Friday, February 29, 2008

Flipping Out? in the Wall Street Journal

In today's Wall Street Journal, p. Wll (link):
Click here to read more
Jewish Year Abroad
By BEN HARRIS
February 29, 2008; Page W11

By the middle of my post-high-school year of yeshiva study in Israel, it was obvious which of my classmates would return home much as they had left and which would return transformed. In the latter group were the boys who had begun to trade evenings at the bars on Jerusalem's Ben Yehuda Street for the study hall, where they spent hours imbibing rabbinic wisdom. Their hair grew shorter and their sidelocks longer. Baseball caps declaring allegiance to the Yankees and Mets were replaced with velvet yarmulkes. Now they declared allegiance to a higher authority.

Religious transformations like these have become such a phenomenon in the Orthodox Jewish world that they have birthed their own derisive catchphrase. "Flipping Out," a term first popularized by an Orthodox rock band, is now the title of a book published by Yashar Books in cooperation with New York's Yeshiva University, the flagship institution of Modern Orthodoxy. Jews who identify themselves as Modern Orthodox keep kosher, observe the sabbath and practice other rituals but are otherwise well integrated into society, living and working among people of other faiths.

A year of yeshiva study in Israel is now a rite of passage, with some Modern Orthodox high schools sending 90% of their graduating seniors to programs designed to fortify them with religious values before they go off to a secular American college. But some of these teenagers, once in Israel, choose to remain in yeshivas for a second or third year to continue their study of Torah and Talmud (biblical commentary). Others turn down admission to the Ivy League in favor of Yeshiva University, which offers a dual curriculum of liberal arts and religious instruction. In one case described in the book, a student's parents were so horrified at their son's intention to forgo admission to Harvard that they forged his signature on a commitment letter to the university. In the most extreme cases, returnees no longer respect the authority of rabbis they have known their entire lives, or refuse to eat in the home of their parents, whose adherence to Jewish dietary laws is deemed insufficiently rigorous.

"I suspect on some level moves the community to a more separatist position," said Rabbi Yosef Blau, the director of religious guidance at Yeshiva University, who supports Israel study but considers it a double-edged sword. "In Israel, the line between the Orthodox and the non-Orthodox is quite sharp, and that gets reflected back."

Exact figures are hard to come by, but YU estimates that some 2,000 Modern Orthodox high-school graduates depart for single-sex Israeli yeshivas each year. Most attend programs for foreigners, where instruction is typically in English, room and board are included, and 12-hour days of study -- generally a mixture of Bible, Talmud and Jewish law and philosophy, though the diet is more Talmud-centered for men -- are supplemented by trips to sites of religious significance.

"They're basically given the message that they are doing what they were created to do, which is to study Torah, that they are princes and princesses of Judaism, that that is all that they have to do," says Samuel Heilman, a sociologist of American Jewry and the author of "Sliding to the Right." He fingers the Israel year as a chief reason for Modern Orthodoxy's supposed shift toward traditionalism. Critics of the shift point to everything from the style of yarmulke worn by Modern Orthodox men to the reluctance of some returning yeshiva graduates to kiss their female relatives. In 2006, 10 alumni of a right-wing yeshiva in Israel left YU after a year, citing ideological differences.

Survey data in "Flipping Out," the first effort to quantify the effects of the year in Israel, will provide ammunition to the critics. Rabbi Shalom Berger, one of the book's three authors, found that prior to landing in Israel, less than 20% of students rank high on a scale of ritual practice. After the year of study, the number surges to nearly 70%. Rabbi Berger also found that students are more committed to lifelong Torah study and show stronger ties to Israel after they return. But only a tiny minority, he says, eschew higher education entirely and dedicate their lives to studying Torah. Most will eventually attend college and go on to productive careers.

For many Orthodox educators, particularly at Yeshiva University, which recruits heavily from the programs in Israel, these findings are cause for celebration, not concern. With its motto of "Torah Umadda," literally "Torah and secular knowledge," YU has long been the standard-bearer of the ideal of marrying Orthodox practice to secular education. "I believe our tradition is such that we should be confident that we can contribute to the world based on our values," said YU President Richard Joel, five of whose children have studied in Israeli yeshivas. "We're not supposed to view the modern world as the enemy."

What remains unclear is the extent to which the educators in Israel, a country without a tradition of liberal-arts education, share Mr. Joel's commitment to the Modern Orthodox ethos. I have earned two academic degrees from top universities since I left the yeshiva in Israel, all while continuing to observe many of the rituals urged upon me a decade ago by my rabbis there, though I take certain liberties with the law that they would almost certainly frown upon.

Still, I consider that year to have been one of the most enriching of my life. The headmaster, I'm sure, wouldn't agree. Some weeks before my departure, he called me to his office to tell me that I had wasted my time. "Maybe," he said, "if you had learned a little more Torah."

Mr. Harris writes about religion for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.


Thursday, February 28, 2008

Predatory Lending

Dr. Asher Meir, the "Jewish Ethicist", writes about the Subprime Mortgage Crisis* (link):
Q: I've heard the great sub-prime crisis was caused by predatory lending practices. Is it wrong for banks to lend to high credit-risk homebuyers?

A. Some accusations have been made that the banks gave credit on terms that were likely to lead to default and repossession. I can't comment on these accusations, and I have seen no convincing evidence so far. But it is worthwhile to see how Jewish tradition deals with the ethical dilemma involved in the decision to extend credit when there is a good chance that it will result in repossession...

Click here to read moreAsmachta is a legal expression meaning that a person doesn't have true "informed consent" to an agreement, because he doesn't properly understand the risks involved. For example, a hustler's gambling winnings may be considered asmachta...

To sum up: I have seen no evidence that sub-prime lenders were in any way scheming to foreclose. However, the whole crisis has brought public attention to the foreclosure process and possible inequities in it. Jewish law includes a number of safeguards against predatory lending practices, including a demand for truly informed consent to lopsided foreclosure conditions, and a right of redemption for someone who has lost his house.
Let me state my somewhat informed opinion that it is incorrect to suggest that the crisis in general was based on banks lending on terms that they intended to lead to foreclosure. While you can't rule out anything in isolated cases, this was not at all the general attitude. Banks did not (and do not) want to foreclose. They want people to pay them lots of money.

However, that does not mean that there was not a problem of predatory lending. There is ample evidence that mortgage brokers sometimes improperly steared borrowers to more expensive mortgages when they could qualify for cheaper loans. And there is also ample evidence that the complex terms of loans were not adequately explained to borrowers.

However, there was also predatory borrowing that has been a large cause of the current problems. Fraud has been rampant in mortgages for the past few years, which led to borrowers receiving loans on false pretenses that they could not afford. Banks should not have made those loans without proof of ability to repay, but borrowers who lie to obtain a loan are taking advantage of their lenders.

Unfortunately, the current crisis has been caused by widespread wrongdoing on many levels of the financial system--albeit some wrongdoings being explicitly fraudulent and others being less severe. But, sadly, there is plenty of blame to go around. No one party has caused it individually.
* I hate to call this a Subprime Mortgage Crisis because it impacts more than just subprime and has led to problems well beyond mortgages. Now we are starting to hear people talk about a Credit Crunch, which is probably more accurate--particularly about the next stages of developments--although less informative.


New Periodical: Azure No. 31 Winter 2008

New issue of Azure:


Announcements #026

  • Torah U’Madda Conference and Shabbaton in Houston, TX April 4 – 6, 2008

    The Shabbaton will both explore the basis of the Torah U’Madda ideology and examine its relevance for the many issues and challenges in modern life. Our renowned guest speakers will include Rabbi Kenneth Brander and Rabbi Dr. David Shatz. This exciting Shabbaton will include a rich variety of programs and presentations for adults, high school and middle school students. You will be warmly welcomed in Houston Orthodox homes, and enjoy Great Kosher meals in the UOS banquet hall.

    For more information: tumshabbaton@uosh.org www.uosh.org/tum.html 713-723-3850

    To be held at United Orthodox Synagogue (UOS) in Houston, TX, co-sponsored by UOS and Robert M. Beren Academy – offering a superior Judaic and General studies education for children 18 months – 12th Grade (713-723-7170 x 224)



  • (Announce your simchah or Torah lectures by clicking on the button in the top right corner of Hirhurim. See here for readership statistics.)


    Wednesday, February 27, 2008

    Understanding Tzniut

    The topic of modest dress in Jewish law is one that is very dependent on local custom. While there are some issues that are universal, most of the details are location specific. This became glaringly obvious a few years ago when R. Pesach Eliyahu Falk published a book titled Modesty: An Adornment for Life, which consistently presented practices that represent the norm in certain Charedi/Chassidic circles as the unequivocal standard.

    R. Yehuda Henkin has published a detailed and devastating critique of many of R. Falk's fundamental positions. This long essay originally appeared in the journal Tradition and has now been updated and published in a book appropriately titled Understanding Tzniut: Modern Controversies in the Jewish Community. The essay is published alongside another two related essays and a second section of interesting essays on unrelated topic (e.g. whether one must show respect to a disrespectful Torah scholar and the proper attitude towards the state of Israel post-Disengagement). R. Henkin's essay on modest dress analyzes a number of relevant topics (e.g. women's haircovering, necklines) and shows that R. Falk's positions are extreme. In reaching his conclusions, R. Henkin displays a mastery of both halakhic views on this subject and sound reasoning.

    Click here to read moreWhen I first saw the book I regretted that it does not include a brief summary of all of R. Henkin's conclusions. However, I subsequently realized that this actually makes the book useful in a classroom setting, with the construction of a summary a likely student assignment.

    I'd like to discuss here an issue related to this book but not directly addressed in it. On page 21 of R. Falk's book, he quotes the talmudic concept of "kol kevudah bas melekh penimah" (the king's daughter's glory is indoors - Ps. 45:14), which implies that a woman's appropriate place is in the home and not in public places (yes, I know that this is a verse but the application is talmudic). It seems clear to me that this idea is not the practice in the vast majority of Torah observant families, including (especially) kollel families where women go out into the workplace. What does this imply about the concept of "kol kevudah"?

    The idea comes up explicitly in two relevant yet contradictory passages. In Gittin 12b the Talmud actually says that one might have thought that we apply the concept of "kol kevudah", which is why we needed to be taught explicitly that we do not. The implication seems to be that we do not accept the concept. However, in Yevamos (76b) the idea is invoked to explain why women from Mo'av and Amon did not go out to war. In a related passage, the Mishnah in Kesubos (67a) states that male orphans inherit their father's money but must first use it to support their sisters. If there is not enough money for the brothers and sisters, the sisters receive priority because it is "not their way" to go collecting door-to-door. The implication is that we invoke the concept of "kol kevudah".

    Based on all this, the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Ishus 13:11) writes that married women should rarely leave their house to go out in public. The Rema (Shulchan Arukh, Even Ha-Ezer 73:1) writes in a similar vein. It might seem that the practice of women today is halakhically indefensible.

    However, there is a different talmudic concept occasionally invoked that the Jewish people are considered the children of kings. For example, the Mishnah in Shabbos (66b) has a dispute over whether only princes may wear a golden bell in public on Shabbos (and for everyone else it is considered carrying because it is not their normal way of wearing clothing) or that since all Jews are the children of kings we are all allowed to wear princely clothing. Halakhic decisors consistently rule against this idea (cf. Rosh, Shabbos ch. 18 no. 2), implying that on an halakhic level, Jews are not the children of kings. The Mahari Bruna (Responsa, 242) concludes that if Jews are not halakhically considered the children of kings then not only are the men not princes but the women are also not princesses. Therefore, he rules, we do not accept the concept of "kol kevudah".

    The She'arim Metzuyanim Ba-Halakah (152:3) qualifies this, based on the Mishnah in Kesubos quoted above. According to him (R. Shlomo Zalman Braun, a chasidic rabbi in Brooklyn who passed away approximately 10 years ago), the concept only applies to single women but not married women.

    It seems to me that perhaps we can say that the common practice today implies that we follow the Mahari Bruna, possibly as modified by R. Braun. The practice of holy Jews shows that normative halakhah follows this view among the authorities.


    Miscellaneous News of Interest

    Sorry but I don't have time to do news roundups anymore. But here are some random stories that I think will be of interest:
    • Inside information about the concert ban in The Jewish Star: link
    • R. Alan Haber argues that a new guide for egalitarian minyanim is not up to halakhic par: Jerusalem Post
    • American, Israeli rabbis reach conversion deal: JTA, Jerusalem Post, RCA announcement
    • A new survey finds that over 25% of Americans leave their birth religions, although becoming unaffiliated is counted as leaving a religion: NY Times
    • Prof. Ariel Toaff backs down from blood libel: JTA
    • The Rabbinic Association of Poland re-established: Arutz Sheva
    • Non-Orthodox and non-denominational rabbis, check out the chart of ordination numbers: JTA
    • One of the most famous and most successful actuaries in the country is convicted of fraud: Hartford Courant

    New issue of The Commentator (link):


    Parashah Roundup: Vayakhel 5768

    by Steve Brizel

    Bridging the Gap
  • R. Aharon Lichtenstein explains why Moshe Rabbeinu spoke before a special assembly of the entire nation: link


  • Moshe and Aharon
  • R. Yisachar Frand shows how Moshe and Aharon's roles complemented each other without creating any enmity between them: link


  • Click here to read moreBetzalel's Crucial Role
  • R. Yaacov Haber (Torahlab) discusses how Betzalel's positive reaction to his being selected as the designer and artisan of the Mishkan reminds us that we should never shirk from our responsibilities, regardless of our inner doubts about our own capabilities: link


  • Moshe Rabbeinu's Instructions to Betzalel
  • The Gaon Yaakov sheds new light on a discussion between Moshe and Betzalel about the order of construction for the Mishkan: link


  • Betzalel and Art
  • R. Jonathan Sacks and R. Efraim Buchwald discusses Betzalel and the relationship between Halacha and art: link 1, link 2
  • R. Yitzchak Etshalom offers a number of interpretations, all rooted in the text, as to why Betzalel was the primary designer and artisan of the Mishkan: link


  • The Holy and the Mundane
  • R. Mordechai Greenberg suggests that the purpose of the Mishkan was to demonstrate that the spiritual and physical must work together, as opposed to being exclusive of each other: link


  • Shabbos and the Mishkan
  • R. Avigdor Nevenzal reviews many of the Halachic and Hashkafic fundamentals of Shabbos: link
  • R. Mayer Twersky demonstrates that a proper observance of Shabbos has a positive spiritual impact on the rest of the week: link
  • R. Ari Kahn and R. Yaakov Haber (formerly of RIETS) explore the relationship between Shabbos and the Mishkan: link 1, link 2
  • R. Shlomo Riskin suggests that the inclusion of Shabbos between the various mitzvos concerning the Mishkan is to remind us that Shabbos and the Mishkan shared the same hashkafic goals: link
  • R. Zvi Sobolofsky proves that the proper observance of Shabbos, especially the Melacha of Hotzaah, is a form of accepting the Yoke of Heaven: link

  • Tuesday, February 26, 2008

    Electricity on Shabbos

    R. Josh Flug discusses the views on the potential halakhic problems with using electricity on Shabbos (link):
    R. Yitzchak Schmelkes, Beit Yitzchak, Hashmatot to Y.D. 2:31, is of the opinion that completing a circuit constitutes a violation of molid, the prohibition against imbuing an object with a new property...

    R. Shlomo Z. Auerbach, Minchat Shlomo 1:9, questions the application of molid to electricity... Nevertheless, R. Auerbach defers to the halachic precedent established by R. Schmelkes and rules that one should be concerned for the prohibition of molid in dealing with the activation of electrical devices...

    R. Avraham Y. Karelitz, Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 50:9, rules that completing a circuit constitutes a violation of the melacha of boneh, building. Accordingly, deactivating a device by opening the circuit would constitute a violation of soter, destroying...

    According to Chazon Ish, activation of any electric device constitutes a biblical violation of boneh. According to Beit Yitzchak, there are many devices whose activation only constitutes a rabbinic violation of molid, while activation of devices that involve use of heat constitutes a biblical violation of havarah.


    Tying Tzitzit at Night & More

    By: Rabbi Ari Enkin

    Although many things can be done by machine, tying Tzitzit strings is still not one of them. In order to render a Tallit useable, the Tzitzit strings must be hand tied onto a Tallit by a God-fearing individual. What is amusing, however, is the largely mistaken belief that it is forbidden to tie the Tzitzit strings onto a Tallit at night. [1] The source for this misunderstanding is due to a perceived concern that doing so may be a violation of the Talmudic principle of “Ta’ase V’lo Min Ha’asui”.

    The principle of "Ta’ase V’lo Min Ha’asui" teaches that a Tzitzit garment must be functional upon completion. When one ties Tzitzit onto a Tallit at night, the Tallit has no halachic function and is essentially unusable until the next morning. This is because the mitzva of Tzitzit is one of those mitzvot which apply only during the day and not at night.[2] This delay between the assembly of the Tallit and one's first opportunity of being able to use it only arriving the next day, is deemed by some authorities as a possible violation of the “Ta’ase V’lo Min Ha’asui” principle.[3]

    Click here to read moreIn deference to this view, there a number of authorities who advise against tying Tzitzit at night.[4] While the majority of halachic authorities don't disqualify Tzitzit which were tied at night, there a number of whom which recommend avoid doing so if at all possible.[5] Nevertheless, normative halacha is not like these views and tying Tzitzit at night is permitted without reservation.[6] As is the case with all chumrot, those who choose not to tie Tzitzit at night are conducting themselves in a manner not required by normative halacha.[7]

    Related to this issue is the writing of the Tefillin parchments which all authorities permit one to write at night although the mitzva of Tefillin is one which is only performed during the day.[8] Accordingly, one should not hesitate to wear Tzitzit that were tied at night.[9] The Chazon Ish was known to permit tying Tzitzit at night and specifically requested that his own Tallit be prepared at such time.[10] One should only use Tzitzit strings that were hand made,[11] though one should not criticize those who use the machine made variety.[12]

    Many Tzitzit professionals have the custom never to cut Tzitzit strings with scissors or any other metal object. Instead, any necessary cutting or shortening is done with one's teeth.[13] This idea of not using metal in the process of making Tzitzit mirrors the building of the Beit Hamikdash. We are told that it was forbidden to use any metal utensils when hewing the stones which were to be used in the construction of the Altar. As such, some suggest that the use of metal should be forbidden in the process of making Tzitzit as well.

    This common denominator between the Altar and Tzitzit is their role in lengthening human life,[14] while metal is a material used in weaponry whose primary purpose is to shorten it.[15]It is interesting to note that a person has thirty-two teeth which is the equal number of Tzitzit strings on the Tallit.[16] One who is unable to cut Tzitzit strings with his teeth may use a knife made from silver, bronze, or plastic.[17] It is said that being careful in the observance of the mitzva of Tzitzit is a segula for preventing tooth aches.[18]

    Another application of the principle of "Ta’ase V’lo Min Ha’asui” requires that the Tzitzit strings be placed upon the Tallit and not the other way around. For example, if one tore through the corner of one's Tallit causing the Tzitzit strings to fall from the garment, it would not be permissible to simply replace the Tzitzit strings onto the corner and then sew up the tear. Rather, the tear must first be sown up and then the Tzitzit strings re-tied on to the garment anew. Similarly, in the event that one's Tallit had ripped in half, even if the strings remained fastened in the corners, it would not be permitted to simply sew together the two halves of the Tallit. Rather, the Tzitzit must be removed, the Tallit sewn together and then the Tzitzit strings tied anew.

    A blessing is not recited when tying Tzitzit because neither the Tzitzit strings nor even the tying process are inherent requirements relating to a Tallit.[19] Tzitzit strings are among those ritual items, that while not inherently a mitzva, they are necessary component for discharging one, a standing known as "hechsher mitzva". As such, it is perfectly permissible to own a four cornered garment which one does not intend to attach Tzitzit to, or even ever use. It is, however, forbidden to wear such a garment until the Tzitzit are tied to the corners.[20]Authorities cite this concept as additional grounds to permit tying Tzitzit strings at night.[21]

    The principle of “Ta’ase V’lo Min Ha’asui” is highly applicable with regards to the preparations for Sukkot. Among the rules in building a Sukka is the requirement to first build the frame and walls for one's Sukka and only then to place the Sechach on top. It would not be permitted to first prepare the Sechach and only afterwards to erect the walls of the Sukka.[22]




    NEXT WEEK: "Rabbeinu Tam Tefillin". Please send me your lesser-known and obscure sources as well as anecdotes for inclusion. I truly thank and appreciate all those who sent me tidbits in preparation for this article. rabbiari@hotmail.com

    *********************************


    [1] Pri Megadim 18:1
    [2] Menachot 43a
    [3] Afikei Maginim 11;Biurim 13, Shulchan Hatahor ch. 14 and 18
    [4] Shulchan Hatahor 18:1
    [5] Silmat Chaim 28
    [6] Rivevot Efraim, O.C. 3:27; Teshuvot V'hanhagot 2:13, Yabia Omer 8:3
    [7] Aruch Hashulchan O.C. 14:7, Yabia Omer 8:3
    [8] The Butchacher Gaon, cited by Da'at Torah of Maharsham O.C. 10:10
    [9] Neot Deshe 62, Nachalat Binyamin 12, Halacha L’moshe 39, Lev Chaim 3:29, Chachmat Shlomo 18, Maharshag 2:74, Ben Ish Chai Lech Lecha, all cited in “Chokrei Minhagim” by Rabbi Eliyhau Yochanan Gurari
    [10] "Dinim V'hanhagot Mimaran Ba'al Hachazon Ish 2:11
    [11] Piskei Teshuvot 11:2, Divrei Chaim 2:1
    [12] Eretz Tzvi 1:5, Shevet Halevi 1:6, Tzitz Eliezer 6:15
    [13] Mishna Berura 11:61
    [14] Shabbat 32b
    [15] Shulchan Aruch Harav 11:24, Middot 3:4
    [16] Machatzit Hashekel 11
    [17] Piskei Teshuvot 11:29
    [18] Kaf Hachaim 11:17
    [19] Menachot 41a, Yevamot 90b
    [20] See Mishna Berura 17:5
    [21] Chochmat Shlomo O.C. 14:1, 18:1
    [22] Rema O.C. 735:1


    Monday, February 25, 2008

    Grammatically Correct but Politically Incorrect

    Sometimes an interesting hashkafic view can be found in a somewhat obscure grammatical discussion. Consider the following (Exodus 34:9):
    ויאמר אם נא מצאתי חן בעיניך ה' ילך נא ה' בקרבנו כי עם קשה ערף הוא וסלחת לעוננו ולחטאתנו ונחלתנו.
    Then he said, "If now I have found grace in Your sight, O Lord, let my Lord, I pray, go among us, even though we are a stiff-necked people; and pardon our iniquity and our sin, and take us as Your inheritance."
    What does the word "כי" mean in this context? Moshe ask God to go among us and forgive us because we are a stiff-necked people. Is "because" the correct translation of the word "כי"? Why is that a reason to forgive us? To the opposite, it should be a reason NOT to forgive us. The commentators deal with this in a number of ways:
    1. Rashi explains that it means "if". If we are a stiff-necked people then God should forgive us.
    2. Ramban explains it as "because" and refers to the prior phrase -- God needs to go among us and not an angel because we are so stiff-necked.
    3. Radak and R. Yonah Ibn Janach explains it as meaning "even though". Forgive us even though we are stiff-necked.
    4. Ibn Ezra explains it as meaning "admittedly". Admittedly we are stiff-necked but please forgive us.
    One explanation that I automatically thought of, but could not find, is to read it simply as "because". We are stiff-necked so the sin isn't totally our fault. How can God blame us? We have SNS (Stiff Neck Syndrome). But this politically correct peshat does not exist, which perhaps gives us insight into what our sages would say about such politically correct approaches to life.


    Sunday, February 24, 2008

    Judaism and Imagination

    by Rabbi Reuven Spolter

    If my experience is any indication, Jewish education does not place a very positive emphasis on developing an imagination. Rebbeim generally associate imagination with sexuality and inappropriate sexual thoughts - which is not all that surprising given the fact that they're usually speaking to teenage males. Thus, they encouraged us to stifle our imaginations in the hopes of avoiding violation of obvious issurim.

    Moreover, most Jewish education involves the assimilation and spit back of skills and information. We teach our young children simple skills, and have them repeat them back to us. Then as they grow older we teach them more advanced skills which they must apply to more difficult texts and applications. Finally, if they reach a very advanced stage, they study extremely difficult and advanced materials which they then repeat and share with others to demonstrate their advanced knowledge. Halachah and gemara - the staples of yeshiva learning - have reached such a level of intellectual maturity that to all but the most advanced, there's nothing really to add. How many students feel that they have substantial chiddushim to contribute to the world of Jewish study? In truth, in the academically oriented atmosphere of the Beis Medrash, creativity and imagination have been, quite literally, ushered from the room.

    And yet, imagination and creativity seem to be not only critical to a healthy psychological and emotional makeup, but to a positive Jewish intellectual life as well.

    Click here to read moreParshat Ki Tisa relates the qualities that Bezalel ben Uri ben Chur possessed that made him uniquely qualified to head the mishkan construction project.
    ואמלא אותו רוח אלקים בחכמה ובדעת ובכל מלאכה. לחשב מחשבות לעשות בזהב ובכסף ובנחשת
    And I filled him with a spirit of God, with wisdom and knowledge of every craft. And to think thoughts - to make with gold, silver and copper. (Shemot 31:3-4)
    What does the Torah mean when it tells us that God bestows upon Bezalel the spirit of God לחשב מחשבות -- "to think thoughts"? Rashi explains that this refers to מעשה חשב - work of embroidery, and is simply another skill set Bezalel possessed. Yet, Targum Yonatan ben Uziel translates the verse this way:
    למיחשב ברעיוניהון היך למעבד בדהבא ובכספא ובנחשא
    To think with their ideas how to create with gold, silver and copper
    In essence, a craftsman's greatness lies not in his or her technical ability, but in the ability to translate a picture of the mind into reality. Sure, this requires great tactical skill, but it demands even greater mental ability to imagine in one's mind how that creation will appear when complete.

    We think that we know what the mishkan actually looked like. Each year when we study these parshiot that deal with the mishkan's construction, we pull out the pictorial Tabernacle book, and study the pictures to better understand the descriptions in the text. During summer camp we build scale models of the different vessels to learn their various dimensions and attributes. So we know exactly how the mishkan looked. Only we don't.

    No book or model can approximate the fantastic craftsmanship, creativity and imagination that the builders of these vessels utilized to create them. Who can picture the true beauty of the hand-woven tapestries that adorned the walls and curtains of the mishkan? What about the engravings, etchings and carvings in the gold throughout the structure. Indeed, while we can approximate the size and shape of the different vessels, we cannot estimate their inherent beauty in a picture of a model. Nor should we try. We should leave that to our imaginations.

    And we need our imagination for more than just arts and crafts. We need it for life.

    In order to grow beyond ourselves, we need the ability to envision a different kind of life; an experience beyond our familiarity. To create life beyond what we know we must first be able to imagine what's possible. Only when it's real in our minds can we translate that vision into reality. This truism applies not only to life experiences, but to communities, institutions, programs -- basically any human endeavor. Great businessmen are not the people who simply fulfill the needs of others. Rather, they are the people who see a need unfulfilled, and can envision their ability to fill that need. In essence, they see in their minds what others cannot or do not. Similarly, great communal builders see not just the challenges in building their ideas and institutions, but also their finished product in their minds. Only then can they set about bringing their visions to fruition. Without creativity we become stale, stagnant and unable to adapt and grow, limited to the finite borders of our past experiences. With imagination and creativity, we open ourselves to the unlimited expanses of the possible, as long as we can dream it.

    In cannot be coincidental that Jewish tradition considers great Jewish leaders and builders dreamers. Yosef's brothers describe him as an איש החלומות -- "a man of dreams". While his inability to conceal those dreams land him in trouble during his youth, that very same imagination and creativity literally save him and the world. Only Yosef can not only properly interpret the dream of Par'oh, but perhaps even more importantly, devise a solution to resolve the problem. His solution brings him to prominence and provides sustenance for the region during the difficult years of famine.

    The Midrash Tanchuma writes:
    ילמדנו עוד רבינו מה בין חלומות הצדיקים לחלומות הרשעים? חלומות הרשעים לא בשמים ולא בארץ, שנאמר ופרעה חולם והנה עומד על היאור (בראשית מא א). וכך נבוכדנצר כתיב חלם (הוא) [חזית] ודחלנני (דניאל ד ב), שלא היה לא בארץ ולא בשמים, אבל חלומות של צדיקים בשמים ובארץ, שכן אתה מוצא שאמר יוסף לאחיו הנה אנחנו מאלמים אלומים (בראשית לז ז), הרי בארץ, ובשמים מנין, שנאמר הנה השמש והירח ואחד עשר כוכבים משתחוים לי (שם שם /בראשית ל"ז/ ט), וכן באבינו יעקב ויחלום והנה סולם [מוצב ארצה וראשו מגיע השמימה, הרי בשמים ובארץ].
    Let our rabbi also teach us, what is the difference between the dreams of the righteous and the dreams of the wicked? The dreams of the wicked are neither in the heavens nor the earth, as it is written, "and Par'oh dreamt and behold he was standing over the Nile," and it is written similarly about Nevuchadnezzar "I saw a dream which made me afraid," for he was neither on the earth or in the heavens. But the dreams of the righteous are both in the heavens and the earth, for we find that Yosef said to his brothers, "behold we were binding sheaves," - so we see the earth. Where do we see the heavens? As it is written, "behold the sun, moon and eleven stars were bowing to me." And furthermore, [regarding] our forefather Ya'akov it is written, "and behold a ladder was standing on the ground and its head reached the heavens" - so we see his dream related to both the heavens and the earth.
    A truly righteous dreamer - and his dreams - are rooted not in the heavens or the earth, but in the connection between the two; in binding one's yearnings for the heavens with worldly pursuits. Ya'akov dreamed of bridging the gap between the lofty spirituality of the heavens and the stark reality of the world. And because he dreamed it, he brought it to fruition.

    Rav Kook in the fifth chapter of Orot discusses the difference between Jewish imagination in the Land of Israel and Jewish imagination in the Diaspora. He writes:
    הדמיון של ארץ ישראל הוא צלול וברור, נקי וטהור ומסגל להופעת האמת האלקית, להלבשת החפץ המרומם ונשגב של המגמה האידיאלית אשר בעליונות הקדש
    Imagination in the Land of Israel is clear and transparent, clean and pure and prepared for the true divine appearance, for the clothing of the exalted and lofty desires of the ideal orientation in the uppermost levels of holiness...
    To me, even more important than the distinction that Rav Kook draws between imagination inside or outside of Israel, is his emphasis on the significance of imagination in the Jewish religious and spiritual experience. After years - centuries perhaps - of educating our children to suppress their imaginations, perhaps the time has come to reexamine that value and begin to emphasize the positive growth that can come from properly directed creativity, either through study of artistic ability (something now confined to young children and girls), creative writing and poetry or other similar disciplines.

    Only when we learn to harness - and stop fearing -- the constructive power of creativity and imagination will we begin to imagine what the Jewish people can truly become.


    The Big Event Live: Banned

    Last week, there was a ban published in Hamodia that declared an upcoming charity concert by Shloime Gertner and Lipa Schmeltzer to be forbidden (link). Frankly, I have no patience for bans and don't understand why rabbis keep chipping away at their own authority by signing them. They may have won the battle but they are badly losing the war.

    I watched one of the videos posted on the concert's website (link) and it seems to me to just be a lighthearted event of good, clean fun (with separate seating -- I, II). Fun, that is, and not the kind of concert that is all about singing songs in praise of God. There could very well be an halakhic problem with such a concert, perhaps on multiple levels. I certainly do not approve of this kind of concert. But a ban... ? It just alienates the people who are attracted to this kind of event and are already feeling alienated. In other words, it exacerbates the "at risk" problem and serves to undermine rabbinic authority in a large segment of the Charedi community.

    Maybe it would be more effective -- on many levels -- to teach why this concert is inappropriate rather than APPEARING to bully the singers and charity into losing a huge amount of money and spoiling everyone's fun.


    Thursday, February 21, 2008

    Kosher and Open on Shabbos

    There was a recent item on the website of The New York Times about whether a kosher certified restaurant can be open on Shabbos (link). The answer is actually complicated because there are a number of issues. Here are the issues that I can think of right now, although there may be others:Click here to read more
    1. Ownership

      A Jew is not allowed to have his business conduct business on Shabbos. If the restaurant is owned by a Gentile then this is not an issue, but if the restaurant is owned by a Jew then there is a problem. Some authorities allow a Jewish owner to sell his business to a Gentile for Shabbos based on the permission given in the Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 244:6) to sell one's tax collection rights for Shabbos to a Gentile (see the long list in Sha'arim Metzuyanim Ba-Halakhah 73:12-13, which even directs readers to the text of such a contract in the halakhic work Da'as Torah). Others, however, do not allow such a transaction (e.g. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik as quoted by R. Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Ha-Rav p. 168). According to this latter opinion, a Jewish-owned restaurant may not be open on Shabbos and only Gentile-owned restaurants may be open. The only exception is if the restaurant accepts payment only in advance, so it technically does not do business on Shabbos. This used to be fairly common in New York.


    2. Cooking on Shabbos

      Jews may not eat food that is cooked on Shabbos and even after Shabbos must wait enough time to cook the food before eating it (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 318:1). This is if the food was not cooked specifically for him. But if it was cooked for him, then he may not eat it ever (ibid.). There is a debate whether or not restaurants and hotels cook for their customers in general, and therefore any food is prohibited to any customer ever (cf. Piskei Teshuvos 318:3).

      Therefore, a restaurant must make sure that it does not sell food cooked on Shabbos even after Shabbos, or at least wait sufficient time before selling it. If the restaurant only serves pre-cooked food on Shabbos, like kosher hotels, then the process of warming up the food needs to be done properly.


    3. Supervision

      A kosher supervisor must be able to check on the restaurant on Shabbos to ensure that proper kosher standards are followed. This is not always a problem, particularly when the restaurant is adjacent to a residential neighborhood.


    4. Jewish Cooking

      There is a requirement that at least one part of the cooking process be done by a Jew (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 113). If the stoves and ovens operate with a pilot light, then as long as a Jew kindles the pilot light the requirement is fulfilled. However, pilot lights sometimes extinguish unexpectedly and if that happens on Shabbos, there is little that can be done (light the pilot light from another flame that had been lit by a Jew?). Certain standard foods that are not "fit for a king's table", like donuts, do not fall under this prohibition.
    In general, it is difficult to supervise a restaurant that wishes to operate normally on Shabbos. Some authorities will certify such a restaurant if it is owned by a Gentile or sold to a Gentile for Shabbos. Other authorities will neither allow such a sale nor discriminate against Jewish owners by certifying only Gentile-owned restaurants.

    In other cases, though, when a restaurant tries to adjust for Shabbos, it is fairly common for it to be certified. There are kosher restaurants and hotels that operate on Shabbos.

    (As always, ask a competent rabbi and do not rely on the internet for your halakhic rulings.

    As to the picture above, I did a Google search on "Shabbos" and "restaurant" [link] and for some reason the first picture to appear was the famous restaurant from Seinfeld, which is neither kosher nor closed on Shabbos.)

    UPDATE: Note that the Rabbinical Council of America has a resolution from 1990 opposing the kosher certification of restaurants and hotels that fail to observe Shabbos: link


    Rabbi Slifkin Explains - Postcript

    R. Natan Slifkin posted a postcript to his recent article regarding R. Moshe Shapiro's opposition to R. Slifkin's books, in particular about the Gemara in Bava Basra 75a: link (PDF)


    Wednesday, February 20, 2008

    Parashah Roundup: Ki Sisa 5768

    by Steve Brizel

    The Half Shekel
  • R. Yaacov Haber (Torahlab) explores why one must not take a census in a direct manner: link
  • R. Efraim Buchwald, based upon the Alshich, suggests that thehalf shekel is precisely a half shekel to remind man that he cannot consider himself alone: link


  • Washing the Hands
  • R. Berel Wein discusses the Kiyor and the significance of Netilas Yadayim: link


  • Click here to read moreThe Episode of the Golden Calf
  • R. Yisachar Frand, based upon an essay of R Avigdor Nevenzal, suggests a connection between the Episode of the Golden Calf and Parah Adumah-the need to follow the Mesorah of Torah SheBaal Peh: link
  • R. Shlomo Riskin discusses why we learn so many of the fundamentals of teshuvah from the incident of the Golden Calf and how Moshe Rabbeinu evolves from following God's orders to being the defender of the Jewish People: link
  • R. Asher Brander, based upon a drasha of Rav Soloveitchik zt"l, suggests that Moshe's leadership skills and willingness to sacrifice for Klal Yosrael, remain a model for anyone involved in a leadership role: link
  • R. Ezra Bick analyzes the Mitvos that are underscored in the wake of the Episode of the Golden Calf: link
  • R. Aharon Lichtenstein probes why Moshe Rabbeinu broke the first set of Luchos: link
  • R. Avigdor Nevenzal traces many examples where Klal Yisrael engaged in the same rationale as the generation that erected the Golden Calf and finds a common denominator for the cause: link


  • The Thirteen Midos
  • R. Zev Leff explains how one implements the 13 Midos, as opposed to merely reciting them: link


  • The Second Luchos
  • R. Jonathan Sacks, based upon a well known Kabbalistic doctrine, suggests an intrinsic difference between the two sets of Luchos: link


  • Torah Shebiksav and Torah SheBaal Peh
  • R. Herschel Shachter discusses the development of Torah SheBaal Peh: link


  • Talmud Torah and True Freedom
  • R. Mayer Twersky emphasizes that one is free when he internalizes the Torah: link


  • Shabbos and Mikdash
  • R. Yitzchak Etshalom reviews the many halachic and hashkafic relationships between Shabbos and Mikdash: link

  • Tuesday, February 19, 2008

    The State of Modern Orthodox Belief

    What do Modern Orthodox Jews believe? Like other religious groups, there is an official belief (or ranges of belief) and then there is the real situation in the trenches, where some follow the "party line" and others deviate. Without taking a scientific survey, it is difficult to accurately gauge what people believe. However, it is less difficult to learn what beliefs people are teaching. Oral teachings are difficult to collect because there are so many teachers across the world. The written word is easier to track. In this respect, there are two recent books that I think show where mainstream Modern Orthodox belief is today. Yes, there are those who teach beliefs that are farther to the left of these books and those that are farther to the right. However, it is my unproven contention that these books are fair representations of mainstream, centrist Orthodoxy.

    The first book is R. Barry Freundel's Contemporary Orthodox Judaism's Response to Modernity. The book is a few years old. R. Freundel divides the world of belief into multiple sections and offers a brief but thorough overview of contemporary Modern Orthodox thought. No controversial topic is overlooked and his confidence and eloquence allow him to present an Orthodoxy that is both traditional and thoughtful. I suspect that this book began as a primer for converts and/or returnees to observance but it really serves as an excellent reference for everyone.

    The second book is R. Chaim Navon's recently published Genesis and Jewish Thought. R. Navon addresses a wide variety of topics in depth, quoting from numerous sources and discussing prooftexts. The book is nominally based on Genesis but is much more about Jewish thought.

    Click here to read moreDespite the two books' similarities, they differ greatly in style. I would call R. Navon's book ponderous if that did not carry a negative connotation; it delves into topics and discusses them at length, taking readers deep into the discussions between thinkers throughout the millennia. R. Freundel's book stays on the surface of the topics. His book is easier to read without too much mental strain. R. Freundel's book also covers more ground and is a more thorough overview of contemporary thought.

    The similarities and differences between the two books can be seen if we compare how they treat two topics that appear in both books.

    Israel

    After an introduction, R. Freundel points out the importance of the land of Israel in the Bible and the importance of the messiah (and the attendant return to the land of Israel) in our prayer services. He then turns his attention to Israel in the thought of Nachmanides, and points out that even those who disagreed with Nachmanides still reserved a special place for the land. He then turns to modern (secular) Zionism, with a brief history and critique of Zionism and post-Zionism. R. Freundel then discusses religious anti-Zionism, non-Zionism and Zionism, pointing out their influences in contemporary Orthodox circles. He shows how manifests itself on the decision of whether or not to recite tachanun and/or hallel) on Israel Independence Day, offering an explanation for his practice to omit the former and recite the latter with a blessing.

    R. Navon begins his discussion of the land of Israel by arguing the point that Israel is not the natural homeland of the Jewish people, where we belong no matter what, but a temporary home that we lose if we do not follow God's law. He demonstrates this from a number of texts. Israel is unique in that God's presence is greater there. R. Navon then points out other unique aspects that have been emphasized by scholars (traditional and non-traditional) throughout the ages, such as Israel's climate, fruitful land, culture, providence, inherent sanctity, and connection to the Jewish people.

    The Problem of Evil

    Why is there bad in the world? R. Freundel begins by showing that this question is asked by the greatest biblical figures. He then describes the proper response in Jewish practice to tragedies. Sometimes, good things come out of terrible tragedies. Only after that, he discusses the various answers that have been offered throughout the ages to the problem of evil, and groups them into seven categories: 1) evil is a response to sin, 2) most evil is the results of human acts, 3) God limited Himself in order to allow the world to come into being, 4) this is the best of all possible worlds, 5) evil presents a challenge for people to meet, 6) evil purifies us of our sins, 7) God sometimes punishes us collectively by hiding His face. R. Freundel then analyzes the book of Job in depth, offering his unique insight into the biblical text.

    R. Navon posits that the question of evil is based on the fundamental assumptions that 1) God is the ultimate in goodness and truth, and 2) He enjoys ultimate power and strength. Evil in the world seems to undermine the unity of God. Therefore, belief in God's justice is not undermined by the Holocaust because God's justice is part of our definition of God. R. Navon offers a number of proposed solutions to the problem of evil: 1) apparent injustice will be resolved the world-to-come, as explained in two talmudic passages, 2) Maimonides divides the evil in the world into three categories: a) evils stemming from the fact that we are material beings (i.e. this is the best of all possible worlds), b) evils that men inflict upon each other, c) evils that we inflict upon ourselves. There are three weaknesses to these positions: i) they are based no the assumption that God does not intervene in nature, ii) the question remains why God does not intervene to prevent injustice, iii) is it true that this is the best possible world?, 3) there is no answer available to people. R. Navon builds on this last position based on the existential teachings of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik (and Emmanuel Levinas).

    Both books deal with the important questions facing a Jew in today's world: the Bible and literary and historical studies, morality, women's roles, etc. I found R. Freundel's book to be an easier read and more comprehensive, and R. Navon's book to be a broader survey that is intellectually provocative. In general, I believe that they both present a worldview that is representative of today's Modern Orthodoxy.


    Tzitzit - Cotton or Wool?

    By: Rabbi Ari Enkin

    Although wearing a Tallit Katan is always a commendable act, it is not always clear however whether doing so is a mitzva on a Torah level or rather a rabbinic one. The Gemara[1] discusses the topic of which materials may be used in the manufacture of clothing to qualify as "garments"[2] for the mitzva of Tzitzit according to Torah law. One approach in the Gemara argues that only wool and linen garments qualify for the mitzva of Tzitzit according to Torah law. According to another view, one may use any material to produce a Tallit garment.

    It seems that throughout the Torah, whenever “clothing” is discussed, it is typically a wool or linen garment that is implied.[3] Therefore, it may just be that garments made from other materials may not actually be truly considered “garments” from a Torah perspective. As such, when the Torah tells us to place Tzitzit on the four corners of our "garments"[4] it may just be that the Torah is only requiring Tzitzit to be tied on those garments made from wool or linen. Wearing Tzitzit on "garments" made from materials not recognized by Torah law would deprive one of the opportunity to fulfill the mitzva on a Torah level.

    Click here to read moreIndeed, the Shulchan Aruch[5] rules that it is only when one wears wool or linen garments that one truly fulfills the mitzva of Tzitzit on a Torah level. This is why many individuals are particular that the Tallit Katan which is worn under one’s clothes, or on top of them as is the practice of many Chassidim[6], is made from wool. Similarly, it is in deference to this view that the Tallit Gadol which is worn during the morning prayers is always made from wool. This ensures that those who wear a cotton Tallit Katan throughout the day will have at least fulfilled the mitzva of Tzitzit on a Torah level, according to all views, when having worn the Tallit Gadol for the morning prayers.

    The Rema however disagrees and rules that all types of materials and garments are included in the mitzva of Tzitzit, even according to Torah law.[7] Nevertheless, as mentioned, it is in order to comply with the stricter view of the Shulchan Aruch that many individuals are careful to wear only a Tallit Katan made from wool, even in the hot summer.[8]

    One who is uncomfortable wearing a wool Tallit Katan in the summer due to the heat should certainly consider wearing a cotton one. This is because it is vital that the Tzitzit garment be one that serves a clothing-type function and is a garment that one enjoys wearing.[9]Indeed, there have been eminent rabbis throughout the ages who dismissed the view of the Shulchan Aruch in favor of the Rema and only wore Tzitzit made from cotton.

    It seems however that Tzitzit would never be required on a four cornered leather or plastic garment. This is because plastic and leather are materials which all authorities rule are unfit for the use in clothing from the perspective of halacha.[10] The use of nylon and other synthetic materials for Tzitzit garments are also subject to considerable debate among contemporary halachic authorities and are therefore not recommended.[11]

    The differences in opinion concerning the use of Tzitzit made from synthetic materials are especially relevant for those who wear the somewhat popular mesh-like Tzitzit. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein was quite opposed to the use of mesh Tzitzit. In fact, it is reported that within a week of his view having been made public there was not a store in America that had continued selling them for quite some time. It is also noted that the mesh Tzitzit should be disqualified because they are "parutz meruba al ha'omed" – there are more holes in it than material, and such "styles" of clothing are certainly not the norm.[12] One who has always worn only wool Tzitzit and now wishes to change to cotton ones will have to be "matir neder" before doing so.[13] One should only use Tzitzit strings that were hand made.[14]

    Some authorities suggest that the issue of whether or not the mitzva of Tzitzit is fulfilled on a Torah level has nothing to do with which materials are used but rather the way in which the materials are manufactured into clothing. According to this approach, anything that is woven in the process of its manufacture would be considered as "wool or linen" for this purpose. As such, cotton, which is woven in the process of producing it into clothing, would be included in the Torah’s definition of "clothing".[15]

    Notwithstanding all that has been mentioned above, common custom is to put Tzitzit strings on all four-cornered garments regardless of what they are made from.[16] It is interesting to note that theoretically one could go an entire lifetime without ever fulfilling the mitzva of Tzitzit. This is because there is no actual requirement to ever wear Tzitzit, rather, the only requirement is to wear Tzitzit on four-cornered garments should one choose to wear one.[17] Nevertheless, common custom is to wear a Tallit Katan all day regardless of the lack of a formal requirement to do so. Such conduct has become the indication of one who is committed to Torah observance.[18] The Talmud[19] teaches that one who is scrupulous in wearing Tzitzit will merit seeing God’s Holy Presence and that the mitzva of Tzitzit is equal to all the other mitzvot of the Torah combined.[20]



    NEXT WEEK: "Tying Tzitzit at Night". Please send me your lesser-known and obscure sources as well as anecdotes for inclusion. I truly thank and appreciate all those who sent me tidbits in preparation for this article. rabbiari@hotmail.com

    **********************************


    [1] Menachot 39b
    [2] This article is only discussing the materials relating to the manufacture of the garment on which Tzitzit are attached, regardless of whether the term "Tzitzit" or "Tallit Katan" is being used. Unless otherwise stated, we are not discussing the actual Tzitzit strings.
    [3] Vayikra 13:47
    [4] Numbers 15:37-41
    [5] O.C. 9:1,6
    [6] O.C. 8:11, 24:1
    [7] Rema O.C. 9:1
    [8] Mishna Berura 9:5, Igrot Moshe O.C. 2:1, Chayei Adam 11:5; Shulchan Aruch Harav 9:4
    [9] Beit Yosef O.C. 10
    [10] Menachot 40b, O.C. 10:4, Mishna Berura 10:11, Levush 10:4, Chayei Adam 11:6
    [11] Igrot Moshe 2:1. It is noted that Rabbi Yosef Henkin permitted these types of garments.
    [12] Rabbi Hershel Schachter
    [13] Ruling of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein
    [14] Divrei Chaim 2:1
    [15] Levush O.C. 10:14, Har Tzvi O.C. 9, Tzitz Eliezer, 12:3
    [16] O.C. 9:1
    [17] Rambam Tzitzit 3:11
    [18] Igrot Moshe 4:4
    [19] Menachot 43b, O.C. 24:6
    [20] Nedarim 25a, The gematria, or numerical value, of the Hebrew word Tzitzit is 600, plus the five knots and eight strings equals 613, the number mitzvot in the Torah


    Sunday, February 17, 2008

    Responses to Questions on the Essay by R. Avraham Ben Ha-Rambam

    In a previous post, I posted questions to be posted on this blog from R. Moshe Meiselman that were sent to me by someone involved in the controversy over R. Slifkin's books. The questions revolve around R. Avraham Ben Ha-Rambam's essay on the aggados (non-legal Talmudic literature) in which he states that the Sages were sometimes mistaken on scientific issues. R. Meiselman asked questions about the authenticity of the essay. (See also this post). What follows are the questions and my responses. I was also privileged to have R. Chaim Eisen respond to some of the questions and his letter is provided after mine (with permission).

    But first, while I acknowledge that this is a discussion of importance in terms of historical fact, I believe that it should have no normative significance. This is because the opinion offered in the essay by R. Avraham Ben Ha-Rambam has been offered by other Rishonim and Acharonim, and accepted by Gedolei Torah throughout the ages. I once again direct readers to Rav Yitzchak Herzog's Judaism: Law and Ethics, p. 152 (link).

    Click here to read moreSecond, I have great respect for R. Moshe Meiselman's learning. The one time I spoke in learning with him I raised an obscure Mishneh La-Melekh and not only was he familiar with it but he was able to correct my explanation of it's views. The following is simply my own understanding of this issue that is offered in the spirit of respectful discussion and in response to a direct request.
    1) There is an obvious disagreement between the Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayos and the author of this piece in the understanding of the gemorroh in Chulin 124a. The author of this piece says that this means that one would not have to listen to Yehoshua bin Nun.

    The Rambam writes that this means that prophecy has no place in altering halochoh - a basic foundation of the Rambam's view of halochoh. Are these positions consistent? If not, where do we find that the son ever disagrees with his father on basic issues.
    This is an interesting point but one whose significance is, I believe, minimal. The Rambam quotes the Gemara about disagreeing with Yehoshua as proving that a prophet has no special status in issues of halakhah. This is a very important aspect of Rambam's view of the Oral Torah. However, R. Avraham quotes the Gemara as showing that one may disagree with a great scholar of an earlier generation, even Yehoshua.

    I don't see R. Avraham as disagreeing with his father's view but only of his interpretation of this Gemara. The disagreement is interesting but nothing particularly out of the ordinary. He has disagreed with his father on bigger things. There is no indication that R. Avraham disagrees with his father's principle, just the interpretation of a single talmudic passage.
    2) The Rambam writes that one may use an even tekumah to prevent miscarriage and go out with it on Shabbos. The Rambam also says this in Moreh Nevuchim. The Rashba says that the Rambam was of the opinion that this was a result of Chazal's experimentation, not that of the general culture.

    According to this author, this is not so and one may not wear it because of darchay ho'emori and certainly not on Shabbos. Where do we find that the son ever disagreed with the father on an explicit halochoh in Mishneh Torah?
    I disagree with the implied reading of R. Avraham. All he says is that an even tekumah (an amulet worn by pregnant women) does not work; he does not say that one may not wear it. This is entirely consistent with the Meiri's approach (Commentary to Shabbos 53a, 60a, 67a; Pesachim 109b and elsewhere) that many of these types of "segulah" remedies serve as placebos. The question is whether the Rambam followed this same approach.

    The Rashba (Responsa 1:413) that R. Meiselman quoted notes apparent contradictions among the Rambam's various writings on this subject. For example, the Rambam writes that amulets do not work (Moreh Nevukhim 1:61) but allows someone to wear a proven amulet on Shabbos (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Shabbos 19:14). However, the Rashba offers no resolution of these contradictions and, as the Arukh Ha-Shulchan (Orach Chaim 301:80) notes, gives no clear conclusion on the subject. In general, I've found two approaches to understanding the Rambam's position on the issue of "segulah" remedies.

    1. The Radbaz (Responsa 5:63,153) writes that the Rambam believes that there is no medical benefit from "segulah" remedies. However, since people think that there is medical benefit one is allowed to wear "segulah" remedies on Shabbos and there is no issue of carrying on Shabbos or "darkei ha-Emori" (forbidden heathen practices). This position of the Radbaz has the Rambam and R. Avraham agreeing entirely on this subject. I believe that this can be inferred from Moreh Nevukhim 3:37 (see R. Yosef Kaffach's translation p. 359, the text near n. 40).

    2. Maharam Chabib (Tosefes Yom Ha-Kippurim, Yoma 83a) explains that the Rambam allows for "segulah" remedies that have been tested and confirmed by doctors. Even though doctors cannot explain how these remedies work, they will not deny proven remedies. But unproven remedies are to be ignored. This is also the approach of Maharatz Chajes (Tiferes Le-Moshe ch. 4 in Kol Sifrei Maharatz Chajes vol. 1 p. 423).

    In recent literature, R. Yosef Kaffach in his edition of Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Shabbos 19:13 n. 33 follows the approach of the Radbaz. So do R. Yehudah Levi in his The Science in Torah p. 136 and Dr. Marc B. Shapiro in his article "Maimonidean Halakhah and Superstition" in Arthur Hyman ed., Maimonidean Studies vol. 4 (2000), pp. 99-100. R. J. David Bleich follows the approach of Maharam Chabib in "Maimonides on the Distinction between Science and Pseudoscience" in Fred Rosner and Samuel Kottek eds., Moses Maimonides: Physician, Scientist, and Philosopher, pp. 253-254 n. 3, quoted in this post.

    The position in R. Avraham's essay does not necessarily contradict the Rambam but rather supports the Radbaz's explanation of the Rambam.
    3) While the Cairo Geniza does have a partial version of the work by Rabbeinu Avrohom ben hoRambam, is there any indication that this segment quoted in the Ein Yaakov actually appears in that work? Furthermore, if that work expressed mainstream ideas why is it that we only find it in the genizah?
    There are multiple manuscripts of the essay! The essay seems to have been part of the book Ha-Maspik Le-Ovdei Hashem, of which the vast majority has been lost. It is not a question why we only find it in the genizah because 1) we find it elsewhere, 2) most of the book is not even found in the genizah, and 3) the genizah has been a treasure trove of valuable manuscripts from all the old books over centuries that were placed to rest in it (it has unquestionably not been merely a depository for deficient and erroneous works but has been confirmed countless times as a valuable resource for accurate manuscripts). The passage in question is not (to my knowledge) in the genizah fragments but it is in the Oxford, Paris and JTS manuscripts.
    4)Where did Reb Shlomo Zalman [Auerbach] say that one may not question this opinion?
    Shemiras Ha-Guf Ve-Ha-Nefesh, p. 54 (translation taken from an essay on Zootorah.com):

    I saw in the work Nishmas Avraham 14:4 that he brings the words of Rav Sherira Gaon and Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam, and rates this view as one of the reasons why we cannot use the medical cures brought in the Talmud; and the gaon Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach raised the point that it is appropriate to bring this view as "some say," but the main approach is with the other views. I asked Rav Shlomo Zalman who are those views that argue with Rav Sherira Gaon and Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam. He wrote to me as follows: "At the moment I do not remember if there is someone who actually argues, or even if there is anyone who is able to argue with them. But it could be that my intent was that since many have given the reason of nature having changed, and did not mention at all the aspect of improvements and increased knowledge in medical methods in our time, therefore I raised the point that it should be written as 'some say'..."
    5) To say that it agrees with Rambam because he quotes the gemoroh in Pesochim is rather outlandish. Everyone had that gemoroh. Only Rabbeinu Tam had a unique view of it.
    It is not just that they both quote the Gemara, but that is significant also. If Rav Meiselman is willing to concede that the majority of commentators understood the Gemara as R. Avraham does, then there is little further to discuss because that understanding is an explicit support of the idea that the Sages could have been mistaken on scientific matters. However, there are multiple similarities between this essay and R. Avraham's other writings, this being only one of them. See R. Elazar Hurvitz's overview of the manuscripts for details.

    Let me just close by stating that there have been some very personal remarks made about this issue and about Rabbi Slifkin in particular. I believe that these are regrettable and hope that proper amends will be made and interpersonal peace restored. No further public comment on this is necessary.
    [Responses from R. Chaim Eisen:]

    I feel compelled to respond to the questions Rabbi Meiselman “posed in the interest of open discussion about the passage by R. Avraham ben Ha-Rambam regarding the sages of the Talmud and science.” I am limiting my focus to the first two points Rabbi Meiselman raised. In both, he questions the compatibility of the perspectives ascribed to R. Avraham b. Rambam with views articulated by Rambam in his writings. It is exclusively regarding these questions of compatibility that I feel obliged to comment here.

    1. Quoting Rabbi Meiselman, “There is an obvious disagreement between the Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayos and the author of this piece in the understanding of the gemorroh in Chulin 124a. The author of this piece says that this means that one would not have to listen to Yehoshua bin Nun. The Rambam writes that this means that prophecy has no place in altering halochoh -- a basic foundation of the Rambam's view of halochoh,” etc. --

    The “obvious disagreement” is not at all obvious to me. Rambam, in his Introduction to the Mishnah, understands the passage in Chullin 124a as excluding prophetic contributions to Talmudic discussions, since the latter must be predicated solely upon arguments deriving from “סברא” -- i.e., human reasoning. Any claim that cannot be supported in this manner is therefore rejected. This is precisely the point made in Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal. The context differs, but the message again is that any appeal to an authority that is not verifiable through human reasoning (including unattested scientific claims) is inadmissible in Talmudic discussions. To quote from the standard Hebrew translation, the implication of the passage in Chullin 124a is, “לא הייתי מאמין בו -- ואף על פי שהוא נביא -- כיון שאין בידו יכולת להודיע הענין בכוונה בדרך הסברה והמשא והמתן והדרכים שבהם ניתן התלמוד להדרש.” The essence of the more general point in Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal is that trusting uncorroborated scientific pronouncements is tantamount to favoritism in judgment. This is completely consistent with Rambam’s position and borne out perfectly by the citation from Chullin.

    2. Quoting Rabbi Meiselman, “The Rambam writes that one may use an even tekumah to prevent miscarriage and go out with it on Shabbos. The Rambam also says this in Moreh Nevuchim,” etc. --

    To be precise, while Rambam rules thus in Hilkhot Shabbat 19:14, I am unaware of any mention of “even tekumah” per se in Moreh Ha-Nevukhim. (Rashba mentions “even tekumah” while analyzing Rambam’s views on “Darkhei ha-Emori,” in his lengthy correspondence with R. Abba Mari b. Mosheh b. Yosef Ha-Yarchi, on this subject. [See Shut Rashba, I, 413, and Minchat Kena’ot, letters 3 and 5.]) However, Rambam, both in his commentary on Mishnah Shabbat 6:10 and in Moreh Ha-Nevukhim 3:37, does mention other similar “segulot” introduced in the same Talmudic passage that refers to “even tekumah” (see Mishnah Shabbat 6:10 and T.B. Shabbat 67a). Understanding Rambam’s position is a major issue addressed by many rishonim (besides Rashba and R. Abba Mari b. Mosheh b. Yosef Ha-Yarchi, mentioned above), and an exhaustive discussion is definitely beyond the scope of these comments. Nonetheless, the most basic challenge is reconciling Rambam’s ban of paranormal agents (e.g., see Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 11:16, Moreh 3:37, and below) with the Talmudic allowance, which he cites as Halakhah, regarding artifacts construed as medicinally valuable that would otherwise be forbidden as “Darkhei ha-Emori.”

    This is by no means a problem unique to cross-referencing Rambam’s various works. For example, in his Mishnah commentary, he scathingly derides spurious claims pertaining to so-called holy names, regarding which “the writers of talismans and the fools among people rave” (com. on Mishnah Sotah 7:6; see also com. on Mishnah Avodah Zarah 4:7 and his comments regarding talismans, idem, and Moreh 1:61-63). Yet, in the same composition, he explains (and evidently supports -- see also Hilkhot Shabbat 19:14, 20:13, and 26:14) the license to bear a “talisman produced by an expert” (“kamea mumcheh”) in the public domain on Shabbat (com. on Mishnah Shabbat 6:2). Likewise, in Moreh 3:37, Rambam states, regarding “Darkhei ha-Emori,” “In order to keep people away from all magical practices, it has been prohibited to observe any of [the idolaters’] usages, even those attaching to agricultural and pastoral activities and other activities of this kind. I mean all that is said to be useful, but is not required by speculation concerning nature, and takes its course, in their opinion, in accordance with occult properties. This is the meaning of its dictum: ‘And ye shall not walk in the customs of the nation’ (VaYikra 20:23), these being those that are called by [the Sages], may their memory be blessed, Amorite usages. For they are branches of magical practices, inasmuch as they are things not required by reasoning concerning nature and lead to magical practices that of necessity seek support in astrological notions. Accordingly the matter is turned into a glorification and a worship of the stars” (The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963], II, 543). Yet, again in the same passage, in an ostensive nod to similarly occult practices, he writes, “You must not consider as a difficulty certain things that [the Sages] have permitted, as for instance the nail of one who is crucified and a fox’s tooth (see Mishnah Shabbat 6:10 and T.B. Shabbat 67a). For in those times these things were considered to derive from experience and accordingly pertained to medicine and entered into the same class as the hanging of a peony upon an epileptic and the giving of a dog’s excrements in cases of the swelling of the throat and fumigation with vinegar and marcasite in cases of hard swellings of the tendons. For it is allowed to use all remedies similar to these that experience has shown to be valid even if reasoning does not require them. For they pertain to medicine and their efficacy may be ranged together with the purgative action of aperient medicines” (Guide, II, 544; these are the practices, together with “even tekumah,” that Rambam rules are permitted in Hilkhot Shabbat 19:14).

    A partial resolution of the apparent inconsistency may lie in the placebo effect of “segulot,” which Rambam seems to countenance as having real, albeit feeble, prognostic implications (see com. on Mishnah Yoma 8:6). In addition, regarding the laws governing what may or may not be borne in the public domain on Shabbat, Rambam (com. on Mishnah Shabbat 6:10 and Moreh, loc. cit.) cites favorably the Talmudic principle, articulated by Abbayyei and Rava, “Anything that has the status of medicine does not have the status of ‘Darkhei ha-Emori’” (Shabbat 67a and Chullin 77b). Significantly, in his Halakhic code, Rambam quotes this allowance but qualifies it by specifying, “This is if the physicians say that it is beneficial” (Hilkhot Shabbat 19:13). (Note that Rashi takes a very different approach to the aforementioned principle; see his commentary on Shabbat and Chullin, loc. cit.) For Rambam, on the most basic plane, the prohibitions of “Darkhei ha-Emori” are canceled when mundane, terrestrial experience (as opposed to an appeal to the paranormal) corroborates claims for the efficacy of an activity. This will remain true, even if the efficacy is unexplained, tenuous, or merely psychologically induced. Similarly, the question pertaining to the laws of Shabbat is whether one can tenably argue that the article -- which one would be otherwise forbidden to bear in the public domain -- is not being “borne” in an Halakhic sense since it serving as a palliative. Do such statements attest to actual medicinal efficacy? Clearly, to Rambam, they do not. He conspicuously justifies the use of what would otherwise be forbidden articles because “in those times these things were considered to derive from experience and accordingly pertained to medicine” (Moreh, loc. cit.) -- implying that he deemed this conclusion uncorroborated in his own times and, potentially, scientifically flawed.

    Without dwelling on this to excess, note that the above resolution is comparable to that which R. Menachem b. Shelomoh Ha-Me’iri presents, in his Beit Ha-Bechirah on Shabbat 66b-67a; see also his similar comments in Beit Ha-Bechirah on Pesachim 109b, on Sanhedrin 67b, and on Chullin 77b. R. Yedayah ben Avraham HaPenini Bedersi, in his Iggeret Hitnatzelut to Rashba (quoted in Shut Rashba, I, 418), takes an approach that is essentially equivalent. R. Nissim Gerondi presents a somewhat different, but substantively comparable, formulation, in his commentary on Hilkhot Rif on Shabbat and Chullin, loc. cit., and, with much greater elaboration, in Derashot Ha-Ran, Derush 4 and especially Derush 12. Rashba’s view, as emerges in his lengthy correspondence with R. Abba Mari b. Mosheh b. Yosef Ha-Yarchi on the subject, cited above, is substantively very different. Considering the nuances that distinguish among these approaches is beyond the scope of these comments.

    3. Quoting Rabbi Meiselman, “According to this author, this is not so and one may not wear it because of darchay ho'emori and certainly not on Shabbos. Where do we find that the son ever disagreed with the father on an explicit halochoh in Mishneh Torah?” --

    Given the above, consider what Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal actually states in the standard Hebrew translation regarding “even tekumah”: “שאנחנו מוצאים להם אומרים שלא נתאמת ולא נתקיימו בגמרא דברי הרפואות, וכענין אבן תקומה, שאמרו, שמונע להפיל הנפלים, שלא נתאמת.” The statement pertains to neither that which is prohibited as “Darkhei ha-Emori” nor what one is permitted to bear in the public domain on Shabbat, the exclusive foci of Rambam’s rulings, as noted above. Rather, this statement addresses the question of scientific accuracy -- which it discounts -- which, as opposed to Halakhic considerations, was the sole focus of its context. Far from contradicting Rambam’s statements on the subject, it veritably flows from the dichotomy that derives from Rambam, as noted above.

    4. Apart from establishing that the statements Rabbi Meiselman cites from Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal are completely consistent with Rambam’s views, some perspective is necessary. As Rabbi Student notes, no one impugned the attribution of Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal to R. Avraham b. Rambam until the recent objections to Rabbi Slifkin’s citation of it. Far from an obscure work, it has been published in the introductory material of the popular Ein Ya‘akov for centuries, and no reputable scholars ever doubted its authenticity as R. Avraham b. Rambam’s work. I must be blunt: Transparently, the current objection to the work’s authenticity is due to its attitude regarding the Sages’ fallibility in their non-Halakhic, scientific statements. (The work explicitly affirms the Sages’ authority in all Halakhic statements; the reconciliation of these views is not the subject of this discussion.) We should then ask whether this very approach, concerning the fallibility of the Sages’ scientific views, is consistent with Rambam’s. Consider, then, the following two quotations from Rambam’s Moreh Ha-Nevukhim:

    “You should not find it blameworthy that the opinion of Aristotle disagrees with that of the Sages, may their memory be blessed, as to this point [pertaining to astronomy].... You know, on the other hand, that in these astronomical matters they preferred the opinion of the sages of the nations of the world to their own. For they explicitly say: The sages of the nations of the world have vanquished. And this is correct. For everyone who argues in speculative matters does this according to the conclusions to which he was led by his speculation. Hence the conclusion whose demonstration is correct is believed” (Moreh 2:8; Guide, II, 267).

    “Do not ask of me to show that everything [the Sages] said concerning astronomical matters conforms to the way things really are. For at that time mathematics were imperfect. They did not speak about this as transmitters of dicta of the prophets, but rather because in those times they were men of knowledge in these fields or because they had heard these dicta from the men of knowledge who lived in those times” (Moreh 3:14; Guide, II, 459).

    Note that the view regarding non-Halakhic, scientific statements of the Sages, exemplified by these citations, is neither unique to, nor originated with, Rambam. R. Sherira Ga’on and R. Hai Ga’on articulated it in a responsum (see B. M. Lewin, Tachkemoni, I, 41), two centuries before Moreh Ha-Nevukhim, on the efficacy -- or even safety -- of Talmudic medicinal remedies (see Gittin 67b-70a). Indeed, Rabbi Meiselman concedes that most commentators understand this to have been the thrust of a well-known passage in the Talmud itself (see Pesachim 94b). However, our focus in these comments is not establishing the precedence or pedigree of this perspective, only the consistency of its presentation in Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal with its presentation in Rambam. Likewise, the dichotomy between the Sages’ fallibility in non-Halakhic, scientific statements and their authority in all Halakhic statements, expressed in Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal, echoes Rambam’s comments on the list of maladies rendering an animal an Halakhic terefah. (See Hilkhot Shechitah 10:12-13, and see also the comments of R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz on them, in Chazon Ish, Yoreh De‘ah, 5:3.) Again, apart from establishing consistency, understanding this dichotomy is also not our focus at present.

    In closing, I feel obliged to invoke an additional statement by Rambam, in Hilkhot Kiddush Ha-Chodesh 17:24, in which he justifies his reliance, idem, upon the works of ancient Greek astronomers: “Since all these matters are [corroborated] by clear evidence in which there is no blemish and regarding which it is impossible for a person to have afterthoughts, one should not be misgiven regarding the author, whether prophets composed [the work] or [other] nations composed it. For regarding anything whose reason is revealed and whose truth is known by clear evidence in which there is no blemish, one relies not upon the individual who stated it or taught it, rather upon the evidence that was revealed and the reason that was known.” Rambam aphoristically affirmed the same principle in his introduction to “Shemonah Perakim” in his Mishnah commentary, justifying reliance upon non-Jewish philosophers (primarily, Aristotle and neo-Aristotelians) in that work: “Hear the truth from whoever says it.” The author of Ma’amar al Odot Aggadot Chazal stresses this very point, attributing it to his father: “וענינים אלו וכיוצא בהם -- אין להבינם ולהתבונן אותם מפני שהיה גדול העצה והחכמה, אלא מפני הראיות והמופתים שיש עליהם. וכן אמר אבא מורי ז"ל ביאורה. והוא דבר מבואר, וענין קל בעיני כל נוטה מעל תאות גופו.” In other words, let us, unbiased, allow the evidence to speak for itself. One hopes that, in that vein, by now, we can finally, conclusively, lay the question the author’s identity (and that of his father) to rest.


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