Oh My Gosh: Saying God's Name In English

One of the ten commandments is to refrain from using God's name in vain. While that is generally taken to refer to swearing (taking an oath, not using profanity), the Gemara (Berakhos 33a) uses it as a source for a prohibition to recite an unnecessary blesing. Because a blessing contains the name of God, reciting it without proper cause involves saying God's name "in vain" (at least on a rabbinic level). The Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Berakhos 1:15) also quotes this verse in reference to an unnecessary blessing. However, the Minchas Chinukh (30:8) points out that the real source of the prohibition is the obligation to fear God (Temurah 4a), which includes treating His name with proper respect.

The question I'd like to address is whether this obligation to treat God's name with respect, and therefore to refrain from saying it unnecessarily, applies to translations of God's Hebrew name into other languages. Can you say the word "God" or do you have to use substitutes like "Gosh" or "Goodness." (Side question: Once these substitutes become common, do they turn into translations and become equally prohibited?) As we discussed in a post about erasing God's name in English (link), the word "God" is generally considered to be a nickname (or as fancy people say, appellation) for God's name. It has the same status as words like "Chanun" and "Rachum".

Click here to read moreThe Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 219:4) writes that if someone recites the blessing of "Gomel" using God's name in Aramaic and you answer "amen", you have fulfilled your obligation even if he did not have an obligation. The Rema (ad loc.) points out that, by using a translation/nickname, the person who recited the blessing avoided the problem of an unnecessary blessing. This would seem to imply that there is no issue of saying God's name in vain with a translation. This is something that the Penei Yehoshua (Berakhos 12a sv. ve-yoser) states explicitly.

However, the Rema adds that you can only do this in certain very specific occasions, which might imply that in a general case of doubt you cannot recite a blessing in this way. As the Peri Megadim (219:MZ:3) points out, if it were that easy then we would not have a rule to omit blessings in cases of doubt. Just recite them with God's name in Aramaic. He suggests that when you add a description of "Ruler of the universe" after a translation of God's name, as we do in blessings, then you run into a problem of saying God's name in vain. Otherwise, it seems that it is perfectly permissible to do so.

As we saw in the earlier post, R. Akiva Eiger (Responsa, no. 25) rules that you may erase a translation of God's name. However, when it comes to saying that translation, he rules strictly. The She'arim Metzuyanim Ba-Halakhah (Nedarim 7a sv. she-kol) quotes a responsum of the Mahari Weil (no. 192) who is strict on this. He also quotes a Nimukei Yosef (Nedarim 7b sv. hazkaras) who says that it is permissible but improper.

The Chayei Adam (5:1) rules strictly as well, explicitly differentiating between erasing God's name and saying it in vain. They do, after all, derive from different commandments. However, the Chavos Yair (109) seems to state the opposite logic -- erasing God's name is forbidden so certainly saying it in vain must be as well.

Interestingly, the Netziv (Ha'amek She'elah, Yisro no. 2) states that the Chasam Sofer would personally say a doubtful blessing with God's name in Aramaic, implying that there is no problem of saying God's name in translation. However, the She'arim Metzuyanim Ba-Halakhah (Nedarim 2a sv. u-shevu'os) points out that the Chasam Sofer writes in his commentary there that it is forbidden to do that. He also quotes the Tashbetz (3:121) who says that the meturgeman, the simultaneous translator, should not translate the blessings of the haftarah because blessings are valid in any language.

On the other hand, he quotes the Derekh Pekudekha (aseh 4), Arukh Ha-Shulchan (Orach Chaim 202:3) and other authorities who rule that you can say doubtful blessings in Aramaic. See also the Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh De'ah 328:1).

The bottom line is that this is a matter of debate so consult with your rabbi.

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Can We Say That God Exists? II

Following up on this post, I was thinking that there is another reason we can (ironically) say that God exists. Anselm of Canterbury famously composed an ontological argument for God's existence. You can read about it here: link. In an imprecise nutshell, a perfect being must exist because otherwise it would not be perfect.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (2:3:4), demolished the argument in a way that has largely been accepted as conclusive (link). Essentially, Kant argued that existence is not a property and therefore a perfect being need not exist. One website summarizes Kant's objections like this (link):
Click here to read more

According to Kant, existence is not a predicate, a property that a thing can either possess or lack. When people assert that God exists they are not saying that there is a God and he possesses the property of existence. If that were the case, then when people assert that God does not exist they would be saying that there is a God and he lacks the property of existence, i.e., they would be both affirming and denying God’s existence in the same breath. Rather, suggests Kant, to say that something exists is to say that the concept of that thing is exemplified in the world. Existence, then, is not a matter of a thing possessing a property, existence, but of a concept corresponding to something in the world.

To see this more clearly, suppose that we give a complete description of an object, of its size, its weight, its colour, etc. If we then add that the object exists, then in asserting that it exists we add nothing to the concept of the object. The object is the same whether it exists or not; it is the same size, the same weight, the same colour, etc. The fact that the object exists, that the concept is exemplified in the world, does not change anything about the concept. To assert that the object exists is to say something about the world, that it contains something that matches that concept; it is not to say anything about the object itself.

While Kant's word is not final on arguments for God's existence (link), his point about existence is useful in our current discussion. It seems to me that it undermines the Rambam's objection to attributing existence to God. If existence is not a property then saying that God exists is not defining God in any way.

Maybe someone with more knowledge in this area can weigh in on this in the comments section. Is this correct and it is possible to use Kant's argument against proof of God's existence as a basis to say that God exists?

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The Sins of Eli's Sons

The second chapter of 1 Samuel tells the story of how the sons of Eli the High Priest diverged from his holy ways. 1 Samuel 2:12-17 lists their sins. Later in the chapter (v. 22), when discussing how Eli eventually heard of his sons' bad ways, the text tells us something surprising: "Now Eli was very old. He heard all that his sons were doing to all Israel, and how they lay with the women who served at the entrance to the tent of meeting." The Bible tells us that Eli's sons were sleeping with women who brought sacrifices to the altar. However, this was not mentioned in the previous list of sins! You would think that, when listing the sins, it would be proper to include the most egregious of them all.

Click here to read moreThis seems to be why the Talmud (Shabbos 55b) says that Eli's sons did not sleep with the women. Rather, the Bible was merely exaggerating their sin and what they did was delay women who brought sacrifices so that they returned to their husband a day late. It seems that the Talmud was starting from the textual problem described above and, in order to address it, proposed an answer based on extra-textual information. Relying on extra-textual information is an approach within the derash methodology (I have a long, as-yet-unwritten post on this subject). The job of the peshat commentator who wants to learn from the Sages is to utilize their textual insights but to offer resolutions that remain within the text.

R. Yitzchak Etshalom, in a lecture on this chapter that is part of the OU's Nakh Yomi project, offers an explanation that one of his high school students proposed (the audio is available on the OU website here and on Etshalom.com, both websites are incredible treasure troves). Note that in verse 22, it only says that Eli heard that his sons were sleeping with women and not that they actually were. What could have happened is that Eli heard rumors about these terrible acts and figured, "where there's smoke, there's fire." Even if they weren't doing that exact sin, they were probably doing something wrong along the lines of "they don't tell stories like that about you and me." Obviously, some people have enemies who will stoop so low as to spread spurious rumors. But when rumors of wrongdoing are rampant then there is very often actual wrongdoing going on. That was the case with Eli's sons. While the rumors exaggerated their sins, the general idea that they were oppressing those who brought sacrifices was true. Eli realized this and was, therefore, distressed.

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Parashah Roundup: Masei 5768

by Steve Brizel

The Long March

R. Aharon Lichtenstein, based upon his understanding of Rashi, Ramban and the Rambam in the Moreh Nevuchim, underscores the importance that one accomplishes with even a seemingly limited amount of Talmud Torah and Chesed is important in its own right: link (DOC)

R. Shlomo Riskin suggests that we should always remember our places of origin in looking to the future: link

Click here to read moreYishuv Eretz Yisrael

R. Berel Wein suggests that all of the details of the journeys are to underscore that the settlement of Eretz Yisrael will require human initiative, as opposed to supernatural events: link

R. Hershel Shachter outlines the presence of the Jewish People, both communally and individually, enhances the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael: link

The Cities of Refuge

R. Jonathan Sacks, based upon his reading of Rambam in Rotzeach Ushmiras HaNefefesh 7:8, Yesodei HaTorah 5:5 and a Mishnah in Sanhedrin and the absolute protection provided to a resident of a city of refuge and his defenseless outside of such a domain, argues that in Halacha, the rights of the individual are paramount over those of the community: link

R. Ephraim Buchwald suggests that the critical role of witnesses and testimony illustrates the paramount value of life within Halacha: link

R. Mordechai Kamenetsky, based upon the life of R. Aryeh Levine zt"l, reminds us that even when the Torah prescribes a punishment, it must be accompanied by teachingand rehabilitation: link

Chodesh Av and Tishah B'Av

R. Michael Rosensweig analzyes the binding nature of Tishah B'Av, as opposed to other fasts relating to calamities of the past: link

R. Yitzchak Etshalom explores the nature of the Three Weeks as reflecting a rejection of the Torah and the origin, structure and purpose of Megilas Eicha: link 1 (PDF), link 2 (PDF), link 3 (PDF)

R. Yaakov Haber (formerly of RIETS) points out the dual nature of Tishah B'Av as a day combining Aveilus and Teshuvah: link

R. Yosef Tzvi Rimon reviews the Halachos of Tishah B'Av with special emphasis on when Tishah B'Av occurs on a Sunday: link

R. Eliakim Koenigsberg and R. Avishai David, based upon the teachings of Rav Soloveitchik zt"l, underscores the halachic differences between Avelus Yeshanah and Aveilus Chadasha and Tishah B'Av before and after Chatzos: link 1 (audio), link 2 (audio)

R. Joshua Flug reviews many of the halachos surrounding the reading of Megilas Eicha: link

R. Asher Weiss surveys many of the Halachos of Tishah B'Av: link

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The Search

R. Marc Angel's recent book, The Search Committee, is an interesting attempt to portray the divisions within contemporary Orthodox Judaism through a fictional story. The story revolves around the largest yeshiva in America, Yeshivas Lita. Its rosh yeshiva has passed away and the board appointed a search committee to find a replacement. The entire book consists of interviews -- with the candidates, their spouses, their colleagues and a few others.

The search committee narrowed their options to two candidates -- the former rosh yeshiva's son and a brilliant, charismatic instructor in the yeshiva. R. Angel uses these two candidates to show the growing split within Orthodoxy. The rosh yeshiva's son, Rav Shimshon Grossman, represents isolationist Yeshiva Orthodoxy and the instructor, Rav David Mercado, represents the left wing of Modern Orthodoxy.

Click here to read moreRav Shimshon believes in lifelong, fulltime study of Torah only, with full faith in every utterance of every sage and as little exposure to the gentile and non-religious world as possible. He wants his students to follow the tradition he knows in all aspects of life, whether in terms of study or finding a mate.

Rav David is a ba'al teshuvah married to a convert (long, moving story). He is open-minded to secular knowledge and modern approaches to Jewish texts, greater roles for women in Judaism, and engagement with the gentile and non-religious world.

In this book, you will find articulate arguments for both sides. The book is essentially a passionate debate between Yeshiva Orthodoxy and Modern Orthodoxy. For many readers of this blog, most of these issues are old hat. But for the majority of the Jewish community, who only know their own ideologies and are not familiar with the rationales for other approaches, this book might be very eye-opening. It just might convince a Modern Orthodox reader of the correctness of Yeshiva Orthodoxy and vice versa.

However, it probably will not. That is because the author made the characters too stereotypical. Rav Shimshon is an arrogant bully and Rav David is a humble idealist. The truth is, and I write this from personal experience, that these types of personalities exist on both sides of the divide. This unfortunate portrayal of the personalities involved is, I think, a significant negative in the book.

I think some reviewers will lament the entire concept of the book and wish that we would spend our time emphasizing points of agreement rather than disagreement. I don't subscribe to that point of view. I fully agree that we all have to remember that, in the big scheme of things, we are all Orthodox Jews and therefore agree on most issues of spiritual importance. However, in order to cultivate full religious personalities we have to respectfully acknowledge where we disagree. How else are we going to teach our children what we believe? For that, I think this book is helpful in articulating the points of divergence within Orthodoxy.

I found the literary concept, writing style, and overall plot in this quick read to be very interesting. While the real world is more complicated, this book shows -- in an entertaining way -- some of the major ideological differences within today's Orthodox community.


[I saw in the book an interpretation of the Baraisa (Avos 6:9) about only living in a place of Torah, that this is a wrong approach that was rejected. I tried but could not find any such interpretation in the classical commentaries. Does anyone know of such an interpretation or is this R. Angel's unique contribution?]

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Using First Names

By: Rabbi Ari Enkin

According to the Talmud, it is forbidden to refer to one's parents and teachers by their first names and the prohibition remains in place even after their passing.[1] We are taught that addressing teachers by their first names is so severe that the Talmud declares that one who does so is to be considered an apikores – one who has deliberately distanced himself from Jewish norms.[2] Gehazi was punished only because he referred to his teacher, Elisha, by his first name.[3] If, however, a title prefaces the teacher’s first name, it is permissible to address a teacher in this way.[4] That is why the common Israeli practice of addressing a teacher by first name, preceded by “Morah”, “Moreh”, or "Rav" is halachically acceptable.[5] The Mishna teaches us that one should fear one’s teacher just as one would fear heaven.[6]

Click here to read moreThere was an ancient practice, still used in some religious circles, of addressing one's teacher and other prominent rabbis in the "third person", known as "lashon nistar" is halachic literature, as a sign of respect. While doing so seems somewhat reasonable in the Yiddish or Hebrew language, speaking this way in English makes for awkward and inconsistent grammar in many instances. As Rabbi Michael Broyde once wrote: "when speaking to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States during oral argument, if one did not understand the question that he posed, one might say "Chief Justice, I did not understand the question." However, one would not turn to the Chief Justice and say "What did the Chief Justice ask?" Therefore, addressing rabbis in the "second person" should not be seen as a lack of respect.

In the Talmudic era, the title “rabbi” was actually used more for signifying a personal relationship, and not so much as an honorific appellation or scholarly title. Indeed, one will quickly note that many of the Talmudic sages are not even addressed with the title “rabbi.” This was due in part to the cessation of the Sanhedrin, and by extension, the classical semicha, or rabbinic ordination procedure.[7] In our day and age, however, the term “rabbi” is always used as a title, and, therefore, reverence is in order when referring to one’s Torah teachers. In any event, it is always proper manners and good behavior to speak to our teachers, as well as everyone else, with respect.[8] It would be remiss not to point out, however, that rabbis, teachers, and other people in positions of authority are entitled to forgo any formalities owed to them, and may be addressed by their first names should they so desire.[9] Rav Huna, on the other hand, was very particular to be addressed with his rabbinical title.[10]

As we have seen, showing respect for other human beings, especially parents and teachers, is not a custom, but rather Torah-mandated practice. The Talmud relates that when Rabbi Eliezer fell ill, his disciples came to visit him.[11] They asked him, “Rabbi, teach us the correct manner of living so that we may merit to enter the World to Come.” Among his responses was: “Make sure to show respect for others!”

**********************

[1] Kiddushin 31b. When being called to the Torah one must refer to his father as “Reb” or “Avi Mori.” Whenever referring to one’s mother, one can use the title “Ha’isha,” “Imi Morati,” or “Marat.” Y.D. 240:2.
[2] Sanhedrin 100a.
[3] Melachim II 8:5.
[4] Y.D. 242:24.
[5] Y.D. 242:16
[6] Avot 4:12.
[7] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semicha for more information.
[8] Sefer Chassidim 579.
[9] Kiddushin 32b.
[10] Pesachim 86b.
[11] Berachot 28b.

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Audio Roundup VII

by Joel Rich

Dr. Shai Secunda - Midrash Aggadah: link
An 8-session series studying Medrash Aggada as a primary source rather than through secondary sources (e.g. quoted in Rashi). A brief history is provided. Medrash will generally deal with problems in the narrative (e.g. who sold Yosef?) and problems with words and phrases (e.g. Tov meod). Another approach to classification of Medrash differentiates between exegetical (interpreting every pasuk) and homiletical (big picture).

The shiur includes the class reviewing Medrashim and analysis (more being in the kitchen than getting a prepared meal).

Click here to read more

Rabbi H Schachter - Responding to the current challenges of the Family and Community in Crisis: link
Discussion of the parameters of pru urvu. R’HS discusses whether one needs to keep having children. Individual circumstances play an important part in giving an eitzah hogenet. The requirement to support one’s children is also discussed.

Also discussion of yuchsin and when one doesn’t disclose that another is a mamzer and does this non-disclosure extend to gerim as well. (see here)

Mrs. Elana Stein Hain-Torah in the Ancient Near East: link
Interesting insights into why there are parallels between the Torah and “secular” history. The Torah is presenting God’s take on what people are talking about!

R' Dr.Gil Perl - What was the Rosh Yeshiva Reading?: link (click on flyer on home page)
So why did I listen to this shiur?
1. Gil is the son of the great Harold S. Perl of MTA and YU basketball fame?
2. I’m trying to get in good with Gil Student, how many Gil’s are there?
3. R. Witkin Z”L called me the Hamek Davar for years imho because he was surprised that I owned a copy and studied it!
4. The intro to the Hamek Davar where he discusses why Breishit is called Sefer Hayesharim is my all time favorite.
5. Someone paid asked me to in the comments section of an earlier write up.

The shiur itself deals with how the Netziv who lived his whole life in Volozhin knew about things like fossils and current practices in Arab lands. The answer may be surprising to those whose bookshelves (or minds :-)) are not as broad as the Netziv’s.

Rabbi Jeremy Wieder-Concise Methodological Manifesto: link
Unfortunately, Rabbi Wieder, who IMHO is a real Talmid Chacham and mentsch, felt the need to defend his shiur as not being a course in academic Talmud. Pssst – the earlier generations were aware of layers and girsaot and utilized many tools in learning.

Rabbi Pinny Rosenthal-Tzedakah:Part 1-What are the resistances?: link
A very practical discussion of how donors are approached and segmented. Psychologic vs. halachic priorities in Tzedaka. Me-Why do people allow themselves to be manipulated?

R' Asher Weiss - Ask the Posek: link (click on Torah on the Web and scroll down)
OK, I admit it, I’m a big fan. This shiur, in English, once again demonstrates you can have gadlus, humanity and a dry sense of humor.

He reinforces that the increasing pace of change and new concepts in technology and institutions (even financial) demand a creative Ramban, or Rashba, to deal with issues where we don’t always find sources in Chazal, Rishonim or Poskim to deal with these issues.

Sometimes a posek must just use his best judgment (svarat halev, hargashat halev) and it’s hard to draw a clear line between logic, emotions, intuition and thoughts. The posek needs a lot of siyata d’shmaya.

He discusses some military shailot which demonstrated the need for macro thinking – there’s nothing in the sh”ut literature that deals with pikuach nefesh on a macro scale – an army can’t have kol hayashar beynav yaaseh!

Rabbis Marc Angel and Shmuel Herzfeld join the discussion on the current conversion debate. Bill Bishop comes to the dining room table to show trends in polarization.: link Go to around the dining room table
The Big Sort. Is a discussion of polarization by locality and a new generation lack of desire to accept compromise – in the general population!

Then a response to Rabbi Herring’s defense of the RCA’s agreement with the chief rabbinate concerning conversions. Surprise – there are two sides to every story.

Matzevot - R Z Cinnamon: link
A clear discussion of why, where, when and what. Remember though – the true remembrance is living up to their ideals!

Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb-Minchas Chinuch: Shiur 2: link
Second in a new series on the minchat chinuch (lst is not up yet). Interesting discussion on the taam of pru u’rvu – is it to have children, or to raise them, or both? Do the children need to be able to have children? An interesting conjecture by R’Nissan Alpert ZT”L as to whether there was a mitzvah of pru u’rvu in Soviet Russia.

Rabbi Breitowitz - Tzedakah: link
An excellent discussion of specifics with regard to Tzedaka. How are income, offsetable expense and cash-like donations defined? How do you set priorities? How do you evaluate overhead? He quotes the aruch Hashulchan as stating that priorities imply an emphasis/direction but don’t imply that you can’t give to the other causes.

Rosh HaYeshiva Norman Lamm-Integrity and harmony as rabbinic principles: link
How do we balance the requirements of shalom, emet, tzedek and chesed? He quotes Niels Bohr’s theory of complimentarity; various approaches to describing reality appear contradictory, yet there is evidence that each is correct (e.g. light as a wave and a particle, Certs as a breath mint and a candy mint (ok, I added this one:-)). He refers to this as the circular strategy (the machol of tzaddikim) each approach is legitimate and reality can’t be described except in seemingly contradictory terms – similar to bein hashmashot according to Rav Soloveitchik having elements of both day and night.

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Announcements #047: Join WebYeshiva for Free This Elul Zman!

Elul Zman has always been an intense and special time for the Jewish people, a time where we try a little harder to become the type of people that God wants us to be. In light of the seriousness and importance of Elul Zman, WebYeshiva has decided to open its doors to anyone who is interested in seriously studying Torah.

Now is your opportunity to join the thousands of people from around the world who have experienced Torah the WebYeshiva way. Regardless of your schedule or learning background, WebYeshiva has a shiur for you. With 27 online, fully interactive shiurim offered at all times of the day, 6 days a week WebYeshiva makes it easier than ever for you to join an engaging, challenging shiur that's right for you.

This offer is available to EVERYONE - former students, present students and (hopefully) future students.

To learn more about this special offer or to sign up now, please follow one of the links below:

• Personal Invitation from Rosh Yeshiva Rabbi Chaim Brovender


• View the Elul Zman schedule


• Check out the course descriptions


• Register for free

(Announce your simchah or Torah lectures by clicking on the button in the top right corner of Hirhurim. See here for readership statistics and here for instructions on buying an announcement.)

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Can We Say That God Exists?

Someone told me that he heard a recent deep conversation in which someone said to a rabbi that God exists and the rabbi, after thinking about it, agreed that we can say that. I don't know for sure what the rabbi's hesitation was about, but I doubt that it was whether God exists. I think he was probably considering the following.

Click here to read moreMedieval philosophers were very concerned with the issue of attributing characteristics to God. This was deemed problematic because it implies a defect in the unity of God. For example, if you say that Shimon is good you are implying that there is an independent trait of goodness that Shimon has, thereby distinguishing between Shimon and goodness. However, God is indivisible into components and cannot contain a separate trait of goodness.

Charles Manekin (On Maimonides, p. 27) explains the problem with the following example:

For example, if Jake describes Samantha as "lively," "clever," and "forceful," we may infer that Samantha's personality is complex and multifaceted. But if we describe an absolutely simple God as "living," "knowing," and "powerful," how can we avoid the same implication?

Some rishonim follow the view of the Kalam (medieval Muslim philosophy) and distinguish between two types of attributes: accidental attributes and essential attributes. Accidental attributes are properties that an object may or may not have. An apple is green, a person is happy, a cup of coffee is hot, etc. These can all change and are not necessary for the object. An essential attribute is a property that an object's definition depends on. Dr. Manekin's example of descriptions of Samantha are all accidental attributes -- clever, lively, forceful.

R. Bachya Ibn Pakuda (Chovos Ha-Levavos, sha'ar ha-yichud ch. 10, p. 42 in Feldheim/Kafach edition, tr. in R. J. David Bleich, With Perfect Faith, p. 126) allows for three essential attributes of God -- existence, unity and eternity. R. Sa'adia Ga'on (Emunos Ve-Dei'os 2:1-2, Kafach edition p. 82ff., tr. in With Perfect Faith p. 115ff.) states that we can describe God with three essential attributes -- living, powerful, wise. The essential attributes are part of the definition of God and therefore, according to R. Bachya and R. Sa'adia Ga'on, do not imply multiplicity or divisibility in God.

However, the Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 1:52, Kafach edition pp. 77-78, With Perfect Faith p. 135) opposes even essential attributes. He divides essential attributes in two -- a description that fully defines an object and a partial definition. He rejects the former because it implies that there is a cause that precedes God. Kenneth Seeskin (The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, p. 84) explains:

The problem is that, once God is defined by any concept, the essence of God would be dependent on something else and limited in exactly the way the concept is limited.

Rambam rejects the latter type of essential attribute because by being a partial definition, it implies that God is made up of multiple parts. In 1:57, Rambam says that God's existence is different than any other being's existence, and therefore that attribute cannote be correctly applied to him: "הוא מצוי שלא במציאות He exists without possessing the attribute of existing" (Kafach p. 90; cf. Ramban on Ex. 3:14).

Therefore, the Rambam concludes that we can only speak of God in negatives. When we say that God is powerful we mean that He is not weak.

It would seem, then, that according to R. Bachya and R. Sa'adia Ga'on we can legitimately say that God exists. According to the Rambam we can say it but we can only mean that God must exist and His existence is always absolute. R. Chasdai Crescas (Or Hashem 1:3:3, Fisher edition p. 110) rejects the Rambam and agrees with the earlier philosophers that God has essential attributes, such as existing and unity.

Of course, this whole discussion has nothing to do with whether or not there is a God. It is about whether we can attribute the property of existence to God.

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Meet Rabbi Etshalom in Jerusalem

R. Yitzchak Etshalom, author of Between the Lines of the Bible: A Study From The New School of Orthodox Torah Commentary, will be giving a lecture in Jerusalem on Sunday evening, July 27 at Pomeranz Book Store - 5 Be'eri (continuation of Hillel Street) near the center of town. The lecture will begin at 7 p.m. The public is invited but please RSVP to the store (via email) if you plan to come.

Anyone who comes to the shiur will get a 15% discount on any books they buy there. Between the Lines of the Bible will be available for sale and R. Etshalom will sign copies after the shiur.

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Parashah Roundup: Matos 5768

by Steve Brizel

The Fulfillment of Promises

R. Berel Wein, R. Yissocher Frand and R. Michael Rosensweig tells us why the Halachos of Nedarim were given to the leaders of the tribes: link 1, link 2, link 3

R. Asher Brander proves from the Halacha of Mufleh Samuch L'ish why the Torah, emphasizes that what which leaves a person's mouth, especially for a minor, is seemingly more important than what enters their mouthes: link

R. Yitzchok Adlerstein, based upon the Nesivos Shalom (as explicated by R. Eliezer Kwass), reminds us that we have the potential to sanctify our speech via Talmud Torah and Tefilah: link 1, link 2

Click here to read moreMoshe Rabbeinu and Other Prophets

R. Shlomo Riskin offers a fascinating explanation why Moshe Rabbeinu was different than all of the other Prophets: link

R. Mosheh Lichtenstein poses Moshe Rabbeinu and Yirmiyahu as representing two distinct models of prophecy: link

The Misplaced Priorities of The Children of Gad and Reuven

R. Hershel Shachter reminds us that we should always place the Torah education of our children as our foremost priority: link

R. Jonathan Sacks demonstrates why Moshe's objections to the objectives of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven was predicated on the importance of Jewish education and why Jewish education has been and should be a critical societal goal for every Jewish community: link

Tevilas Kelim

R. Asher Weiss and R. Dovid Gottlieb review the halachos of Tevilas Kelim: link 1 (MP3), link 2 (audio)

Hilchos Tisha B'Av

R. Yonasan Sacks reviews many of the Halachos of Tisha B'Av and how we are to relate to, understand and internalize the Churban HaBayis link

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Richard "The Middle Man" Joel

The World Jewish Digest interviews YU President Richard Joel and tries to pin him down ideologically, ultimately unsuccessfully (link):

WJD: What about [Yeshivat] Chovevei Torah?... How do you see YU as different from Chovevei and how, if at all, has YU had to reposition itself or reevaluate itself in light of it?

RJ: Yeshiva University has 7,000 students, an annual budget of $670 million, an endowment of over a billion dollars, about 5,000 employees; we have a minimum of 40 students a year graduating from our rabbinical school, 750 for our undergraduate schools... So what is it you are asking me to compare?...


Part of what YU does is say, be secure in your particularism but be adventurous in learning from those around you...

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Occasional Vort VI

by Netanel Livni

Chazal have a somewhat negative attitude towards personal vows. Famous are their words (Nedarim 22a, 60b, Gittin 46b, Yerushalmi Nedarim 9:1): “Anyone who takes a vow – it is as if he built a bama (a private altar), Anyone who fulfills his vow – it is as if he brought a sacrifice upon it.” This imagery needs further explanation.

Click here to read moreThe Maharal explains that the bama is chosen because it is an example of someone striving to serve Hashem in their own private manner. Hashem chose a central place for the Jewish people to serve Him. The person who builds a bama, however, decides that he has his own personal way to serve Hashem. He feels that he needs to express his own personal feelings in a way that is completely independent of the service of the community.

Someone who takes an oath is doing a very similar act. The Torah says something is allowed to the Jewish people, yet this person says that while the object of his oath is indeed allowed to everyone else, for him it is prohibited. It is a service that is detached from the service of the community. He is, in a way, making his own private Torah.

They key is not to express one’s subjective spirituality in a manner that separates us from the community around us – that is not what Hashem desires. We must strive to express our subjective spirituality in a manner that contributes to the strengthening of our community and helps the Jewish people as a whole meet the demands of our shared mission.

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Prisoner Transfers in Jewish Law

Someone asked me on Shabbos what halakhah has to say about the recent prisoner transfer in Israel, in which five Arab prisoners -- some of them very dangerous -- and the bodies of 200 Arab terrorists were exchanged for the bodies of two dead Israeli soldiers. The answer might seem straightforward but I'm not sure that it is.

The Mishnah (Gittin 45a) states that we do not redeem captives for more than their "value" because of "tikkun ha-olam", which Neusner translates as "for the good of the world". The Gemara has two opinions about what this reason means: either because that could lead to the bankrupting of communities when they are forced to pay exorbitant amounts to free captives or because it will increase the frequency of kidnappings by making it an extremely lucrative crime. The Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Matenos Aniyim 8:12) and Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De'ah 252:4) adopt the latter reason.

Click here to read moreThere are a few exceptions to this rule, such as when redeeming yourself or your wife (Tosafos, Gittin 45a sv. de-lo), a great scholar (Tosafos, Gittin 58a sv. kol) or the captives are in mortal danger (ibid.). This last exception is hotly debated -- see Pischei Teshuvah (YD 252:4). Tosafos (Gittin 45a sv. de-lo) also add a provocative exception: This rule does not apply after the destruction of the Temple because paying a ransom will not impact future kidnappings.

A recent application of this principle was the 1970 hijacking of two TWA airplanes (link) on one of which R. Yitzchak Hutner was a passenger. It seems that some of R. Hutner's students were prepared to gather a large sum of money to pay the hijackers (via the US government) for his personal release. R. Yaakov Kamenetsky was asked whether this was allowed and he responded in the negative, for a reason explained below.

Since the incident in 1970, many articles have been written on this subject, attempting to apply this halakhic discussion to the contemporary situation. I think it is important to note that the talmudic rule is based on logic and not any biblical or rabbinic legislation, which allows for greater latitude in incorporating other logical considerations. Here is a brief review of some prominent opinions:

1. R. Yehudah Gershuni ("Pidyon Shevuyim Le-Or Ha-Halakhah" in Ha-Darom, Nissan 5731, cited in R. J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 1 pp. 18-20) states that there is an additional concern in today's prisoner transfers: The prisoners to be transferred openly plan on murdering civilians upon release. R. Gershuni argues that this consideration overrides any potential permission to redeem the Jewish captives through a prisoner transfer. The life-threatening danger to the captives does not override the danger to the public of releasing murderous terrorists.

2. R. Ovadiah Yosef (cited here by R. Yaakov Kermaier), writing in regard to the 1976 Entebbe hostages crisis, disagrees with this analysis. The danger to the captives is certain while the danger of release to the public is uncertain. The certain danger takes precedence over the uncertain, so an exchange is allowed.

3. R. Chaim David Halevi (Aseh Lekha Rav 7:53) argues that the entire halakhic discussion is predicated on a situation in which transfers can encourage or discourage future kidnappings. However, in today's war, this is not the case. The enemy will continue kidnapping Israelis regardless of whether prisoners are exchanged (see the view of Tosafos about the destruction of the Temple, cited above). Therefore, such an exchange should be allowed.

4. R. Ya'akov Kamenetsky (cited by R. Hershel Schachter, Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon, p. 206; note that this is not mentioned in Emes Le-Ya'akov on Shulchan Arukh despite the many oral rulings mentioned in the footnotes to the book) utilized a similar approach but arrived at the exact opposite conclusion. He ruled that since we are at war, any large ransom (even just money) will strengthen the enemy and is therefore forbidden.

5. R. Shlomo Goren (Toras Ha-Medinah, pp. 434-436) agrees with R. Kamenetsky's approach but adds a mitigating consideration: Because the captive soldiers were acting as agents of the Israeli government, the government is obligated to do whatever is necessary to free them.

6. R. Shaul Yisraeli (Torah She-Be'al Peh 17 [5735] which I think was republished in Chavos Binyamin vol. 1 and is cited by R. Kermaier) argues similarly that there is an unwritten agreement between soldiers and the Israeli government that the government will use all reasonable means to release captive soldiers. This contractual agreement overrides the halakhic concerns that are normally in play in ransom situations, in that it is as if the captives are redeeming themselves through a previously appointed messenger.

These positions of R. Goren and R. Yisraeli are significant in that the theories presented also support the transfer of prisoners in exchange for the bodies of dead Israeli soldiers (R. Yaakov Kermaier says that it does not, but I am not sure why). R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (cited by R. Kermaier) also permitted such an exchange because of its impact on soldier morale.

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Obama and Old Jews in Florida

This is too funny, especially since on the train ride home tonight a secular 60-something Jewish woman was giving me a speech about how she won't vote for a black man.

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Symposium: Why People Become Orthodox VI

(continued from here: I, II, III, IV, V)

Conservative Rabbi Charles Simon is the Executive Director of the Federation of Jewish Men’s Clubs, having served in that position since 1981. A 1977 graduate of the Rabbinical School of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Rabbi Simon served as a congregational rabbi and has written numerous articles, two books and two educational films.

I need to admit at the outset that this is not topic that I have devoted a great deal of time to thinking about. I am more concerned with the children of the members of Conservative synagogues and those who were raised as Jews with nothing, and creating ways to help them identify with Conservative Judaism. But Conservative Judaism is not for everyone. Its broad, more open appeal continuously challenges people to consider and reconsider their behaviors and their religious practices. Its openly plurastic attitude often confuses people who are searching for a more defined definition of how to live their lives. Perhaps it's not surprising that a number of people searching for meaning within community are not attracted to the Conservative model and will choose instead to be Orthodox. Orthodox Judaism has been more successful in providing entrée points into the community as a result of its shabbat and holiday structure. We offer a different model that continues to evolve.

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Audio Roundup VI

by Joel Rich

Torah Web is also an excellent source of topical Shiurim. Some that I remember as interesting were on the internet, shall I call the police, the role of personal initiative and how much is too much work life balance?? One pet peeve of mine on this last topic, as well as practical Halacha in the workplace type shiurim, is that sponsors don't seem to consider having someone who is in the field rather than just advisors. (I recall one such presentation where the advice was to avoid shaking a woman's hand by blowing your nose into your own with a used hanky.)

Click here to read more

Marc Shapiro - Authority of Moroccan Rabbinate: link
Marc Shapiro discusses the differences between the traditional Sfardi and Ashkenazi halachic approaches and how the Ashkenazi approach has crowded out the Sfardi. He also posits that much of the Ashkenazi stringency is a reaction to the reform movement because we cannot be seen as giving in (hmmmm, can’t imagine how that happened). He contrasts this reaction with a Moroccan community where there was no reform movement, thus no denominations. The Moroccan Rabbis had to be community leaders for the entire community since they controlled inheritance, divorce, etc. He discusses Moroccan Takanot made in 1947 which were based on recognizing modernity where not in conflict was Halacha vs. what he describes as the Charedi approach of our generation not being worthy of making changes. A specific example was regarding inheritance for unmarried daughters. He also discusses at length the limud zchut approach and awareness of specific situations. He mentions that the Sfardi approach to conversion was much more lenient than the Ashkanazi (shades of current blogs!) One reference in the Shiur concerning past practice in West Orange was derech guzma.

Rabbi Y. Barth - Torah Umedina: link (Go there and follow directions for Hebrew site)
This first in the series in easy Hebrew (any Hebrew I understand) discusses how Halacha interacts with changes in modern society. This shiur deals with Tcheilet and includes a comprehensive review of the sources, opinions and some of the give and take surrounding use of Tcheilet in our time. I strongly recommend Rabbi Barth’s series on Halacha and technology which I found to be one of the best presentations I've heard dealing with the intersection of modern technology and Halacha.

Dr. Shira Weiss - Tehillim: link
Differing philosophical classifications and understandings of faith/emunah based on Tehilim. Here a discussion of rational vs. emotional components.

Question: It seems there are dangers to “the group” (albeit to different individuals within the group) in both allowing and forbidding philosophical inquiry. How should leadership address this issue on a macro basis?

Rabbi Hershel Schachter - Asking Shailos in Halacha: link
A wide ranging discussion of the role of the Rabbi modeled after the responsibilities of the Melech. A number of interesting specific issues such as practical halacha related to Kedushat Kohen, bringing the Torah into the women’s section and when minhagim can be changed. In general, a very pragmatic approach to “practical” Halacha.

Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik - Tcheilet: link
A discussion of the symbolism of Tcheilet with some Halacha thrown in as well. The white strings represent the rational side which reflects clarity and certitude, the Tcheilet represents distance, complexity and items beyond our control. The Rav also points out that the Rambam defines Tchelit based on the permanency of the dye, much like the permanence required of our people. Some really interesting, if dated, historical references to Vietnam and the Holocaust.

Rabbi M. Taragin - Character and Ethics: link
In the 8th of this series, Rabbi Taragin discusses the requirement of lifelong zerizut in our Avodat Hashem. In the 9th he discusses sharing others’ pain even if you can’t alleviate it.

Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik - Esther: link
Rabbi Soleveitchik compares the laws regarding handing over a member of the city in order that raiders not kill all the inhabitants of the city and the story of Esther. His general take is that you can’t give the enemy what he really wants(makes you think). Other lessons from Esther include the concept of a common Jewish destiny and that an individual can’t save himself at the cost of the Jewish people. He also comments on Mordechai’s historical sensitivity – His realization that the choice of Esther as Queen was not coincidental and thus, he stayed by the court because he “knew” that something would happen.

Rabbi D. Linzer - Values Independent of Jewish Tradition: link
Discussion of “is there an ethic outside of Halacha?” Lots of interesting discussion although clearly it is always possible to say that any ethic reflected in Halacha came from Halacha. The give and take amongst the teacher and students is instructive.

Rabbi Z. Cinamon - What Smells?: Birchas HaRaiach: link
A general review of Brachot Hareiach.

Rabbi Dani Rapp -13 Ikarim - Introduction: link
I suppose trying to stay in Marc Shapiro’s good graces, Rabbi Rapp says that the Rambam’s 13 principles are “somewhat” universally accepted and if you don’t believe even one “it’s bad”. This shiur, as part of a series, discusses in detail the first essential and notes that according to the Ramban, an axe murderer who believed would have a place in the world to come but not somebody who lived a good life but just was not a believer. (The famous Nebach of R’Chalm?)

Rabbi Ally Ehrman - Rabbinic Authority: link
Describes a number of approaches as to the requirement to listen to earlier authorities based on R’ Sholom Fischer. The first is quoted in the name of the Kesef Mishanah who says it was a kabala by later authorities not to argue with earlier ones and, therefore, only applies to practical Halacha, not Agada or Taamim. He understands this to mean an Amora can interpret a statement of a Tanna to be limited to a particular case, even if that’s not what the Tanna meant! (R’Gil – how about a post on original intent vs. later understandings.)

Kiryat Sefer is quoted as using Halacha Moshe Misinai as a source (doesn’t say from where). The Chazon Ish is quoted to understand earlier generations knew better and that is why they must be listened to and in particular the Talmud was at the end of the 2000 years of Torah and therefore must be listened to. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman is quoted as saying the Mishna and then later the Gemara were Kibbutz Chachmei Yisrael and thus had to be accepted.

R’ Tzadok - R' Yitzchak Blau: link
This is part of a series on modern Rabbinical thought. R Tzadok’s approach is characterized as omni significance; that is, every detail in Shas is filled with deeper meaning. This includes the placement, as well as details, of medrashim.

No mention of what I consider his biggest chiddush – the switchover from prophets to Rabbis as the source of direction (see R' Angel's Tradition article).

Erev Shabbat Parshat Balak , by Rav Yonatan Snowbell with Rav Binyamin Tabory on Rav Maimon z"l: link
Weekly podcast with lessons from the parsha and a biography of a Jewish thinker. This week focuses on R’Maimon, the first Minister of Religion in Israel.

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Freedom from Bondage V

(Continued from these posts: I, II, III, IV)

CHAPTERS EIGHT & NINE: A REMARKABLE HISTORY

In these two chapters, Gold argues against the idea that Jewish history throughout the ages is remarkable. To do this, he gives examples of three other nations that have survived for millennia -- the Basques in the Pyrenees mountains, the Parsis in India, and the Armenians.

I don't understand his point. He began chapter 8 with a quote from R. Emanuel Feldman that ends: "Now all this may not necessarily prove that a God exists -- it may be a fluke of history, it may all have happened by chance, it could all be attributed to random occurrences -- but isn't it curious that no other people had benefitted from such randomness and that no other people has lived through such a history?" (p. 90)

Click here to read moreGold points out that the second half of that statement is not entirely correct because there are other ethnic groups that evidently demonstrated similar longevity, but how does that resolve the first half of the statement? It is still remarkable. It could be that they are all flukes of history but it could also be that they were intended by God. Who says that God only arranged for the Jews to survive throughout history?

The point is that the historical fact that the Jews have survived should raise important questions in your mind. R. Feldman does not say that this is a proof to Orthodox Judaism, just that it raises questions. Therefore, when Gold writes, "The Orthodox claim, then, is that this state of affairs, the present existence of a substantial Jewish community, cannot be given a naturalistic explanation" (p. 93) is a misrepresentation of R. Feldman's view that Gold quotes three pages earlier.

Gold then proceeds to argue that Jewish survival should not raise questions because it can be explained naturally. There is no question that it can be explained naturally. The issue is whether the reader finds the natural explanation to be more plausible than the supernatural explanation. This is a subjective evaluation that no one can force on you. Instead, Gold tries to increase the plausibility of the natural explanation. In my opinion, he fails miserably.

Gold points out that in any given decade in history, if you look at it in isolation, it is not surprising that the Jewish people survived through that decade. Add up all the decades and it is not surprising that Jews have survived for thousands of years.

I find this reductionist approach to be unconvincing. The disappearance of a people is a process that involves intermingling with other peoples and assimilation into them. You don't see that happen in any single decade, although there are turning points in history that can push the process along fairly rapidly. It is something that happens over a long period of time and has occurred with almost every nation in history. In which decade did the Romans disappear from history? Or the Babylonians?

Particularly remarkable is not only that the Jewish people has survived throughout history but that it has made contributions to history far beyond its proportions. Could this have been the reason for survival, pride in our heritage? I look at the people in America today who intermarry and I see among them Jews proud of their heritage, so I don't think it could be the reason. Jewish history has simply been an incredible story that defies the odds and boggles the mind, and there is no shortage of quotes from intellectuals who have marvelled at this wonder. Gold may not take it seriously but he is among a minority in the world in that respect.

Gold attempts to dissect various aspects of Jewish history in search of the single unique element. Only at the end of chapter 9 does he suggest the obvious: "[W]e might argue that [Jewish history] displays a unique combination of characteristics. Perhaps it was not the most turbulent history (compared with, say, Kurdish history), and perhaps the intellectual contributions are not unsurpassed (compared with, say, Greek contributions). But how about when we combine these? Among ethnic groups with turbulent histories, are there any who have made comparable intellectual contributions?" (p. 115).

Gold is wrong on two points here. First, there is no reason to demand that Jewish history be entirely unique in this respect. It only needs to be sufficiently different to be surprising and to raise questions. If there are enough other communities that have gone through similar experiences then there is nothing surprising about Jewish history. But if that is not the case, then there is no reason to assume that the Jews are the only people in the world who can have a remarkable history. That is irrelevant to the discussion.

His second error is in arguing that by combining characteristics to evaluate Jewish history we are manipulating the criteria in order to reach our predetermined conclusion. That is, in my opinion, an unfair argument that is largely a rhetorical trick. He took a fairly simple statement about Jewish history, deconstructed it into multiple pieces, and then said that the combination of those pieces is arbitrary and self-serving.

Looking at the larger statement on its own, however, I doubt that anyone would consider it arbitrary. It is only by rephrasing it in his own terms that Gold can make it seem arbitrary. It's a neat trick, but I can use the same tactic to deconstruct just about any evaluative statement and then say that its construction is arbitrary and self-serving.

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NbN 1st Intl Jblogger Con!

On August 20th, Nefesh B'Nefesh will be sponsoring the First International Jewish Bloggers Convention in Jerusalem that I will be attending -- "The Power of the JBlogosphere: Taking Jblogging to the next level". Jbloggers from all over the world will gather to celebrate their achievements, discuss their challenges and share secrets of the trade. I will be speaking on a panel about how to expand your readership and increase your influence, and I look forward to being able to meet other Jbloggers in person.

The convention will be webcast and you can register to attend in person or on the web here: link

Thanks to NbN, I will be traveling to Israel (for the first time in almost 10 years!) on NbN's August 18th aliyah flight. NbN will connect me with a family and I will be telling their aliyah story on this blog. If anyone has any specific ideas or questions they want me to discuss, please leave them in the comments section.

Kudos to Nefesh B'Nefesh and WebAds for sponsoring and arranging this event.

Stay tuned for more information.

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Building on Shabbos

Last month, a controversy erupted in Israel when the newspaper Yated Ne'eman criticized a ruling by R. Avi Gisser, the rabbi of Ofra (link). If I understand the situation correctly, there is a piece of land where Jews were building homes on land whose ownership was contested by Arabs. R. Gisser ruled that the homes may be built on Shabbos by gentile workers so that Jewish families could move in before the courts ordered that the building cease. Yated condemned this ruling as improper. Setting aside the issue of correct ownership, which is important, I would like to address the Shabbos issues.

Click here to read moreI. Amirah Le-Nokhri

A Jew is not allowed to ask a gentile to perform forbidden labor on Shabbos. If a Jew can't do it, he can't have a gentile do it for him. However, if the Jew pays the gentile for a project rather than by the day, then the gentile can choose whether he wants to do it on Shabbos. For example, if a dry-cleaner cleans your clothes on Shabbos, it doesn't matter because it is his choice to do that work on Shabbos and you are only paying by the suit and not hourly or daily wages.

An exception to this is property work. Because people know who owns property, a gentile cannot do work on a Jew's property on Shabbos even if he is being paid by the project. People will not know about the payment arrangement and might assume the worst. Because of this potential for suspicion and confusion -- chashad, the law is very strict about gentiles working on Jewish property on Shabbos. This is all explained in Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 242.

When the prevalent practice in a community is to pay workers by the project, then there would seemingly be no concern of chashad because everyone would assume that the workers on someone's property are being paid by the project, which is permissible. The Mishnah Berurah (242:7) quotes the Taz who prohibits this, R. Akiva Eiger and the Peri Megadim who permit it, and concludes that you should be strict regarding a house. In other words, you may not hire gentile workers to work on your house on Shabbos.

However, R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Orach Chaim 3:35) argues strongly against the Mishnah Berurah and claims that, in theory, this should be entirely permissible. He is not even concerned with guests from out of town who might not be faimilar with the community's practice of paying workers by the project because today it is so common throughout the country, if not the world. However, for explicit public policy reasons he does not allow this.

II. Amirah La-Amirah

There was a serious problem in war-torn Pressburg in the mid-1800s. Houses had been destroyed during war and there was ample work for builders. However, when Jews would insist that the builders cease work on Shabbos, they would find another house to work on and not return to finish the Jewish house. This was causing a severe housing crisis in the Jewish community. R. Moshe Sofer, the Chasam Sofer, relied on the following reasoning as the main basis of his lenient ruling (Responsa Chasam Sofer 1:60) allowing Jews to hire builders to work on Shabbos:

The Chavos Ya'ir (nos. 46, 53) had argued that while a Jew may not ask a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on Shabbos, he may ask a gentile to ask another gentile to do so. If a Jew hires a contractor, who then hires other workers to do the actual building, then it should be allowed on Shabbos. The Chasam Sofer added other conditions to his leniency and the housing crisis was certainly a mitigating concern. However, his precedent should not be entirely ignored. (I saw a responsum of the Kesav Sofer [no. 40], the Chasam Sofer's son and successor, quoted on this subject but I was unable to look it up.)

III. Yishuv Eretz Yisrael

Daf Yomi students can tell you that the Gemara (Gittin 8b) allows asking a gentile to sign documents for you on Shabbos in order to acquire land in Israel. Even though this is normally rabbinically forbidden, the mitzvah of settling the land of Israel sets aside this prohibition. The Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 306:11) rules this way, as do all subsequent halakhic codes.

The Satmar Rav (Va-Yo'el Moshe, Ma'amar Yishuv E"Y ch. 63) suggests that this leniency does not apply today because there is currently no mitzvah to settle the land. This is his famously controversial position, and does not explain why contemporary codes quote this ruling without any limitations. However, even he agrees that there is somewhat of a mitzvah in acquiring land in Israel for Jews rather than gentiles and enabling the performance of mitzvos dependent on the land, and therefore a double rabbinic prohibition (shevus di-shevus) would be allowed (which would presumably include asking a gentile to ask another gentile to do work -- amirah la-amirah).

Conclusion

Based on all of the above factors, I see multiple reasons why a rabbi would allow the hiring of a gentile contractor who uses gentile workers to build houses on Shabbos in Israel so as not to cede land into Arab hands. While I am unqualified to render a decision on this, and there may be public policy issues here of which I am unaware, a lenient ruling does not seem particularly outlandish to me. Quite the opposite, it is solidly based on the rulings of the Chasam Sofer, the Satmar Rav, R. Moshe Feinstein and others.

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How Many Children?

The first mitzvah in the Torah is to have children -- "peru u-revu - be fruitful and multiply". How many children is a Jewish man obligated to (try to) have? The Mishnah and Gemara (Yevamos 61b-62a) discuss the views of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel. According to Beis Shammai, a man is biblically obligated to (try to) have four children -- two sons and two daughters. According to Beis Hillel, and this is the view halakhah follows, it is two children -- one son and one daughter.

However, that is not the end of the story. The Gemara (Yevamos 62b) quotes the following Baraisa:
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R. Yehoshua said: [Even if] a man was married to a woman in his youth he should also be married to a woman in his old age; [even if] a man had children in his youth he should also have children in his old age, as it says "In the morning sow your seed, and at evening do not let your hands be idle" (Eccl. 11:6).

In other words, there is an obligation to continue having children even after you have fulfilled your biblical obligation of having a son and daughter. What is the strength of this obligation? It seems to be at least a rabbinic obligation, if not one with post-Mosaic biblical force (divrei kabbalah). That is how the Minchas Chinukh (1:27) describes it, although he quotes a Ramban who seems to say that it is less than that. R. David M. Feldman (Birth Control in Jewish Law, pp. 48-49) writes, "The second 'rabbinic mitzvah' is known as la-erev... Both these rabbinic expositions have the force of law and are treated in the Responsa alongside the primary biblical one, removing, in effect, its Mishnaic limitations [of one son and one daughter]".

However, I saw that R. J. David Bleich (Judaism and Healing, p. 52) writes, "According to rabbinic interpretation, the obligation with regard to procreation is fulfilled by the siring of two children, one male and one female, provided that each of the two in turn becomes the parents of a boy and a girl. Nevertheless, further procreation is regarded as meritorious" (emphasis added). R. Bleich seems to say that there is no explicit obligation to have more than two children and "In the morning sow your seed..." is not an obligation but a meritorious attitude. R. Hershel Schachter writes similarly in his classic article on birth control in The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (IV [Fall 1982], pp. 17-18) and attributes this to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan (Even Ha-Ezer 1:8).

Setting that aside, I recently heard R. Schachter say something both surprising and extremely reasonable in a lecture (link - audio, starting at 9 minutes). He suggests that the biblical obligation to procreate requires having a son and a daughter, and the further meritorious act involves having another son and another daughter. In other words, it does not involve having countless children but four. This is not a maximum. As he points out, he has nine children! However, above two sons and two daughters it is a matter of preference as determined by the many issues that concern a religious personality.

(Needless to say, you should always discuss halakhic matters with your rabbi before following what you read on the internet.)

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Why Do People Become Observant?

A propos the ongoing symposium on why people become Orthodox, R. Shlomo Aviner writes the following theoretical analysis in his message on this week's Torah portion (link):

Maran (our revered teacher) Ha-Rav Kook clarifies this question in his book "Eder Yakar." He asks: what causes heresy? He provides two answers, one a standard explanation and one that is unusual. The first is that the development of science is to blame. This is what is called "Scientific Heresy." There appears to be contradictions between the scientific description of the world and the religious description. Since people learn and rely on science, faith suffers. We will not discuss the question of who decided that such contradictions exist. It is enough for us to understand that these contradictions are imaginary and stem from a surface understanding of both science and faith. If one examines in depth, he can see that they work together.

Click here to read moreMaran Ha-Rav Kook’s second reason is what is called "Ethical Heresy." Contemporary man, armed with a critical sense, sees that the daily life of religious people is not so ethical. He therefore decides that religion lacks any benefit and that he can be an upright and ethical person outside of religion just as within religion, and actually even more so. We cannot respond to this problem because there is simply no answer. It is the greatest desecration of Hashem's Name.

Truth be told, this answer of Maran Ha-Rav Kook is not new at all. It is mentioned by our Holy Rabbis in the Gemara in Yoma (86a). They say that if a person learns Torah, but he is not careful about how he speaks – he insults and speaks ill of others, he is not honest in his business practices – he deceives and lies, people will say: "Woe is the person who learns Torah. Woe is his father who taught him Torah. Woe is his Rabbi who taught him Torah. See how corrupt are the ways and how ugly are the acts of this person who has learned Torah." As a result, Hashem's Name is desecrated.

So how do we deal with this terrible problem?!

We also know the way to help others repent: increase sanctification of Hashem's Name. The same Gemara explains: If, however, a person learns Torah and he speaks pleasantly, and he is honest in his business practices – he pays his obligations and does so on time, people will say: "Praiseworthy is the person who learns Torah. Praiseworthy is his father who taught him Torah. Praiseworthy is his Rabbi who taught him Torah. See how pleasant are the ways and how sweet are the actions of this person who learns Torah." We understand: we do not get others to repent, but bring ourselves to integrity, truth, good relations with other people and good character traits. The Gemara (ibid.) tells us that through this we sanctify Hashem's Name as it says, "You Israel, I am praised through you" (Yeshayahu 49:3).

Almost all of those who repent and become observant are not the fruit of some front-line, explanatory onslaught, but the fruit of a meeting with holy people living in their lives.

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Occasional Vort V

by Netanel Livni

The Midrash BaMidbar Rabba says (21:1):

פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן אמר הקב"ה בדין הוא שיטול שכרו לכן אמור הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום

“Pinchas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the priest.” Said the Holy One Blessed is He: Justice demands that he receive his reward “Thus say: Behold, I give unto him My covenant of peace”

The Hatam Sofer asks a very obvious question on this midrash. Do not all understand that שכר מצוה בהאי עלמא ליכא – there is no reward for mitzvas in this world? All of a sudden Pinchas becomes the one exception and deserves immediate reward?

Click here to read moreThe Hatam Sofer explains that we must distinguish between two different approaches that people have toward mitzvoth. The righteous person is never satisfied with the mitzvoth he has performed. Each mitzvah is another link in a chain of personal growth which never truly finishes. Thus, there is no obvious concrete point in time at which justice demands that the righteous person receive their reward. Thus, their work is never completed in this world and the rewards must come in the next one. On the other hand, the wicked person considers every good deed he performs to be an autonomous and voluntary act which is not connected to any bigger picture. Thus, the good deeds of the wicked man are lacking a larger context in his life. Justice would seem to demand that reward be granted for such acts as soon as possible.

Pinchas, of course, was a tzaddik. However, the nature of the act for which he was rewarded was such that he naturally never wanted to have to commit anything like it ever again. Unlike the rest of his Divine service – this particular act was one towards which he related as an unfortunate necessity. Thus, justice demanded that he receive his reward in this world and not in the next.

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Parashah Roundup: Pinchas 5768

by Steve Brizel

The Covenant of Peace

R. Aharon Lichtenstein suggests that the covenant of peace is a blessing that even someone who is dedicated to truth and peace, but is forced to commit a violent act, will ultimately return to his peaceful roots: link

R. Berel Wein underscores the fact that Pinchas, despite his actions at the beginning of the Parsha,erred in judgment and thus, is not repeated and complimented again in the Torah: link

R. Asher Brander suggests that Pinchas, because of his conduct, required a special bracha in order to remain a Kohen: link

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R. Yissocher Frand, based upon the comments of the Netziv and Golda Meir, illustrates why zealotry must be exercised in a delicate and careful manner: link

R. Mordechai Willig, based upon the teachings of Rambam in the Moreh Nevuchim and R Chaim Yaakov Goldvicht z"l, suggests that the covenant of peace is is transmitted at every Bris Milah and through proper parenting: link

Parshas HaMusafim

The Gra, based upon the Zohar, as elucidated by R. Eliezer Kwass, tells us why the Karbanos for Peach and Sukkos differ in number and how they are offered: link

R. Zev Leff explains why God instructed Moshe Rabbeinu to teach the Jewish People the Parshas HaMusafim before choosing his successor: link

R. Yitzchak Etshalom demonstrates that the process of transition in leadership was paralleled by a parsha that exemplifies the constancy of the relationship between God and the Jewish People: link

The Succession of Joshua as the leader of the Jewish People

R. Jonathan Sacks emphasizes that Torah leadership is not dynastic in nature: link

The Laws of Inheritance

R. Asher Weiss provides an overview of the laws of inheritance: link

R. Elchanan Samet suggests that the daughters of Tzleofchad were not the prototypes for feminists, but rather seeking their father's portion of the inheritance of the Land of Israel: link

R. Shlomo Riskin reminds us that our parents and grandparents inherit the Land of Israel through our actions: link

Understanding Exile and Redemption

Rav Soloveitchik zt"l discusses Aveilus Yeshanah and Aveilus Chadashah, Tisha Bav and explains Kinos: link 1, link 2

R. Tzvi Sobolofsky urges us to remember that the cessation of the Korban Tamid should serve as a vehicle for rededicating our lives to Avodas HaShem: link

R. Asher Weiss emphasizes that we must experience both exile and redemption on a personal and communal level and different views within the Rishonim how the Bayis Shlishi will be rebuilt: link (audio)

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