chose to back out of the event.

[Note, I heard this second-hand so do not take it as gospel.]

The point: Be very aware of those upon whom you bestow respectability by appearing as one of their colleagues. Furthermore, the more you associate with such people, the more the public will associate you with them and their causes - justly or not.

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Coming Up On Hirhurim

Some topics that, time permitting, I hope to discuss in the near future:

1. Kol Ishah
2. Archaeology and the Bible
3. Who is a Talmid Hakham?
4. The Ordination of Women

Remember that feedback is always welcome, whether in the comments section or via e-mail.

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Women's Prayer Groups - R. J. David Bleich's Position

R. J. David Bleich is, in my opinion, an unfortunately under-appreciated giant of our generation. He holds a PhD in Philosoephy, lectures on Hullin and other subjects to semihah students at Yeshiva University, is a co-head of a kollel for dayanus at YU, teaches at Yeshiva College and Cardozo Law School and is a world-renowned expert on bio-medical ethics. He is a walking encyclopedia of halakhah which, with his acerbic wit, makes him close to an Ashkenazic version of R. Ovadiah Yosef. Why he is not counted among the top posekim of this generation is beyond me.

R. Bleich's regular column in the journal Tradition titled "Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodic Literature" demonstrates his breadth of knowledge and his depth of understanding. It also serves as the majority of his series of books Contemporary Halakhic Problems. In volume three of this series (pp. 115-121), he reprinted with minor changes an article of his from the journal Sh'ma (15/299 - Oct. 18, 1985) that deals with Women's Prayer Groups. At that time, the most popular term for these groups was "Women's Minyanim" which R. Bleich adopted, despite the imprecision of the term. I wish that copyright law would allow me to reproduce the entire article because its eloquence and sensitivity greatly strengthen its arguments. Unfortunately, select quotes and a summary will have to suffice.

I. Sexism

R. Bleich points out the irony of Women's Prayer Groups. Both women and men may attend regular services in the synagogue but men are barred entirely from Women's Prayer Groups. This innovation is entirely sexist! This is halakahically irrelevant, but nonetheless worthy of note.

II. Improper Decision-making

R. Bleich makes the point that we have raised in prior points that going to the effort of attending an organized prayer service but choosing to pray without a minyan over with a minyan is making an halakhically improper decision. He illustrates it beautifully and I will reproduce his analogy (p. 117).

This point may be illustrated by the following analogy: No one is obligated to invest in funds in order to earn a profit... [C]onsider the person who does have both the funds and the desire to invest. He or she is offered two separate investment opportunities. Each is entirely risk-free and open-ended in terms of potential profit. The second is tied to the first in the sense that it is guaranteed to yield no less a return than the first but carries the additional advantage of a guaranteed minimum return. Which offer should the investor choose? Since the first investment opportunity carries no advantage over the second, while the second bears the distinct advantage of a guaranteed return, the choice is obvious. An investment counselor who recommends the first investment over the second has not only offered poor advice but has transgressed the biblical commandment "and thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" Leviticus (19:14).

Women who pray with a minyan have a guaranteed better reward for their prayers than women who pray with a Women's Prayer Group. If women are willing to take on the burden of leaving their homes and going to a place of prayer (i.e. they are willing to invest their money in an opportunity) and choose the lesser option of praying without a minyan (i.e. place their money in the opportunity that gives a lower return), they are making a foolish choice. Anyone who advises them to do so is giving bad advice, with all of the attendant implications.

R. Bleich further writes (p. 119): "Assuredly, the guaranteed benefits of tefillah be-zibbur outweigh those of any possible subjective experience."

Of the rabbis who advise women to attend Women's Prayer Groups, R. Bleich writes (p. 116):

There is no question that many women who participate in women's prayer groups are highly sincere and are prompted by the loftiest of motives. Nevertheless, one can only conclude that their rabbinic mentors have misled them by reason of the latter's own lack of erudition.

III. Torah Reading

R. Bleich (pp. 119-121) spends a good deal of time addressing the issue of reading the Torah at a Women's Prayer Group. He first points out that a "real" Torah reading can only take place with a minyan. Regarding a "fake" Torah reading, one without the attendant blessings, R. Bleich deems it prohibited for a surprising and difficult reason. He claims that the Rambam in Hilkhos Melakhim 10:9 prohibits the innovation of religious rituals. The application of this prohibition to the Torah reading at a Women's Prayer Group is very difficult to me and I will just leave this tzarikh iyun without elaborating on the entire matter.

Conclusion

R. Bleich ends with the following (p. 121):

There is no substitute for the prayer of the community as a unified whole. As so eloquently stated by Ramban in his commentary on Exodus 13:16, "The purpose of... synagogues and the merit of communal prayer is that people have a place wherein they assemble and express gratitude to the Almighty... and proclaim publicly and say before Him 'we are Your creatures!'" To this end Jews, men and women alike, join together in the synagogue in common and collective expression of worship and devotion.

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Women's Prayer Groups - R. Eliezer Berkovits' Position

In his book, Jewish Women in Time and Torah, R. Eliezer Berkovits discusses many issues regarding contemporary women and has a short section on Women's Prayer Groups (pp. 74-83). R. Eliezer Berkovits studied in the Hildesheimer Institute in Berlin under the great scholar R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg (author of Seridei Eish) and briefly served as a congregational rabbi in Nazi-dominated Berlin. After World War II, R. Berkovits found his way to Chicago where he taught philosophy at Hebrew Theological College. His main foray into halakhah was a thwarted attempt to introduce conditional marriages so as to avoid the problems of an agunah. This proposal was rightly opposed by leading scholars who demonstrated that this plan had been previously suggested (twice) and had been highly criticized by the greatest scholars of two generations (for more on this, see R. Menahem Kasher's article on this subject in the first issue of No'am or, in English, R. Moshe Meiselman's Jewish Woman in Jewish Law). Some of R. Berkovits' other writings have further served to marginalize him in the Orthodox world. One book, on the nature and function of halakhah, was so close to the approach of Conservative scholars that R. Berkovits' students have found it necessary to show exactly how his approach is different. R. Berkovits was certainly a great Jewish philosopher, arguably among the greatest in the twentieth century, but he was not known as a posek and published no responsa.

I. Why Not?

R. Berkovits begins his discussion of Women's Prayer Groups by asking why not (p. 75)? I would think that the more proper question is to ask why? Jewish tradition is to be treasured, not discarded when a prohibition against abandoning it cannot be found. There can certainly be a good discussion over "why" but "why not" should not even be asked.

II. Communal Prayer

R. Berkovits then proceeds to argue that women have no place in the communal prayer in the synagogue.

[W]omen are outside the community, and even in the synagogue their prayer remains tefillat yahid, the private prayer of an individual. There is indeed a great deal of difference between communal and individual prayer, but only for men. Only for them is tefillah be-tzibbur of greater importance than tefillat yahid. For women, however, tefillah be-tzibbur is an impossibility.

Halakhically, this is a very dubious suggestion. Women can never join the tefillah be-tzibbur? This is certainly not a mainstream approach and is one that, if anything, marginalizes women in Judaism just as much if not more than what so-called right wing rabbis have said. Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer, in their extensive article on Women's Prayer Groups, write the following about this contention:

Furthermore, there is even a minority opinion of several leading posekim who maintain that women sitting in the Ezrat Nashim (a separate women’s section or balcony) never fulfill tefilla be-tsibbur.

[Endnote:] ...Most other posekim seem to disagree...

Even this, though, is different from R. Berkovits' suggestion. He claims that women can never be part of tefillah be-tzibbur, regardless of whether the mehitzah separates them into a different room. This, to my knowledge, is undocumented anywhere and R. Berkovits fails to bring a single proof for his surprising contention. Although, he was writing a popular work in English rather than an halakhic article so the lack of detailed proof is somewhat understandable.

III. Negative Custom

R. Berkovits then proceeds to address the contention that since we have never had the custom of Women's Prayer Groups we may not institute such an innovation. To R. Berkovits' credit, he acknowledges (unlike others, as we shall see in a future post) that there is a famous case in which we say lo ra'inu ra'ayah (that we did not see it is a proof) regarding a custom. That is in the very first paragraph in Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah. There is an early source indicating that women cannot serve as ritual slaughterers (shohetim) and most of the medieval talmudists disputed this ruling. Howeve, the Ashkenazic practice remained that, even though women can technically serve as shohetim, through custom we do not permit such a practice. The sources are fairly clear that since we have not had women shohetim in the past, the custom is that women may not serve as shohetim. R. Moshe Isserles, the famous Rema, codified this in his glosses to Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 1:1 and every major Ashkenazic code has included this custom (e.g. Levush, Hokhmas Adam, Simlah Hadashah, Arukh ha-Shulhan, Darkei Teshuvah). If that is the case, perhaps the argument can be made that, since we have not had Women's Prayer Groups in the past, the custom is not to allow them.

R. Berkovits responds to this argument by suggesting that lo ra'inu ra'ayah is a valid claim only when dealing with a matter of dispute. There was disagreement over whether women can serve as shohetim and, while we rule technically like those who permit, the custom has evidently developed to follow those who prohibit. However, in other cases such as Women's Prayer Groups, in which there was not a dispute in the past, we cannot say that the custom followed the strict opinion. At that time, there was no need and no desire for Women's Prayer Groups. That does not imply the following of a strict position.

R. Berkovits' logic is sound and is deserving of contemplation. However, he neglects that the case of shohetim is not the only case in which we say lo ra'inu ra'ayah. As the Shakh on the above Rema points out, the Rema himself explicitly states in Hoshen Mishpat 37:22 that we say lo ra'inu ra'ayah regarding the customary practices involved in accepting testimony. The Shakh on Hoshen Mishpat 37:38 expounds at length on when we say lo ra'inu ra'ayah and when not, and his analysis is different from R. Berkovits'.

IV. Introducing a New Custom

R. Berkovits (pp. 79-81) addresses the permissibility of introducing a new custom by citing two responsa from his mentor, R. Yehiel Ya'akov Weinberg. In one responsum, R. Weinberg prohibits the administration of an anesthetic before circumcision. In another, he permits the institution of a Bas Mitzvah ceremony. R. Weinberg's support for the Bas Mitzvah ceremony is seen by R. Berkovits as precedent for his support for Women's Prayer Groups.

What R. Berkovits leaves out is R. Weinberg's stated reason for permitting the Bas Mitzvah ceremony. From Seridei Eish vol. 3 no. 93:

That it was not done in previous generations is indeed no argument. The generations before us did not have to occupy themselves with the upbringing of daughters as we do today [until here, R. Berkovits quotes - Simcha] because their homes were full of Torah and fear of Heaven, and the air of each Jewish city was full of the spirit of Judaism. Girls who were raised in a Jewish home were saturated with the Jewish spirit without acts [i.e. ceremonies] and practically nursed Judaism from their Mothers' breasts. Now, however, the generations have greatly changed. The influence of the street uproots all attachment to Judaism from the hearts of each youth and girls are educated in Gentile or secular schools that do not try to instill in the hearts of their students a love for Torah or for the holy Jewish customs...

In other words, as an emergency measure to prevent girls from leaving Judaism we must institute the Bas Mitzvah ceremony (with some caveats that we will get too soon). If R. Berkovits is arguing that we must institute Women's Prayer Groups because otherwise women will leave Judaism, he has failed to mention it. Indeed, some would suggest that the institution of Women's Prayer Groups may lead more women to leave traditional Judaism than otherwise. Those who are looking for complete egalitarian participation will never find it in Orthodox Judaism and when the newness and excitement of Women's Prayer Groups wears off they will leave Orthodoxy for places where they can find true equality (and such has, sadly, happened).

V. Confirming the Heterodox

What R. Berkovits entirely omits from his discussion is a concern that his mentor, R. Weinberg, took very seriously. In a celebrated responsum, R. David Tzvi Hoffman analyzed whether an organ may be used in a synagogue during the week when there is no problem of violating Shabbat or the holiday (Melamed Le-Ho’il, vol. 1 no. 16). R. Hoffman neatly summarized the existing literature on the subject and then formulated his own extensive reasoning as to why an organ is prohibited in the synagogue even during the week. In addition to the prohibition against walking in Gentile ways, which he thoroughly analyzed from all positions, R’ Hoffman also cited the prohibition against imitation, and thereby encouragement, of sectarians. Since the Reform movement certainly qualifies as sectarian, we may not adopt any of their practices which might confirm them in their ways. Once we take a small step towards Reform the public might think that, despite our protests to the contrary, this is only the first of many steps.

R. Weinberg (ibid.) cited this responsum of R. Hoffman, his predecessor as rector of Hildesheimer's Institute, and agreed with R. Hoffman's conclusion. Imitating a heterodox practice, even if unintentionally, “has within it the strengthening of the destroyers because they were the first to initiate the new practice of celebrating the Bas Mitzvah.” This, R’ Weinberg rules, is a sufficient reason to prohibit the Bas Mitzvah celebration. The only way for such a practice to be permitted is to sufficiently differentiate it from the heterodox celebration. Therefore, R. Weinberg concluded, a Bas Mitzvah may not take place in a synagogue and must be a celebration of family joy and, more importantly, a time of educational strengthening of the religious development of a budding woman.

I would think that R. Berkovits would have to deal with this issue in the context of increasing female participation in the prayer service. Given the steps that the Conservative movement took in the 70s and 80s towards complete egalitarianism in the synagogue, there might be a real concern that Women's Prayer Groups falls under the prohibition of confirming the Heterodox. Or maybe they are sufficiently different to be permissible. But he entirely omits this issue, even while citing the responsum from his mentor that deals with the matter. From a student of Hildesheimer's Institute, I would have expected more grappling with the views of R. Hoffman and R. Weinberg.

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Religious Philosophy

In trying to explain the Medieval Ashkenazic community's self-image of piety, Dr. Haym Soloveitchik ("Religious Law and Change: The Medieval Ashkenazic Example" in AJS Review Fall 1987) lists as one source for this attitude their simplicity of beliefs. As an explanation of this, he writes (p. 213):

[R]eligious philosophy is an act of justification. It seeks to make the beliefs and practices of a religion comprehensible in the terms of another system. Implicit in the act of translation is the assumption that the categories of the other system are the dominant ones. They are the notions which yield comprehension and bestow value. Otherwise why translate?

One could respond that the act of translation itself provides an opportunity for greater clarification. When we have to restate our beliefs in different words, we deepen our own understanding and crystallize the underlying convictions that form our religious world. Then again, who says that we cannot do this without having to translate our religion into the language of philosophy?

I have a feeling that many religious Jews who dabble (or more) in philosophy believe that philosophy is superior and that we must, as intelligent people, define ourselves in the terms of the Western philosophical tradition. Emotionally, I sympathize with that view even though I believe it to be mistaken.

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The Historicity of Megillas Esther

An essay on the historicity of Megillas Esther, presumably in response to this essay. It clearly does not address all of the original essay's points, but it also clearly did not intend to.

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Women's Prayer Groups - R. Yehuda Henkin's Position II

Introduction

I wrote in an earlier post in describing the writings of R. Yehuda Henkin:

However, I do not believe that his responsa will ever become mainstream because his method of approaching a question is fairly unique and idiosyncratic.

Let me once again clarify that I did not intend to insult R. Henkin with this comment. I was trying to offer an explanation of why I do not think that his responsa will be accepted by the mainstream Torah-studying public. My suggestion was that his derekh ha-limud -- the way he approaches a sugya and the sources he chooses to analyze -- is not widespread and is not what one would find in, say, the responsa of R. Moshe Shternbuch or R. Nosson Geshtetner. I'll add that I consider this to be the same reason that R. Ephraim Greenblatt's multi-volume Rivevos Ephraim cannot be found in most yeshiva and private libraries.

In conjunction with this, any readers who would like to obtain the three volumes of responsa from R. Yehuda Henkin may contact him personally. He occasionally posts to Mail-Jewish and Avodah, and his e-mail address is henkin-at(@)-012.net.il.

I. Public Prayer

I quoted R. Henkin as writing, "Unfortunately, many women's sections and men's sections alike are places of idle gossip."

I had meant to comment that the solution to this problem is not necessarily the innovation of a new practice. Perhaps a better resolution would be to fix the synagogues so that everyone can have a talk-free davening. If that is impossible, alternate minyanim are also a possibility. I've seen it done. Women's Prayer Groups are certainly not the only solution to the problem of talking in shul.

III. Foreign Influence

I had written:

My understanding, perhaps mistaken, is that this is incorrect. The Feminist movement made inroads into Christianity just like it did into Judaism and, historically, all-female prayer groups were formed among Christians before Jewish women started to do so. However, I do not currently have a source to back up that impression. I will see what an internet search turns up. This is, clearly, a crucial point. If Christians were forming Women's Prayer Groups first then there is ample reason to prohibit such groups for Jews.

I found the following through an online search. Obviously, more adequate research is required before any authoritative statement on the matter can be made but the initial indications are that Women's Prayer Groups have a long Christian history.

Source 1:

For example, Finney [the 19th century Revivalist] made great use of women's prayer groups which required every woman to take her turn in public prayer, again following the practice initiated by Wesley, but hitherto far removed from orthodox Christianity.

Source 2:

While historians have examined earlier women's prayer groups, they've tended to ignore these modern-day evangelical groups because of their assumed connection to the "religious right."

VI. Falsifying Torah

I wrote regarding Maharshal's position that falsifying Torah is yehareig ve-al ya'avor:

R. Henkin disagrees with the nature of the severity of this prohibition and even cites R. Moshe Feinstein on this matter.

I should have noted that R. Henkin cites the Talmudic Encyclopedia as a source for R. Feinstein's position. Although, as I pointed out, R. Feinstein's grandson implicitly disputes this attribution, R. Henkin is not at fault for this discrepancy. He was merely quoting a reputable source and had no way of knowing the "Torah she-be-al peh" on this matter.

VII. Conclusion

I quoted R. Henkin as writing, "Nevertheless, I am not endorsing women's prayer groups, because one cannot rule from a distance without knowing the operative souls (hanefashot ha'osot)."

I was directed by a learned source to look again at the phrase hanefashot ha'osot which somehow had escaped my attention. This is, of course, a reference to Vayikra 18:29: "For whosoever shall do any of these abominations, even the souls that do them (ha-nefashot ha-osot) shall be cut off from among their people."

Very interesting...

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Persia and the Talmud

As a Yeshiva University alumnus, I get quite a bit of mail from the school that I place directly into the garbage. Last week I received a copy of YU Today but did not immediately throw it out because a picture of R. Hershel Schachter on the cover caught my eye. I proceeded to read that article, which was entirely uninteresting, and then saw an article about Dr. Yaakov Elman that looked promising. And it lived up to its promise. (I just found the article online here.)

Aside from providing a biography of Dr. Elman's interesting life, stories that I had heard piecemeal and never really believed, the article details his most recent intellectual endeavour. Dr. Elman has taken a profound interest in the Persian background of the Babylonian Talmud. What was the Persian legal and sociological context in which the sages of the Talmud lived and, perhaps more importantly, in what intellectual and theological trends were they swimming - whether reacting to or passively accepting? This is an area of tremendous importance that has received almost no treatment at all. Such considerations in Palestine during the times of the Mishnah and later have been exhaustively treated, but Persia has been left untouched. Dr. Elman is delving into this area and, in the process, revitalizing the field of Persian Studies.

Relatively new to the field, Prof. Elman is already well known among the world’s community of Persian scholars. During the 2002–03 academic year, while on sabbatical from YU, he was a Harry Starr Fellow in Judaica at the Center for Jewish Studies at Harvard University, affording him time to work on one book and start another.

“He is a multi-faceted jewel in the crown of wisdom, a helpful colleague, a gentle friend,“ says Prof. Russell, the Mashtots Professor of Armenian Studies at Harvard. “He has become an expert in Iranian law and lore, bringing his new and profound learning to the study of Talmudic tradition.”

“Yaakov is no less than a force of nature,” adds Prof. Skjaervo. “He is single-handedly carrying out a crusade among his colleagues for the importance of Pahlavi [Middle Persian] studies. It may well be the salvation of Old Persian studies.”

This seems to me to be an extremely important development and may put Yeshiva University, once again, on the map of academic Talmudic Studies. I wish Dr. Elman much success in his investigations.

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Women's Prayer Groups - R. Yehuda Henkin's Position

The time has come to summarize and critique the writings of those who permit Women's Prayer Groups. The first in this series is R. Yehuda Henkin, although as we shall see he does not entirely fit into this group.

R. Yehuda Henkin is the grandson of the renowned ga'on R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, who was a world-recognized posek in the mid-twentieth century. The younger R. Henkin is a rav in Israel and has written widely on modern subjects, particularly women's issues, as well as a three-volume work of responsa. He is not particularly famous or recognized -- I do not know anyone other than me who owns all three volumes of his responsa -- but he is a serious talmid hakham and one of the few who are willing to take seriously the halakhic questions raised by feminists. He is unquestionably Modern Orthodox and has, together with his wife, founded an institute to teach the laws of nidah to female scholars and prepare them to be halakhic advisers.

A review of his responsa will demonstrate that he is neither particularly lenient nor strict; he calls them as he sees them. For example, he comes out fairly strongly in favor of separate seating at weddings (at least for singles) in responsum vol. 1 no. 35, which is quite surprising for a Modern Orthodox posek, much less someone looked up to by feminists. However, I do not believe that his responsa will ever become mainstream because his method of approaching a question is fairly unique and idiosyncratic. In other words, his derekh ha-limud is very unusual. That does not mean that he is wrong or is less than serious. It just means that I do not think that he will ever be a "big posek", even before taking into account factional politics. He is nevertheless a very significant talmid hakham.

R. Henkin addresses the issue of Women's Prayer Groups briefly in one of his responsa (vol. 2 no. 10), which he has since translated into English and published in his Responsa on Contemporary Jewish Women's Issues. I will be using his English translation in this post and all page numbers refer to that book.

I. Public Prayer

R. Henkin starts off, "Some rabbis object to these women's prayer groups because they lack the Halachic status of public prayer. But women have no obligation of public prayer... In many communities women did not go to synagogue at all... Unfortunately, many women's sections and men's sections alike are places of idle gossip" (p. 72).

In other words, it is not a minyan but so what? Women do not have to pray with a minyan. This is a valid response to the argument he quoted but does not address other issues that we spelled out in previous posts. For example, what about the problem of ein ma'avirin al ha-mitzvot? Women who put in the effort to leave home and attend a service, but then intentionally do not go to a minyan and instead go to a Women's Prayer Group, are passing over the greater mitzvah.

II. Torah Reading

R. Henkin then spends a good deal of time objecting to the claim that women are obligated to hear the reading of the Torah and, therefore, must attend a minyan. I fully agree with him on this, or at least his conclusion. Again, I do not share his methodology of approaching a question.

III. Foreign Influence

R. Henkin next addresses the argument that Women's Prayer Groups are "inspired or influenced by the non-Jewish women's liberation movement, in violation of the prohibition in Vayikra 18:3 against adopting non-Jewish practices" (p. 74).

He responds that "the Torah prohibits actions and not movements. Motivation alone is not a violation..." (ibid.).

In other words, there is nothing wrong with being influenced by non-Jewish ideas as long as we do not imitate their actual practices. This is, to me, a tremendous hiddush which R. Henkin really just tosses out there with barely any proof. All he does is direct the reader to Deut. 12:30 and the Ramban's commentary to that verse. I would think that such an innovative idea would deserve much more elaboration.

He then adds another important caveat to this argument. "Since Christian women do not pray by themselves but with men, Jewish women's prayer groups without men do not violate ubechukoteihem lo teileichu" (ibid.).

My understanding, perhaps mistaken, is that this is incorrect. The Feminist movement made inroads into Christianity just like it did into Judaism and, historically, all-female prayer groups were formed among Christians before Jewish women started to do so. However, I do not currently have a source to back up that impression. I will see what an internet search turns up. This is, clearly, a crucial point. If Christians were forming Women's Prayer Groups first then there is ample reason to prohibit such groups for Jews.

IV. Synagogue Customs

R. Henkin accepts the critique that Women's Prayer Groups are an improper deviation from traditional synagogue customs and therefore requires that they be held elsewhere, either in a private home or in an adjacent hall. He also prohibits the bringing of a communal Torah scroll for one-time use (ibid.).

V. Self-Delusion

"As for the charge that women are deluding themselves into thinking that they are conducting public prayer when in fact they have only the status of individuals, whether or not they are deluding depends on the circumstances in each community" (ibid.).

Granted.

VI. Falsifying Torah

R. Shlomo Luria, the Maharshal, wrote that misrepresenting Torah is a matter of yehareg ve-al ya'avor, of the most serious nature. R. Henkin disagrees with the nature of the severity of this prohibition and even cites R. Moshe Feinstein on this matter. In other words, while falsifying Torah is a very bad thing, one must not give up one's life rather than violate this prohibition. How this is an endorsement of Women's Prayer Groups, I don't know. If one accepts the premise that they are misrepresenting Torah, then all R. Henkin has demonstrated is that women need not give up their lives rather than form such a group. In other words, it has the same status as the eating of pig meat.

As an aside, R. Mordechai Tendler frequently states that this ruling of the Maharshal was very critical to his grandfather's, R. Moshe Feinstein's, world view. In other words, contrary to R. Henkin's claim, R. Moshe Feinstein agreed with the Maharshal. Anyone interested in investigating this topic, that is really quite unrelated to the issue of Women's Prayer Groups, is encouraged to spend some time trying to determine R. Feinstein's view. Whatever it is, it does not in any way impact on our topic.

VII. Conclusion

R. Henkin concludes as follows:

Nevertheless, I am not endorsing women's prayer groups, because one cannot rule from a distance without knowing the operative souls (hanefashot ha'osot). This issue is in the province of gedolim... Another reason for not issuing a heter now is that I saw an article in which one of the rabbis expounded at length on the dangers he anticipates from women's prayer groups [perhaps R. Hershel Schachter? - Simcha]."

(pp. 75-76)

To summarize R. Henkin's view:

1. Women's Prayer Groups may not take place in a shul's sanctuary
2. Women may not use a Torah scroll for such a group (if it is a one-time use)
3. He cannot rule on this issue without knowing the details of the local community
4. Only a gadol should rule on such a complex and delicate issue (compare with my recent post from R. Mayer Twersky)

From where I am sitting, R. Henkin barely addressed the many issues raised by R. Hershel Schachter and R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, and those he addressed he did not do so convincingly.

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Traffic Laws in Halakhah

Traffic laws in frum circles fall under the category of "lesser commandments which a person [sometimes] treads on with his heels" (Rashi, Devarim 7:12) except that they can really be among the hamuros and not just "lesser commandments" because reckless driving puts people's lives in danger.

From Torah.org's Business Halacha class, written by R. Tzvi Shpitz and translated into English by R. Aaron Tendler:

A. Traffic laws that are enacted to save human lives and property are obligatory according to the laws of the Torah on every person, at all times and everywhere in the world. It makes no difference what type of government enacted them.

B. If a person knows of someone who drives recklessly and endangers people's lives, he must do everything within his power to prevent the reckless driver from driving in this manner. Therefore, if he is able to personally warn the driver, or summon him to appear before a Rabbi or Bais Din to warn him to refrain from driving recklessly, he must do so. If he is certain that these steps will not be effective, the Halacha requires him to inform the police of this danger to the public safety, so that the reckless driver and others like him can be prevented from causing tragedies...

C. The case of a person who drives recklessly and kills someone is in the category of "Shogeg Korov L'Maizid", unintentional but caused by negligence (lit. "close to deliberate"). This means that, in the times of our Sanhedrin, although he could not be found deserving of capital punishment...

D. Today, when we don't have Dayanim (Rabbinic judges) authorized to judge cases of capital punishment, a Go'el HaDam is not permitted to do anything to someone who killed his relative through reckless driving. However, the driver must repent in a manner that is befitting his terrible action. He also must financially support the family of the victim, especially if the victim was the bread winner of his family...

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Interfaith Dialogue III

R. Mayer Twersky enters the printed debate in this week's devar Torah from Torah Web:

In general, psak halacha is exclusively reserved for talmidim she’higi’u l’hora’a, great torah sages. Chazal unequivocally condemn those who are not qualified to pasken, and yet do so. “He is a wicked, delusionary, and arrogant person.” “(such people) increase divisiveness, destroy the world, extinguish the lamp of Torah, and violate the vineyard of Hashem” (Ramabm Hil. Talmud Torah, Perek 5). Psak halacha in this context denotes adjudicating a new or unresolved question, or applying halacha in new situations. A rav need not consider himself a great Torah sage, however, to guide his ba’alei batim or talmidim regarding explicit halachos in Shulchan Aruch or matters and situations about which he has a tradition in psak halacha.

Certain questions, due either to the gravity of the issurim involved or their implications for Klal Yisroel or both, are reserved for gedolei Yisroel. Outstanding though they are, even talmidim she’higi’u l’hora’a refer such questions to the gedolim. For instance, questions of aguna due to the gravity of issur eishes ish and yuchsin, have always been referred to gedolim, and even they traditionally seek the approval of their colleagues in issuing a heter...

I believe – and I write without pretensions or delusions, as a talmid shelo higia l’hora’a – that we urgently need to engage in introspection regarding these matters of psak halacha. Too often we do not defer and refer to the appropriate halachic authorities. Case in point: the recent renewed interest and debate concerning interfaith relations and dialogue. What needs to be emphasized is the absolute indispensability of referring such questions to our gedolim. Such questions involve potentially grave issurim and also have profound implications for Klal Yisroel. We can debate the appropriateness of the highly publicized visit by a group of cardinals to Yeshiva, but only gedolim are entitled to decide the issue. The failure to refer the question to our gedolim reminds us of the vital need for introspection regarding psak halacha.

Granted, we can debate who is a gadol but I certainly am not and neither are most local synagogue rabbis.

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Agudath Israel and the Internet

Also from this month's The Jewish Observer (table of contents page). In case anyone is interested, this is their internet policy:

The Jewish Observer has devoted a great deal of space to the perils of the Internet and to the need for everyone to be extremely vigilant in its use. We have echoed the pleas of our gedolim that it should not be in use, unless it is an unavodiable necessity, and then only with all suitable safeguards. While its dangers must be recognized and controlled to every possible degree, our gedolim recognize that many people and businesses require its use, and therefore it has not been banned. This is why we accept advertisements listing website addresses, but in no way does this imply that the gedolim or The Jewish Observer condone casual use of the Internet.

I don't think this explains why they allow footnotes in articles to reference sources on the web, unless that too is purely for business purposes (no sarcasm or mockery intended here).

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Interfaith Dialogue II

Eschewing the path of totally ignoring the events in American society, The Jewish Observer boldly addressed the topic of Mel Gibson's The Passion in its Nissan 5764/April 2004 issue. Chosen to tackle the issue was the eloquent Yonason (AKA Jonathan) Rosenblum in the lead article titled "Passion, Prejudice, and Political Incorrectness." Predictably, although this time plausibly, taking the opposite stance of mainstream Jewry, Rosenblum criticized the tactics of the ADL and Amcha. After listing the mistakes of the mainstream Jewish establishment, Rosenblum set forth his proposal for how we should have dealt with the movie. This is where things start to get very interesting.

[T]hat does not mean that the Jewish community was helpless in the face of the threat posed by the movie or without potential allies. The Catholic Church presented the most natural ally. Since the early 1960s, the Church has been working with Jewish groups to reverse the deadly effects of millennia of Church teachings on Jewish guilt... [H]ere too there were grounds to work together with evangelicals and other conservative Protestants... In recent years, a number of close relationships have been forged between Jews, mostly Orthodox, and leading figures from the so-called religious Right...

Say what? Was that just an endorsement of interfaith dialogue from a prominent Haredi spokesman, writing in the organ of Agudath Israel of America?!?

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Solving the Agunah Problem

Over my vacation, I had the opportunity to read through R. Michael J. Broyde's not-so-recent book Marriage, Divorce, and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law. He calls this book a conceptual analysis, and it is. He makes a number of excellent and insightful points by distinguishing between the concepts underlying different views of divorce.

I. Concepts of Marriage

The first insight of his that I found extremely helpful was in differentiating between divorce in Jewish law and in most other modern systems of law. In American law, for example, divorce is a part of public law in that the government creates and dissolves marriages. The government declares when two people are married and when they are not, e.g. "By the power vested in me by the state of Nevada I now pronounce you husband and wife." Therefore, the government can dissolve marriages at will, whether it be in the interest of one or both spouses or not. This adds convenience to those who wish to dissolve problematic marriages but has wide-reaching consequences that could potentially prove perilous. Imagine if the government decided that all marriages between people of different races would be dissolved. If marriage is entirely a matter of public law then this is a possibility, as are many other scary scenarios that the reader can imagine.

In contrast, marriage in Jewish law is a matter of private law. The two spouses agree to marry each other and two witnesses are needed to effectuate and prove the agreement. A rabbi is only needed to ensure that everything is done properly, not as an agent of the state. Because marriage is an agreement between two private parties, the state or community cannot simply dissolve the bond at will.

II. Definitions of Agunah

The second major insight I found in this book is the statement that the "Agunah Problem" will never be solved until we define what an agunah is. The classical case of agunah is of a woman whose husband has disappeared and it is unknown whether he is still alive. However, that is not the problem facing the Jewish community today. Nowadays, an agunah is a woman whose husband will not give her a Jewish divorce. Since their marriage was entered mutually and must be exited mutually, if he refuses to divorce her then she is chained to that marriage (as is he, if she refuses to accept the divorce; but more on that later). However, this definition is overly simplistic. We need to better define the term or, more fundamentally, the desired concept of divorce.

Do we desire a no-fault divorce system in which either spouse, upon requesting a divorce, will automatically be entitled to one? Until fifty years ago, that was not the case in the US and is still not the case in many states. R. Broyde is of the opinion that the social consequences of no-fault divorce is extremely negative while the benefits are small. If we desire a fault divorce system, we must define the severity of the faults that would require a divorce. Spouse abuse? Infidelity? Mental incapacity? Weight gain? Perhaps a religious divorce should automatically follow a secular divorce. If all we desire is equality in divorce, we can empower the woman or remove power from the man. Either will result in equality but will have very different practical consequences.

Depending on the type of divorce one believes should be standard, one's definition of an agunah will change as well. Is a woman whose husband will not give her a get until they finish litigating the terms of their secular divorce an agunah? Some would say yes; some no; and some (like me) would say that it depends. The husband might be using the get as leverage for better terms. But what about an amicable divorce (and I am told that most divorces are amicable but they don't make the news or the rumor mills) in which the husband wishes to wait until the divorce is final before giving a get (you never know, she might change her mind and come back to him)? Is the woman in such a case an agunah? And what about when the husband is using the get to level a field that is otherwise biased in favor of the wife, as American law tends to be?

Different communities, R. Broyde is quick to point out, have different standards and different views on marriage. Being perhaps overly tactful, he fails to give examples of different communities. But I imagine that the Yuppy Modern Orthodox community would prefer a no-fault divorce system while more hassidic elements would prefer a severe fault divorce system, with a broad spectrum in between.

III. One Solution, Different Agreements

R. Broyde's solution is that prenuptial agreements based on the different concepts of marriage and divorce can be written (and he gives examples in an appendix) and that before couples wed they must choose which concept to accept by signing the appropriate agreement. It sounds a bit tedious and unrealistic to me, unless communities choose a standard agreement and have all couples sign them before marrying. Thus, the Satmar beis din will have its own prenuptial agreement and insist that all Satmar marriages include the document. Similarly, the rabbis in the Upper West Side will have their own prenuptial agreement, as will the Torah Vodaas crowd, the Chaim Berlin alumni, etc. While there will still be people chained to marriages in communities that lack no-fault provisions, this will be considered a necessary by-product of marriage as conceived by that community.

IV. Miscellany

Important in this book is a review of different historical attitudes towards divorce in rabbinic literature and R. Broyde offers charts to illustrate these different concepts. The author shows the historical progression as well as the alternatives that have been firmly rejected by authorities.

One critique I have of R. Broyde's book is the short shrift he gave to unscrupulous batei din that offer illegitimate heterei me'ah rabbanim, permissions for a husband to remarry without technically divorcing his wife. This provision was intended for the most extremely unfortunate of cases but has recently been taken advantage of by some dishonest rabbis. R. Broyde devotes a small passsage, I think one paragraph, to this phenomenon and only gives a vague hint as to the leader of these offenders. These men are destroying what little respect was left for the beis din system and deserve public declaim. They are also effectively removing protections that were instituted into Jewish law over a thousand years ago to give women the ability to refuse a divorce. By allowing just about any man to remarry without divorcing his first wife, these contemporary rabbis are removing this important protection of women.

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I'm Back

Pesah is over and I'm back. I did some interesting reading over the holiday and have a lot about which to blog. But that will have to wait until I am more settled in to regular life.

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Masekhes Gittin

Hadran alakh Masekhes Gittin ve-hadrakh alan...

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Links

The following are websites/blogs that link to Hirhurim, initially determined via Google. If your website and/or blog links to Hirhurim and is not listed, please post your URL in the comments and it will be added to this post. Thank you.

PLEASE NOTE that the blogger has not reviewed these websites and makes no claim about their content. This is just a list of website that link here.

Judaism Online
http://godolhador.blogspot.com
http://w2.devarim.com
http://failedmessiah.typepad.com
http://lewyn.tripod.com/blog
http://differentriver.com
http://www.blissfulknowledge.com
http://yutopia.yucs.org
http://differentriver.com
http://mayornot.com
http://www.smontagu.org/blog/
http://www.aliyahblog.com
http://www.mowoman.com
http://www.livejournal.com/users/onasamaya/
http://www.israellycool.com/blog/
http://hassagot.blogs.com
http://chakira.blog-city.com
http://differentriver.com/
http://www.jewishblogging.com
http://www.rishon-rishon.com
http://blogshares.com
http://www.campusj.com
http://atowncrier.blogspot.com
http://velvel.blogspot.com
http://hamikdash.blogspot.com
http://baynonim.blogspot.com
http://mountainsmog.blogspot.com/
http://houseofhock.blogspot.com
http://fourthrabbi.blogspot.com
http://biurchametz.blogspot.com
http://daashedyot.blogspot.com
http://apikorsus.blogspot.com
http://chareidi.blogspot.com
http://fourthrabbi.blogspot.com
http://mysticalpaths.blogspot.com
http://kaspit.typepad.com
http://serandez.blogspot.com
http://myobiterdicta.blogspot.com
http://jschick.blogspot.com
http://mosi.blog-city.com
http://averyspecialblog.blogspot.com
http://mochassid.blogspot.com
http://zackarysholemberger.blogspot.com
http://benchorin.blogspot.com
http://sruliblog.blogspot.com
http://jewish-outreach.blogspot.com
http://thewonderingjew.blogspot.com
http://www.outofstepjew.blogspot.com
http://jewish-music.blogspot.com
http://gimmeshelter.blog-city.com
http://goodshabbos.blogspot.com
http://wishfulbutstuck.blogspot.com
http://www.chilledyungerman.blogspot.com
http://margavriel.blogspot.com
http://cosmicx.blogspot.com
http://cross-currents.com
http://rebsnpy.blogspot.com
http://www.parshablog.com
http://parsha.blogspot.com
http://labrab.blogspot.com
http://boroparkpyro.blogspot.com
http://nebach.blogspot.com/
http://www.jewlicious.com/
http://www.jewishpress.com
http://www.gottorah.com
http://www.naaleh.com

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Homosexuality in Halakhah IV

Statement regarding Same-Sex Marriages issued on March 30, 2004 by the Rabbinical Council of America and the Orthodox Union:

The Rabbinical Council of America and The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America reaffirm the following foundational principles and beliefs in unambiguous and unmistakable terms:

· Homosexual behavior is, and has always been, absolutely forbidden by Jewish law and tradition. Any attempt to characterize Jewish law and tradition to the contrary must be rejected.

· The only legitimate form of sexual behavior is that which takes place between adult men and women, within the sacred institution of marriage, as traditionally defined and permitted.

· Under no circumstances can Jewish tradition or law countenance a notion of so-called “Same-Sex Marriage” rituals or status under religious auspices. In our view, the term “marriage” by its very definition cannot be construed or applied to same-sex relationships. To do so is to deprive the term of its fundamental and defining meaning. The institution of marriage, and family life, as defined and practiced for thousands of years as between a man and a women, a father and a mother, respectively, is far too important and essential to the bedrock of society and civilization as we know it, to be thus undermined by those who presume to redefine its essence.

· At the same time we reaffirm that those who, in spite of their acceptance of these principles, have difficulty in living up to these standards, should be treated with compassion, sensitivity, and understanding, in our synagogues, in the Jewish community, and in society at large.

· We further note that Passover, commemorating the Exodus from Egypt, is an especially appropriate time to reaffirm these principles. As Leviticus 18 makes clear, the liberation was not only from slavery and infanticide, but also from the sexual depravity practiced in ancient Egypt, which, as understood by the Sages of blessed memory (Sifra Lev. 132), included the legitimization of same-sex marriages.

We thus call upon our fellow Jews and fellow citizens to stand opposed to any attempt, whether judicial, legislative, or religious in nature, to bestow the sanctity of marriage upon same-sex couples.

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Who Am I?

I asked before and I will ask again, please do not try to identify me in the comments section. Whether you are correct or not, I do not want guessing on this blog. If you have a comment to say to me that includes or is based on my real identity, e-mail me.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Important Update

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The Rise and Fall of Biblical Criticism

Two essays on the much heralded and perhaps exaggerated demise of the Documentary Hypothesis:

R. Dr. Nathan T. Lopes Cardozo, "On Bible Criticism and Its Counterarguments" from Between Silence and Speech: Essays on Jewish Thought (Aronson: 1995). The essay is a decade old so it is missing the most recent developments.

David Stern, "Recent Trends in Biblical Source Criticism: A Draft" I don't know who the author is and I only found this essay from a post to LookJed (and here), but it has excellent references from cutting-edge scholarship.

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Women's Prayer Groups: Rav Soloveitchik's Position

The attitude of R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (AKA R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, R. Yoshe Ber Soloveitchik, "The Rav") towards Women's Prayer Groups (WPGs) is a matter of contention, indeed hot debate. His opinion is very important because the proponents of WPGs are exclusively Modern Orthodox and R. Soloveitchik was largely the guiding light of American Modern Orthodoxy during the mid-twentieth century. His students are generally the current leaders of American Modern Orthodoxy and his shadow still looms large over the community. R. Soloveitchik's opposition to any practice is a major obstacle for any scholar to overcome.

The results of a major investigation into R. Soloveitchik's view was published by Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer in their article "Women's Prayer Services - Theory and Practice" in Tradition Winter 1998. The two authors conducted dozens of interviews with people who had discussed the issue with R. Soloveitchik throughout the years and attempted to chart the historical development of R. Soloveitchik's views. Their report has not gone unchallenged, and I will try to sort through the evidence and arrive at what I believe to be the correct conclusion (which is not worth much because I never even met R. Soloveitchik, but this is my blog so I'll write my opinion). Two other important reports are those of R. Soloveitchik's grandson, R. Mayer Twersky, in an article titled "Halakhic Values and Halakhic Decisions: Rav Soloveitchik’s Pesak Regarding Women’s Prayer Groups", originally published in Tradition Spring 1998, and that of his nephew, R. Moshe Meiselman, titled "The Rav, Feminism and Public Policy: An Insider's Overview" and published in Tradition Fall 1998.

Establishing R. Soloveitchik's Opposition

The Frimers report that R. Soloveitchik "was of the view that a women's prayer service, if properly structured, could be conducted in accordance with halakha. Nonetheless, the Rav was most hesitant about women's tefilla groups as a general practice and felt that they should not be encouraged. Consistently, he would recommend to his students not to hold such services." The wording here is a bit soft. R. Soloveitchik "felt that they should not be encouraged" and "would recommend" not to establish them. From what I understand, R. Soloveitchik was quite adamant in his opposition to these groups. He did not recommend to his students that they not establish them; he told his students not to but when they disobeyed him he still maintained contact with them and answered all of their questions (R. Meiselman discusses at length this particular aspect of R. Soloveitchik's personality). R. Twersky refers to his grandfather's position as being a "consistent, unequivocal opposition to women’s tefilla groups." Similarly, R. Meiselman writes that "the Rav halakhically forbade, without equivocation, women's prayer groups." The soft wording chosen by the Frimers is misleading because, while technically correct, it gives the impression that R. Soloveitchik was not really opposed to WPGs and only gave friendly advice to his students who asked. The only evidence to support that contention is the parameters he offered to those who told him that, regardless of his opinion, they were going to hold WPGs and asked him for guidelines on how to do so. Rather than abandon them, as many would, R. Soloveitchik risked the possibility of being misunderstood and gave them guidelines on how to proceed. The Frimers report:

The Rav shared with R. Feuerstein that a group of women studying at Brandeis University had approached him on the matter. The Rav was not in favor of the prayer group, but it was clear to the Rav that the women were not prepared to listen and would proceed under any circumstance. The Rav consequently gave them halakhic guidelines similar to the ones he later gave to R. Wachstock and R. Riskin... R. Shlomo Riskin, then rabbi at Lincoln Square Synagogue, had been among the first people to discuss the women’s services and hakafot issue with R. Soloveitchik, sometime in late 1971... The Rav gave R. Riskin the same halakhic guidelines he gave to R. Wachstock... Nonetheless, the Rav expressed his view that women’s services were “tokenism”-to which the Rav objected... Moreover, the Rav believed that it was not worth “the political price.” Despite all the above, R. Riskin maintains that the Rav conveyed to him a sense that he had confidence in R. Riskin’s judgment of his community’s needs. Accordingly, for Simhat Torah 5733 (October 1, 1972), R. Riskin arranged for a women’s service to meet in the synagogue’s beit midrash.

In other words, R. Soloveitchik told R. Riskin not to hold a WPG even in the kiruv context of Lincoln Square Synagogue at that time, but R. Riskin did so anyway and followed R. Soloveitchik's guidelines for those who were not willing to listen to him on the propriety of WPGs. One has to really strain to find any positive attitude towards WPGs coming from R. Soloveitchik.

I. Public Policy and Halakhic Values

Rs. Frimer also state that R. Soloveitchik "also expressed concern regarding numerous other hashkafic and public-policy issues which relate to the fundamental nature of religious practice and community." This is a very important statement and, I believe, is key to unraveling the differing reports in R. Soloveitchik's name. The Frimers list a number of objections that R. Soloveitchik stated at one time or another against the establishment of WPGs (I list them below). However, they call those objections "Public Policy" issues as opposed to real halakhic issues. This, I believe, is a distinction that they have interpreted from the reports they received. A different interpretation, from a much more authoritative source, is that some of these issues are not "Public Policy" but are matters of "Halakhic Values." As R. Twersky eloquently explains, these are meta-halakhic concerns that deal with the "spirit of the law" and not the nitty-gritty details of the law (see also the letter in The Edah Journal by R. Twersky's pupil, R. Gil Student). While Rs. Frimer and R. Twersky agree that R. Soloveitchik opposed WPGs on grounds that are not technical halakhah, they differ on their interpretation of the grounds for opposition. Rs. Frimer consider them all to be merely "Public Policy" concerns while R. Twersky distinguishes some as having loftier halakhic values. I believe that they are both (or rather, all three) are correct in that R. Soloveitchik was certainly concerned from a "Public Policy" perspective but he was also very concerned with the distortion of "Halakhic Values" that WPGs represent. The Frimers are not to be blamed for this oversight but their interpretation of the evidence they uncovered, and their lumping all of the reasons together, should certainly not be seen as the final word on the matter. R. Soloveitchik's views on almost any subject were highly nuanced and it is the task of the student to uncover those fine distinctions. In support of my contention, I quote R. Meiselman who wrote, "[R. Soloveitchik] felt that they were halakhically prohibited; and he felt that they were also wrong and should be fought on grounds of public policy."

II. Deviation from Customs

The Frimers state that R. Soloveitchik "gave great credence to established Jewish custom and tradition, especially in the area of prayer and the synagogue... Women's prayer groups with Torah reading, hakafot, etc. was, for the Rav, a clear deviation from Jewish prayer forms. That alone was sufficient reason for the Rav to withhold his support for the emerging practice."

(Compare with R. Hershel Schachter's arguments VII & VIII)

R. Meiselman writes, "The fact that we have a mesora, a tradition from each previous generation, to praise and how to praise God, enables us to proceed. Halakha and tradition enable us to engage within prayer. The moment we deviate from these guidelines, our prayer loses its meaning, and more importantly, its justification."

He further writes, "In the area of the halakhot of prayer, minhag has greater power than in other areas of the halakha... For the Rav, minhag bet ha-keneset also had great significance..."

III. Beginning of Large-Scale Reform

According to the Frimers, R. Soloveitchik "was worried that if the rabbis gave in on those matters of synagogue practice where there was admittedly some room for flexibility, it might well lay the ground for a call for change in other areas of halakha as well-areas where there was little or perhaps no room for maneuvering."

This, I believe, can be seen today with the move in Orthodox feminist circles to call women to the Torah and the momentum gaining for the ordination of Orthodox women rabbis.

IV. Improper Motivations

The Frimers report that R. Soloveitchik was concerned over the motivation of the women proposing WPGs. The possibility was evident that they wanted not greater spirituality but "public peer approbation, conspicuous religious performance, or a sense of equality with men. If the real motivating factor was any of the latter, it was likely that a women's tefilla group would not truly satisfy their religious needs; on the contrary, the women's services would merely foster increasingly unfulfillable expectations, resulting in greater frustration and perhaps even a break with halakha." The motivation plays, according to R. Twersky, a much more important role in R. Soloveitchik's view. "The desire for and emphasis upon active participation and leadership are antithetical to genuine service of the heart and contribute to the extroversion of prayer." In other words, the motivation underlying WPGs -- that of more active participation by women in the prayer service -- belies a misunderstanding and distortion of the proper motivations for prayer.

(Compare with R. Hershel Schachter's argument VI)

V. Inauthentic Practice

The Frimers write, "[T]he women engaged in a women's service were missing out on tefilla be-tsibbur, the recitation of various devarim she-bi-kdusha, and a proper, halakhic Torah reading-available to them only if they attended a regular minyan. Granted, women are exempt from the obligations of public prayer, but the Rav was deeply disturbed that women who had consciously chosen not to stay and pray at home, but rather to participate in a women's tefilla group, were actively and deliberately opting for the inauthentic in place of the authentic."

Similarly, R. Meiselman writes, "First and foremost, halakha simply does not allow one to opt for a secondary level of religious performance. We are absolutely obligated to pursue excellence in our divine worship. One who opts for mediocrity in his religious worship is not only a second class citizen, but also has violated basic precepts in Jewish law."

(Compare with R. Hershel Schachter's argument I)

According to R. Twersky, this is more than just the non-halakhic choice of opting for a WPG over a minyan. By making this choice, women are demonstrating a lack of understanding of very fundamental principles of prayer. The inauthenticity of WPGs are due to the axiological incorrectness of their basic raison d'etre.

R. Meiselman goes even further:

The Rav often commented to me that women’s groups that introduced new rituals were misinterpreting the nature of halakhic rituals and confusing them with pagan ones. Pagan ritual allows the person to express certain concepts and beliefs through ritual activity. There is no intrinsic meaning to the ritual performance. The purpose of the ritual is to reinforce these ideas through ritual activity. The focus of the activity is exclusively the performer himself. The process is validated by the impact upon the person. Pagan ritual is spiritual self-stimulation.

According to R. Meiselman, the inauthenticity derives from WPGs having no halakhic status and, therefore, a choice for WPGs over a minyan is a choice for nothing over something. Additionally, those who advocate nothing -- WPGs -- are demonstrating that their own "self-stimulation" is more important to them than God's will.

VI. Distortion of Torah

The Frimers report, "At the same time, the Rav was equally perturbed by the attitude of the many women who viewed women's prayer groups as an authentic, alternative form of tefilla be-tsibbur (public prayer), or at least an authentic, valid alternative to tefilla be-tsibbur. Thus, the hashkama minyan, the main shul minyan, the beginners' minyan, the teenage minyan and the women's service were all being perceived as equally halakhically valid choices in the spectrum of tefilla be-tsibbur. This was clearly not the case, and the Rav charged that those rabbis who gave the women's prayer groups the 'go ahead' were misleading them."

This, I believe, is in harmony with R. Twersky's thesis. WPGs are a fundamental distortion of tefillah and the rabbis who authorize them are misleading the public.

(Compare with R. Hershel Schachter's arguments II & V)

VII. Non-Halakhic Agendas

The Frimers write, "While recognizing that many of the women involved in the groups were sincerely motivated by their desire for greater spirituality and kavvana, he expressed regrets that other women were co-opting the services for their own non-halakhic social agendas."

Similarly, R. Meiselman writes, "He saw in women’s prayer groups the use of prayer as part of an agenda alien to proper religious behavior, and felt that they should be fought. He felt betrayed by students who had involved his name in an issue that violated his very essence... He felt that they were laying the groundwork for a new and possibly more pernicious version of Conservative Judaism."

(Compare with R. Hershel Schachter's argument XII)

VIII. Heterodox Practices

Again, from the Frimers, "He further articulated his concern as to the confusion women’s services might generate in light of the general egalitarian movement within Conservative and Reform Jewry."

Unlearned (and even some learned) people will certainly ask that if WPGs are legitimate, perhaps other feminist innovations that the non-Orthodox movements initiated are also valid. Perhaps calling women to the Torah, having women read megillah for the entire synagogue or even female rabbis are legitimate. (Note that two of the three examples are already practiced by Orthodox feminists and the third is certainly on its way.)

Furthermore, what will the non-Orthodox think when we take a step towards their innovations and acknowledge that their egalitarian urges, to which we once objected as being inauthentic, are now correct? We will certainly be confirming them in their ways.

(Compare with R. Hershel Schachter's argument XI)

IX. Community Divisiveness

The Frimers also write, "He was also wary that allowing maximal diversity in religious experience might weaken the fabric and cohesiveness of the community."

This seems to me to be an extremely legitimate "Public Policy" concern. Great is peace for even God's name is erase for its sake.

Conclusion

What can be clearly seen, from three separate and even antagonistic reports of R. Soloveitchik's view, is that he was firmly set against the practice for a whole host of reasons. This has been confirmed from dozens of interviews and from the testimony of his close students and relatives. While he did not agree with everything that R. Hershel Schachter wrote on this subject, he agreed with his conclusion that WPGs are not allowed.

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