The Suvalker Rav

From this week's Hama'ayan:

R' David Lifschitz z"l

R' Lifschitz, known as the "Suvalker Rav," was a important figure in American Jewish life for nearly five decades, as a rosh yeshiva and as president of the Ezras Torah welfare organization from 1976 until his passing. He was born in Minsk in 1906, but moved to Grodno as a child, where he later studied in Yeshivat Shaar Hatorah of R' Shimon Shkop z"l. From there he transferred to the Mir yeshiva where he studied under R' Eliezer Yehuda Finkel z"l and Rav Yerucham Levovitz z"l.

At age 24, R' Lifschitz married Zipporah Chava Yoselewitz, daughter of the rabbi of Suvalk. Two years later, in 1935, R' Lifschitz succeeded his father-in-law as rabbi of Suvalk, a title he carried for the rest of his life.

R' Lifschitz suffered tremendous persecution at the hands of the Gestapo before the Jews were expelled from Suvalk. One-half of Suvalk's 6,000 Jews (including the Lifshitz family) escaped to Lithuania. In June 1941, R' Lifschitz arrived in San Francisco on a boat that carried several other leadingsages. R' Lifschitz's first position was in Chicago, but he soon moved to Yeshivat Rabbeinu Yitzchak Elchanan (the rabbinical school of what later became Yeshiva University), where he remained for the rest of his life. R' Lifschitz passed away on 9 Tammuz 5753 / 1993.

A small number of R' Lifschitz's shmuessen / ethical lectures were printed posthumously under the title Tehilah Le'David. Several of these relate to the subject of "shalom," such as one from Yom Kippur 1974 when he said:

When we say "Shalom aleichem," we are not merely greeting someone; we are blessing him. "Shalom" is a name of G-d, meaning "completeness." "Shalom" / "Peace" means that the whole cosmos has achieved a state of completion through uniting to serve G-d. Whereas man was created lacking, it is his job to complete himself . . .
Israel today [one year after the Yom Kippur War] is in a state of truce. There are agreements, but is that peace? Is a cease-fire peace? Real shalom can exist only when Hashem's awe is over all His handiwork, united to do His will (paraphrasing the Yom Kippur prayers). Shalom cannot be just the absence of war, because peace is completeness, a name of G-d.

I actually translated one of the chapters in Tehilah Le-David.

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Is Darwin Kosher?

From today's Wall Street Journal (p. W11): link. Note that you can buy The Challenge of Creation and place an advance order for Sacred Monsters at the Yashar website:

A Tradition's Evolution: Is Darwin Kosher?
By EVAN R. GOLDSTEIN

The Wall Street Journal
June 29, 2007

Last month, 600 people turned out for a Yeshiva University fund-raiser at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. The museum, which stands as a monument to science, houses one of the world's most extensive collections of dinosaur fossils. The dinner itself was held in the dramatic Milstein Hall of Ocean Life, which features a massive blue whale that hangs suspended in midair; intricate dioramas modeled on the flora and fauna of the planet's oceans line the walls. Everything about the affair suggested that Yeshiva, the intellectual epicenter of Modern Orthodox Jewish life in America, is very much at ease in the world of secular science.

This impression is confirmed by Carl Feit, who is an ordained rabbi and Talmudic scholar as well as chairman of the science division at Yeshiva College. Prof. Feit says that in nearly a quarter-century of teaching introductory biology, he has always taught evolution -- supported by traditional Jewish source material -- and that "there has never been a blip on the radar here." His assessment echoes the official line of the Modern Orthodox rabbinical association, which states that evolution is entirely consistent with Judaism.
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The seeming ease with which this branch of Judaism has embraced science can in large part be credited to the towering intellectual legacy of Moses Maimonides. In his 12th-century masterpiece, "Guide to the Perplexed," Maimonides opened the door to a Judaism unfettered by a literal reading of religious texts. For many Jews the persuasive case for evolution does indeed amount to a crisis of faith, but the Maimonidean precedent of figurative interpretation provides a framework within which conflicts arising between Torah and science can be argued away. To be sure, some arguments are more compelling than others (and a great many are not compelling at all). But in contrast to many observant Christians, there is a greater willingness of these believers to live with such inconsistencies.

This practice has long been on display even in the more rigid Orthodox precincts of the Jewish world, where many prominent rabbis were quick to reconcile the Torah with the truths of science. "It is the power of the Torah that all theories can be included," wrote one Montreal-based Orthodox rabbi in the summer of 1925, at the time of the Scopes trial. A few years earlier, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, chief rabbi of pre-state Palestine, assured his followers that evolution, "more so than all other philosophical theories, conforms to the kabbalistic secrets of the world."

Yet there are important exceptions to this tradition of moderation, and in certain parts of the ultra-Orthodox world, Darwinism has always been denounced as subversive and dangerous. Take the case of Rabbi Natan Slifkin. A boyish-looking ultra-Orthodox Israeli scholar and science writer, Mr. Slifkin, who publishes his books in English, is popularly known as the "Zoo Rabbi" because of his consuming fascination with the animal kingdom and his Steve Irwin-esque pedagogical style. In recent years he has emerged as a central figure in the ultra-Orthodox struggle to define the proper place of science within Judaism.

Rabbi Slifkin's work has been publicly denounced by 23 prominent ultra-Orthodox rabbis who attacked his beliefs as "nonsense" and ordered that Rabbi Slifkin himself "burn all his writings." The basis for the rabbinical protest differs from that of most Christian fundamentalists who oppose Darwin. Whereas Christian creationism is based on a literal reading of the Bible, most Orthodox Jews who reject evolution tend to do so because they find it incompatible not only with the Torah, but with other Jewish texts and centuries of rabbinic commentary.

Rabbi Slifkin does not consider Darwin a threat to his faith. Relying heavily on Maimonides he argues not only that there is no incompatibility between traditional Jewish faith and the laws of nature, but that a full understanding of one depends on a full understanding of the other. "Appreciating the role and rule of natural law is an essential prerequisite to appreciating the role and rule of the spiritual law of Torah," Rabbi Slifkin writes in "The Science of Torah." "To be sure, we have scientific explanations for phenomena. But this does not paint G-d out of the picture. On the contrary -- it presents a new picture, that of the body of scientific
law, for Him to have painted."

To Rabbi Slifkin, God set the scientific process in motion. Yet he sharply dismisses the claims of intelligent-design advocates like Michael Behe as "wrong and dangerous." He thinks it "strange" that such people feel compelled to "find gaps in biology in order to give God something to do." After all, "Man's physical ancestry in the animal kingdom has no bearing on his unique spiritual nature. Whether our physical bodies originate from mud or monkey, our fundamental identity does not relate to either."

According to Marc Swetlitz, co-editor of "Jewish Tradition and the Challenge of Darwinism," "the Slifkin affair has forced both Jews and non-Jews to remember that there are Jews who oppose evolution and they are not afraid to say so. I think there is more Jewish anti-evolution writing out there now than ever before."

Rabbi Slifkin has not given an inch to his critics despite the animus directed toward him by some neighbors and colleagues. He has taken to the Internet to mount an exhaustive defense of his writings, meticulously countering each and every argument made against him. And though he was dropped by his religious publisher and distributor as a result of the controversy, he has since signed with a new outfit that is planning to release a vastly expanded version of one of his banned books, "Sacred Monsters," in July.

The animating idea that runs through all of Rabbi Slifkin's work is his insistence that "science and monotheism go hand-in-hand." At a moment when our national debate tends to cast religion and science in adversarial roles, he reminds us that belief in the former needn't imply hostility to the latter.


Mr. Goldstein is a contributing editor at Moment Magazine.

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Another Soloveitchik Machzor

The new Rav Soloveitchik machzor for Rosh Hashanah is available now at an advanced discount of 25% here.

See here about the Yom Kippur machzor: I, II

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Bless Me for Peace

The Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism includes that we may only pray to God and to no other being (link). This precludes praying to angels. According to the Rambam, this is tantamount to idolatry. This position was agreed to by other rishonim, such as the Ramban (Kisvei Ha-Ramban, vol. 1 p. 171) and the Sefer Ha-Ikkarim (1:3).

Based on this, the Maharal questioned a passage in selichos called "Makhnisei Rachamim" in which we ask angels to bring our prayers to God. According to the Maharal, this is tantamount to idolatry. The Chasam Sofer (Responsa, Orach Chaim 166) elaborates on this Maharal and says that he personally inconspicuosly skips "Makhnisei Rachamim" for this reason.

This same issue seems to arise in the third stanza of Shalom Aleikhem -- "Bar'khuni Le-Shalom" -- in which we ask angels to bless us. For this reason, the practice in the Volozhiner Yeshiva was to skip the last two stanzas of Shalom Aleikhem. I believe that this is the practice of R. Hershel Schachter and I know that R. Mordechai Willig does this (as do I). (cf. Halakhic Man, p. 44; Nefesh Ha-Rav, pp. 215-216.)

However, the Minchas Elazar (1:68 and in Nimukei Orach Chaim 559:3) strongly defends the practice. Along with talmudic proofs, there are two rishonim -- Shibbolei Ha-Leket no. 282) and Responsa Mahari Bruna (no. 275) -- who explicitly permit this type of practice. The She’arim Metzuyanim ba-Halakhah (128:7) also allows it.

For a broader overview of this topic and a discussion of an eighteenth century debate about this, see this article (PDF) by David Malkiel.

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Sacred Monsters

Yashar is now accepting advance orders for R. Natan Slifkin's new book Sacred Monsters!

Unicorns, mermaids, dragons, and phoenixes may feel at home in fantasy literature, but references to these and other mysterious creatures go back much further in history. The Bible, Talmud, and Midrash refer to many such strange creatures. In this beautifully designed and richly illustrated book, Natan Slifkin, the famed “zoo rabbi” and author of Seasons of Life, Nature's Song, and The Challenge of Creation, examines a host of mythic and not so mythic creatures from both their Torah descriptions and modern zoological research, giving us a new perspective on the interface between science, myth, and Torah thought.

Greatly expanding on a prior book, Mysterious Creatures, Rabbi Slifkin explores conflicts between the Talmud and science in the context of Torah mysteries of zoology. The Talmud and Midrash discuss a wide range of bizarre creatures, including mermaids, unicorns, griffins, dragons, sea-serpents and phoenixes, as well as strange biological concepts such as spontaneous generation. Sacred Monsters discusses these cases in detail and brings a range of different approaches for understanding them. It is an essential book for any student or educator who has ever struggled with conflicts between the Talmud and science. Strikingly designed, and including extraordinary photographs and illustrations, this is a truly stimulating work.

The goal of this book is not merely to persuade readers that the Talmud and Midrash are worthy of their interest. It is important to discuss these creatures for the same reason that the Sages of the Talmud and Torah scholars throughout the ages saw fit to discuss them -- namely, that they are also part of Torah. Torah is not just about history, religious ritual and laws of interpersonal conduct. It is an extremely broad field of study that encompasses many different topics. Some areas of the Torah are more popular or more relevant than others, but we should not neglect the others. The animals of this book are discussed in classical Jewish literature for a variety of reasons. With some, such as the tachash, it is a matter of understanding the construction of the Tabernacle. With others, such as the mermaid, the goal is to clarify a matter of law. And with yet others, such as Leviathan, the point is to convey various theological messages.

Furthermore, there is a particular pressing need for a book of this nature. When people encounter references to such creatures in the Talmud, they can be left with anything from gnawing questions to a severe crisis of faith. Did such creatures really exist? Did the Sages of the Talmud really believe in such creatures? What are we to make of it? This book studies the history of the various approaches that have traditionally been taken by Torah scholars in resolving such issues.

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Praise for the Book

“Rabbi Natan Slifkin’s newest book is a delightful mix of Talmudic teachings, zoological science, and historical investigations. Anyone who ever doubted the comprehensiveness of our Torah will now be convinced that kulah bah – there is a place in it even for ‘sacred monsters.’ Rabbi Slifkin is to be commended for once again offering us a work which answers questions, informs, and, in this case, even entertains.”

— Rabbi Dr. Tzvi Hersh Weinreb, Executive Vice President, The Orthodox Union

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“References in the Talmud and Midrash to curious zoological phenomena are often more mystifying than the creatures themselves. Rabbi Slifkin’s thorough scholarship, so well proven in his previous works, comes through once again. Even more important than providing answers to thorny questions surrounding the subjects of the book’s title, this work helps the student plot a steady course through the sometimes churning waters of the Sages’ science. How much did they rely on the science of their day? When did they—and when did they not—mean to be taken literally? Rabbi Slifkin provides answers consistent with the spirit of our mesorah. By doing so, the profundity of the Torah of our Sages shines with even greater brilliance.”

— Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein, Author, Maharal: Be’er HaGolah

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“Rabbi Natan Slifkin’s new book, Sacred Monsters, is a very impressive work, combining exceptionally broad scholarship in such varied fields as science, classical literature, and the Jewish tradition. It provides fascinating insights into the literature of legendary creatures and their possible origins. In this particular book, the author has managed to avoid the many pitfalls awaiting anyone treating the intersection between science and Torah.”

— Professor Yehudah Leo Levi, Rector Emeritus, Jerusalem College of Technology, Author, Torah and Science

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Place your order for the book here.

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Kol Not-Ishah

There is an article in The Jerusalem Post about a 20-year old yeshiva student in Israel whose singing voice sounds like a female's. Because of this, his songs have been banned by certain Haredi radio stations (link).

There is a general halakhah that a man may not hear a woman sing (see here: I, II, III). However, there is a debate regarding hearing a woman's recorded voice. On the one hand, one is not technically hearing a woman's voice but an electronic duplication and amplification of it. Therefore, it should be permissible to hear a woman singing over the radio, on television and even through a microphone (cf. Tzitz Eliezer 5:2:5). On the other hand, if the reason for the prohibition is that it might cause a man to have improper thoughts about the woman, then even a recording might be prohibited. Some limit this to occasions when the man knows what the female singer looks like (cf. Yabi'a Omer 1:Orach Chaim:6).

To some extent, the issue revolves around the reason behind the rule -- is it that a woman's singing voice is inherently prohibited or that hearing it might cause a man to have improper thoughts. If it is the former, then there is ample to room to be lenient because one is not technically hearing a woman's voice. If it is the latter, then there is room to be strict because an electronic replication of a woman's voice sounds the same as the real thing.

What if a man thinks he is hearing a woman's singing voice but really is not? This might be my own limitations but I can't see either side of the debate prohibiting it. The bottom line is that it is not a woman's voice. However, if a man has improper thoughts because of hearing the voice, then he should refrain from listening to it. This can be compared to watching an animated video of a woman improperly dressed (e.g. the Disney version of Aladdin). One is looking at a drawing and not a real woman. However, if a man has improper thoughts from looking at such a drawing then one is forbidden from watching it (heard in the name of R. Hershel Schachter). And, from what I understand, there are animated movies that are far less innocuous than Aladdin that are certainly forbidden.

I presume, perhaps incorrectly, that the same should apply to a man's singing voice that sounds like a woman's (and, according to one opinion above, an electronic transmition of a woman's singing voice). If a listener has improper thoughts then he is obligated to refrain from listening to it.

UPDATED: And what if a woman has a "sexual reassignment" operation or takes steroids and dresses like a man to the point of being unrecognizable as a woman, is it forbidden to listen to her sing? When I had such an issue (believe it or not), I thought that it would revolve around the above discussion. If the prohibition is based on a man having improper thoughts, then hearing such a woman would be permissible. But if it is based on a woman's singing voice being prohibited, then it would be forbidden. I asked someone in kollel, more to freak him out than any other reason, and he said that he thought it would be forbidden no matter what. Then I asked a talmid chakham and he said that he thought it would be permitted according to both views (I didn't have time to find out his reasoning). When I was faced with the case, I left the room as soon as I realized what was going on. But as I was leaving, I heard the voice and it sounded entirely like a man.

(As always, ask a competent rabbi before following anything you read on the internet.)

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Funeral and Shivah

The funeral for Rabbi Shalom Carmy's mother will be today at 1pm at Midwood Memorial -- Ave M & Coney Island Ave in Brooklyn.

Rabbi Carmy will be sitting Shivah at the address in the comments section.

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Moses and Injustice

R. Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Difference, p. 57:

Biblical morality, by contrast, is far more complex. It emphasizes the dual nature of our moral situation. On the one hand, we are members of the universal human family and thus of the (Noahide) covenant with all mankind. There are indeed moral universals - the sanctity of life, the dignity of the human person, the right to be free, to be no man's slave or the object of someone else's violence. The three vignettes of Moses' life before he becomes leader of the Israelites perfectly illustrate this. He intervenes, first to rescue an Israelite from an Egyptian; then an Israelite from a fellow Israelite; then the (non-Israelite) daughters of Jethro from (non-Israelite) shepherds who are preventing them from watering their flock. Moses recognizes the universal character of injustice and who is its victim.

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For Shame

For Shame

1. Kudos to the bishops for refusing to speak to the press about Rudy Giuliani's view on abortion (link). There's little upside -- pro-lifers know where he and the bishops stand -- and it will likely alienate marginal Catholics. And shame on the NY Times for trying to impute the bishops with nefarious motives, like waiting until the time is right to pounce or remaining silent because of tax concerns.

2. Germany blatantly discriminating against someone because of his religious views -- bad idea (link). I've got no love for Scientology or this actor, but this is just plain, old-fashioned discrimination. Shame on them.

3. Tzeni'us in Manila churches, le-havdil (link). The real shame is that it needs to be said.

(Yes, I'm staying away from Israeli politics. But I wrote it and deleted it three times until I conquered my desire to post about it.)

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Room for Innovation

The Gemara in Chullin (6b-7a) discusses King Chizkiyahu's praiseworthy actions in destroying the copper serpent that Moshe had made (in last week's parashah) because it had been worshipped as an idol. Asks the Gemara, how could Chizkiyahu have done that? The righteous kings Assa and Yehoshafat destroyed countless idols but did not destroy the serpent. Clearly, they felt that there was no need to destroy it. So how could Chizkiyahu contradict their conclusions and destroy it?

The Gemara answers that Chizkiyahu's predecessorshad left him an opportunity in which to assert himself. Rashi implies that they had done this intentionally, saying that if they don't leave him something like this then how will he become great? This is a very difficult approach. Commentators struggle with how these righteous kings could have neglected the obligation to destroy an idol in order to leave open the opportunity for a descendant.

Perhaps Rashi can be explained based on Radak's explanation (commentary to 2 Kings 18:4) of why Chizkiyahu destroyed the serpent. Radak explains that it wasn't until the generation prior to Chizkiyahu that people started to worship Moshe's serpent as an idol. This was not intended to contradict the Gemara because Radak quotes it in the flow of his comments. I would suggest that Radak understood the Gemara as asking why Assa and Yehoshafat did not see the potential danger in the serpent and therefore destroy it along with the idols. Rather, Chizkiyahu destroyed it once it became an actual idol. With this, Rashi's explanation of the answer is that they did see the potential change in circumstances but left it up to the leader of the future generation to rise to the occasion and solve the problem. That is the charge of each generation's leaders -- to become great by addressing the issues of the day.

(And perhaps Rebbe, in the other case in the Gemara, saw a change in circumstances -- the additional evidence of R. Meir -- and rose to the occasion and made a radical ruling based on it.)

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The Water-from-the-Rock Doublet

Stories of Moshe obtaining water from a rock appear twice in the Torah, in Exodus 17 and Numbers 21. In both stories he hits the rock, but in the second he was supposed to speak to it and was punished for hitting it. Is this a case of two versions of the same story coming from different sources, as some biblical critics have suggested? The following is from the standard Reform commentary on the Torah.

W. Gunther Plaut, The Torah: A Modern Commentary, p. 1155:

This is the second murmuring to take place at Meribah, the first being reported in Exod. 17:1-7, and in both instances water is miraculously provided from a rock. Bible critics have, therefore, suggested that we have here two version of the same story. However, such a conclusion is highly speculative. It is equally likely that a return to the old resting place, which had seen a popular upheaval many years before, evoked memories and frustrations and led to a renewed complaint against the leaders who seemed to keep Israel forever in the desert. In fact, the focus here is less on the discontent of the people and more on the failure of leadership...

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The Limits of Common-Sense

R. David Silverbeg (link -DOC):

We may suggest yet another basis for associating the story of Korach with the laws of the heifer by viewing Korach's uprising from a different perspective. Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik (Rabbi Abraham Besdin, "Reflections of the Rav," volume 1, chapter 13) describes Korach's revolt as "the common-sense rebellion against Torah authority." Rashi (Bemidbar 16:1), cites a passage from the Midrash describing how Korach ridiculed certain laws in an attempt to challenge Moshe's authority to interpret God's will. According to Rabbi Soloveitchik, "for the entire congregation is holy" expressed a conviction not of intrinsic equality of stature, but rather of intellectual equality. All those who stood at Sinai, Korach insisted, reserved the right to interpret the Torah received at Sinai.

We may perhaps understand the introduction of the red heifer in this context as God's response to Korach's theological revolution. In the Midrash and classic commentaries, the institution of para aduma constitutes the quintessential chok, a statute whose rationale eludes human comprehension...

Para aduma, then, perhaps signifies the limit of human comprehension with regard to divine law. As much as man is encouraged to explore, study, theorize and inquire, he must maintain an awareness of the inadequacy of the human intellect to fully comprehend divine wisdom. Korach's intelligence (see Rashi, beginning of Parashat Korach) prompted him to challenge Moshe's legal authority; he felt he could apply his own reasoning and intuition in determining God's will. The red heifer represents the fallacy of Korach's claim, and underscores the inherent limitation of man's intellectual capabilities.

UPDATE: Note that in this week's TorahWeb, R. Michael Rosensweig says a very similar idea (link).

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Rambam on Reward

The Rambam writes in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Teshuvah 8:1 (link): "The goodness reserved for the righteous is life in the World To Come." In other words, the reward for observing mitzvos is received in the World to Come. The standard commentators (e.g. Kesef Mishneh) explain that the Rambam is following the view of R. Ya'akov (the Tanna) who says "Sekhar mitzvah be-hai alma leika -- There is no reward for mitzvos in this world."

However, R. Shlomo Goren (Toras Ha-Mo'adim, ch. 5) points out that this is difficult because of what the Rambam writes at the beginning of the very next chapter (9:1):

Once it is known that a reward is given for fulfilling commandments and that the goodness which we will receive if we follow the way of God as mentioned in the Torah is life in the World to Come... then what is it that is written in throughout the Torah, that if one listens, one will receive such-and-such, and that if one doesn't listen such- and-such will happen to one, as well as all earthly matters such as plenty, famine, war, peace, monarchy, humility, living in Israel, exile, success, misfortune and other covenantal matters? All these matters were true and always will be. Whenever we fulfil the commandments of the Torah we will receive all good earthly matters, and whenever we transgress them, all the mentioned evils will befall us. Nevertheless, the goodness is not all that the reward for fulfilling commandments consists of, and the evils are not the entire punishment received by transgressors. This is how all matters are decided: The Holy One, Blessed Be He, gave us this Torah, which is a support of life, and anybody who does what is written in it and knows that everything contained in it is complete and correct, will merit life in the World To Come. He will merit [a portion] in proportion to the magnitude of his actions and to the extent of his knowledge. The Torah assures us that if we fulfil it with joy and pleasure and always act according to it, then all things such as illness, war, famine, et cetera, which could prevent us from doing so will be removed, and all things such as plenty, peace, richness, et cetera, which will aid us in fulfilling the Torah will be influenced to come our way so that we will not have to occupy ourselves all day in [obtaining] bodily needs, but that we will be free to sit all day, learn and gather knowledge and fulfil commandments, in order to merit life in the World To Come.

In other words, the main reward for observing mitzvos is in the World to Come but there is also reward in this world. R. Ya'akov could not have held that position, as can be seen from the following passage in Kiddush (39b):

Someone whose father told him to go up to a building and bring chicks, and went up, sent away the mother bird, took the chicks and on the way back fell and died... where is the good he is supposed to see?... R. Ya'akov saw this happen.

Someone was fulfilliing two commandments at the same time -- honoring one's parents and sending away a mother bird before taking the chicks, both of which explicitly promise in the Torah long life -- and the man died. R. Ya'akov explained this as being due to the Torah's rewards referring to the World to Come. If he held like the Rambam, that there is reward in this world to hepl us do more mitzvos but mainly in the World to Come, why didn't this person live longer so that he could do more mitzvos?

I think that rather than holding like R. Ya'akov, perhaps the Rambam follows a different view in that extended passage. Let's briefly review the entire passage in Kiddushin (39b).

- The Mishnah says: One who does a Mitzvah, God will bestow good to him and lengthen his days, and he will inherit the land.

- The Gemara (Rav Yehudah and Rav Shemarya) explains that this Mishnah is talking about someone who does one mitzvah that raises him above 50-50 mitzvos/ aveiros.

- A Baraisa is quoted as contradicting the Mishnah: Anyone whose merits outweigh his sins, God will do evil to him, he will be appear to be punished as someone that burned the entire Torah.

- Abaye answers: Mishnah refers to God making for someone a "good day" and a "bad day" (two explanations of this below).

- Rava answers: The Mishnah follows R. Ya'akov who says that reward for a Mitzvah cannot come in this world. Then comes the above story about R. Ya'akov.

Rashi explains Abaye as meaning that the Mishnah is talking only about the World to Come, i.e. the "good day" is a reward in the World to Come. Tosafos ask that, if so, Abaye is givingthe same answer as Rava/ R. Ya'akov. Yet the Gemara seems to differentiate between them. Therefore, Tosafos explain that "good day" refers to rewarding someone wicked in this world so he receives only punishment in the World to Come and "bad day" is punishing someone righteous in this world so he is rewarded in the World to Come.

Perhaps we can suggest that Rashi (within the view of Abaye) and the Rambam agree on the general mechanics of reward, if not on the reasons for them. The main reward for observance of mitzvos is in the World to Come, the "good day", but sometimes minor rewards are given in this world. Thus, according to Rashi, Abaye does not agree with R. Ya'akov, who holds that there is no reward at all in this world. But he does agree that reward is predominantly in the World to Come. And this view of Abaye seems to be the Rambam's view as well.

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Where Have All the Theologians Gone? II

In a prior post, I quoted an article that lamented the lack of young theologians. A reader directed me to Dr. David Shatz's eulogy for Dr. Marvin Fox in Tradition 36:1 (Spring 2002), in which he discusses this issue. He agrees with the above conclusion and suggests the following reasons:

• A more educated laity requires classes on the basic texts of Judaism (Talmud etc.) that take up more of a rabbi's time (for preparation) and leaves less time for theology/philosophy.


• Related to the preceding, philosphy does not draw crowds of laypeople because, among other reasons, it has a reputation for being irrelevant to religious life.
• Theology, rightly or wrongly, carries a suspicion of heresy.
• Potential writers are concerned about being publicly attacked as a heretic, often due to the attacker's lack of sophistication in this field.
• Most people are sadly satisfied with the views of religion and God that they learned in elementary school and have no interest in acquiring a deeper understanding.
• Philosophy is considered hard by many people, partly because people are not taught the subject in high school.

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Important VBM Information

Last week, the Virtual Beit Midrash experienced a serious computer crash, which resulted in the loss of our subscription lists. People must resubscribe to the shi'urim that interest them.

To subscribe to VBM (written) shi'urim, go to: http://www.vbm-torah.org/howto.htm

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As always, all shi'urim are free of charge.

Please pass this information on to your friends.

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Ashkenazic Chief Rabbis of Israel

R. Gershon Tannenbaum lists the Ashkenazic Chief Rabbis of Israel in his "My Machberes" column in this week's The Jewish Press (link):

Rabbi Avraham Isaac Kook, zt”l (1864-1935) Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem and prolific author, was appointed as Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of (then) Palestine in 1921 and served until 1935;

Rabbi Yitzchok HaLevi Herzog, zt”l (1889-1959) previous Chief Rabbi of Ireland and author of Heichal Yitzchak, was appointed as successor to Rabbi Kook in 1936 and served until 1959;

Rabbi Isser Yehuda Unterman, zt”l (1886-1976) Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, was appointed Chief Rabbi of Israel from 1964 to 1973;

Rabbi Shlomo Goren, zt”l (1917-1994) former Chief Rabbi of the Israeli Defense Forces, served as Chief Rabbi of Israel from 1973 to 1983;

Rabbi Avraham Elkanah Kahana Shapira (born 1917) Rosh Yeshiva Mercaz HaRav and author of Even Ha’Ezel, served as Chief Rabbi from 1983 to 1993;

Rabbi Yisroel Meir Lau (b. 1937) Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv served as Chief Rabbi of Israel from 1993 to 2003;

and Rabbi Yonah Metzger (b. 1953) Regional Rabbi of North Tel Aviv, was appointed as Chief Rabbi in 2003, and presently serves as the 7th Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel.

There is a three volume history of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel by R. Shmuel Katz: Ha-Rabanut Ha-Roshit Le-Yisrael: Shivim Shanah Le-Yisudah (Heikhal Shlomo, 2002).

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Providence and the Talmud

I've previously posted on the views of the Rambam and the Ramban, that hashgachah peratis -- individual providence -- is not necessarily extended to every person (link). One question that arise is how they understand many talmudic passages in the Talmud that indicate universal individual providence. One could suggest that there are multiple views within the Talmud and they follow the view that there is not universal individual providence. However, that is somewhat vague and a more specific analysis is certainly desirable.

Dr. Yaakov Elman has addressed this in his writings. Due to lack of time, let me just raise one specific passage and how Dr. Elman has explained it.

The Gemara in Chullin (7b) states the following:

R. Chanina said: No one bruises his finger below unless it was so decreed against him above, as it says "The steps of a man are ordered by God" (Ps. 27:23) and "How then can a man understand his own way?" (Prov. 20:24). R. Elazar said: The blood of a bruise atones like the blood of an olah sacrifice. Rava said: [Only the] right thumb and the second bruising, and only if it happened to someone who is on his way to do a mitzvah.

It seems from this passage that there is universal providence, because the only explanation for bruising one's finger is providence. What about someone who is not on the level of having universal providence? The Gemara seems to say that there is no such person.

The standard way of understanding Rava is that he is modifying R. Elazar's statement. The only time that a bruise atones like an olah is under all of those qualifications. I searched through many commentaries and that is the only explanation that I found. However, Dr. Elman offers another possible explanation ("The Contribution of Rabbinic Thought to a Theology of Misfortune" in Shalom Carmy ed., Jewish Perspectives on the Experience of Suffering, pp. 186-187). He suggests that Rava is modifying R. Chanina's statement. The only time that bruising one's finger must be decreed from above is when it is the right thumb, a second bruising, and when one is one the way to do a mitzvah. Otherwise, says Rava, there is no indication that it is an act of divine providence.

Thus, like later rishonim, Rava in this passage can also be limiting divine providence. Dr. Elman expands on this idea and particularly focuses on Rava's position throughout the Talmud.

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Wearing a Tallis in the Street

There is a fascinating book titled Eyes to See: Recovering Ethical Torah Principles Lost in the Holocaust by an elderly Torah scholar, R. Yom Tov Schwarz. R. Schwarz will forever be remembered as the man who wrote a harsh and bitingly personal criticism of R. Moshe Feinstein's responsa. I initially refused to even look at this latest book but the book was literally thrust into my hands and after a few months of it sitting around I gave in and looked at it.

But putting that aside, the book is a critique of today's Toah community. There is something in there for all cynics. I would characterize the book as a learned, text-based, eloquent, well-translated, book-long kvetch. There are enough things in the book that it will resonate with everyone, but so much that you find it hard to take it totally seriously.

For example, chapter 25 addresses the evil represented in the "new custom" of wearing a tallis in the street on Shabbos, on the way to and from synagogue. The author declared this to be a bad thing because it looks foolish to wear a big wool covering during the hot summer and it makes gentiles feel uncomfortable. It is arrogant and a lack of consideration for our gentile neighbors.

Nice thoughts but... come on! Somehow it's OK to walk around the streets looking like a long lost Blues Brother or an eighteenth century Polish nobleman but put on a prayer shawl on your way to shul and you're suddenly looking strange? Wearing a suit and a fur hat -- or any hat -- on a hot summer day looks much more foolish than wearing a prayer shawl on your way to synagogue.

Be nice to your neighbors -- and shovel the sidewalk when you can -- and they will have no problem with you observing your religion and wearing a prayer shawl on the way to synagogue.

There are real problems in our community, just like in every community, and R. Schwarz addresses many of the them in his book. But by focusing on minor issues we are making the entire process of self-critique look silly rather than the essential task it truly is.

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The Married Woman's Tzeni'us Dilemma

I had the good fortune this past Shabbos of hearing a rabbi give his pre-summer tzeni'us sermon. Basically, he lectured the men of his synagogue about how important it is that women should dress and act modestly. He urged the men to tell their wives not to wear tight-fitting clothing and strongly told the men not to become too friendly with women other than their wives. He went so far as to recommend that men refer to other women formally as Mrs. Cohen and the like rather than by their first names.

Let me be absolutely clear that I have no problem whatsoever with this aspect of his speech. I think he is absolutely correct and both men and women would be wise to follow his advice. Granted, I've never spent much time in a bungalow colony and can't pretend to understand the dynamics of what goes on there. But he seems worried and I give him credit for trying to encourage greater observance of high standards of modesty.

I've always wondered what in the world these women are thinking when they buy their clothes. Presumably they look into a mirror. Do they have even the slightest doubt that it is unacceptable to dress like that?

But then I was thinking about a woman's perspective to all this, as difficult as that is for me. It is true that there are halakhos about this subject and a woman is obligated to follow them. But what happens if a married woman is the only one in the neighborhood to follow them? What will her husband think? Presumably, he is a God-fearing man who only wants to do what is right and is happy that his wife thinks similarly. But if all of the other women in their community are dressed fashionably and, day in and day out, he sees women in the street looking their best and then comes home to a woman dressed like a comparative shlump, there is no way that it does not make an impact on him. What woman wants her husband to be noticing other men's wives? She wants her husband's eyes to be on her.

Unless she's one of these super-women who can compete with other women with her natural beauty and/or charm, and assuming she isn't deluding herself into thinking she has those traits when she doesn't (as I often suspect of people who give such inspirational speeches), she does not have many options. She can dress immodestly inside the house and change whenever she goes outside. But that seems like something impossible for any woman juggling young children and other chores. Otherwise, she's stuck in a dilemma.

I don't have an answer to this problem. All I can suggest is that the rest of us judge women who wear tight clothing a little more favorably. Perhaps they are not self-centered. Maybe they are just worried about their shalom bayis.

(Note that while the above should be absolutely clear, let me reiterate that I do not encourage women to dress immodestly. I encourage full observance with the spirit and laws of the Torah.)

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Brooklyn Eruv Debate II

The debate between R. Shmuel Pultman and R. Yair Hoffman discussed in this post was continued in last week's Five Towns Jewish Times (PDF, pp. 16-20). This time I'm not going to quote from the exchange. I leave it up to you to read it, if it interests you.

Let me just offer a few comments:

1. I think R. Pultman is a little unclear ona central so let me explain it in my own words. The Magen Avraham and Taz say that most rishonim are of the view that a reshus ha-rabim needs 600,000 people. The Mishkenos Ya'akov and Mishnah Berurah challenge those statements based on commentaries published from manuscript. If one accepts views newly found in manuscript then one must also utilize the more recently published views also, which leads one to the conclusion that the majority of rishonim require 600,000 people. If one rejects newly published manuscripts, as the Chazon Ish reportedly did, then one must return to the Magen Avraham's and Taz's original statements. Either way, the majority holds that we require 600,000 people. And R. Pultman proves that this is the majority, presumably based on the extensive research of the greatest baki of rabbinic literature, in the broadest sense of the term, of the twentieth century--R. Menachem Kasher. See Torah Shelemah, vol. 15 (Yisro chs. 18-19), addenda, no. 12. Additionally, as the Beis Ephraim (Orach Chaim 26) pointed out and R. Mordechai Willig (Am Mordechai on Shabbos, Kuntres Nachalas Ya'akov Avi 3:1) recently reiterated, the majority of Ashkenazic rishonim, by anyone's count, require 600,000.

2. R. Pultman repeatedly makes the claim that the rishonim and the Shulchan Arukh require 600,000 traverse a particular street. He deduces this from the language "shishim ribbo overim bo -- 600,000 traverse it". But who says that "bo" refers to a specific street? I think the simple explanation is that it refers to walking around in the street in general, anywhere in the city.

3. R. Pultman twice quotes Iggeros Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:90 as holding that a gap of ten amos is only de-rabbanan. I don't know. I don't really see that in the responsum because it could be discussing a case of a karmelis in which the requirement for an eruv is already de-rabbanan.

On another subject, The Yeshiva World quotes an article in the NY Times about a change in a Manhattan eruv. The TYW editor adds a note that Gedolim of the previous generation forbade any eruv in Manhattan. While he is correct that many Gedolim did, indeed, forbid any eruv in Manhattan, it should be noted that R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik's students (led by R. Norman Lamm) erected an eruv with his permission. As R. Adam Mintz has written (link), R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin approved in principle an eruv in Manhattan. This was confirmed to me by his grandson, R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, who added that his grandfather nevertheless instructed him not to carry in the eruv. Additionally, R. Menachem Kasher was very much involved in the eruv project. And, more recently, R. Hershel Schachter has approved eruvin in Manhattan (see, for example, the YU eruv). For more on R. Shachter's view, see his article "The Laws of Eruvin: An Overview" in The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society. And see R. Mordechai Willig's views in general in his above-mentioned kuntres.

UPDATE: See also here about the Manhattan eruv.

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It's the Parents' Fault

Dr. Benzion Sorotzkin takes a look at the "drop-out" phenomenon and names the parent-child relationship as the key element: link

Gutsy. Intuitive, if not obvious. Very non-PC. Especially this story, which I did not know:

Likewise, when a prominent frum periodical published a series of articles addressing the topic of teen dropouts, it published the viewpoints of all parties involved except those of the children themselves. At the encouragement of his former mashgiach, a young adult wrote a very moving and eloquent letter relating how the difficulties he had with his parents led him to abandon Yidishkeit. At first, the periodical rejected the letter. After some pressure was brought to bear on the editor, the letter was indeed published, but only in a censored and heavily edited manner, which portrayed the letter writer in a very negative and distorted light. In fact, the editor implied, based on virtually no evidence, that the writer had a serious problem with his perception of reality. It was a classical case of trying to deny the message by killing the messenger. When the young man's therapist wrote a letter of protest in order to set the record straight, the editor refused to publish the letter because of concern of "causing additional pain" to parents of rebellious children. Similar concern for the feelings of the unjustly maligned youngster was not expressed.

And this one won't win any sympathy from the right wing:

To the best of my knowledge, the rate of children rebelling against their parents' Torah standards among families with increased exposure to the media is no higher than in families that strictly insulate their homes from outside influences... It is very doubtful that exposure to the media, in itself, can make it worthwhile for children to abandon their parent's way of life.

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Berger v. Stern on Interfaith Dialogue II

Dr. David Berger is back from a trip to Israel and sent me the following to post:

Let me say first of all that I am very grateful for the supportive remarks by several commenters regarding my exchange with Rabbi Eliyahu Stern in The Jewish Week. Some question was raised regarding my observation that I had made an argument against Christian proselytizing in a paper delivered more than half-a-year ago at a meeting with Presbyterians. The question was whether or not this is consistent with my general posture of disapproval of telling Christians how to define their own faith. Let me add that because of both the venue and the theological content of the paper, which dealt with conversion and proselytizing in Judaism and Christianity, I asked R. Aharon Lichtenstein whether or not I should accept the invitation. In light of the possibility that this would help to discourage missionizing, he unequivocally encouraged me to go ahead. Here then is the relevant section of that paper.

As long ago as 1983, I expressed strong opposition to Jewish efforts to instruct Christians about what to believe regarding their own religion, and I have repeated this position on numerous subsequent occasions. I confessed, however, that with respect to missionizing, “even Jews who hesitate most about intervention in the internal affairs of Christianity have some mixed feelings.” I went on to say that “the Jewish mandate to protect Jews from conversion is no less a religious requirement than any Christian mandate to convert them, and, although my basic sympathies are with the ‘non-interventionists,’ in the case of aggressive missionizing aimed specifically at Jews, the overriding principle of pikkuah nefesh, or danger to life (including spiritual life), may well prevail.”[1] In short, if I could persuade a Christian uncertain of his or her position regarding mission to the Jews that proper Christian belief should affirm the possibility of salvation for unconverted Jews, I would try to do this.

Nonetheless, I do not regard honest advocates of proselytizing who adhere to the harshest position regarding Jewish salvation as evil in any sense. Thus, I take the position that someone who has declared war on me and my people is nonetheless a fine person whom I can embrace as a friend in other contexts. There is, of course, an emotional tension in this position, and I ask myself whether an argument for Jewish exceptionalism can be formulated that does not impinge on Christian doctrine. I think it possible that this question can be answered in the affirmative. Christians in the modern world, including those with exclusivist views of salvation, definitively reject coercive methods, whether physical or economic, to enforce conformity to Christian belief and practice, and they do this not only because such methods would be ineffective but because they abhor them in principle. This appears to mean that even saving another’s soul does not outweigh all competing considerations. One who refrains from religious coercion recognizes that the apparently transcendent benefit does not outweigh the harm done to the coercer’s moral personality, to that of his or her collective, or to civil society as a whole, not to speak of the immediate suffering of the presumed beneficiary.

In light of these considerations, we are now in a position to ask if there is any moral harm inflicted by non-coercive proselytizing. It can certainly damage, even poison, intergroup relations, and it renders respectful dialogue about religious matters next to impossible. These concerns apply to proselytizing directed at any group; the question is whether they are serious enough to set aside the salvific advantage of conversion to Christianity. At the very least, they may persuade Christians who believe that the other party’s salvation is not at stake to eschew active missionizing.

In dealing with Jews, the moral objections to conversionary efforts increase exponentially. First, even in an open society, there is a tinge of pressure, if not genuine coercion, when members of a majority religion carry out sustained campaigns to convince the minority to abandon its faith. Eighteen years ago, the New York Times published a letter in which I objected to their accepting advertisements from “Jews for Jesus” containing biblical prooftexts for Christian doctrines. Setting aside the well-known issue of the ethically objectionable misappropriation of Jewish symbols, the letter argued that publishing such religious polemic puts a Jewish respondent in an untenable position. Jews would either have to explain in a counter-ad why the verses in question cannot legitimately be understood christologically, which “would pollute the atmosphere of interfaith relations and create concrete dangers for the Jewish minority,” or they would have to remain silent, thus accepting “a quasi-medieval position of being bombarded by public attacks on their faith without opportunity for candid response.”[2]

Second, the history of Christian treatment of Jews is genuinely relevant to this moral calculus. The Jewish community reacts to missionary efforts by Christians through the prism of crusades, Inquisition, blood libels, accusations of host desecration and well poisoning, depictions of Jews as instruments of the devil, and assorted massacres. This reaction is not merely understandable; it is thoroughly legitimate. The Jewish people managed to survive these religiously motivated efforts to destroy it, but contemporary efforts to wipe it out by kinder means are tainted by this history. Like it or not, the Christian missionary to the Jews is continuing the work of Count Emicho, Vincent Ferrer, Torquemada, and Chmielnicki. “Jews for Jesus” can proclaim as loudly and as often as they wish that these persecutors of Jews were not Christians, but there is no avoiding the fact that they acted and were perceived as acting in the name of Christianity. Even if proselytizing other groups is appropriate, proselytizing Jews is arguably not.

Let me end more softly by returning to my anti-interventionist mode. In a contemporary context, it is a matter of the first importance to recognize that belief in eschatological verification is very different from mission. I have made this point in several essays, but it bears repetition here. Participants in dialogue often affirm that even the assertion that your faith will be vindicated at the end of days constitutes morally objectionable triumphalism. I regard this position as itself morally objectionable. Both Jews and Christians are entitled to believe that their respective religions are true in a deep and uncompromising sense, and that this truth will become evident to all the world in the fullness of time.

---

[1] “Jewish-Christian Relations: A Jewish Perspective,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 20 (1983): 17-18.
[2] “Jews for Jesus Ad Poses Painful Choices,” The New York Times, January 9, 1988, p. 26.

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The Rabbi as the Judge in Those Days

R. Yehuda Henkin, Bnei Banim, vol. 4 p. 32n.:

However, according to the Sefer Ha-Chinukh (495, 496), "Do not turn to the right or the left from the words they say to you" (Deut. 17:11) applies to the great Torah scholars [Gedolim] of every generation. The Chayei Adam (127:1) wrote similarly that something established by the geniuses [ge'onim] of our times... one is biblically prohibited from deviating as it says "Do not turn." However, the source for the words of the Sefer Ha-Chinukh are not clear and the views of the Rambam and Ramban is to the contrary. See what I wrote in Bnei Banim 2:23:5. The Ritva wrote in his novellae (Mossad Ha-Rav Kook edition, Shabbos 130a) in the name of the Ra'avad that "Do not turn" applies to every rabbi in his city. While his source is also unclear, it seems to me that his intention is not like the Sefer Ha-Chinukh but that nowadays, when it is impossible to to fulfill "And you shall arise and go up to the place..." (ibid.) then "Do not turn" applies to every rabbi in his city because he is "The judge there in those days" (ibid.). It does not apply to the great scholars of a generation, putting their rule over the entire world.

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Where Have All the Theologians Gone?

Elliot Cosgrove has a provocative article in the current issue of the Forward in which he asks where all of today's theologians are (link):

Name five contemporary Jewish theologians saying something interesting about Jewish belief who had not already published a major work by 1990.

Stumped? So am I.

Over the past few months, I have asked my theologically minded colleagues this question, and the responses have been disheartening...

With Borowitz and Gillman retiring from their teaching positions at, respectively, Hebrew Union College and the Jewish Theological Seminary, it is altogether troubling that there is no theological heir apparent at either institution. And last month’s passing of Mordechai Breuer serves to underscore the shortage of Orthodox thinkers who are fully engaged with the claims of modernity and critical scholarship.

Briefly, from the Modern Orthodox world -- R. Shalom Carmy, R. Chaim Eisen, Dr. Shalom Rosenberg, R. Yitzchak Blau and R. Meir Soloveichik, just to name a few. OK, Dr. Rosenberg may have published works before 1990, but I don't think a major work. The same with R. Carmy and R. Eisen. And if we are going to include R. Mordechai Breuer, then we should certainly also include R. Elchanan Samet and R. Yoel Bin-Nun.

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Homosexuality in Halakhah VI

In previous posts (I, II, III, IV, V), we discussed whether homosexuals are inculpable for sinful acts because they fall into the category of annusim, someone coerced into doing something, this time coerced by their strong, lifelong desires. I came across a fascinating responsum from R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, regarding enlisting in the army as a chaplain, in which he carefully delineates, with great lomdus, the distinction between piku'ach nefesh and ones. Here is one of the differences (Community, Covenant and Commitment, p. 36):

Secondly, there is another characteristic which is essential for the understanding of ones or coercion -- namely that the crime be perpetrated under the impact of immoral interference of another human being who suggested to the agent the sinful action. Maimonides sharply discriminated between natural necessity, which denotes the force of mechanical factors under whose influence human behavior is often determined, and coercion, which applies to an act under compulsion caused by one's fellow man. If one acts under [the] stress of cruel nature, although his act is necessary because he is too weak to fight against powerful, sometimes overwhelming, forces, he is, however, not considered to act under constraint, for his freedom of action is not completely canceled. The individual chooses what to do, how to act, and both the initiative and decision are his. Only immoral human intervention and an attempt to exercise dominion over another's will renders the act of the coerced person involuntary.

From the editor's introduction, it seems that this entire responsum was written in English, which is surprising given its complexity and that it was addressed to R. Shmuel Belkin.

As to R. Soloveitchik's conclusion, it is: "We may therefore, say that enlisting as a chaplain in the armed forces is permissible according to the Halakhah" (p. 56) and "[I]t is our duty to meet the challenge of the hour and see to provide the armed forces with as many chaplains as our quote requires" (p. 57).

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Da'as Balebatim

The saying goes, more or less, that "Da'as balebatim hefekh da'as Torah" -- the view of laypeople is the opposite of the Torah view. Is this really true? No, writes R. Hershel Schachter, in his humorous fashion (link):

Needless to say, all of these exaggerations are ridiculous. The Sema never meant to say that the sechel of baalei batim is always the opposite from sechel haTorah. A layman who is not familiar with the intricacies of physics or biology will often be mistaken if he will apply common sense to those disciplines; and the same is true of the self-contained discipline of Torah. But very often we will use common sense in establishing halacha! The Talmud tells us that by way of sevorah we can establish a din de’oaraisa!

I recently met a young talmid chochom who insisted that a certain halacha in Shulchan Aruch must be understood literally, as applying in all cases, even when it made no sense. I argued that it was self understood that one use his common sense, and only apply the halacha when it indeed did make sense. (I later checked the Iggros Moshe of Rav Moshe Feinstein and he wrote exactly the same in that particular instance). This young talmid chochom told me, no, we may not use common sense at all, and even though the halacha – as he misunderstood it – made no sense, he has “emunas chachomim.” I told him that this was a Christian concept (the principle of the infallibility of the posek). Our Torah speaks of the theoretical possibility of a par he’elem davar shel tzibbur, a korban brought in a situation where all seventy one members of the Sanhedrin paskened wrong. The torah tells us that on one occasion Moshe Rabbeinu was about to issue an incorrect psak, until he listened to his brother Aharon and corrected his position.

In our religion, are we not permitted, or better yet – obligated, to ask questions when we come across a halacha that makes no sense? Isn’t that what “lernin” is all about: to make sense out of the halacha! Our Torah is a Toras emes: it corresponds to reality, and does not contradict it!...

Yes, indeed, emunas chachomim is a very fundamental principle in our faith: we believe Hakadosh Baruch Hu will give divine assistance to an honest and deserving talmid chochom that he should be above his personal negios in issuing a psak; he will not have an agenda. But it doesn’t mean that we should believe in nonsense...

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Googling Someone

Are you allowed to uncover a person's private information by searching the internet?

Says R. Asher Meir, the Jewish Ethicist:

One area is the prohibition on idle gossip. The Torah teaches: "Don't go as a talebearer among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). Rashi's commentary explains that a talebearer (in Hebrew 'roche'l) is like a spy ('rogel') who goes from house to house hearing what gossip is told about someone and then spreading it about. The information is all known, but the forbidden talebearer puts it all in one place and disseminates it. Jewish law states that gratuitous gossip about personal details is forbidden even if the information itself is not derogatory, since people don't want to have all their private information made public. (1)

Another area is privacy among neighbors. The Talmud states that "Loss of privacy (literally, damage through seeing) is a kind of damage." (2) The consequence of this law is that neighbors can be compelled to pay for partitions to keep them from viewing a neighbor's courtyard. Even when the protected area is one that is visible to passers-by, the neighbor's ability to see is a greater invasion of privacy, since the neighbor sees constantly. (3)

These sources can be readily extrapolated to the case of web searches. In both cases, there is a distinction between casual and legitimate observation of public information, as in a aside in conversation or a person's activities viewed in passing by a stranger, and the forbidden practice of deliberate efforts to concentrate and disseminate information, for example by a habitual gossip or a neighbor who observes someone constantly.

In the case of web searches, it would be permissible to do a simple web search of someone's name, to see some of their most prominent activities. This is today's equivalent of a simple inquiry to a mutual friend, without deliberate prying into details beyond what is easily available...

However, this is different than making a concerted effort to uncover all available public information about somebody. For example, information garnered from a simple search could be used to identify other sites where information is posted but blocked from search engines, or to identify web aliases that a person uses to intentionally hide their identity in internet communications. This would be forbidden in the case of a private individual. But it is a legitimate and widely used practice to find information about a business, since a business must assume that competitors will seek any publicly available information and take responsibility for controlling such information.

I have to admit that I don't see his last point. It seems a bit farfetched to me to extrapolate from guarding the visual privacy in one's own home to protecting one's personal but public information.

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Israeli Real Estate Fair

There will be an Israeli real estate fair in New York and New Jersey early next week, June 17th-19th. More information available here. I don't quite know who profits from this, so I'm hesitant to endorse it. But it sounds sufficiently interesting to look into.

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Eulogy for Prof. Mordechai Breuer

Dr. Marc Shapiro writes a fascinating eulogy for Prof. Mordechai Breuer (the historian): link

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A Note on Nits

A Note on Nits

by R. Natan Slifkin

A well-known section of the Talmud brings the view that one is permitted to kill lice on Shabbos because they spontaneously generate:

Rabbi Eliezer said: One who kills a louse on Shabbos is like one who kills a camel on Shabbos (and has violated Shabbos)… Rav Yosef said: The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer in the case of lice, which do not reproduce…

Talmud, Shabbos 107b

The Rabbis believed that lice “do not reproduce” - that is to say, they do not hatch from eggs laid by other lice. The medieval and later authorities explain that lice are instead generated from sweat.[1] Accordingly, they are not considered to be life-forms like other animals and they may be killed on Shabbos. The Talmud proceeds to question this, based on a statement that seemingly acknowledges the fact that lice hatch from eggs:

Abaye said: And do lice not reproduce? Surely it was said, “God sits and sustains from the eggs of lice to the horns of re’emim (wild oxen)” (which shows that lice come from eggs)?

Ibid.

The Talmud responds that this statement should be understood differently and does not in fact mean that lice reproduce in the “eggs of lice”:

- That refers to a species which is called “eggs of lice.”

Ibid.

There are many questions and controversies surrounding this passage, which I dealt with in my book Mysterious Creatures and which I deal with at greater length in my forthcoming book Sacred Monsters. Here, I want to focus on one question: the strange nature of the last line of the Talmud cited above. As usually understood, it means that the Talmud is responding that the statement about God sustaining the “eggs of lice” does not actually refer to eggs of lice, but rather to a type of insect which is called “eggs of lice.” This seems extremely strange, to say the least! Why would an insect be called “eggs of lice”? Wouldn’t it be much more reasonable to assume that the phrase really does refer to eggs of lice? Furthermore, the beginning of that statement speaks of the God sustaining “the horns of re’emim,” which are appendages of an animal rather than a type of animal. Accordingly, the last part of the statement would also be describing the appendages of an animal rather than a type of animal. It thus seems very strange for the Talmud to claim that “eggs of lice” are a type of insect!

Another question that people have on this topic is that nits - lice eggs - are not all that tiny. Certainly they can be seen with the naked eye, albeit with some difficulty. Did people really not know about them?

The truth is that if we look at another section of the Talmud, we find an explicit discussion about nits. In a section relating to the law that a nazir may not have a haircut, the Talmud seeks to determine whether hair grows from the tip or from the root. One argument is based on the position of something called “inba” on a hair as it grows:

Does a hair grow from the root or from the tip? …Let us bring a proof from a live inba, which remains at the root of the hair [as it grows]; if you were to say that a hair grows from its root, then the inba should end up at the tip of the hair!

No, one could still say that it grows from the root, and because the inba is alive, it keeps moving down [as the hair grows].

Let us bring a proof from a dead inba, which is at the tip of a hair; if you were to say that a hair grows from its tip, then the inba should be at the root of the hair!

No, one could still say that it grows from the tip, and because the inba has no strength [to grip], it slides along it.

Talmud, Nazir 39a

This inba is clearly a nit, and we thus see that Sages of the Talmud had observed nits. So why did they state that lice spontaneously generate? And why did they redefine “eggs of lice” to refer to a species of insect?

In order to answer these questions, let us take a look at what people in the ancient world thought about lice. Aristotle has a fascinating discussion in which he makes it clear that he had seen nits, and he even knew that lice laid them. What he did not know was that lice also hatch from them. Rather, nits were thought to be merely the useless result of two spontaneously-generating lice mating with each other:

But whenever creatures are spontaneously generated, either in other animals, in the soil, or on plants, or in the parts of these, and when such are generated male and female, then from the copulation of such spontaneously generated males and females there is generated a something - a something never identical in shape with the parents, but a something imperfect. For instance, the issue of copulation in lice is nits; in flies, grubs; in fleas, grubs egg-like in shape; and from these issues the parent-species is never reproduced, nor is any animal produced at all, but the like nondescripts only.

Aristotle, History of Animals, Book V, Part 1

If this is how people thought of lice, then our questions are answered. Rashi states that the “eggs of lice” of tractate Shabbos are the inba of tractate Nazir.[2] Accordingly, when the Talmud explains that the statement, “God sits and sustains from the eggs of lice to the horns of re’emim” refers to a species called “eggs of lice,” it does not mean that there is a species of insect called “eggs of lice.” Rather, it is referring to nits - actual lice eggs. It is stating that they are a distinct entity, that are laid by lice, but not from which lice actually hatch. The Talmud is saying that they are called “eggs of lice” because they are egg-shaped organisms that are laid by lice - but they do not hatch into lice, and thus, according to the Talmud, it is still correct to state that lice spontaneously generate.

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[1] Ba’al Halachos Gedolos; Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 11:3; Rashba, Commentary to Shabbos 12a; Mishnah Berurah 316:38.
[2] Rashi to Avodah Zarah 3b, s.v. beitzei kinnim, and Rashi to Nazir 39a.

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World Jewish Congress

There's been a lot in the news lately about the troubles at the World Jewish Congress. Frankly, I just can't get worked up about the whole thing. What is the WJC? Does it actually do anything? I have no idea of anything it does that has any relevance to my life or my community.

I've got to believe that with all the big money and professional Jews, some of these organizations actually do something but I'm just not sure where they all fit into the picture. Someone with some knowledge about Jewish organizations please fill me in.

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On Expanding the Palace II

Continuing from this post, R. Aryeh Frimer has asked me to post his side of the story.

One side aspect of this issue is that previously this would all have transpired over the course of months or years in the pages of a journal. For some reason, and to my knowledge contrary to the journal BDD's policy, the authors have posted their articles online, one even prior to publication. I only posted about this most recent article (the response by Dr. Ross) after receiving it in a mass e-mail from a third party. The speed of scholarly debate has quickened and journals, certainly annuals, cannot keep up with it.

What follows is R. Frimer's response that he e-mailed to me. On the one hand, I am hesitant to post it because it seems clear to me that no reasonable individual would take seriously the accusations made against him and therefore it is better to just let the accusations be forgotten. However, since there are plenty of unreasonable people out there and I believe that those accused should be able to defend themselves, here it is. I ask that everyone read it charitably and assume the best about all parties involved.

Dear Gil,

On the recent responses to your blog regarding my review of Prof. Tamar Ross's book, I have been charged with acting in a scurrilous and reproachable manner. I believe I should set some of the record straight. Dr. Ross's ad hominum response is uncalled for and unjustified.

I ask you all to remember that I am a full time University Chemistry Professor with a lab of 10 active students, who also gives regular shiurim in shul. If several years ago I said that I didn't have time to go over the MS of Dr. Ross's book, then I really didn't. I never saw the original manuscript. However, last academic year I was on Sabbatical which gave me an opportunity to write about the things I wanted to - and that included reading Dr. Ross's impressive and erudite book over several months. Yes, I read it - several lengthy and critical sections repeatedly. The project was initiated by Prof. Cyril Domb who was then editor of BD"D. He gave me the Book and asked me to review it, which I happily accepted in great anticipation. I have committed 35 years of my life to studying various aspects of Women and Halakha in depth - and this was certainly worth my added efforts. But Prof. Domb specifically asked me to keep the review confidential until it was published. This commitment I kept, despite the fact that I specifically advised to the contrary. But the Editor's decision was final. Hence, I did not divulge to Prof. Ross that I was writing the review - though I made it clear that I was honestly interested in her writing and troubled by her theology.

I opened my piece with nothing but respectful praise for Dr. Ross and her scholarship - read that section again. Yes I am very critical of her theology and halakhic analysis and delineate why. I also document my positions extensively - kach Darki (that's my way), as anyone who reads any of my writings can testify. I never used the word apikorus or kefira - which others have put in my mouth. I turned to several respected colleagues around the globe who are Judaic scholars, philosophers or theologians to check whether my understanding of Dr. Ross's theology was correct - and they assured me that it was (but asked me to maintain their anonymity, for reasons of their own). But despite all this, I tried to be guarded and the most I was willing to say is that her theology is beyond what has normally considered acceptable in Traditional Orthodox circles over the past millenium.

A reviewer cannot possibly focus on everything in the volume, lest he end up writing a book himself. Yes, I believed the theological and halakhic issues to be pivotal and hence I dealt with them. If I erred on some of the minor points or in style, I ask the review be judged on its major thrust - which I believe to be correct. My conclusion that Dr. Ross has not bridged the gap between Orthodoxy and unabashed feminism is therefore, very painful for me personally, and for many others who still consider themselves Orthodox feminists.

Aryeh

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Berger v. Stern on Interfaith Dialogue

Dr. David Berger responds in this week's The Jewish Week to a challenge last week by R. Eliyahu Stern. The latter had advocated open theological dialogue with Christians, including demanding that certain of their beliefs be changed (link). Dr. Berger forcefully counters (link):

Does any serious person think that such transcendent chutzpah will benefit Jews? Some pro-Israel Evangelical Christians have expressed resentment even at Jewish objections to proselytizing. One can only imagine how traditional Christians would react if large numbers of Jews would tell them that it is their ethical obligation not merely to refrain from preaching the Gospel to Jews but to abandon their faith in the Second Coming altogether?...

Finally, as I indicated in the passage that aroused Rabbi Stern’s ire, Christians instructed by Jews to reject their confident affirmation of the Messiahship of Jesus may well be moved to turn to us with reciprocal demands. The fact that Jews have not persecuted Christians mitigates their right to do so, but I do not think that it eliminates it...

From every relevant perspective — intellectual, moral, religious and pragmatic — Rabbi Stern’s critique is misguided and dangerous. Jews must vigilantly protect their interests, but they do so most effectively through cautious, sober, respectful engagement combined with uncompromising adherence to the beliefs that define their faith.

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R. Ovadiah Yosef on Sages and Science

In a 1976 responsum (published in Yabi'a Omer, vol. 10, Yoreh De'ah 24) regarding a Brooklyn yeshiva rebbe who taught that the view of R. Avraham ben Ha-Rambam regarding the Sages and science, R. Yosef was extremely opposed to this view although he recommended retaining the rebbe but reaching out to him to convince him to change his views.

It was recently brought to my attention that a R. Moshe Levi in Israel wrote a book on the laws of Shabbos titled Menuchas Ahavah with the commentary Mei Menuchos. He discussed the issue of the Talmudic permission to kill lice on Shabbos because they do not reproduce (i.e. they generate spontaneously), explained that they do reproduce and the Sages were incorrect, but defended the ruling for a different reason. After his book was published, he was evidently challenged on this. In the third edition of his book (published in 1992), he wrote a long defense of his view and had his mentor, someone with whom I am not familiar but goes by the name Ne'ema"n S"t (I believe the last abbreviation stands for Sephardi Tahor [Pure Sephardi]), write a brief approbation to which R. Ovadiah Yosef signed his agreement. Below is the text. Click on it to enlarge it.

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Halakhic Measurements

A Simple Jews has posted a chart of halakhic measurements based on the Chazon Ish and R. Chaim Na'eh: link

Note that I have not verified the numbers.

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A New Siddur

The United Synagogue of Great Britain recently published a new siddur (link), with a new translation and commentary by Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. As has come to be expected of this rabbi of formidable talent, the translation and commentary is thoughtful and eloquent. What follows are some brief thoughts on the new (Nusach Askenaz) siddur.

- The binding is excellent. The book is lightweight and slightly smaller than most prayer books. I measure this to be 4 1/2 x 5 3/8. It has a green leather cover and two elegant cloth bookmarks attached to the binding.

- The Chief Rabbi’s introduction is excellent and I believe better than any other siddur introduction I’ve seen. I particularly appreciated the section on the patterns in prayer. Although I was hoping for a little more about the historical development of the prayer structure.

- The Chief Rabbi’s commentary is sparser than Artscroll’s but always intelligent and informative and inspirational. He makes a big deal about Franz Rosenzweig’s three principles of Judaism (creation, revelation and providence) and how they appear in the prayer service.

- The Hebrew typesetting is excellent. The page seems much less “busy” than the Artscroll page. It uses a bold sheva to identify a sheva na, which is much more easily identified by the eye than Artscroll’s horizontal line above the letter. It also identifies a kametz katan by elongating it, although that does nothing for me personally because I pray in Ashkenazic Hebrew. There is also a good deal of poetic typesetting of the prayers, which to me adds meaning to the prayers.

- They devised an interesting way to identify seasonally added prayers without copying Artscroll’s now-classic gray-shading method. The new way is arguably better. I found that particularly regarding Ha-Me’ir La-Aretz in Yom Tov morning birkhos keri’as Shema, something that always trips me up, this siddur does it better than Artscroll.

- The Hebrew text is almost entirely based on Dr. Seligmann Baer’s classic Siddur Avodas Yisrael (as was the 1890 “Singer Siddur”). This leads to a few nuanced differences, such as some additional degeshim kal(im) and u-vi-nimah kedoshah, kulam in Shacharis birkhos keri’as Shema (rather than the common u-vi-nimah, kedushah kulam - Baer attributes this change to R. Wolf Heidenheim). This could be viewed as an improvement over the anonymously created Artscroll vowelization. The De Sola Poole siddur’s Hebrew was put together by the famous scholar R. Chaim Dov Chavel (of Ramban fame), which gives me confidence in it. But I’m not sure who vowelized the Artscroll siddur and who approved it. Baer, at least, knew his grammar inside out. It could be argued that Baer and Heidenheim were somewhat overly enthusiastic with their conceptions of grammatical purity, but Baer’s siddur is long established as a classic so I’m perfectly comfortable using it.

- There are a few deviations from the Baer text that makes this siddur largely unusable by most people. Berikh shemeih, while the Torah is being taken out, was removed. Fine, that doesn’t really bother me. The Akedah and all of korbanos between Parashas Ha-Tamid and Eizehu Mekoman was removed (as explained in the footnote, this is according to the siddurim of R. Sa’adia Gaon and R. Amram Gaon). And the silent prayer(s) during the singing of the kohanim in duchenen was removed. I don’t know why they did it but that’s a deal-breaker for me.

- There are sections identified in the table of contents for Yom Yerushalayim and Yom Ha-Atzma’ut. These sections give instructions of the “some say Hallel” type. While I don’t, it’s nice to see the days acknowledged.

- The mi she-beirakh texts are unrecognizable to me, both the regular one(s) and the one for the State of Israel. I found the one for the royal family to be interesting.

- The siddur does not have the Torah readings for Yom Tov, which I found quite annoying on Shavuos. Although it does have the readings for Chol Ha-Mo’ed.

- There are only brief sections on the halakhos of praying, nothing remotely near what Artscroll has. That is unfortunate.

- The siddur does not have the entire book of Psalms appended to it, which I greatly appreciate. If I want a Tehillim, I’ll take one off the shelf.

- The English translation is simply excellent. Birnbaum and De Sola Poole use archaic English, with an abundance of “thee”s and “thou”s. Artscroll (and Metsudah) doesn’t but it usually translates word for word, often with somewhat awkward translations, and generally does not adjust for English sentence structure. R. Sacks translates word for word in an elegant but common English and generally changes the order of the wording when appropriate, to adjust for sentence structure in English.

For example, from Ashrei:

Artscroll Righteous is Hashem in all His ways and magnanimous in all His deeds. Hashem is close to all who call upon Him -- to all who call upon Him sincerely.

Sacks The Lord is righteous in all His ways, and kind in all he does. The Lord is close to all who call on Him, to all who call on Him in truth.

Note that in the first verse, Artscroll has “Righteous” before “Hashem”, using the Hebrew rather than English sentence structure. This is the norm in Artscroll. But then in the very next verse, it deviates from the Hebrew and uses English sentence structure. Notice also the use of “Hashem”, as if that is a translation into English or somehow less of an approximation of God’s name than “Lord”. And the word “magnanimous” is somewhat awkward. Here, R. Sacks is consistent, correct and more elegant. (Although, I have found a few occasions where he uses Hebrew sentence structure.)

- Here is part of the second blessing in the Shemoneh Esreh with a few translations:

Birnbaum Thou, O Lord, art mighty forever; thou revivest the dead; thou art powerful to save. (Thou causest the wind to blow and the rain to fall.) Thou sustainest the living with kindness and revivest the dead with great mercy; thou supportest all who fall, and healest the sick; thou settest the captives free, and keepest faith with those who sleep in the dust. Who is like thee, Lord of pwer? Who resembles thee, O King? Though bringest death and restorest life, and causest salvation to flourish.

De Sola Poole Lord who art mighty for all eternity, Thou revivest the dead. Thou art great in saving power, making the wind to blow and the rain to fall, sustaining the living in love. With great love Thou revivest the dead, Thou upholdest the falling, Thou healest the sick, Thou freest the bound, keeping faith with those who sleep in the dust. Who is like Thee, Lord of power! Who can be compared with Thee, King who sends death and gives life, and causes His saving power to flourish!

Artscroll You are eternally mighty, my Lord, the Resuscitator of the dead are You; abundantly able to save. |Who makes the wind blow and makes the rain fall.| He sustains the living with kindness, resuscitates the dead with abundant mercy, supports the fallen, heals the sick, releases the confined, and maintains His faith to those asleep in the dust. Who is like You, O Master of mighty deeds, and who is comparable to You, O King Who causes death and restores life and makes salvation sprout!

Sacks You are eternally mighty, Lord, You give life to the dead and have great power to save. |He makes the wind blow and the rain fall.| He sustains the living with lovingkindness, and with great compassion revives the dead. He supports the fallen, heals the sick, sets captives free, and keeps His faith with those who sleep in the dust. Who is like You, Master of might, and to whom can You be compared, O King who brings death and gives life, and makes salvation grow?

Overall, the Sacks siddur is something I am glad to have as a reference. I also occasionally like to switch siddurim because the different look helps me focus more on the words. So I have added the siddur to my rotation. But I don’t think that as it currently stands it is viable as a regular siddur for frequent use in America. This is even more true since there is presumably a Rav Soloveitchik siddur in the works similar to the recent machzor that will be based on the Artscroll (I have no inside information on this but I think I’m making a pretty safe guess).

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It Can't Be Worse Than Wikipedia

R. Shnayer Leiman expresses some serious reservations about the New Encyclopedia Judaica: link

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On Expanding the Palace

UPDATED:

In the latest issue of BDD, R. Aryeh Frimer published a very harsh review of Dr. Tamar Ross' book Expanding the Palace of the King – Orthodoxy and Feminism (link - PDF). (As a disclaimer, let me be clear that I offered comments on an early version of the article and am thanked in the acknowledgments.) Significantly, R. Frimer accused Dr. Ross of being a heretic, or at least of espousing heresy. A quote from an article by Ilana Saks that R. Frimer cites is helpful (link - DOC):

The ideas that the Torah that was revealed to only through Moshe and that it is unchanging clearly are not accepted by her. It is important to note that while Dr. Ross’ ideas clearly do not follow the normative view, she claims that there is precedence for her ideas in traditional sources.

Prof. Ross has now issued a harsh response to the critique (link - PDF).

Let me be clear. I didn't read the book under discussion and Dr. Ross' defense is so jargon-filled that I can't make heads or tails of most of it. However, if I understand section II.5 correctly, then I think Dr. Ross has confirmed R. Frimer's evaluation and only responded that it isn't so bad. On the prodding of commenters, I reread the section and believe that she is saying as follows: The Torah was initially given to an audience that lived in a male-dominated culture and therefore was written in that style. However, God was capable of including in the Torah all of the laws, hints, meanings, etc. that was necessary for eternity. That doesn't seem like heresy to me, even if I am uncomfortable with it.

Does anyone disagree with my interpretation of her clarification?

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Jewish Law and Coffee

Interesting post on the Harry Potter and Torah blog regarding the Torah's attitude to addiction to coffee (link). He points out that the posekim mention it and accommodate it without condemning it.

But see this post regarding R. Mordechai Willig's view of any kind of addiction.

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Graduation Presents

It's graduation time and here are some books that make excellent graduation gifts from friends, family members, synagogues and schools:

The Legacy of Maimonides: Religion, Reason and Community edited by Rabbi Yamin Levy and Rabbi Shalom Carmy	Between the Lines of the Bible by Rabbi Yitzchak Etshalom
Gray Matter volumes 1 & 2 by Rabbi Chaim Jachter	The Students' Guide through the Talmud by Rabbi Zevi Hirsch Chajes

Buy them at your local Jewish bookstore or online at Yashar's website or on Amazon.com.

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